#29135-a-SRJ 2021 S.D. 36
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
**** STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
JUSTIN DUANE LANGEN, Defendant and Appellant.
****
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
THE HONORABLE JON SOGN Judge
JASON R. RAVNSBORG Attorney General
SARAH L. THORNE Assistant Attorney General Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.
CHRISTOPHER MILES of Minnehaha County Public Defender’s Office Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorney for defendant and appellant.
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS APRIL 20, 2020 REASSIGNED FEBRUARY 19, 2021 OPINION FILED 06/16/21 #29135
JENSEN, Chief Justice (on reassignment).
[¶1.] Justin Langen was convicted of possession of a controlled substance
and several misdemeanor offenses. He appeals, arguing the circuit court erred by
denying his motion to dismiss for a violation of the 180-day speedy trial rule. We
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2.] On June 10, 2018, Langen was arrested following a traffic stop in
Minnehaha County. During the stop, he was uncooperative and provided law
enforcement with false information. Law enforcement also found
methamphetamine in his vehicle. In her report, the arresting officer noted that
Aurora County had an outstanding warrant for Langen’s arrest due to a probation
violation.
[¶3.] The next day, the Minnehaha County State’s Attorney’s Office filed a
seven-count complaint against Langen. An initial appearance was held on the same
day. 1 The court scheduled a preliminary hearing for July 24, 2018, and appointed a
public defender (PD) from the Public Defender’s Office (PDO) as Langen’s attorney.
The State recommended that Langen be released on a personal recognizance bond
but requested a bond condition requiring Langen to appear for urinalysis (UA) at
1. The complaint charged Langen with: count 1-possession of a controlled substance in violation of SDCL 22-42-5 (methamphetamine); count 2- obstructing a law enforcement officer or jailer in violation of SDCL 22-11-6; count 3-resisting arrest in violation of SDCL 22-11-4(1); count 4-intent to deceive a law enforcement officer in violation of SDCL 22-40-1; count 5- possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of SDCL 22-42A-3; count 6- operating a motor vehicle without two head lamps and rear lamps in violation of SDCL 32-17-4; and count 7-driving without a license in violation of SDCL 32-12-22. The State dismissed count 2 prior to trial.
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the Minnehaha County Sheriff’s Office twice a week as part of the County’s 24/7
program. Langen did not oppose the State’s recommendation. However, he
expressed concern that he would not be able to comply if he was detained on the
Aurora County warrant.
[¶4.] The court responded by instructing Langen to “make sure . . . when
you get out [to Aurora County] . . . [to] talk to the 24/7 folks either there or here,
and get it set up to do the UAs, okay?” Langen agreed, and the court issued the
personal recognizance bond with the 24/7 bond condition. The court also instructed
Langen that the bond was “conditioned upon you staying in contact with your
lawyer, . . . [and] comply[ing] with the 24/7 program by providing two UAs a week . .
. .” Langen was transported from the Minnehaha County Jail to the Davison
County Jail two days later, where he was held pending resolution of the Aurora
County probation violation. 2 Because Langen was incarcerated on the Aurora
County charge, he failed to appear for his first UA on June 15, 2018, in Minnehaha
County.
[¶5.] On June 22, 2018, the Minnehaha County Sheriff’s Office filed a 24/7
violation report with the circuit court, which stated that Langen “was released from
jail [on] June 13, 2018[,] . . . has not tested elsewhere in the state[,] and court
records do not indicate any changes have been made.” Later that day, Sergeant
Kurt Schaunaman prepared an affidavit requesting an arrest warrant based on the
bond violation. The court issued a no bond warrant for Langen’s arrest.
2. Davison County houses inmates for Aurora County.
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[¶6.] On July 19, 2018, a hearing was held in Aurora County on Langen’s
probation violation, in which Langen admitted to violating the terms of his
probation. The Aurora County court revoked Langen’s suspended execution of
sentence and imposed a four-year penitentiary sentence. Shortly thereafter, he was
transported to the South Dakota State Penitentiary to begin serving his Aurora
County sentence. Langen and his PD did not inform Minnehaha County about his
status either before or after the Aurora County hearing and sentencing decision.
[¶7.] The same day, a Minnehaha County grand jury indicted Langen for
the seven offenses listed in the complaint. The State also filed a part II
information, alleging that Langen was a habitual offender. An arraignment date
was not scheduled at that time, but the bench warrant for Langen’s failure to
appear for his UAs remained outstanding. 3
[¶8.] On October 29, 2018, Sergeant Schaunaman filed a letter with the
circuit court that requested cancellation of the Minnehaha County warrant. In the
letter, Sergeant Schaunaman stated that Langen did not appear for his UAs “due to
being in custody in another jurisdiction.” The record does not show how Minnehaha
County learned that Langen was incarcerated. The court cancelled the warrant the
following day.
[¶9.] On December 6, 2018, 179 days after his initial appearance, Langen
signed a notarized letter that requested the court honor his “ri[ght] for due process”
by granting him a prompt hearing on the pending Minnehaha County charges. The
3. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss in August 2019, the State and Langen agreed that it is customary for the defense counsel to schedule an arraignment hearing in Minnehaha County.
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letter also asked the court to cancel Langen’s Minnehaha County warrant,
indicating that Langen knew about his outstanding warrant before it was cancelled
in October. In addition, Langen claimed that he had complied with the conditions of
his bond by maintaining contact with his PD, although Langen complained his PD
never responded to his communications. The Minnehaha County Sheriff’s Office
transported Langen from the state penitentiary to Minnehaha County for
arraignment two weeks later. 4
[¶10.] At the time of the arraignment, Langen’s PD was no longer employed
by the PDO. Langen completed an application for court-appointed counsel and was
assigned another attorney from the PDO at the arraignment hearing. The court
also issued a scheduling order and set trial for April 1, 2019, to which Langen did
not object. Beginning on March 7, 2019, Langen brought the first of six motions
that pushed the trial back until August 22, 2019.
[¶11.] On June 27, 2019, Langen submitted another letter that was filed with
the Minnehaha County Clerk of Courts, in which Langen reasserted that his former
PD failed to communicate with him and advanced the same complaint against his
current counsel. In the letter, Langen also asked the court to dismiss the
indictment on the grounds that his 6th Amendment speedy trial rights had been
violated. On August 2, 2019, Langen’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case
with prejudice due to a violation of the 180-day speedy trial rule, asserting that
more than 180 days had lapsed between Langen’s initial appearance on June 11,
4. The record does not indicate to whom Langen sent this letter, and the letter was not filed with the circuit court until June 27, 2019.
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2018, and March 7, 2019, when Langen brought the first of several motions to
continue the trial. The parties agree that these motions tolled the 180-day
timeframe.
[¶12.] The court held a hearing to address Langen’s complaints about his
counsel on August 7, 2019. Langen asserted that he maintained contact with his
former PD after he was transported to Aurora County “about my situation with . . .
sentencing” but heard nothing back. He claimed that he made several attempts to
contact his PD, including leaving messages, until October 2019 when his girlfriend
learned that Langen’s former PD was no longer employed by the PDO and the PDO
had closed its file on Langen. Langen also claimed his new court-appointed
attorney had failed to maintain contact with him. The circuit court found Langen
did not establish good cause for the appointment of new counsel.
[¶13.] On August 14, 2019, the circuit court held a hearing on Langen’s
motion to dismiss for a violation of the 180-day speedy trial rule. Langen argued
that because he was in custody from July 19, 2018 to October 29, 2018, he was not
unavailable under SDCL 23A-44-5.1(4)(d), and the delay from this period was
attributable to the State. The State responded that Langen was unavailable during
this time, and good cause existed for this delay because Langen had an outstanding
warrant. The State further argued the lapse of communication between Langen
and his PD may have partially accounted for the delay and that any delay caused by
these communication problems was not attributable to the State.
[¶14.] The court took the matter under advisement and issued oral findings
of fact and conclusions of law the next day. Among other periods, the court excluded
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the period in which the Minnehaha County warrant was outstanding and denied
the motion. It held this delay was caused by Langen’s absence or unavailability.
Alternatively, the court held there was good cause to exclude this period because of
the outstanding warrant.
[¶15.] To preserve his right to appeal the circuit court’s speedy trial ruling,
Langen waived his right to a jury trial and requested a court trial. A stipulated
bench trial took place on August 22, 2019, in which Langen agreed to the admission
of the State’s exhibits and evidence. The court found Langen guilty of the charges,
including the felony possession of a controlled substance, and determined that
Langen was a habitual offender as alleged in the part II information. The court
imposed a three-year suspended penitentiary sentence on the conviction for
possession of a controlled substance and imposed suspended jail sentences on the
misdemeanor convictions.
[¶16.] Langen appeals and raises a single issue for our review: whether the
circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for a violation of
the 180-day rule.
Analysis and Decision
[¶17.] We review de novo “whether the 180[-]day period has expired as well
as what constitutes good cause for delay . . . .” State v. Andrews, 2009 S.D. 41, ¶ 6
n.1, 767 N.W.2d 181, 183 n.1. “A circuit court’s findings of fact on the issue of the
180-day rule are reviewed using the clearly erroneous rule.” State v. Seaboy, 2007
S.D. 24, ¶ 6, 729 N.W.2d 370, 372.
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[¶18.] The “180-day rule” is a rule of procedure that is designed to move cases
expeditiously through the court system. It requires that a defendant is brought to
trial within 180 days from the defendant’s first appearance before any “judicial
officer on an indictment, information or complaint.” Andrews, 2009 S.D. 41, ¶ 7,
767 N.W.2d at 183 (quoting SDCL 23A-44-5.1(2)). A violation of the “rule is not
synonymous with [a] violation of a constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Hays v.
Weber, 2002 S.D. 59, ¶ 16, 645 N.W.2d 591, 596.
[¶19.] SDCL 23A-44-5.1(4) provides that certain “periods shall be excluded”
from the 180-day period, including:
(a) The period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant . . . ;
(b) The period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request or with the consent of the defendant or his counsel provided it is approved by the court and a written order filed[;] .... (d) The period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant; .... (g) Other periods of delay not specifically enumerated herein, but only if the court finds that they are for good cause. A motion for good cause need not be made within the one hundred eighty day period.
[¶20.] Langen does not challenge the circuit court’s decision to exclude 206 of
the 437 days between the time of Langen’s first appearance and the trial. These
days included periods during which the Aurora County charges were pending as
well as the delay caused by Langen’s requests for trial continuances. The only
dispute involves the 102 days excluded by the circuit court between July 19, 2018
and October 29, 2018: the period after Langen’s Aurora County charges were
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resolved but the Minnehaha County bench warrant remained outstanding. If the
circuit court properly excluded this 102-day period, Langen was tried within 134
days of his initial appearance.
[¶21.] We first consider whether the circuit court properly excluded the time
under SDCL 23A-44-5.1(4)(d) as “resulting from [Langen’s] absence or
unavailability . . . .” In State v. Webb, this Court affirmed the circuit court’s
exclusion of a 41-day period during which the defendant had an outstanding bench
warrant due to his failure to maintain contact with his attorney and appear before
the court. 539 N.W.2d 92, 96 (S.D. 1995). We concluded that the defendant was
unavailable while the bench warrant remained outstanding and that the delay was
attributable to the defendant under SDCL 23A-44-5.1(4)(d). Id. Webb differs from
this case because Langen remained incarcerated elsewhere on unrelated charges
while the warrant was outstanding. Nevertheless, we apply Webb’s analysis to
determine whether the absence or unavailability exception applies and whether the
delay was attributable to Langen.
[¶22.] Langen argues that he was not unavailable because he was
incarcerated in the state penitentiary while the warrant was outstanding, and
Minnehaha County could have transported him for arraignment and other court
proceedings, including trial, at any time. 5 However, Langen’s argument reads
SDCL 23A-44-5.1(4)(d) too narrowly. The language of the Rule is implicated when a
defendant is unavailable or absent. It is undisputed that Langen failed to appear
5. The record shows that Langen was being held at the Yankton Community Work Center during at least part of the time that his case was pending in Minnehaha County.
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for his UAs in Minnehaha County or explain his absence. The court in Minnehaha
County issued a warrant for Langen’s arrest because of his failure to appear. Then,
despite the outstanding warrant, neither Langen, nor his attorney, notified
Minnehaha County of Langen’s status either before or after his sentencing in
Aurora County.
[¶23.] Langen also argues that he was not absent or unavailable because his
UA appearances were excused while he was incarcerated, and the bench warrant
should never have been issued. However, the appearances for UAs were a condition
of his release in Minnehaha County, and it is undisputed that Langen failed to
appear for the required UAs. Langen’s conditions for release were clear and did not
include any exceptions. Langen indicated that he understood the conditions at the
hearing and acknowledged the conditions in writing. Further, the magistrate court
never suggested that Langen’s bond conditions would be excused based upon the
Aurora County proceedings. To the contrary, the magistrate judge recognized that
Langen would likely be transported to Aurora County after he was released on bond
and instructed Langen to make arrangements to comply with his bond conditions
once he arrived. There is also no evidence that Minnehaha County was aware of
Langen’s incarceration on the Aurora County convictions until October 29, 2018,
when the bench warrant was recalled.
[¶24.] Langen cites no authority to support his claim that his incarceration
excused the conditions of his bond. Langen’s failure to appear for UAs is analogous
to a defendant who is unable to attend a court-ordered hearing. Even if a defendant
has a legitimate excuse for failing to appear, the defendant’s court-ordered
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obligation remains in effect until the defendant contacts the court and the court
excuses the appearance. See Foster v. State, 372 N.W.2d 468, 469 (S.D. 1985)
(rejecting a defendant’s argument that he did not violate South Dakota’s failure to
appear statute, SDCL 23A-43-31, because he had not been released from custody on
another charge at the time of his required appearance). The circuit court properly
determined that Langen was absent given his failure to appear for twice-weekly
UAs or to request a modification to his bond conditions.
[¶25.] Langen relies on State v. Steele, 624 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 2001), to argue
that even if he was unavailable or absent, the delay was still attributable to the
State because it voluntarily released him from custody knowing he would be
transported to Aurora County due to his outstanding arrest warrant there. In
Steele, the defendant was released on bond on a felony mischief charge. 624 N.W.2d
at 3-4. Nebraska authorities subsequently took the defendant into custody on an
unrelated Colorado warrant. Id. at 4. The defendant had an upcoming jury trial in
Nebraska on the original mischief charge, but he waived extradition; and Nebraska
authorities returned the defendant to Colorado under the Uniform Extradition Act.
Id. Approximately two months later, the defendant’s court-appointed attorney on
his Nebraska charge appeared at a pretrial conference and informed the
prosecutors’ office that the defendant was ready for trial, but he was still
incarcerated in Colorado and needed to be transported back to Nebraska to face the
charges. Id. However, Nebraska did not issue a detainer for another two months
that would allow the defendant to be transported back to Nebraska. Id.
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[¶26.] The Nebraska Supreme Court determined the defendant’s absence or
unavailability was attributable to the prosecution because “the extradition had the
effect of preventing [the defendant] from requesting a speedy disposition of his
pending charges in Nebraska.” Id. at 8. “Where the State has discretion to hold a
defendant until trial and the prosecuting attorney has knowledge of extradition
proceedings, the defendant’s unavailability should be attributed to the State.” Id.
The court also relied upon the prosecution’s failure to lodge a detainer for more than
four months, noting that this delay prevented the defendant “from requesting a
speedy disposition . . . .” Id.
[¶27.] Langen’s reliance on Steele is misplaced. Unlike Steele, in which the
defendant had the fugitive warrant from another jurisdiction, Langen was released
on the condition that he submit to UAs twice a week, and he was instructed to
provide notice if he was not able to comply with his bond conditions. Further,
unlike Steele in which the State of Nebraska waited months to lodge a detainer, the
Minnehaha County prosecutors were not dilatory in their effort to secure Langen’s
presence. Within a week of Langen’s missed appearance, Minnehaha County
verified that Langen failed to meet the conditions of his bond and requested a bench
warrant. Further, after Langen was convicted of the Aurora County charges,
neither he nor his counsel notified Minnehaha County of his status or that the
proceedings in Aurora County had been completed for nearly five months. Two
weeks after Langen penned his December 2018 letter advising Minnehaha County
of his status, he was transported back for an arraignment. Under these
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circumstances, the circuit court properly determined that the delay caused by
Langen’s absence from Minnehaha County was attributable to him.
[¶28.] We also conclude that the circuit court properly excluded the 102 days
for good cause. In determining whether good cause exists to exclude days under
SDCL 23A-44-5.1, we have consistently distinguished between delays attributable
to the State and delays attributable to the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Two Hearts,
2019 S.D. 17, ¶ 10, 925 N.W.2d 503, 509; Seaboy, 2007 S.D. 24, ¶ 12, 729 N.W.2d at
373; Weber, 2002 S.D. 59, ¶ 17, 645 N.W.2d at 598; State v. Sparks, 1999 S.D. 115, ¶
6, 600 N.W.2d 550, 553; Webb, 539 N.W.2d at 95. In addition, in considering good
cause, our focus is on the reason for the delay. See State v. Cooper, 421 N.W.2d 67,
70 (S.D. 1988).
[¶29.] Langen argues that the State cannot establish good cause because it
was aware of the warrant in Aurora County and could have easily determined
Langen’s whereabouts after he failed to appear for his UAs. Under Langen’s
proposed rule, the State would be placed in the untenable position of having to
continue monitoring a defendant’s whereabouts after a bench warrant is issued for
failure to appear or the violation of a bond condition. We decline to adopt such a
rule.
[¶30.] There is no evidence that the State was dilatory after Langen failed to
comply with his bond conditions. Minnehaha County obtained a bench warrant a
week after Langen missed his first UA, and it presented the charges to a grand jury
and obtained an indictment a month later. More importantly, neither Langen, nor
his PD, notified Minnehaha County of his incarceration or that the Aurora County
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charges had been resolved for nearly five months. There is also no reason to believe
that Minnehaha County was aware of Langen’s status until Sergeant Schaunaman
asked the circuit court to cancel the bench warrant on October 29, 2018, “due to
[Langen] being in custody in another jurisdiction.” 6 Under these circumstances,
good cause existed for the delay until the warrant was withdrawn.
[¶31.] Our primary consideration in assessing good cause is whether the
delay is attributable to the State or the defendant. Further, we have made no
distinction between the defendant personally and their attorney in determining
whether a delay is attributable to the defendant under our speedy trial rule. See
Two Hearts, 2019 S.D. 17, ¶ 16, 925 N.W.2d at 511 (holding the days from “August
7, 2015, and continuing throughout November 2015” during which defense counsel
failed to respond to the State’s requests to schedule a trial were properly excluded
as delays attributable to the defendant under our speedy trial rule). The suggestion
by the dissent that we should distinguish between Langen and his attorney in
attributing the fault for the delay is inconsistent with our cases. Our inquiry in
considering the 180-day speedy trial rule has always been on whether the delay is
6. We distinguish the facts in this record from State v. Goodroad, in which we weighed the eight months while a defendant was incarcerated in the South Dakota State Penitentiary, from May 1992 to January 1993, “against the prosecution for delay or inaction.” 521 N.W.2d 433, 439 (S.D. 1994). Goodroad involved a motion to dismiss Butte County charges for a violation of speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment, rather than SDCL 23A- 44-5.1. Id. at 436-37. Further, the defendant in Goodroad was sentenced to the penitentiary on a Pennington County charge in June 1992, but it was not until “December 10, 1992, Butte County filed an arrest warrant with the penitentiary.” Id. at 435. In contrast, Langen’s warrant was outstanding before he was sentenced to the state penitentiary in July 2018.
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attributable to the State or to the defense. See Seaboy, 2007 S.D. 24, ¶ 12, 729
N.W.2d at 373-74.
[¶32.] The circuit court properly excluded the 102 days in which the
Minnehaha County warrant was outstanding. We affirm Langen’s convictions.
[¶33.] SALTER, Justice, and GILBERTSON, Retired Chief Justice, concur.
[¶34.] KERN and DEVANEY, Justices, dissent.
[¶35.] MYREN, Justice, not having been a member of the Court at the time
this action was submitted to the Court, did not participate.
KERN, Justice (dissenting).
[¶36.] Although SDCL 23A-44-5.1 identifies certain periods of delay
attributable to the defendant in calculating whether 180 days has elapsed, the
excluded statutory periods do not encompass a delay caused by the State’s mistaken
belief that a defendant is wanted on a warrant when, in fact, the defendant is in
state custody. In concluding otherwise, the majority opinion improperly places the
onus on an incarcerated defendant to make it known to the State that he is in state
custody and is thus present and available for prosecution. The majority opinion
also erroneously excuses the State of its burden to bring the matter to trial in a
timely manner. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Absence or unavailability
[¶37.] Neither party nor the majority opinion cite authority directly on point
for the conclusion that the period of delay caused by the State’s mistaken belief that
Langen was absent or unavailable should be attributable to Langen under SDCL
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23A-44-5.1(4)(d). More importantly, the cases relied on by the majority opinion do
not support that Langen had a duty to notify Minnehaha County, before or after his
sentencing in Aurora County, of his status as an inmate in the State penitentiary.
[¶38.] The majority opinion’s reliance upon Foster is misplaced. The issue in
Foster was not whether there was a violation of the 180-day rule or the defendant’s
right to be brought to trial. Rather, the issue was whether the defendant who failed
to turn himself in to the sheriff to begin serving a sentence could properly be found
guilty of the crime of failing to appear before a court or judicial officer under SDCL
23A-43-31. Foster, 372 N.W.2d at 469. Unlike the defendant in Foster, Langen was
never released from custody, a significant distinction impacting the question here—
whether he was absent or unavailable under SDCL 23A-44-5.1(4)(d).
[¶39.] The majority opinion’s reliance upon Webb is also unpersuasive.
Although the case examined whether a period of delay should be attributed to the
defendant due to his unavailability, the case did not concern an incarcerated
defendant. Rather, the defendant was deemed unavailable because he failed to
remain in contact with his attorney. In that circumstance, we concluded that “[t]he
failure of a defendant to maintain contact with his attorney which necessitates the
withdrawal of the attorney as counsel for defendant shortly before trial is plainly
attributable to the defendant.” Webb, 539 N.W.2d at 95.
[¶40.] Here, in contrast, the circuit court did not find, nor could it find based
on this record, that Langen failed to keep in contact with his attorney. Instead, the
record includes Langen’s unrefuted assertions that he attempted to make contact
with his attorney on multiple occasions prior to sending his December 6, 2018
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correspondence to the State’s Attorney and Clerk of Courts. Without a factual
finding supported by the record stating that Langen failed to maintain contact with
his counsel, we cannot attribute the delay here to the defendant. For this reason,
Webb is inapplicable to this case.
[¶41.] In a more analogous case, this Court rejected the contention that the
defendant—an inmate in the State penitentiary—was unavailable for prosecution,
concluding that it was “obvious that [the defendant] was available for prosecution,
being all of that time confined in the penitentiary[.]” 7 State v. Starnes, 86 S.D. 636,
639, 200 N.W.2d 244, 246 (1972). So too here, Langen was an inmate in the State’s
custody and was obviously available for prosecution for the purposes of SDCL 23A-
44-5.1(4)(d). In fact, Langen’s status as an inmate could have easily been tracked in
the Odyssey system or through contact with Aurora County officials. Had that been
done, Langen could have been brought before the Minnehaha County Circuit Court
on a writ to address his pending charges. Thus, the circuit court erred, as a matter
of law, in holding that Langen was absent or unavailable when he was at all times
in the State’s custody.
Good cause
[¶42.] The circuit court ruled, in the alternative, that there was good cause to
exclude the period in which the Minnehaha County warrant was outstanding.
Although periods of delay may be excluded for good cause under SDCL 23A-44-
7. Starnes predates SDCL 23A-44-5.1 and is factually distinguishable in that the county authorities did not claim ignorance of the fact that the defendant was incarcerated. As to the question of unavailability, the premise that a defendant in State custody is obviously available for prosecution remains sound.
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5.1(4)(g) when there are exceptional circumstances not specifically enumerated in
the rule, such was not the case here. In Cooper, we identified three “exceptional
circumstances” that could constitute good cause for delay: “‘unique, nonrecurring
events’[;] or nonchronic court congestion[ 8][;] or unforeseen circumstances, ‘such as
the unexpected illness or unavailability of counsel or witnesses[.]’” 421 N.W.2d at
70 (citations omitted). The State bears the burden of establishing good cause. Two
Hearts, 2019 S.D. 17, ¶ 11, 925 N.W.2d at 509.
[¶43.] At the August 14 hearing, the State told the circuit court that:
[As] far as we knew, he was gone. And he wasn’t available. The State didn’t dillydally. The State went ahead, indicted the case in the normal course. And part of the problem here is that when defendants are indicted, if they are represented by counsel, we let the defense set the date that is most convenient to the defendants. And in this case the public defender’s office didn’t do that. The bench warrant—we didn’t even realize that he was in custody and the warrant would be called back until . . . October 29.
None of the circumstances identified in Cooper are present here. The State’s
reliance upon an erroneously issued warrant and its routine practice of allowing
defense counsel to schedule arraignments should not be deemed exceptional
circumstances. The State was aware at the outset of Langen’s case that he had a
pending probation violation in Aurora County. Moreover, it was clear at his initial
hearing that Langen was being turned over to the Aurora County authorities on
their pending no bond warrant. Indeed, Minnehaha County facilitated his transfer
to the Davison County jail at their request. This is not a unique or nonrecurring
8. “[E]xcept for short-term docket congestion caused by extraordinary circumstances, delay caused by docket congestion is attributable to the prosecution.” State v. Hoffman, 409 N.W.2d 373, 375 (S.D. 1987).
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event nor is it an unforeseen circumstance. Defendants frequently have charges
pending simultaneously against them in more than one county or state.
[¶44.] For example, in Goodroad, the defendant alleged a violation of his
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial as a result of a 27-month delay in the
prosecution of a case filed against him in Butte County. 521 N.W.2d at 435, 437.
After resolving a number of pending charges in several counties in Minnesota, the
defendant waived extradition and returned to South Dakota to address charges in
Pennington, Butte, and Meade Counties. Id. at 435-36. The defendant was
transported first to Pennington County where he pled guilty to the charge against
him and was sentenced and sent to the penitentiary. Id. at 436. An eight-month
delay occurred before he was transported to Butte County for arraignment. Id. at
435. In rejecting Butte County’s explanation (which was similar to the State’s
explanation here) that it was not notified by Pennington County that the defendant
was transferred back to the penitentiary, we assessed this portion of the 27-month
delay “against the prosecution for delay or inaction.” 9 Id. at 439.
[¶45.] Central to the majority opinion’s reasoning is the mischaracterization
of Langen’s failure to appear for 24/7 testing as a violation of the circuit court’s
order setting various conditions of release. The most reasonable interpretation of
the full colloquy between Langen and the court regarding the 24/7 condition—“[i]f
you get held and you go out to Aurora County, when you get out there, then you
9. While it is true that Goodroad involved a violation of speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment, rather than SDCL 23A-44-5.1, the decision is nonetheless instructive because, like here, the County claimed good cause for the delay because it was unaware of the defendant’s incarceration in the penitentiary.
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need to make sure you talk to the 24/7 folks either there or here, and get it set up to
do the UAs, okay”— is that it applied if and when he was released from custody.
(emphasis added). Because Langen was never released from custody, he had no
reason to contact the 24/7 program to arrange for twice weekly UAs. Despite the
fact that the condition triggering this requirement never occurred, the Minnehaha
County Sheriff’s Office mistakenly filed a 24/7 violation report indicating that
Langen was “released from jail” on June 13. The resulting warrant was later
rescinded when the error was discovered. Although these events may have been
inadvertent, they can hardly form the basis for a finding of good cause such that the
resulting delay is attributed to a defendant who was at all times incarcerated.
[¶46.] Importantly, the circuit court made no factual finding that Langen or
his counsel were the root cause of the delay. Rather, the court simply concluded
that Langen was unavailable under the circumstances and, alternatively, that the
State had good cause to rely upon an outstanding warrant. Langen’s and his
counsel’s actions are analyzed separately only to show that neither may be held
responsible for this delay, not to distinguish between the two as the majority
opinion suggests. See Majority Opinion ¶ 31. With no delay attributable to the
defense, there is no foundation upon which to base the circuit court’s finding of good
cause. Quite simply, the State had the burden to move the case along and failed to
do so.
[¶47.] I further disagree with the majority opinion’s contention that
attributing the delay to the prosecution here would place the State “in the
untenable position of having to continue monitoring a defendant’s whereabouts
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after a bench warrant is issued for failure to appear or the violation of a bond
condition.” See Majority Opinion ¶ 29. Such a view ignores the fact that the
warrant was mistakenly issued on the faulty premise that Langen had been
released from jail. It also ignores the fact that despite the State’s awareness of
Langen’s pending felony probation violation in Aurora County, no effort was made
to check on the status of that case. Instead, the State relied upon the custom in
Minnehaha County to allow defense counsel to set court dates. But it is the State
who has the burden to bring to trial “[e]very person indicted, informed or
complained against for any offense[.]” SDCL 23A-44-5.1(1). Imposing the burden
on the State to ascertain the whereabouts of a defendant in state custody hardly
places the State in an untenable position.
[¶48.] Because the period of delay during which Minnehaha County officials
erroneously believed Langen was out of custody with a warrant pending was
improperly excluded, prejudice to Langen is presumed. The case must be dismissed
unless the prosecution successfully rebuts this presumption. SDCL 23A-44-5.1(5).
Although this is precisely the type of case in which the presumption might very well
have been rebutted, the State made no effort to do so here.
[¶49.] At the August 7 hearing, Langen told the court that he was prejudiced
by the delay in resolving his Minnehaha County case because he had qualified for
work release from the penitentiary and wanted to begin working before he was
released to start paying delinquent child support, fines, and costs. At a subsequent
hearing, the court asked whether “the [S]tate ha[d] anything to present to rebut the
[alleged] presumption of prejudice to the defendant?” The State replied in part, “I
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guess I don’t have anything today. . . . I suppose, on the one hand, it is sort of
speculation as to whether or not he would get a job and whether or not he would get
out, but I don’t have anything to say that he wouldn’t.” (emphasis added.) Despite
the fact that Langen’s asserted prejudice was not directly connected to the pending
case, the State failed to present any argument or evidence to rebut the statutory
presumption of prejudice. Therefore, the dictates of SDCL 23A-44-5.1 require the
case to be dismissed with prejudice.
[¶50.] DEVANEY, Justice, joins this writing.
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