State v. LeBlanc
This text of 578 So. 2d 1036 (State v. LeBlanc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE of Louisiana, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jude L. LeBLANC, Defendant-Appellant.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
*1037 Edward J. Marquet, Lafayette, for defendant-appellant.
J. Nathan Stansbury, Dist. Atty., Lafayette, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before STOKER, KNOLL, and KING, Judges.
KNOLL, Judge.
Defendant, Jude L. LeBlanc, was sentenced to 10 years at hard labor after entering a nolo contendere plea to theft of over five hundred dollars, by means of fraudulent conduct and misrepresentations, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:67. As part of the plea agreement, the State dismissed another criminal charge against defendant of theft of over five hundred dollars. Defendant appeals, relying on two assignments of error.
FACTS
When the trial court accepted defendant's nolo contendere plea, it ordered the police reports of defendant's criminal activity entered as part of the record. Therefore, we have more facts available than we normally do in cases involving no trial. Defendant's criminal charges stem from an oil field investment scheme which cost five victims at least $121,500. Between January 1986 and February 1988 defendant individually told his victims he was purchasing valves from oil field suppliers and selling them to oil companies, such as Exxon and Phillips, for large profits. Defendant told some victims he was selling the valves to oil companies for use overseas, with the help from an uncle working for an oil company in Africa. Each valve cost $5000, and the amount of guaranteed profit varied according to the number of valves each victim helped defendant purchase. To "insure" the investments defendant gave each victim a postdated personal check and a promissory note. Defendant promised the victims that they would receive a return on their investments in a few weeks.
Defendant did not repay the victims the money they invested nor any of the guaranteed profits. It was later learned that defendant wrote some of the personal checks in 1988 on a bank account which was closed in 1987. One of the victims, Charles D. Abshire, initially invested $20,000 with defendant; although he received a $7000 partial repayment, defendant still owed him the balance of his investment. After his arrest, defendant admitted to another victim, Thomas Newland, that he lied when he said that he had an uncle working with Exxon in Africa. Defendant's arrest occurred after his victims filed criminal charges for the theft of their money.
In March 1989 defendant entered a written plea of not guilty to the criminal charges. On April 20, 1990, defendant withdrew his earlier plea and entered a *1038 plea of nolo contendere. During his Boykinization, defendant refused to admit guilt for the criminal charge of theft of over five hundred dollars. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation report and made the police reports part of the record.
COMPLIANCE WITH LSA-C.CR.P. ART. 894.1
Defendant argues that the sentencing court failed to articulate the aggravating and mitigating factors in concluding that defendant deserved the statutorily maximum sentence.
It is not necessary for the sentencing court to articulate every criteria of LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 894.1; however, the record must reflect that the court adequately considered them in particularizing the sentence to the defendant. If there is an adequate factual basis for the sentence contained in the record, the sentencing court's failure to articulate every circumstance listed in Article 894.1 will not necessitate a remand for sentencing. State v. Cottingin, 476 So.2d 1184 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1985), appeal after remand, 496 So.2d 1379 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1986).
As stated in Cottingin, supra at 1186:
"There are two underlying purposes of the codal requirement that the sentencing court articulate the specific reasons based on particular facts and considerations for imposing a sentence. First, it ensures that the sentence is particularized to the defendant.... In addition, it aids the reviewing court in the determination of whether the sentence imposed is excessive by providing an actual indication of whether the sentencing court adequately considered the statutory guidelines." (citations omitted.)
In the case sub judice, the presentence investigation report and police reports establish that defendant has a lengthy criminal record involving theft and issuing worthless checks. These reports indicate that defendant has been involved in other schemes to defraud individuals; in Vermilion Parish alone, defendant, a former employee of an oil field supply company, has civil judgments against him which total in excess of $500,000.
Prior to these criminal charges, defendant had two felony theft convictions for which he received suspended sentences and supervised probation on the condition that he would make restitution. At the time of his sentencing in the present case, defendant was delinquent on his payments for restitution on these prior convictions.
The presentence investigation report presents limited mitigating factors. Soon after sentencing, defendant's wife was expecting the birth of their first child. In the sentencing colloquy, the sentencing court stated that it reviewed the mitigating factors but found nevertheless that a severe sentence was appropriate.
Even though the sentencing court's reasons for sentencing defendant are minimal, we find that the record presented more than adequate factual basis for the ten year sentence, and shows that the sentencing court considered the factors of LSA-C. Cr.P. Art. 894.1.
This assignment of error is without merit.
EXCESSIVENESS OF SENTENCE
Defendant next contends that the imposition of a 10 year sentence constitutes an excessive sentence prohibited by the state and federal constitutions.
The defendant's sentence of ten years at hard labor is the maximum term of imprisonment for theft of over five hundred dollars. LSA-R.S. 14:67 B(1). The imposition of an excessive sentence is prohibited by both the state and federal constitutions. La. Const. Art. 1, Section 20, and U.S. Const.Amendment 8. The imposition of a sentence, although within the statutory limits, may violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). Generally, a sentence is considered excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, or is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered *1039 grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it is so disproportionate as to shock our sense of justice. State v. Reed, 409 So.2d 266 (La. 1982).
The trial court's reasons in imposing a sentence, as required by LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 894.1, are an important aid to this court when called upon to exercise its constitutional function to review a sentence complained of as excessive. State v. Cann, 471 So.2d 701 (La.1985). The sentencing court is given a wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed by it should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of this discretion. State v. Cann, supra.
In its imposition of sentence, the sentencing court remarked, "It appears to me ... that what we are dealing with here is a career criminal. Pure and simple.
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578 So. 2d 1036, 1991 WL 57873, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-leblanc-lactapp-1991.