State v. Lampley

Ohio Court of Appeals

State v. Lampley

2012 Ohio 4071

Ohio Court of Appeals·Decided September 5, 2012·No. 10CA30·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS

RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:

Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.

Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.

Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J.

-vs-

Case No. 10CA30

THOMAS LAMPLEY

Defendant-Appellant OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 09-CR-650D

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: September 5, 2012

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

JAMES J. MAYER, JR. OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER PROSECUTING ATTORNEY MELISSA M. PRENDERGAST RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO Assistant State Public Defender 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400 BY: JILL M. COCHRAN Columbus, Ohio 43215 Assistant Richland County Prosecutor 38 South Park Street Mansfield, Ohio 44902

Hoffman, P.J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Thomas Lampley appeals his conviction entered by the Richland County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} On August 28, 2009, Appellant was employed at the Mary McLeod Bethune Center (“MBCC”) owned by his wife. On that day, Appellant and his wife became involved in an argument, during which Appellant operated a vehicle in the MBCC parking lot coming close to and almost hitting LaShona Bronson who was also an employee of MBCC and an acquaintance of Appellant. A dispute then arose between Bronson and Appellant as to how close Appellant was to hitting her, and Appellant called Bronson a “bitch.” Bronson telephoned her husband, David Jermain Bronson, aka J.B. Bronson. She then told Appellant “We going to have somebody to take care of you” and “We got something for you.” J.B. subsequently came to the parking lot, but Appellant had already left the scene.

{¶3} When Appellant returned to the MBCC parking lot, he encountered LaShona Bronson and her husband, J.B., who approached Appellant at the vehicle Appellant was driving. An altercation ensued. Appellant maintains J.B. approached the vehicle and began striking Appellant through the open window. J.B.'s friend, Danny McClain, had accompanied J.B. to the parking lot, and was outside the vehicle on the driver's side. Appellant accessed a firearm stored in the MBCC's van, and used the firearm to shoot and fatally wound J.B.

{¶4} Appellant was indicted by the Richland County Grand Jury on four counts:

murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), with a firearm specification; murder, in violation

Richland County, Case No. 10CA30 3

of R.C. 2903.02(B), with a firearm specification; having a weapon under disability, in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); and tampering with evidence, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1).

{¶5} A jury trial commenced on February 23, 2010, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all four counts. The jury also returned a finding of guilt on the firearm specifications.

{¶6} The trial court imposed a sentence of fifteen years to life imprisonment on count one, merging counts one and two. The court also imposed a five year sentence on count three and a two year sentence on count four, to be served consecutively. An additional three year mandatory consecutive prison sentence was imposed for the firearm specifications, for a total sentence of twenty-five years to life.

{¶7} On March 10, 2010, Appellant filed a notice of appeal with this court in Case No. 10–CA–30. Subsequently, on April 26, 2010, Appellant filed a petition to vacate or set aside his sentence in the trial court.

{¶8} On August 10, 2010, the trial court overruled Appellant's petition for post-

conviction relief. On October 29, 2010, this Court dismissed Appellant's direct appeal for failure to prosecute because Appellant failed to submit a brief.

{¶9} Appellant appealed the trial court's August 10, 2010 denial of his motion for post-conviction relief. Via Judgment Entry of March 9, 2011, this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion for post-conviction relief. State v. Lampley, Richland App. No. 10CA30, 2011-Ohio-3814.

{¶10} On December 9, 2011, this Court granted Appellant's application to reopen the direct appeal finding Appellant's appellate counsel was ineffective in failing

Richland County, Case No. 10CA30 4

to raise a potentially meritorious claim. This Court reopened Appellant's appeal for the limited purpose of considering whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a jury instruction on the Castle Doctrine, as codified in R.C. 2901.05 and R.C. 2901.09.

{¶11} Appellant assigns as error:

{¶12} “I. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR ARGUING COMMON-

LAW SELF-DEFENSE AND FOR FAILING TO REQUEST THAT THE JURY BE INSTRUCTED ON THE CASTLE DOCTRINE, AS CODIFIED IN R.C. 2901.05 AND R.C. 2901.09. SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION; STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

{¶13} “II. APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RAISE A MERITORIOUS ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IN MR. LAMPLEY’S DIRECT APPEAL OF RIGHT. SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION; EVITTS V. LUCEY, 469 U.S. 387 (1985).”

I. and II.

{¶14} Appellant's assigned errors raise common and interrelated issues;

therefore, we will address the arguments together.

{¶15} Our standard of review for ineffective assistance claims is set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Ohio adopted this standard in the case of State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373. These cases require a two-pronged analysis: First, we must determine whether counsel's assistance was ineffective; whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation and was violative of any of his essential duties to the client. If we find ineffective assistance of counsel, we must then determine whether or not the defense was actually prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness such that the reliability of the outcome of the trial is suspect. This requires a showing that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional error, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id. Trial counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that all decisions fall within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 673, 675, 693 N.E.2d 267.

{¶16} Ohio Revised Code section 2901.05(B)(1) provides,

{¶17} "Subject to division (B)(2) of this section, a person is presumed to have acted in self defense or defense of another when using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another if the person against whom the defensive force is used is in the process of unlawfully and without privilege to do so entering, or has unlawfully and without privilege to do so entered, the residence or vehicle occupied by the person using the defensive force.

{¶18} "***

{¶19} "(3) The presumption set forth in division (B) (1) of this section is a rebuttable presumption and may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence."

{¶20} Revised Code section 2901.09, codifies specific circumstances under which a person has no duty to retreat. The statute provides,

{¶21} "(B) For purposes of any section of the Revised Code that sets forth a criminal offense, a person who lawfully is in that person's residence has no duty to

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retreat before using force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person's residence, and a person who lawfully is an occupant of that person's vehicle or who lawfully is an occupant in a vehicle owned by an immediate family member of the person has no duty to retreat before using force in self-defense or defense of another."

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