SCOTT, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction entered by the Anoka County District Court finding defendant guilty of escape, Minn.St. 609.485. We affirm.
On September 13, 1976, Forrest Wayne Kjeldahl (defendant) was in lawful custody at the Minnesota Metropolitan Training Center
(MMTC) at Lino Lakes, Minnesota, pursuant to a burglary conviction. MMTC is a minimum security facility in a rural area of Anoka County. At the end of August defendant had been transferred- to MMTC from the State Reformatory at St. Cloud, Minnesota, to participate in a drug treatment program. Upon his arrival at the facility, defendant received a copy of the institution’s rules and regulations. These rules, which prohibit escape and provide that it can be punished by time in segregation or expulsion from MMTC, were read by defendant.
On September 13, 1976, defendant cleaned out the trunks of state-owned automobiles in preparation for a public auction of the vehicles. Defendant claims he found a bag of “dope” in the trunk of one of the vehicles. At approximately 7:30 that evening, defendant signed out from his cottage, telling the counselor on duty that he was going to walk around the MMTC grounds. Instead, he walked away from the MMTC and made his way to Minneapolis. He was arrested two days later in downtown Minneapolis, asleep in an illegally parked car on Hennepin Avenue. At trial, defendant claimed that he had “snorted” some of the narcotics he had found and had no recollection of the events from the time he signed out of his cottage until he awoke in the Hennepin County Jail. This is the only evidence that defendant was intoxicated when he left MMTC other than his own statements. James Parks, the counsel- or on duty the night defendant left MMTC, testified that he did not notice anything unusual about the defendant when he signed out of the cottage.
Following his arrest and detention in the Hennepin County Jail, defendant was interviewed by Mr. Brunner of the MMTC. During the course of this interview defendant signed an agreement waiving his right to a hearing and accepting expulsion from MMTC as the “full penalty” for his violation of the MMTC escape rule. Defendant testified at trial that Mr. Brunner informed him that, “ * * * it was a complete punishment and that I wouldn’t be tried again for it.” Mr. Brunner was hospitalized at the time of defendant’s trial on the escape charge and, consequently, was unable to testify regarding the conversations he had with defendant when the agreement was signed. Mr. Glyn, the discipline officer at MMTC, though, testified that it was standard procedure to explain to the inmate at the time of the signing that the agreement was binding only between the prisoner and the MMTC and had no bearing on any criminal charges which could be brought by the state.
Defendant was returned to St. Cloud Reformatory to serve the remainder of his sentence. Four months later, he was charged with the crime of escape, pursuant to Minn.St. 609.485. The case was tried to the court without a jury. Following a 1-day trial, defendant was found guilty and committed to the Commissioner of Corrections.
The following issues are presented by this appeal:
(1) Is a criminal prosecution for escape barred by the prior imposition of administrative discipline by prison authorities?
(2) Is specific intent to leave lawful custody with the purpose of avoiding confinement an essential element of the crime of escape?
1. Defendant’s first claim is that the combination of administrative discipline and criminal conviction constitutes double jeopardy in violation of the state
and federal
constitutions. Although new to this state, this precise issue has been litigated a number of times in other jurisdictions. Almost without exception, these other courts have held that a federal or state charge for escape is not barred by the prior imposition of administrative discipline by prison authorities. See, e. g.,
United States v. Williamson,
469 F.2d 88 (5 Cir. 1972);
Hutchison v. United States,
450 F.2d 930 (10 Cir. 1971);
Alex v. State,
484 P.2d 677 (Alaska, 1971);
State v. Tise,
283 A.2d 666 (Me.1971);
Commonwealth v. Sneed,
322 N.E.2d 435 (Mass.App.1975);
State v. Maddox,
190 Neb. 361, 208 N.W.2d 274 (1973);
State v. Weekley,
S.D., 240 N.W.2d 80 (1976). We agree with these cases and hold that the double jeopardy clause does not bar prosecution of defendant.
The purpose of the prohibition of double jeopardy is to protect the individual from being subjected to a second trial for the same offense.
State
v.
McDonald,
298 Minn. 449, 215 N.W.2d 607 (1974);
State v. Thompson,
241 Minn. 59, 62 N.W.2d 512 (1954). A criminal trial imposes great psychological, physical and financial burdens on the defendant, and the double jeopardy clause guarantees that he experience these burdens only once “for the same offense.”
Breed v. Jones,
421 U.S. 519, 529, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1786, 44 L.Ed.2d 346, 355 (1975).
Prison inmates may, of course, experience some pressures as a result of the prison discipline process, but these pressures are of a much lesser degree than those incident to a full criminal prosecution. As stated in the well-reasoned opinion of
State v. Week-ley, supra:
“ * * * Although it may very well be true that appellant and others similarly situated experience some anxiety and insecurity by virtue of being subjected to administrative discipline by penitentiary authorities, it would trivialize the protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause of the state and federal constitutions to hold that it applies in this case to bar prosecution on a state charge of escape. * * *.
“In summary, then, we conclude that in the light of the principles set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Breed v. Jones,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
SCOTT, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction entered by the Anoka County District Court finding defendant guilty of escape, Minn.St. 609.485. We affirm.
On September 13, 1976, Forrest Wayne Kjeldahl (defendant) was in lawful custody at the Minnesota Metropolitan Training Center
(MMTC) at Lino Lakes, Minnesota, pursuant to a burglary conviction. MMTC is a minimum security facility in a rural area of Anoka County. At the end of August defendant had been transferred- to MMTC from the State Reformatory at St. Cloud, Minnesota, to participate in a drug treatment program. Upon his arrival at the facility, defendant received a copy of the institution’s rules and regulations. These rules, which prohibit escape and provide that it can be punished by time in segregation or expulsion from MMTC, were read by defendant.
On September 13, 1976, defendant cleaned out the trunks of state-owned automobiles in preparation for a public auction of the vehicles. Defendant claims he found a bag of “dope” in the trunk of one of the vehicles. At approximately 7:30 that evening, defendant signed out from his cottage, telling the counselor on duty that he was going to walk around the MMTC grounds. Instead, he walked away from the MMTC and made his way to Minneapolis. He was arrested two days later in downtown Minneapolis, asleep in an illegally parked car on Hennepin Avenue. At trial, defendant claimed that he had “snorted” some of the narcotics he had found and had no recollection of the events from the time he signed out of his cottage until he awoke in the Hennepin County Jail. This is the only evidence that defendant was intoxicated when he left MMTC other than his own statements. James Parks, the counsel- or on duty the night defendant left MMTC, testified that he did not notice anything unusual about the defendant when he signed out of the cottage.
Following his arrest and detention in the Hennepin County Jail, defendant was interviewed by Mr. Brunner of the MMTC. During the course of this interview defendant signed an agreement waiving his right to a hearing and accepting expulsion from MMTC as the “full penalty” for his violation of the MMTC escape rule. Defendant testified at trial that Mr. Brunner informed him that, “ * * * it was a complete punishment and that I wouldn’t be tried again for it.” Mr. Brunner was hospitalized at the time of defendant’s trial on the escape charge and, consequently, was unable to testify regarding the conversations he had with defendant when the agreement was signed. Mr. Glyn, the discipline officer at MMTC, though, testified that it was standard procedure to explain to the inmate at the time of the signing that the agreement was binding only between the prisoner and the MMTC and had no bearing on any criminal charges which could be brought by the state.
Defendant was returned to St. Cloud Reformatory to serve the remainder of his sentence. Four months later, he was charged with the crime of escape, pursuant to Minn.St. 609.485. The case was tried to the court without a jury. Following a 1-day trial, defendant was found guilty and committed to the Commissioner of Corrections.
The following issues are presented by this appeal:
(1) Is a criminal prosecution for escape barred by the prior imposition of administrative discipline by prison authorities?
(2) Is specific intent to leave lawful custody with the purpose of avoiding confinement an essential element of the crime of escape?
1. Defendant’s first claim is that the combination of administrative discipline and criminal conviction constitutes double jeopardy in violation of the state
and federal
constitutions. Although new to this state, this precise issue has been litigated a number of times in other jurisdictions. Almost without exception, these other courts have held that a federal or state charge for escape is not barred by the prior imposition of administrative discipline by prison authorities. See, e. g.,
United States v. Williamson,
469 F.2d 88 (5 Cir. 1972);
Hutchison v. United States,
450 F.2d 930 (10 Cir. 1971);
Alex v. State,
484 P.2d 677 (Alaska, 1971);
State v. Tise,
283 A.2d 666 (Me.1971);
Commonwealth v. Sneed,
322 N.E.2d 435 (Mass.App.1975);
State v. Maddox,
190 Neb. 361, 208 N.W.2d 274 (1973);
State v. Weekley,
S.D., 240 N.W.2d 80 (1976). We agree with these cases and hold that the double jeopardy clause does not bar prosecution of defendant.
The purpose of the prohibition of double jeopardy is to protect the individual from being subjected to a second trial for the same offense.
State
v.
McDonald,
298 Minn. 449, 215 N.W.2d 607 (1974);
State v. Thompson,
241 Minn. 59, 62 N.W.2d 512 (1954). A criminal trial imposes great psychological, physical and financial burdens on the defendant, and the double jeopardy clause guarantees that he experience these burdens only once “for the same offense.”
Breed v. Jones,
421 U.S. 519, 529, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1786, 44 L.Ed.2d 346, 355 (1975).
Prison inmates may, of course, experience some pressures as a result of the prison discipline process, but these pressures are of a much lesser degree than those incident to a full criminal prosecution. As stated in the well-reasoned opinion of
State v. Week-ley, supra:
“ * * * Although it may very well be true that appellant and others similarly situated experience some anxiety and insecurity by virtue of being subjected to administrative discipline by penitentiary authorities, it would trivialize the protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause of the state and federal constitutions to hold that it applies in this case to bar prosecution on a state charge of escape. * * *.
“In summary, then, we conclude that in the light of the principles set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Breed v. Jones,
supra, the proceedings before the penitentiary disciplinary board and the administrative sanctions imposed by the board upon appellant are not sufficiently analogous to the subsequent criminal proceedings brought against appellant on the charge of escape and the resulting sentence imposed thereon to warrant a holding that appellant was subjected to jeopardy within the meaning of the state and federal constitution when he was charged with and found guilty of being absent from count.” S.D., 240 N.W.2d 82.
Moreover, the only administrative sanction imposed on defendant was to remove him from an open facility and return him to the secure facility at St. Cloud. Thus, not only would application of the double jeopardy clause “trivialize” the protections of this constitutional guarantee, but it would com
pletely frustrate the prison’s capacity to deal with escapes from minimum security facilities.
Similarly, we are not persuaded by defendant’s claim that this combination of prison discipline and criminal trial violates the prohibition against serialized prosecutions embodied in Minn.St. 609.035.
A prison disciplinary proceeding is not a “prosecution.”
Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951 (1974). Rather, it is an administrative proceeding designed to maintain an orderly institution. See, e. g.,
State v. Tise, supra,
283 A.2d 668;
State
v.
Weekley, supra,
240 N.W.2d 82. Thus, the statute has no application to these facts.
2. At trial defendant stipulated that he left MMTC without the consent or permission of the appropriate authorities. As a defense to the escape charge he claims he was intoxicated when he left MMTC and remained so until his arrest. Recognizing that voluntary intoxication is a valid “defense” only if specific intent is an essential element of the crime in question,
defendant’s second claim on appeal is that the crime of escape requires a specific intent to leave custody with the purpose of avoiding confinement.
It has long been settled that the legislature may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission a crime without regard to the intention or motive of the actor.
State v. Reps,
302 Minn. 38, 46, 223 N.W.2d 780, 786 (1974). Such is the case with the offense of escape. Minn.St. 609.-485 provides in part as follows:
“Subdivision 1. Definition. 'Escape’ includes departure without lawful authority and failure to return to custody following temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited period.
“Subd. 2. Acts prohibited. Whoever does any of the following may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 4:
“(1) Escapes while held in lawful custody on a charge or conviction of a crime; * * *
if
Quite clearly, the statute does not include a requirement of specific intent.
Rather, the only intent required to constitute the crime of escape is the intent to do the act which results in the departure from custody. See,
State v. Jones,
266 Minn. 526, 124 N.W.2d 729 (1963). Such an interpretation of the statute is consistent with the great weight of authority. E. g.,
Alex v. State,
484 P.2d 677 (Alaska 1971);
State v. Marks,
92 Idaho
368, 442 P.2d 778 (1968). See, generally, 3 Anderson, Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure, § 1372; Perkins, Criminal Law, p. 504. We therefore reject defendant’s contention and hold that specific intent is not an essential element of the crime of escape.
Affirmed.