State v. LA. POLICE RIVERBOAT GAMING ENF. DIVISION
This text of 768 So. 2d 284 (State v. LA. POLICE RIVERBOAT GAMING ENF. DIVISION) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE of Louisiana, Through the LOUISIANA RIVERBOAT GAMING COMMISSION
v.
LOUISIANA STATE POLICE RIVERBOAT GAMING ENFORCEMENT DIVISION.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
*285 Richard P. Ieyoub, L. Rand Dennis, Thomas A. Warner, III, Office of Attorney General, Baton Rouge, for Plaintiff-Appellant State of Louisiana, through the Louisiana Riverboat Gaming Commission.
Charles S. Lambert, Jr., Baton Rouge, for Intervenor-Appellee Capitol House Preservation Co., L.L.C.
Before: PARRO and GUIDRY, JJ., and GANUCHEAU[1], J. Pro Tem.
PARRO, J.
The State of Louisiana, through the Louisiana Gaming Control Board,[2] appeals the trial court's award of attorney fees to the successful litigant, Capitol House Preservation Company, L.L.C. (Capitol House). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The history of this litigation is outlined in two previous decisions of this court, and will not be reiterated here.[3] For purposes of this appeal, it is sufficient to state that this lawsuit was filed by the Commission pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 4:556(A)[4] as a petition for declaratory judgment regarding administrative rules, seeking to validate the Commission's regulations pertaining to the licensing process for riverboat gaming. Capitol House intervened, claiming those rules were invalid.[5] The trial court agreed, and its judgment invalidating certain of those rules was affirmed by this court in Riverboat I. Capitol House then filed a supplemental petition under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1878, seeking, among other things, reasonable litigation expenses pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 49:965.1(A). The trial court overruled the Board's exceptions and motions filed in opposition to Capitol House. In Riverboat II, this court denied the Board's application for supervisory relief, thus upholding the trial court's judgment allowing Capitol House to seek such relief. Capitol House filed a motion for summary judgment regarding its entitlement to attorney fees, which was granted by the trial court. In a judgment signed June 8, 1999, the trial court ordered the Board to pay Capitol House reasonable litigation expenses incurred in the amount of the statutory maximum of $7,499.99. This appeal followed.
*286 ANALYSIS
The only issue before this court is whether the trial court erred in awarding Capitol House reasonable litigation expenses under the authority of Louisiana Revised Statute 49:965.1(A). The Board bases its argument against the award on this court's opinion in Riverboat I. There we concluded that this matter was not governed by the procedural articles in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),[6] but rather by the procedural articles of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, because the case was filed under a statute that specifically called for it to be governed by those articles.[7] Accordingly, the Capitol House intervention was not limited by criteria in the APA, specifically Revised Statute 49:963, because this was not the procedural mechanism employed by Capitol House to intervene. Citing GMAC v. Meyers, 385 So.2d 245 (La.1980), the Board correctly notes that generally, a successful litigant cannot recover attorney fees except where authorized by statute or contract. The Board argues that nothing in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure allows Capitol House to be awarded attorney fees in this case. This is certainly correct, but it does not resolve the issue. This court's decision in Riverboat I dealt with a procedural question; the issue in this appeal is substantive in nature. Therefore the answer is not limited to a consideration of which statutory provisions guide the procedural aspects of the case.
As argued by Capitol House, the substantive provisions of the APA are at the core of this dispute. Former Louisiana Revised Statute 4:519(D), under which the Commission operated when this lawsuit began, stated that all its rules and regulations were to be in accordance with the APA. See LSA-R.S. 27:59(D). The crux of the challenge to those regulations was that they violated the APA in various ways and exceeded the agency's statutory authority. The court relied on many substantive provisions of the APA in concluding the rules were not valid. Therefore, although the procedural aspects of the case have been controlled by the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, the substantive issues have to a great extent been guided by the APA. Accordingly, Capitol House was well within the general ambit of this litigation in basing its request for litigation expenses on an APA provision.
Capitol House's request for litigation expenses and the trial court's award were based on Louisiana Revised Statute 49:965.1(A). It provides, in pertinent part:
When a small business files a petition seeking: ... (2) judicial review of the validity or applicability of an agency rule, ... the petition may include a claim against the agency for the recovery of reasonable litigation expenses. If the small business prevails and the court determines that the agency acted without substantial justification, the court may award such expenses, in addition to granting any other appropriate relief.
"Reasonable litigation expenses" are any expenses, including attorney fees, not exceeding $7500, that are reasonably incurred in opposing or contesting the agency action in connection with any one claim. LSA-R.S. 49:965.1(D)(1); McSweeney v. Louisiana Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, 600 So.2d 890, 891 (La.App. 1st Cir.1992). To qualify for this relief, a "small business" must meet the criteria defined by the Small Business Administration in Section 13 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 121. LSA-R.S. 49:965.1(D)(2). A business with annual receipts of less than $5 million or fewer than 500 employees is considered a "small business" under the applicable regulation. 13 C.F.R. 121.601.
In granting the motion for summary judgment, the trial court determined there were no genuine issues of material fact *287 and Capitol House was entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 966. Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court's consideration of whether a summary judgment is appropriate. Paul v. Louisiana State Employees' Group Benefit Program, 99-0897 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/12/00), 762 So.2d 136, 140. A motion for summary judgment is properly granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(B). If, as in this case, the mover bears the burden of proof at trial on the issue before the court, the burden of proof on the motion for summary judgment is on the mover to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2).
In support of its motion, Capitol House filed the affidavit of Charles S. Lambert, Sr., its manager, in which he attested that the company had annual receipts of less than $5 million and fewer than 500 employees at all times since its inception. As attorney for Capitol House, Charles S.
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768 So. 2d 284, 2000 WL 1393839, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-la-police-riverboat-gaming-enf-division-lactapp-2000.