[Cite as State v. Kirkland, 2026-Ohio-586.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250142 TRIAL NO. B-2302736 Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
JOHNTYN KIRKLAND, : JUDGMENT ENTRY Defendant-Appellant. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and the cause is remanded. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 2/20/2026 per order of the court.
By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as State v. Kirkland, 2026-Ohio-586.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250142 TRIAL NO. B-2302736 Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. : OPINION
JOHNTYN KIRKLAND, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: February 20, 2026
Connie Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith Anton Lapp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Bryan R. Perkins, for Defendant-Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
ZAYAS, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Johntyn Kirkland appeals his convictions for murder with
specifications, following a jury trial, and for having a weapon while under a disability
(“WUD”), following a bench trial. In eight assignments of error, Kirkland contends
the court erred by allowing prior-bad-act evidence, the prosecutor committed
prosecutorial misconduct, the court erred in admitting gruesome photos, his
convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence or the weight of the evidence,
the record did not support the imposition of consecutive sentences, the court violated
his due-process rights during the sentencing hearing, and the court erred by imposing
postrelease control on the murder conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
Factual Background
{¶2} Kirkland was indicted for two counts of murder with specifications and
two counts of having a weapon while under a disability. The victim was his stepfather.
Kirkland pled not guilty to the charges and proceeded to a jury trial on the murder
charges and a bench trial on the WUD charges. The jury acquitted him of the first
murder charge and convicted him on the second murder charge and the accompanying
firearms specifications. The trial court found him guilty of both WUD charges, and
merged the second WUD conviction with the murder conviction. The court sentenced
Kirkland to 15 years to life on the murder conviction, consecutive to a 54-month
sentence on the firearm specification, and 36 months on the WUD conviction to be
served consecutively to the murder sentence for an aggregate term of 22½ years to
life.
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Sufficiency and Manifest Weight
{¶3} For ease of discussion, we address the assignments of error out of order.
In his fourth and fifth assignments of error, argued together, Kirkland contends the
convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and were contrary to the weight
of the evidence.
{¶4} When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, he is
arguing that the State presented inadequate evidence on an element of the offense to
sustain the verdict as a matter of law. State v. Hawn, 138 Ohio App.3d 449, 471 (2d
Dist. 2000). “[T]he question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the state, any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential
elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Ham, 2017-Ohio-
9189, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991), paragraph
two of the syllabus.
{¶5} In reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we sit as a
“thirteenth juror.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). We must
review the entire record, weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of the witnesses,
and determine whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest
miscarriage of justice. Id. “Although an appellate court may review credibility when
considering the manifest weight of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses is
primarily an initial determination for the trier of fact.” State v. Brown, 2024-Ohio-
2148, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.), citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one
of the syllabus. “The trier of fact is best able ‘to view the witnesses and observe their
demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the
credibility of the proffered testimony.’” Id., quoting State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202,
¶ 24.
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶6} The jury found Kirkland guilty of murder under R.C. 2903.02(B) for
causing the victim’s death as a proximate result of knowingly committing or
attempting to commit felonious assault. The State presented evidence that Kirkland
had an altercation with his stepfather two days before the murder and moved out of
the home. The day before the murder, Kirkland texted his stepfather informing him
that he could not be around “y’all” and accused “y’all” of killing his little brother, who
had committed suicide. Acknowledging that Kirkland was “strapped,” his stepfather
responded, “You got smoke about something, come speak upon it, about it, with
whoever you feel like it.” A detective testified that “strapped” meant a person was
armed.
{¶7} On the morning of the murder, Kirkland was supposed to leave the
apartment with his grandmother, but he refused to go. His grandmother was so
concerned about Kirkland’s behavior, she wanted to schedule a family meeting to
discuss his behavior and actions with him.
{¶8} That morning, the victim drove his wife to work and his daughter to
school. When Kirkland’s mother left the home that day, the doors were locked, but
Kirkland still had a key to the home. He was supposed to return the key, but he kept
it. The key was on his keychain. When the victim returned home, he had planned to
clean carpets that morning, and he called his wife between 8:00 and 9:00 to tell her
the carpet cleaner was not working. Sometime between 9:00 and 11:00 a.m., the
victim failed to respond to text messages or answer his phone. Both his wife and
daughter had repeatedly tried to contact him. When his daughter arrived to check on
him, the back door was unlocked, which was unusual because her father always locked
the back door. His daughter found him dead, lying in the foyer.
{¶9} Kirkland’s younger brother was at his grandmother’s apartment playing
5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
video games when Kirkland knocked on the door. Kirkland had a gunshot wound on
his hand, but would not say how he got it. Kirkland’s V-neck shirt was on the side of
his shoulder, and he was pacing back and forth saying it was a flesh wound. Kirkland
continued to pace, and his brother cleaned and bandaged his hand. Kirkland was
unable “to get words out,” which was very unusual. The younger brother, who was
scared, called his grandmother because Kirkland wanted his grandmother to come
home. After Kirkland’s brother’s conversation with his grandmother, the police
arrived, and he and Kirkland were detained. When the arresting officer asked
Kirkland if anyone else was in the apartment, he responded, “It’s me you’re looking
for.”
{¶10} Kirkland’s grandmother testified that she picked up Kirkland’s mother
from work to meet with Kirkland because he had been shot and did not want to go the
hospital. By the time Kirkland’s mother entered his grandmother’s car, she knew her
husband was dead, and the grandmother drove her home. While they were driving,
Kirkland’s younger brother called his grandmother. She asked him if he were being
held hostage. His grandmother thought Kirkland might be holding him hostage due
to the situation with Kirkland’s stepfather. Kirkland’s grandmother brought the police
to the apartment with her.
{¶11} The criminalist photographed the entire scene. When the criminalist
arrived, she entered from the rear of the house, and blood droplets were on the back
porch. The victim, who had been pronounced dead, was in the front foyer by a
staircase. The criminalist authenticated numerous photos, including the blood spatter
on the porch, the bedrooms in the home, and a Speer 9 mm casing on the first landing
of the stairwell. Two vacuum cleaners were also on the landing. At the top of the stairs
on the floor, she photographed a spring, magazine back-plate, and 33 unfired bullets,
6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
which was consistent with a broken magazine.
{¶12} The State’s theory was that Kirkland was at the top of the stairs and the
victim was on the first landing when Kirkland shot him. After the victim was shot, he
fell down the stairs and into the foyer.
{¶13} At the crime scene, a trail of blood led from the second floor to the back
porch. The criminalist collected numerous blood swabs, and a forensic biologist
testified that the DNA profile of the bloodstains on the wall up the staircase, the
entryway, the entry into the kitchen, kitchen floor, a bedroom, and the porch step
matched Kirkland. The blood trail ended at the woods behind the home. The woods
run along the rear of the house and the apartment, both on Queen City.
{¶14} A video showed Kirkland crashing through the woods and entering the
apartment building. Thirty-five minutes prior, a video depicted Kirkland exiting from
the building. He was wearing a black pullover sweatshirt, black sweatpants, and
maroon Nike gym shoes. A trace-evidence examiner testified that the black hooded
sweatshirt tested positive for gunshot residue. The front of the sweatshirt contained a
mixture of DNA. The major contributor matched Kirkland, and the minor profile was
too minor to make a comparison.
{¶15} Testing of the DNA mixture found on the bullet that killed the victim
could not exclude the victim or Kirkland as contributors. The forensic biologist further
testified that, “The portion of the population that cannot be excluded from having
contributed to this mixture of DNA profiles is approximately 1 in 45,250 individuals.”
The coroner testified that the victim’s death was a homicide due to a gunshot in the
left upper chest.
{¶16} Kirkland argues that the convictions were unsupported by the evidence
and contrary to the weight of the evidence because no eyewitness testified, the gun
7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
used in the murder was not recovered, and Kirkland’s hands tested negative for
gunshot residue. He further contends that two witnesses never saw him with a gun
and no DNA connected him to the numerous bullets found in his mother’s house.
{¶17} The State must prove the identity of a perpetrator by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and it may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, which do
not differ with respect to their probative value. State v. Tyler, 2019-Ohio-4661, ¶ 31
(9th Dist.). Although there were no eyewitnesses to the actual shooting, the State
introduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to identify Kirkland as the shooter. “The
fact that the gun was not recovered was not fatal to the State’s case.” State v. Hill,
2011-Ohio-2526, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.). Both Kirkland’s grandmother and the victim’s wife
testified that Kirkland owned two guns.
{¶18} Although no gunshot residue was found on Kirkland’s hands, gunshot
residue was found on his sweatshirt. Additionally, his younger brother cleaned the
injured hand, and then Kirkland was treated at the hospital. DNA evidence connected
Kirkland to numerous blood drops left at the crime scene, including the blood trail
leading to the back porch. The blood trail ended at the woods, and a video captured
Kirkland running out of the woods to his grandmother’s apartment after the shooting.
{¶19} Kirkland further contends that the evidence was insufficient to support
the WUD conviction. After Kirkland’s arrest, a loaded Taurus handgun was found
under a couch cushion at his grandmother’s home. The Taurus contained DNA
matching Kirkland. A forensic scientist from the coroner’s crime lab testified that the
Taurus was operable. While the bullet that killed the victim was not fired from the
Taurus, DNA evidence linked Kirkland to the bullet that killed his stepfather and the
broken Taurus gun magazine and its parts found near where the murder occurred.
Although the murder weapon was not found, circumstantial evidence established that
8 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Kirkland was the shooter. Kirkland stipulated to the felony convictions underlying the
WUD charges.
{¶20} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational
trier of fact could have found proof of guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Kirkland
murdered his stepfather and possessed a firearm while under a disability. Reviewing
the entire record, weighing the evidence, and considering the credibility of the
witnesses, we cannot conclude the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created a
manifest miscarriage of justice.
{¶21} Accordingly, we overrule the fourth and fifth assignments of error.
Prior Bad Acts
{¶22} In his first and second assignments of error, argued together, Kirkland
contends that the trial court erred as the result of the prosecutor eliciting prior-bad-
act evidence, which also constituted prosecutorial misconduct.
{¶23} “Evid.R. 404(B) categorically prohibits evidence of a defendant’s other
acts when its only value is to show that the defendant has the character or propensity
to commit a crime.” State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-4441, ¶ 36. The admissibility of other-
acts evidence, pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B), is a question of law that must be reviewed
using a de novo standard of review. State v. Hartman, 2020-Ohio-4440, ¶ 30. If the
other-acts evidence was offered for a permissible purpose, the determination of
whether to then admit the evidence—after weighing its probative value against its
prejudicial effect—is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 30.
{¶24} Before Kirkland’s family members testified, Kirkland asked the State to
remind the lay witnesses not to discuss his prior criminal history. In several witness
interviews, the witnesses had mentioned that Kirkland had recently been released
from prison.
9 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶25} The victim’s daughter, who was also Kirkland’s sister, testified that she
and her brother had been close a few months before the murder, but they were no
longer close. Kirkland objected when the prosecutor asked, “Had something
happened between that fractured your relationship in those months leading up to June
12th?” Kirkland objected based on relevance and prior bad acts. The court asked if
the sister was going to say anything about a prior conviction. The prosecutor
responded that his understanding was that Kirkland was behaving erratically toward
his family members. The prosecutor further noted that the sister was cautioned not to
discuss Kirkland’s incarceration or prior convictions. The court overruled the
objection.
{¶26} Kirkland’s sister responded that Kirkland was dating someone, and he
chose that woman over her. When asked “how bad had it gotten after this relationship
had started,” she responded, “It was bad because he actually threatened me.” When
Kirkland objected, the prosecutor responded that he was not trying to elicit that
testimony and immediately ceased his questioning. The State did not mention the
testimony in closing arguments. The prosecutor did not object to a curative
instruction, and the court instructed the jury to disregard the statement.
{¶27} Assuming that the other-acts testimony was improper, Kirkland cannot
establish he has suffered any prejudice as a result. The testimony itself was minor;
especially here where his grandmother testified that she was so concerned about
Kirkland’s behavior and conduct that she wanted to call a family meeting.
Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the testimony, and “[w]e
presume that the jury followed the court’s instructions.” See State v. Stidhum, 2018-
Ohio-4616, ¶ 57 (1st Dist.). After excising the improper statement, the remaining
evidence adduced by the prosecution was sufficient to overcome any unfair prejudice.
10 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶28} Kirkland further argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
eliciting the statement. To establish prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show
that the prosecutor’s conduct was improper and prejudicially affected the defendant’s
substantial rights. State v. Walker, 2007-Ohio-6337, ¶ 45 (1st Dist.).
{¶29} Here, the witness volunteered the other-acts testimony during her
direct examination, and the prosecutor represented that he was not trying to elicit that
testimony and immediately ceased his questioning. Additionally, the prosecutor did
not object to the curative instruction or mention the testimony in closing remarks.
Consequently, we cannot hold that the prosecutor committed misconduct. Even
assuming that the questioning was improper, we cannot hold that Kirkland was denied
a fair trial. In light of the evidence before the jury, we cannot hold that a reasonable
probability exists that, absent the questioning by the prosecutor, the jury would have
found Kirkland not guilty.
{¶30} We overrule the first and second assignments of error.
Gruesome Photographs
{¶31} Next, Kirkland argues that the trial court erred by admitting gruesome
and repetitive photos, specifically, exhibits 4-A and 4-EE. Kirkland argues that the
two crime-scene photos depicting the victim’s body were graphic and repetitive with
minimal probative value because he did not contest “the manner, method, or cause of
[the victim’s] death.”
{¶32} “The admissibility of gruesome photographs in a noncapital case is
considered under Evid.R. 403.” State v. Davis, 2021-Ohio-1693, ¶ 45 (1st Dist.).
Under Evid.R. 403(A), a trial court must exclude evidence “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues,
or of misleading the jury.” We review a trial court’s decision that a photograph satisfies
11 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
this standard for an abuse of discretion. See id.
{¶33} Kirkland objected to exhibits 3-U and 3-Y, arguing they were graphic
because they showed the victim’s body. The State explained that 3-U was an overview
of the body to show its proximity to the door and how the body was discovered. 3-Y
showed the blood trail, the blood trail on the stairs and the proximity of the body to
the blood trail. The State argued that the photos contained “the most important piece
of evidence in the entire case” and helped to show the crime scene and investigation.
The court overruled the objection to the photos finding that the crime scene photos
were relevant.
{¶34} When the State presented two additional photos of the body, exhibits 4-
A and 4-EE, Kirkland objected because they were duplicative of the body photos in 3-
U and 3-Y, except that the photos in exhibit 4 contained evidence placards. The court
agreed that 4-A and 4-EE were duplicative and sustained the objection. In response,
the State removed 3-U and 3-Y.
{¶35} The criminalist who took the photos testified that exhibit 4-A depicted
the body as the police found it at the bottom of the stairs, and 4-EE showed the
relationship to the body of the blood drops, labeled with placards E and F. Placard E
delineated the first blood spot inside the foyer, and placard F delineated the blood
drop on the first stair. The criminalist swabbed the blood drops for DNA. Each swab
was packed separately in a box, which was marked by the placard letter to distinguish
the locations of the drops. The forensic biologist testified that the blood spot in the
entryway, placard E, matched Kirkland, and placard F matched the victim.
{¶36} Exhibit 4-A “illustrated the testimony of the detectives who described
the crime scene,” and also was “probative of [the defendant’s] intent and the manner
and circumstances of the victims’ deaths.” See State v. Mammone, 2014-Ohio-1942,
12 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
¶ 98; State v. Trimble, 2009-Ohio-2961, ¶ 135 (“These photographs were relevant to
show the position of the victims’ bodies at the scene.”). Exhibit 4-EE was relevant to
show the location of the blood drop that matched Kirkland and illustrated the
testimony of the forensic biologist who tested the blood drops depicted in the photos.
Under these circumstances, the probative value of the two photos outweighed the
danger of unfair prejudice to Kirkland. See Mammone at ¶ 100.
{¶37} Accordingly, we overrule the third assignment of error.
Consecutive Sentences
{¶38} In his sixth assignment of error, Kirkland argues that the trial court
erred by imposing consecutive sentences because the record did not support the
findings.
{¶39} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a), an appellate court may review the trial
court’s consecutive-sentence findings, and it may “increase, reduce, or otherwise
modify” consecutive sentences only if it “clearly and convincingly” finds that the record
does not support the trial court’s findings. “An appellate court’s inquiry is limited to
a review of the trial court’s R.C. 2929.14(C) findings.” State v. Glover, 2024-Ohio-
5195, ¶ 44; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
{¶40} Ohio law contains a statutory presumption of concurrent sentences for
defendants convicted of multiple offenses. State v. Galinari, 2022-Ohio-2559, ¶ 9 (1st
Dist.). “The general principle set forth in the Revised Code is that concurrent
sentences are the default and consecutive sentences are the exception.” State v.
Hitchcock, 2019-Ohio-3246, ¶ 21. To impose consecutive sentences, a sentencing
court must make the mandatory sentencing findings prescribed by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
See Galinari at ¶ 9, citing State v. McKinney, 2022-Ohio-849, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.). A trial
court must make three distinct findings: (1) “the consecutive service is necessary to
13 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender,” (2) “consecutive
sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to
the danger the offender poses to the public,” and (3) one or more of R.C.
2929.41(C)(4)’s subsections apply. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
{¶41} Here, Kirkland concedes that the court made the requisite findings and
argues that the record does not support consecutive sentences because the following
finding was confusing, “These two or more multiple offenses committed as a single
course of conduct aren’t so great and so unusual not to reflect the seriousness of the
conduct, that you are a felon with a gun. You shot his stepfather. And your history
shows consecutive terms that are needed to protect the public.”
{¶42} The record reflects that the trial court concluded that the harm caused
was the greatest harm a person can commit, and that his relationship with the victim
facilitated the offense. The court considered Kirkland’s prior convictions, including a
firearm conviction, and prior incarceration and found consecutive terms were
necessary to protect the public and not disproportionate to the seriousness of the
conduct and the danger he poses to the public. This record does not clearly and
convincingly fail to support the trial court’s findings. We overrule the sixth assignment
of error.
Sentencing Hearing
{¶43} In his seventh assignment of error, Kirkland challenges the fairness of
his sentencing hearing because the trial court referenced “the lowest circle of hell”
during the hearing. Specifically, Kirkland argues that the court unconstitutionally
expressed religious beliefs by stating “it’s the lowest circle of hell for people to violate
14 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
and portray a felony.1 The worst of the worst.”
{¶44} The Ohio Supreme Court has acknowledged that “a sentencing judge’s
religious comments may violate an offender’s due process rights when they reveal an
‘explicit intrusion of personal religious principles as the basis of a sentencing
decision.’” State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 222 (2000), quoting United States v.
Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 741 (4th Cir. 1991). In Arnett, the Court held that the trial court
did not violate due process by referring to the Bible while contemplating an
appropriate sentence and quoting a biblical passage. Id. at 212. The Court further
held that a court’s religious expression “does not violate the offender’s right to due
process, when the judge adheres to the sentencing procedures outlined in the Revised
Code and when the judge’s religious references do not impair the fundamental fairness
of the sentencing proceeding.” Id.
{¶45} Here, during the sentencing, the victim’s wife, younger sister, niece,
brother, and cousin addressed the court. They expressed their profound sadness and
pain, the betrayal they felt, and Kirkland’s lack of remorse. The court made the
comment after hearing their statements and discussing the great harm, pain and
sadness that Kirkland caused. Kirkland does not contend that the court failed to
properly consider the required sentencing factors, and the record reflects that the
sentencing judge properly considered the principles and purposes of felony sentencing
and the seriousness and recidivism factors. Thus, the religious reference did not affect
the fundamental fairness of the sentencing. See id.
{¶46} Accordingly, we overrule the seventh assignment of error.
Postrelease Control
1 The court may have said “betray a family.”
15 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶47} In the eighth assignment of error, Kirkland contends that the trial court
erred by imposing a period of postrelease control for murder.
{¶48} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated, “There’s no postrelease
control.” A few days later, the trial court conducted a second sentencing hearing, and
notified Kirkland of his mandatory postrelease-control requirements. The sentencing
entry reflected that the court imposed postrelease control on the murder conviction
and the WUD conviction. The last paragraph of the sentencing entry stated that
Kirkland was not subject to postrelease control “as this is a life sentence.”
{¶49} Because the trial court correctly informed Kirkland that there would be
no postrelease control for the murder conviction, we remand the matter to the trial
court to correct the sentencing entry via nunc pro tunc entry to remove the imposition
of postrelease control for the murder conviction.
{¶50} We overrule the eighth assignment of error.
Conclusion
{¶51} Having overruled Kirkland’s assignments of error, we affirm the
Judgment affirmed and cause remanded.
NESTOR and MOORE, JJ., concur.