State v. Kirkpatrick

584 P.2d 670, 94 Nev. 628, 1978 Nev. LEXIS 636
CourtNevada Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 28, 1978
DocketNo. 10328
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 584 P.2d 670 (State v. Kirkpatrick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Kirkpatrick, 584 P.2d 670, 94 Nev. 628, 1978 Nev. LEXIS 636 (Neb. 1978).

Opinion

OPINION

Per Curiam:

Respondent was charged, by information, with the crime of robbery (NRS 200.380) and having used a deadly weapon in the [630]*630commission of that crime (NRS 193.165). The information provided, in pertinent part, that respondent had'taken personal property “from the person of JAYE JOSEPH, or in her presence, by means of force or violence or fear of injury. ...” (Emphasis added.)

Respondent moved to dismiss the information, contending use of the disjunctive “or” rendered the information “wholly insufficient.”1 The thrust of respondent’s argument was that disjunctive pleading (1) failed to give him adequate notice of the offense with which he was charged, thus violating the clear mandate of the Sixth Amendment;2 and, (2) subjects him to double jeopardy because neither a conviction nor an acquittal would bar a subsequent prosecution upon the alternative allegations. The district court granted the motion. Appellant contends this was error because disjunctive pleading is authorized by NRS 173.075(2).3 We agree.4

1. Where, as here , a single offense may be committed by one or more specified means, and those means are charged alternatively, the state need only prove one of the alternative means in order to sustain a conviction. See, e.g., Gerberding v. United States, 471 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1966). Cf. State v. Luhano, 31 Nev. 278, 102 P. 260 (1909). Thus, notice of the charged offense is not improved by alleging that the crime was committed by acts “a” and “b” rather than by acts “a” or “b.” In either case, the accused must prepare a defense to all means by which it is alleged the érime was committed. Johnson v. United States, 207 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1953); State v. Scott, 395 P.2d 377 (Wash. 1964).

[631]*6312. Respondent is afforded adequate protection from double jeopardy by NRS 174.085(3) and NRS 178.391.5 See State v. Scott, supra. Cf. Fairman v. State, 83 Nev. 137, 425 P.2d 342 (1967); State v. Carter, 79 Nev. 146, 379 P.2d 945 (1963).

The district court order is reversed and the case remanded with instructions to reinstate the information.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
584 P.2d 670, 94 Nev. 628, 1978 Nev. LEXIS 636, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-kirkpatrick-nev-1978.