State v. Laughbaum

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 14, 2026
• Docket: 25-COA-028
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Laughbaum, 2026-Ohio-1783.]

IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO Case No. 25-COA-028

Plaintiff – Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 24-CRI-066

STEPHEN LAUGHBAUM Judgment: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry:May 14, 2026

Defendant - Appellant

BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin, Kevin W. Popham, and David M. Gormley, Judges

APPEARANCES: Christopher Tunnell (Prosecuting Attorney), James B. Reese, III (Assistant Prosecuting Attorney), for Plaintiff-Appellee; Christopher C. Bazeley, for Defendant-Appellant

OPINION

Popham, J.,

{¶1} Appellant Stephen Laughbaum (“Laughbaum”) appeals his conviction and

sentence following a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas for Ashland County, Ohio.

For the reasons below, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On February 9, 2024, Laughbaum was indicted on one count of having

weapons while under disability, in violation of R.C. 2923.13, a third-degree felony, and

one count of aggravated possession of drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a fifth-degree

felony. {¶3} These charges stem from events occurring on April 3, 2022, on which

Ashland County Sheriff’s deputies responded to a trespassing complaint at a rental

property owned by Laughbaum’s mother. Upon arrival, deputies encountered

Laughbaum and determined he had an active arrest warrant from Summit County, Ohio.

A pat-down search incident to arrest yielded, in Laughbaum’s left jeans pocket, a clear

container holding a crystalline powder. Following his removal from the scene, deputies

conducted a consent search of the property and discovered a 9mm handgun concealed in

a heating vent. Subsequent testing confirmed the substance recovered from Laughbaum

was dimethyltryptamine (DMT), a Schedule I controlled substance.

{¶4} On April 15, 2024, the case proceeded to arraignment. (Magistrate’s Order,

Apr. 15, 2024.)1 During arraignment, Laughbaum was unresponsive to both the trial court

and counsel. (Initial Appearance Tr. 3-4.) In response, and at the State’s request, the trial

court read the indictment into the record and entered not guilty pleas on Laughbaum’s

behalf. (Id. at 4-7.) Given the circumstances, the court ordered a competency evaluation

and stayed the proceedings. (Id. at 4, 7; Judgment Entry, Apr. 18, 2024.)

{¶5} Following a May 4, 2024, competency hearing, the trial court determined

that Laughbaum was competent to stand trial. (Judgment Entry, July 11, 2024.)

{¶6} With the matter returned to active status, on July 23, 2024, counsel for

Laughbaum moved to withdraw. On July 25, 2024, the trial court granted the motion,

while noting that the previously scheduled August 13, 2024, trial date remained in place.

That same day - July 23, 2024 - newly appointed counsel entered an appearance, moved

1 We note a discrepancy in the record. The transcript of Laughbaum’s initial appearance lists April

17, 2024, as the date for Laughbaum’s initial appearance, while the Magistrate’s Order lists April 15, 2024. for a trial continuance, and filed a demand for discovery. The trial court granted the

continuance and reset the trial for November 12, 2024. (Judgment Entry, July 29, 2024.)

{¶7} As the rescheduled trial date approached, the court again continued the

matter. Specifically, by entry filed November 8, 2024, the trial court reset trial for January

28, 2025.

{¶8} The proceedings were further delayed when, on December 10, 2024, the

trial court granted a second motion for counsel to withdraw and appointed new counsel

to represent Laughbaum. The trial court tolled the time for trial [“speedy trial”] (R.C.

2945.71) pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(H).

{¶9} On January 14, 2025, newly appointed counsel moved to continue the

January 28th trial date and filed a motion for a bill of particulars and a demand for

discovery. The trial court granted the continuance, rescheduled trial for May 6, 2025, and

again tolled speedy trial time pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(H).

{¶10} On April 29, 2025, defense counsel moved to continue the trial and

requested a change of plea hearing. The trial court scheduled the matter for a plea hearing,

granted a continuance as necessary, and again tolled speedy trial time during the

pendency of the proceedings, citing R.C. 2945.72(H).

{¶11} The change of plea hearing “did not proceed as scheduled”, and the trial

court set a new trial date of July 1, 2025. (Judgment Entry, May 16, 2025). The trial court

again tolled time. See R.C. 2945.72(H).

{¶12} On June 30, 2025, the trial court continued the July 1, 2025, trial date -

citing an older, previously scheduled criminal case set to go forward on July 1st. The trial

court set July 22, 2025, as the new trial date and once again tolled the speedy trial time

in Laughbaum’s case, citing R.C. 2945.72(H). (Judgment Entry, June 30, 2025). {¶13} The State subsequently sought a continuance of the July 22, 2025 trial date

due to the unavailability of a witness. In a July 16, 2025 entry, the trial court addressed

the procedural history and applicable speedy trial provisions under R.C. 2945.71 and R.C.

2945.72. The court found that the witness’s unavailability constituted reasonable grounds

for a continuance, citing State v. Saffell, 35 Ohio St.3d 90 (1998), and further noted a

scheduling conflict with an older case. The trial court granted the continuance and tolled

speedy trial time.

{¶14} Ultimately, the matter proceeded to trial on September 2, 2025. The jury

trial concluded on September 3, 2025, with the jury returning a verdict of not guilty on

the charge of having weapons while under disability and guilty on the charge of

aggravated possession of drugs.

Assignments of Error

{¶15} Laughbaum raises two assignments of error for our consideration:

{¶16} “I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED LAUGHBAUM’S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY

TRIAL UNDER THE U.S. AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS BY ALLOWING THIS CASE TO

REMAIN PENDING FOR 507 DAYS.”

{¶17} “II. LAUGHBAUM’S CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED POSSESSION OF

DRUGS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”

I.

{¶18} In his first assignment of error, Laughbaum asserts that the trial court

violated his right to a speedy trial. We disagree.

Governing Law

{¶19} The right to a speedy trial is secured by the Sixth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution. State v. MacDonald, 48 Ohio St.2d 66, 68 (1976). The availability of a speedy trial to a person

accused of a crime is a fundamental right made obligatory on the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Ladd, 56 Ohio St.2d 197, 200 (1978).

{¶20} To determine whether there has been a denial of a defendant’s

constitutional right to a speedy trial, the court considers four factors identified in Barker

v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972): “(1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the

defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.”

State v. Hull, 2006-Ohio-4252, ¶ 22, citing Barker at 530. No single factor controls the

analysis, but the length of the delay is important. Post-accusation delay approaching one

year is generally found to be presumptively prejudicial. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S.

647, 652 (1992), at fn. 1; State v. Phelps, 2022-Ohio-3025, ¶ 37 (5th Dist.).

{¶21} In Doggett, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that a finding that the delay

is presumptively prejudicial merely triggers the Barker balancing test. Id.

Statutory Framework

{¶22} Ohio has codified the right to a speedy trial in R.C. 2945.71 et seq., which

imposes mandatory time limits within which an accused must be brought to trial. “The

statutory speedy trial provisions, R.C. 2945.71 et seq., constitute a rational effort to

enforce the constitutional right to a public speedy trial of an accused charged with the

commission of a felony or a misdemeanor and shall be strictly enforced by the courts of

this state.” State v. Pachay, 64 Ohio St.2d 218 (1980), syllabus; State v. Hughes, 86 Ohio

St.3d 424, 427 (1999). At the same time, the General Assembly has prescribed specific

and exclusive tolling events in R.C. 2945.72. Those provisions likewise govern the analysis

and must be applied as written. State v. Ramey, 2012-Ohio-2904, ¶ 24. In addition to

meticulously delineating the tolling events, the General Assembly jealously guarded its judgment as to the reasonableness of delay by providing that time in which to bring an accused to trial “may

be extended only by” the events enumerated in R.C. 2945.72(A) through (I). See, e.g., State v.

Singer, 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 109 (1977). “These extensions are to be strictly construed, and not

liberalized in favor of the state.” Id. The enumerated extensions include competency

evaluations, defense motions, and reasonable continuances. R.C. 2945.72(B), (E), (H).

{¶23} A felony defendant must be brought to trial within 270 days of arrest,

subject to the triple-count provision when the defendant is held in jail in lieu of bail. R.C.

2945.71(C)(2)/(E). The clock begins to run on the day after arrest or service of summons.

State v. Szorady, 2003-Ohio-2716, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.).

{¶24} A defendant bears the initial burden to demonstrate that the statutory time

has expired. If met, the burden shifts to the State to establish that sufficient time was

tolled. State v. Butcher, 27 Ohio St.3d 28, 30-31 (1986).

{¶25} We review speedy-trial claims under a mixed standard. We defer to the trial

court’s factual findings if supported by competent, credible evidence, but we

independently review the legal application of the statute. State v. Larkin, 2005-Ohio-

3122, ¶ 11 (5th Dist.).

Analysis

{¶26} The dispositive question is whether more than 270 days, or 90 days under

the triple count provision, as calculated under R.C. 2945.71 and 2945.72, elapsed before

trial. The record confirms that they did not.

{¶27} Laughbaum was indicted on February 9, 2024. A bond hearing took place

in the Court of Common Pleas for Ashland County, Ohio on April 15, 2024, and

Laughbaum’s initial appearance was scheduled for April 17, 2024. (Bond Recommendation, April 15, 2025). Therefore, Laughbaum’s speedy trial clock began to

run on April 15, 2024.

{¶28} On April 18, 2024, the trial court ordered a competency evaluation after

Laughbaum refused to respond to the court and counsel at his initial appearance. Such an

order tolls the speedy-trial period. R.C. 2945.72(B); State v. Palmer, 84 Ohio St.3d 103,

106 (1998). Laughbaum does not challenge the trial court’s order for a competency

determination, and the record amply supports it. See State v. Prim, 134 Ohio App.3d 142,

156-157 (8th Dist. 1999).

{¶29} Therefore, the time period from the bond hearing on April 15, 2024, through

April 18, 2024 - the date of the competency order – (4 days) is chargeable to the state.

Because Laughbaum was incarcerated, those days count as 12 days under the triple-count

provision. R.C. 2945.71(E).

{¶30} The period of time from the April 18, 2024, order that a competency

evaluation take place, to July 11, 2024, the date on which Laughbaum was found to be

competent to stand trial, is tolled and is not chargeable to the State.

{¶31} Once competency was restored, only 12 days elapsed before defense counsel

moved for a continuance on July 23, 2024. Because Laughbaum was incarcerated, those

days count as 36 days under the triple-count provision, chargeable to the State. R.C.

2945.71(E). Thus, a total of 48 days is chargeable to the State2.

{¶32} As noted below, every delay following July 23, 2024, falls squarely within

the tolling provisions of R.C. 2945.72.

2 12 days + 36 days = 48 days. {¶33} Laughbaum’s July 23, 2024, motion to continue tolled time until November

8, 2024. His January 14, 2025, motion to continue likewise tolled time through April 28,

2025. His April 29, 2025, request to continue the trial for a change-of-plea hearing tolled

time through June 30, 2025 – at which time the trial court again continued trial. Delays

attributable to the defense are chargeable to the defense. R.C. 2945.72(H).

{¶34} The trial court’s continuances are equally proper in tolling the speedy trial

provisions. The November 8, 2024 continuance, necessitated by a conflicting criminal

trial, was journalized before expiration of the statutory period, identified the basis for the

delay, and reflected a reasonable need. Such continuances are permissible. State v. Lee,

48 Ohio St.2d 208 (1976); State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 9 (1982). The same is true of

the court’s continuance from July 1 to July 14, 2025, when the State filed its motion for

continuance.

{¶35} Finally, the continuance from July 22 to September 2, 2025, granted upon

the State’s July 14, 2025, motion to continue - due to the unavailability of a necessary

witness - was reasonable and supported by the record. See State v. Saffell, 35 Ohio St.3d

90 (1988). This delay is likewise tolled under R.C. 2945.72(H).

{¶36} At no point did the trial court permit time to run beyond the statutory limit

without a valid tolling event. Nor does the record reveal any improperly attributed delay.

{¶37} In applying the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, we first observe that

the 507-day delay before trial is presumptively prejudicial. However, this threshold

finding merely triggers further analysis and does not, standing alone, establish a violation

of the right to a speedy trial. {¶38} Turning to the reasons for the delay, the record demonstrates that the vast

majority of the delay is attributable to Laughbaum’s own motions. State v. Phelps, 2022-

Ohio-3025, ¶ 38 (5th Dist.). This factor weighs heavily against him.

{¶39} Equally significant, Laughbaum never asserted his right to a speedy trial.

The failure to assert that right weighs against a defendant in the Barker analysis and

reflects a diminished claim of constitutional deprivation.

{¶40} With respect to prejudice, Laughbaum advances no specific argument

demonstrating actual prejudice resulting from the delay. Even assuming, arguendo, that

some prejudice could be inferred, the State has articulated legitimate and justifiable

reasons for the delay that outweigh any such prejudice.

{¶41} Finally, the record contains no indication that the delay resulted from bad

faith, harassment, or an attempt by the State to gain a tactical advantage. Nor does

Laughbaum make such a claim. See State v. Jenkins, 2010-Ohio-2719, ¶ 54 (5th Dist.).

{¶42} Balancing all four Barker factors, we conclude that Laughbaum’s

constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated.

Calculation and Disposition

{¶43} The time chargeable to the State is 48 days. All remaining time is tolled

pursuant to R.C. 2945.72.

{¶44} A summary of our time calculation is as follows:

Date Range Reason Tolled Chargeable Total

Apr. 15 - 18, 2024 No 4 days (Tripled) 12

Apr. 19 - Jul. 10 Competency Yes 0

Jul. 11 - 22 No 12 days (Tripled) 36

Jul. 23 - Nov. 7 Def. Mot Cont. Yes 0 Nov. 8 - Dec. 9 Court Cont. Yes 0

Dec. 10 - Jan. 13 New Counsel Yes 0

Jan. 14 - Apr. 28 Def. Mot. Cont. Yes 0

Apr. 29 - May 15 Change Plea Yes 0

May 16 – Jun. 29 Court Cont. Yes 0

Jun. 30 – Jul. 13 Court Cont. Yes 0

Jul. 14 - Sep. 1 State Mot. Cont. Yes 0

{¶45} Because the total time chargeable to the State - 48 days - falls well below the

270-day limit, and the 90-day limit under the triple count provision, Laughbaum has

failed to establish a prima facie violation of his speedy-trial rights.

{¶46} Laughbaum’s first assignment of error is overruled.

II.

{¶47} Laughbaum asserts that the trial court erred by admitting the drugs

recovered from his person because the State allegedly did not establish a proper chain of

custody. He claims, therefore, that his conviction for aggravated possession of drugs is

against the manifest weight of the evidence because at trial proper chain of custody for

the drugs was not established.

Standard of Review

{¶48} Manifest-weight review examines whether the greater amount of credible

evidence supports one side over the other. Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19;

State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). In conducting this review, an

appellate court functions as a “thirteenth juror,” weighing all evidence and reasonable

inferences, and evaluating witness credibility to determine whether the jury clearly lost its way, creating a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800, ¶

17; Thompkins at 387.

{¶49} Because the jury observes witnesses firsthand, its credibility determinations

are entitled to substantial deference. Eastley at ¶ 21; Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10

Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). Reversal is warranted only in the exceptional case in which the

evidence weighs heavily against conviction, and all three judges on the panel must concur.

Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 3(B)(3); Thompkins at 387.

{¶50} Laughbaum contends that the State failed to account for the handling of the

narcotics before Detective Temple transported the evidence to the Ohio Bureau of

Criminal Investigation (“BCI”), and that multiple individuals allegedly had access to the

drugs while in storage, creating an impermissible break in the chain of custody.

(Appellant’s Brief at 9-10.)

{¶51} The State presented credible testimony establishing an unbroken chain of

custody. Detective Temple conducted the pat-down search and recovered the suspected

narcotics directly from Laughbaum’s pocket. This encounter was captured on a body-

worn camera, providing clear contemporaneous documentation. (Tr. at 41-45, 94-95;

State’s Exh. 1.) Detective Dudte then transported the evidence to BCI, where forensic

scientist Shervonne Bufford received the sample on April 5, 2022. Bufford testified that

the evidence showed no signs of tampering, and that testing would not have been

performed if tampering had occurred. (Tr. at 53, 117-118.) Laboratory analysis confirmed

that the substance contained .11 grams of dimethyltryptamine (DMT), a Schedule I

controlled substance. (Tr. at 112-116; State’s Exh. 4.) {¶52} Ohio law is clear that any alleged break in the chain of custody affects the

weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. State v. Bazler, 2018-Ohio-5306, ¶ 11 (5th

Dist.). It is the jury’s province to weigh the credibility of evidence and determine whether

any irregularities diminish its persuasive value. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230

(1967), paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Ramos, 2019-Ohio-3588, ¶ 25 (2d Dist.);

State v. Maranger, 2018-Ohio-1425, ¶ 74 (2d Dist.).

{¶53} Here, the jury heard the testimony, observed the body-camera recording,

and was fully empowered to evaluate the credibility of the evidence. It could reasonably

conclude that the chain of custody was intact. The jury is entitled to accept all, part, or

none of the testimony and to resolve conflicts in the evidence. State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St.

61, 67 (1964). Minor inconsistencies in how the drugs were handled do not render the

evidence incredible or create a manifest miscarriage of justice. See State v. Craig, 2000

Ohio App. LEXIS 1138, *10 (10th Dist. Mar. 23, 2000).

Conclusion

{¶54} In light of the unchallenged, competent evidence presented at trial,

Laughbaum’s arguments regarding chain of custody are unpersuasive. The trial court

properly admitted the drugs, and the jury, acting within its fact-finding role, reasonably

credited the evidence. After reviewing the record in its entirety, we find no indication that

the jury lost its way or that the conviction represents a manifest miscarriage of justice.

{¶55} The second assignment of error is overruled. {¶56} For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the judgment of the Ashland County Court

of Common Pleas is affirmed.

{¶57} Costs to be paid by Appellant Stephen Laughbaum.

By: Popham, J.

Baldwin, P.J. and

Gormley, J., concur