Opinion issued July 30, 3015
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-14-00723-CV ——————————— THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant V. KNA PARTNERS, A TEXAS JOINT VENUTRE, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 3 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1011330
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this condemnation proceeding, appellant, the State of Texas (“the State”),
challenges the trial court’s judgment in favor of the appellee property owner, KNA
Partners, a Texas Joint Venture (“KNA”). In its sole issue on appeal, the State
argues that the trial court erred in granting KNA more relief than it was entitled to under the law and the pleadings and asks that we modify the judgment by deleting
language making the transfer of title to the condemned property from KNA to the
State contingent on the State’s construction of nine driveways that provide access
to KNA’s remaining property. KNA argues that this appeal is now moot because
the driveways in question have already been constructed.
We dismiss the appeal as moot.
Background
KNA owned a tract of property located at the intersection of IH 610 and Old
Katy Road in Houston, Texas. The property had a large warehouse and a storage
building situated on it, and the site had nine driveways providing access to the IH
610 frontage road and one driveway to Old Katy Road. The State sought to
acquire approximately two-tenths of an acre of KNA’s property for the widening
of U.S. Highway 290 at the intersection of U.S. 290, IH 610, and Old Katy Road.
The property sought by the State in the condemnation proceeding was a strip of
land, thirteen-and-a-half feet wide, that was located along the entire length of the
property and included the portion of land that contained the nine driveways
providing access from KNA’s property to IH 610.
The only issue pending at trial was the amount of just compensation due to
KNA as a result of the condemnation of this portion of its property. The State
presented evidence that its highway project included the construction of nine
2 access driveways connecting KNA’s remaining property to the highway. Both
sides presented evidence regarding the value of KNA’s property before and after
the taking, assuming that the State would provide the planned-for access drives.
The jury found in favor of KNA.
In its final judgment, the trial court found that the State asserted in its
condemnation petition that it would provide access to the highway from KNA’s
remaining property and that it “specifically represented to [KNA] before trial and
to the Court and jury at trial that all nine driveway locations at [KNA’s] whole
property that existed before the State’s condemnation will be reestablished to
provide the same driveway access to [KNA’s] remainder property after the taking.”
The trial court’s judgment also awarded KNA $4,139,181.33 in damages,
representing the difference between the “market value of its whole property before
the taking and the market value of its remaining property after the taking,” as
found by the jury.
Finally, the judgment provided that “[t]he State should have and recover
from [KNA] fee simple title in and to the property” and that “[t]he State’s title to
this property is subject to the State’s agreement to restore the nine driveway
locations along the new frontage road abutting [KNA’s] remainder property that
the State represented to [KNA] before trial and to the Court and jury at trial that it
would do” and was subject to its payment of the full amount of the judgment. The
3 trial court ordered that it “does hereby vest fee simple title in the property . . . in
the State upon satisfaction of this Judgment, including the State’s restoration of the
nine access drives to [KNA’s] remainder property. . . .”
Mootness of the State’s Complaint
The State argues in its sole issue on appeal that the trial court erred in
requiring the conditioning of the transfer of title on its restoration of the driveways
to KNA’s property in the final judgment. KNA argues that the State’s appeal is
moot because the driveways have been restored. The State does not contest that
the driveways are complete, but it argues that its appeal is not moot as “there is an
existing controversy.”
The mootness doctrine implicates subject-matter jurisdiction. Trulock v.
City of Duncanville, 277 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.).
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case.
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993).
Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review
de novo. City of Elsa v. Gonzalez, 325 S.W.3d 622, 625 (Tex. 2010). Challenges
to subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal. Tex. Ass’n
of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 445.
A case becomes moot if a controversy ceases to exist between the parties at
any stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal. In re Kellogg Brown &
4 Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding). An issue becomes
moot when a party seeks a ruling on some matter that, when rendered, would not
have any practical legal effect on a then-existing controversy. Meeker v. Tarrant
Cnty. Coll. Dist., 317 S.W.3d 754, 759 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied);
Thompson v. Ricardo, 269 S.W.3d 100, 103–04 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2008, no pet.) (“[I]f a judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing
controversy, the case is moot,” and any opinion issued on merits would constitute
impermissible advisory opinion); City of Farmers Branch v. Ramos, 235 S.W.3d
462, 469 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (noting court may only decide issues
presenting “a ‘live’ controversy at the time of the decision”).
Here, the State’s only complaint on appeal is that the trial court erred in
ordering in its final judgment that the State must restore the nine driveways
providing KNA’s remaining property with access to IH 610. The State argues that
the trial court granted KNA more relief than it requested in improperly
conditioning the transfer of title on completion of the driveways. It further argues
that the trial court’s judgment is erroneous because the State “has the right to
change its construction plans, even long after the condemnation process is
completed,” and “[t]hat right is destroyed if a property owner may make passage of
title subject to a particular construction plan.”
5 KNA asserted in its brief on appeal that the driveways had been constructed,
and the State does not challenge this assertion. Thus, the State’s arguments that it
must be allowed to change its construction plans are not implicated here. Were
this Court to accept the State’s argument and modify the judgment deleting the trial
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Opinion issued July 30, 3015
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-14-00723-CV ——————————— THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant V. KNA PARTNERS, A TEXAS JOINT VENUTRE, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 3 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1011330
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this condemnation proceeding, appellant, the State of Texas (“the State”),
challenges the trial court’s judgment in favor of the appellee property owner, KNA
Partners, a Texas Joint Venture (“KNA”). In its sole issue on appeal, the State
argues that the trial court erred in granting KNA more relief than it was entitled to under the law and the pleadings and asks that we modify the judgment by deleting
language making the transfer of title to the condemned property from KNA to the
State contingent on the State’s construction of nine driveways that provide access
to KNA’s remaining property. KNA argues that this appeal is now moot because
the driveways in question have already been constructed.
We dismiss the appeal as moot.
Background
KNA owned a tract of property located at the intersection of IH 610 and Old
Katy Road in Houston, Texas. The property had a large warehouse and a storage
building situated on it, and the site had nine driveways providing access to the IH
610 frontage road and one driveway to Old Katy Road. The State sought to
acquire approximately two-tenths of an acre of KNA’s property for the widening
of U.S. Highway 290 at the intersection of U.S. 290, IH 610, and Old Katy Road.
The property sought by the State in the condemnation proceeding was a strip of
land, thirteen-and-a-half feet wide, that was located along the entire length of the
property and included the portion of land that contained the nine driveways
providing access from KNA’s property to IH 610.
The only issue pending at trial was the amount of just compensation due to
KNA as a result of the condemnation of this portion of its property. The State
presented evidence that its highway project included the construction of nine
2 access driveways connecting KNA’s remaining property to the highway. Both
sides presented evidence regarding the value of KNA’s property before and after
the taking, assuming that the State would provide the planned-for access drives.
The jury found in favor of KNA.
In its final judgment, the trial court found that the State asserted in its
condemnation petition that it would provide access to the highway from KNA’s
remaining property and that it “specifically represented to [KNA] before trial and
to the Court and jury at trial that all nine driveway locations at [KNA’s] whole
property that existed before the State’s condemnation will be reestablished to
provide the same driveway access to [KNA’s] remainder property after the taking.”
The trial court’s judgment also awarded KNA $4,139,181.33 in damages,
representing the difference between the “market value of its whole property before
the taking and the market value of its remaining property after the taking,” as
found by the jury.
Finally, the judgment provided that “[t]he State should have and recover
from [KNA] fee simple title in and to the property” and that “[t]he State’s title to
this property is subject to the State’s agreement to restore the nine driveway
locations along the new frontage road abutting [KNA’s] remainder property that
the State represented to [KNA] before trial and to the Court and jury at trial that it
would do” and was subject to its payment of the full amount of the judgment. The
3 trial court ordered that it “does hereby vest fee simple title in the property . . . in
the State upon satisfaction of this Judgment, including the State’s restoration of the
nine access drives to [KNA’s] remainder property. . . .”
Mootness of the State’s Complaint
The State argues in its sole issue on appeal that the trial court erred in
requiring the conditioning of the transfer of title on its restoration of the driveways
to KNA’s property in the final judgment. KNA argues that the State’s appeal is
moot because the driveways have been restored. The State does not contest that
the driveways are complete, but it argues that its appeal is not moot as “there is an
existing controversy.”
The mootness doctrine implicates subject-matter jurisdiction. Trulock v.
City of Duncanville, 277 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.).
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case.
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993).
Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review
de novo. City of Elsa v. Gonzalez, 325 S.W.3d 622, 625 (Tex. 2010). Challenges
to subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal. Tex. Ass’n
of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 445.
A case becomes moot if a controversy ceases to exist between the parties at
any stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal. In re Kellogg Brown &
4 Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding). An issue becomes
moot when a party seeks a ruling on some matter that, when rendered, would not
have any practical legal effect on a then-existing controversy. Meeker v. Tarrant
Cnty. Coll. Dist., 317 S.W.3d 754, 759 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied);
Thompson v. Ricardo, 269 S.W.3d 100, 103–04 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2008, no pet.) (“[I]f a judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing
controversy, the case is moot,” and any opinion issued on merits would constitute
impermissible advisory opinion); City of Farmers Branch v. Ramos, 235 S.W.3d
462, 469 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (noting court may only decide issues
presenting “a ‘live’ controversy at the time of the decision”).
Here, the State’s only complaint on appeal is that the trial court erred in
ordering in its final judgment that the State must restore the nine driveways
providing KNA’s remaining property with access to IH 610. The State argues that
the trial court granted KNA more relief than it requested in improperly
conditioning the transfer of title on completion of the driveways. It further argues
that the trial court’s judgment is erroneous because the State “has the right to
change its construction plans, even long after the condemnation process is
completed,” and “[t]hat right is destroyed if a property owner may make passage of
title subject to a particular construction plan.”
5 KNA asserted in its brief on appeal that the driveways had been constructed,
and the State does not challenge this assertion. Thus, the State’s arguments that it
must be allowed to change its construction plans are not implicated here. Were
this Court to accept the State’s argument and modify the judgment deleting the trial
court’s requirement that the State build the nine driveways in question, there would
be no practical legal effect. The driveways have already been completed, and the
only relief that we could grant the State is a declaration that it did not have to build
the driveways that it has already built. See Meeker, 317 S.W.3d at 759 (“An issue
becomes moot when a party seeks a ruling on some matter that, when rendered,
would not have any practical legal effect on a then-existing controversy.”);
Thompson, 269 S.W.3d at 103.
The State argues that, regardless of whether the driveways have already been
restored, the relief it requests on appeal “will have a legal effect because without
such relief the State will not be able to obtain title insurance for the property
acquired without proving to the satisfaction of a title company that the access
drives have been restored.” It asserts that it has a “concrete interest in obtaining
such relief.” However, “[t]o constitute a justiciable controversy, there must exist a
real and substantial controversy involving genuine conflict of tangible interests and
not merely a theoretical dispute.” Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465,
467 (Tex. 1995). Any difficulty in obtaining title insurance is merely theoretical
6 and does not indicate that there is an existing controversy regarding the trial court’s
judgment requiring the State to build the already-completed driveways. See id.
We conclude that the State’s sole issue on appeal is moot.
Conclusion
We dismiss the appeal as moot.
Evelyn V. Keyes Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Huddle, and Lloyd.