State v. Kuhlwein

2024 Ohio 5497

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 20, 2024
• Docket: 2024-CA-0022
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Kuhlwein, 2024-Ohio-5497.]

COURT OF APPEALS FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: : Hon. John W. Wise, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. : Hon. Andrew J. King, J. -vs- : : RACHEL N. KUHLWEIN : Case No. 2024-CA-0022 : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2018-CR740

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT: November 20. 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

AUSTIN R. LINES ROBERT E. CALESARIC 239 West Main Street 35 South Park Place Suite 101 Suite 150 Lancaster, OH 43130 Newark, OH 43055 Fairfield County, Case No. 2024-CA-0022 2

King, J. {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Rachel Kuhlwein appeals the April 30, 2024 judgment

of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas which denied her petition for limited driving

privileges. Plaintiff-Appellee is the State of Ohio. We affirm the trial court.

{¶ 2} On December 6, 2018, the Fairfield County Grand jury returned an

indictment charging Kuhlwein with one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, a felony

of the second degree, one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, a felony of the third

degree, possession of cocaine, a felony of the fifth degree, illegal use or possession of

drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree, and operating a vehicle under

the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them, a misdemeanor of the

first degree.

{¶ 3} The charges were a result of a motor vehicle crash. Kuhlwein was traveling

at approximately 76 miles per hour in a 45 mile-per-hour zone when she lost control of

her vehicle, went airborne, and crashed into a tree. The crash killed one of her

passengers. At the time of the crash Kuhlwein was under the influence of both alcohol

and cocaine.

{¶ 4} On May 24, 2019, following plea negotiations with the State, Kuhlwein

entered pleas of no contest to each of the charges. She was subsequently sentenced to

a four-year prison term and a mandatory lifetime driver's license suspension.

{¶ 5} In May of 2022, Kuhlwein filed a motion for judicial release. On June 22,

2022, following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and placed her on community

control for five years. Condition 31 of Kuhlwein's Terms and Conditions of Supervision Fairfield County, Case No. 2024-CA-0022 3

was that she was would not be receiving driving privileges. Kuhlwein signed the Terms

and Conditions on June 22, 2022.

{¶ 6} On April 12, 2024, while still under the supervision of the court, Kuhlwein

filed a Petition for Limited Driving Privileges. She requested driving privileges for work,

medical, and personal maintenance purposes. On April 30, 2024 the trial court denied

Kuhlwein's petition. In its judgment entry the trial court noted the loss of life as a result of

Kuhlwein's crime and stated "This Court perpetually denies Defendant's request for

driving privileges. Driving is a privilege and not a right and Defendant violated the privilege

in the highest way possible."

{¶ 7} Kuhlwein filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for

consideration. She raises one assignment of error as follows:

I

{¶ 8} "TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT-

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DRIVING PRIVILEGES."

{¶ 9} We review the trial court's ruling under an abuse of discretion standard.

State v. Uliveto, 2018-Ohio-1364 ¶ 9. "Abuse of discretion" means an attitude that is

unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 19 Ohio St.3d

83, 87 (1985). Most instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply

unreasonable, rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary. AAAA Ent., Inc.

v. River Place Community Urban Redev. Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). An

unreasonable decision is one backed by no sound reasoning process which would

support that decision. Id. "It is not enough that the reviewing court, were it deciding the Fairfield County, Case No. 2024-CA-0022 4

issue de novo, would not have found that reasoning process to be persuasive, perhaps

in view of countervailing reasoning processes that would support a contrary result." Id.

{¶ 10} R.C. 4510.021 addresses limited driving privileges. That section provides:

(A) Unless expressly prohibited by section 2919.22, section 4510.13,

or any other section of the Revised Code, a court may grant limited

driving privileges for any purpose described in division (A) of this

section during any suspension imposed by the court. In granting the

privileges, the court shall specify the purposes, times, and places of

the privileges and may impose any other reasonable conditions on

the person's driving of a motor vehicle. The privileges shall be for any

of the following limited purposes:

(1) Occupational, educational, vocational, or medical purposes;

(2) Taking the driver's or commercial driver's license examination;

(3) Attending court-ordered treatment;

(4) Attending any court proceeding related to the offense for which

the offender's suspension was imposed;

(5) Transporting a minor to a child care provider, day-care,

preschool, school, or to any other location for purposes of receiving

child care;

(6) Any other purpose the court determines to be appropriate. Fairfield County, Case No. 2024-CA-0022 5

{¶ 11} First, Kuhlwein argues that the trial court abused it discretion because it has

a "blanket policy" of denying driving privileges in cases involving aggravated vehicular

homicide. Appellant's brief at 5. But the record is devoid of any evidence that the trial

court in fact employs this alleged "blanket policy." Instead, the trial court's decision

appears to be based solely upon the seriousness of Kuhlwein's crime. That determination

is well within the trial court's discretion. We therefore find no abuse of discretion.

{¶ 12} Second, as noted in our statement of facts, a condition of Kuhlwein's judicial

release was that she would not be granted driving privileges. Kuhlwein did not in any way

challenge that condition. "Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction

bars the convicted defendant from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an

appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was

raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the trial which resulted in that

judgment of conviction or on an appeal from that judgment." State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d

175 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus.

{¶ 13} For the forgoing reasons, the sole assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 14} The judgment of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

By King, J.,

Wise, P.J. and

Baldwin, J. concur.