State v. Kruttschnitt

4 Nev. 178
CourtNevada Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 1, 1868
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 4 Nev. 178 (State v. Kruttschnitt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Kruttschnitt, 4 Nev. 178 (Neb. 1868).

Opinions

By the Court,

Beatty, C. J.

This was an action brought by the State of Nevada against the Assessor of Storey County, and his sureties on his official bond, for malfeasance in office in having failed to assess the proceeds of mines in Storey County for the quarters ending on the thirtieth of June and the thirtieth of September respectively, in the year 1867.

The complaint contains two counts. The first is for failure to perform his duty in regard to the quarter ending June 30th, 1867. On this count there was perhaps a failure on the part of the State to make the proofs correspond with the averments of the complaint. The proofs offered in support of this count were not such as to present any of the more important points that were involved in the trial of the second count. For this reason the whole argument of counsel was directed to the rulings of the Court in regard to'the second count. For the same reason we may, for the present at least, pass to the consideration of that count.

In regard to the second count this state of facts appears : The Assessor called on the mining superintendents for a statement of the yield, etc., of their several mines for the preceding quarter. [199]*199They furnished him statements showing the whole number of tons worked during the preceding quarter — the number worked by wet crushing, and the number worked by Freiburg, roasting or smelting process. The statements also showed the aggregate gross yield of all the ores, and the estimated net value per ton of the ores worked respectively by wet and dry process. The Assessor then entered on his books the net or taxable value of the different classes of ores from this statement, without making any estimate of the difference in value of gold and of paper legal tender currency, and in fact without making any estimate upon his own judgment of the value of the ores. The plaintiff alleges as a breach of the Assessor’s official bond, his failure to assess the value of the ores taken from the different mines.

The defendants contend, first, that the sole duty of the Assessor consists in procuring the proper statements from the mining superintendents of the result of the working of the several mines in his district for the preceding quarter, and entering those results in his book or list of assessments. That he cannot go behind these returns, or question these results. That he has no power to make any estimate for himself of any mine, except where there has been a refusal to furnish the proper statement by the mining superintendent.

Second — That even if he has the power to estimate for himself, he has not failed in his duty, or at least his failure has done the State no harm, for it is not denied that the statements copied by' him in his assessment roll are correct in all other respects, except that they fail to distinguish in their valuation between gold and paper currency; and this distinction he could not make without violating the laws of the United States. '

Third — That the tax on mines as now assessed and levied is unconstitutional and void, and the Assessors cannot be held liable for having violated an Act which is void and inoperative.

We have stated in the three foregoing propositions, we think, the substance of the points made by defendants’ counsel, (though not in their language) so far as it will be necessary to decide them in this case.

There are some minor points discussed in the briefs, which it will [200]*200not be necessary to notice, because the Settlement of these three main points will dispose of the case.

We will discuss the points stated in the reverse order of their statements We have already held that the section of the Constitution which forbids the taxation of the mines, but requires the taxation of the proceeds of the mines, means that the entire proceeds of the mines shall be taxed; not the mere proceeds which happen to be on hand at the particular time the Assessor may happen to visit the mine. We have also held that all ad valorem taxes, whether on the proceeds of mines or other property, must be equal. See State v. Estabrook, (3 Nev. 173) and The State v. The Cal. State Telegraph Co., decided in the present term. To have held that the Convention meant, when it provided for the taxation of the proceeds of mines in lieu of the body of the mine, that only such portion of the proceeds should be* taxed as happened to be on hand once’ a year, when the Assessor went to the mine to make his annual assessment, would have been equivalent • to holding that mines and their proceeds were practically to be free from taxation.- For as the proceeds óf mines are worked from day to day and sent from the State about once a week, there would never at any one time' be enough of the proceeds on hand to be worth taxing.

Since the decision of the case of The State v. Estabrook, there has been a decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Ca-lifor-nia, in the case of the People v. McCreery, fully sustaining our views in regard to the equality of the ad valorem taxation. The Constitution of California and our own are, so far as this point is óoncerned, about identical in language, and the Supreme Court of that State, composed of five Judges, came - unanimously to’ the same conclusion as this Court did on that point. Subsequently two new Judges came on the bench, and they, in a response to a petition for a rehearing, fully concurred with the rest of the Court, thus making seven California Judges concurring without a dissenting voice in the views expressed by this Court as to. the necessity of equality in regard to the rates of taxation on all species of property subject to an ad valorem tax.

But we are told this interpretation of the Constitution is so un[201]*201just and oppressive to the mining interest, that we should review our opinion, and if possible find some interpretation of that instrument less onerous and objectionable. We are even told if this harsh interpretation of the Constitution is insisted on, it may result in the mining counties repealing all law for the collection of taxes from the proceeds of mines. A regret was expressed on the argument of this cause, that the members of the Legislature from the mining counties had not defeated the entire revenue bill of 1867, rather than allow such oppressive taxation.

There can be no doubt but that whenever the interpretation of a statute or a constitution in a certain way will result in manifest injustice, ’ Courts will álways scrutinize the act or constitution closely to see if it will not admit of some other interpretation; for it is not to be supposed that any legislative body passes an Act for the purpose of doing a manifest wrong. Let us see, then, whether there is anything so manifestly wrong in the operation of this constitutional provision as we have interpreted it. With regard to ad valorem taxes on property, we believe it is by universal consent admitted that it is not unjust to make every species of property bear precisely the same rate of taxation. From this general rule there are sometimes deviations. But where there is such a deviation, it is usually upon the ground that there is some policy to be subserved thereby, not that the general rule would be unjust. If there is any exception to the general' rule, it must be in favor of property which is either totally or in a great measure unproductive.

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Bluebook (online)
4 Nev. 178, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-kruttschnitt-nev-1868.