State v. Larson

419 N.W.2d 897, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 60, 1988 WL 14250
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 25, 1988
Docket870225
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 419 N.W.2d 897 (State v. Larson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Larson, 419 N.W.2d 897, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 60, 1988 WL 14250 (N.D. 1988).

Opinion

LEVINE, Justice.

Reuben Larson appeals from a county court judgment of conviction for violating NDCC § 39-06-42 (driving while driver’s license is suspended or revoked.) We affirm.

Larson first argues that NDCC § 39-06-01, which requires motor vehicle operators to be licensed, is a “grant of a title of nobility” and unconstitutional under the United States Constitution and the North Dakota Constitution. We have summarily rejected “title of nobility” arguments in both City of Bismarck v. Vetter, 417 N.W.2d 186 (N.D.1987) and State v. Weldon, 422 N.W.2d 98 (N.D.1988). We hope to put to final rest continuing resort to similar arguments.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “title” as “... in the law of persons ... a name denoting the social rank of the person bearing it,” and defines “nobility” as “[i]n English law, a division of the people, comprehending dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts, and barons.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1331, 944 (5th ed. 1979). A driver’s license has no connection with social rank and bestows nothing more than the authority to operate a motor vehicle. We hold that a driver’s license is not a grant of a title of nobility.

Larson also argues that NDCC § 39-19-01 (state highway commissioner may enter agreements with other states concerning reciprocity in highway-related matters) is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to an administrative officer and that the Nonresident Violator Compact is an invalid exercise of the state highway commissioner’s authority.

In State v. Mehlhoff, 318 N.W.2d 314 (N.D.1982), we held that the validity of a driver’s license suspension may not be collaterally attacked at a trial for driving under suspension (DUS). We concluded that the proper time to challenge the validity of a driver’s license suspension is at a hearing on the suspension. In this case, as in Mehlhoff, Larson elected not to challenge the validity of the suspension of his license at a hearing on the suspension. Instead, he mounts a collateral attack on the suspension in this DUS proceeding. We decline to consider Larson’s constitutional attacks because they are untimely. State v. Mehlhoff, supra.

The judgment is affirmed.

ERICKSTAD, C.J., and MESCHKE, VANDE WALLE and GIERKE, JJ., concur.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
419 N.W.2d 897, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 60, 1988 WL 14250, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-larson-nd-1988.