State v. Kirk, Unpublished Decision (5-26-2004)

2004 Ohio 2667
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 26, 2004
DocketC.A. No. 21635.
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2004 Ohio 2667 (State v. Kirk, Unpublished Decision (5-26-2004)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Kirk, Unpublished Decision (5-26-2004), 2004 Ohio 2667 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
{¶ 1} Appellant, Dustin Kirk, appeals from his conviction for breaking and entering, rendered by a jury in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. We affirm.

I.
{¶ 2} On January 28, 2003, Appellant was indicted on one count of breaking and entering, in violation of R.C. 2911.13(A). Appellant entered a plea of not guilty and the matter proceeded to a jury trial, which began on June 2, 2003. The jury found Appellant guilty of breaking and entering, and the trial court sentenced Appellant to six months in prison.

{¶ 3} Appellant timely appealed, raising two assignments of error, which we have consolidated for ease of review.

II.
Assignment of Error No. 1
"The trial court erred in denying the appellant's oral motion for directed verdict pursuant to Criminal Rule 29 because the appellee presented insufficient evidence in order to meet each and every element of the offense of breaking and entering pursuant to R.C. 2911.13."

Assignment of Error No. 2
"The jury erred in finding the appellant guilty of breaking and entering pursuant to R.C. § 2911.13 because said findings of guilt were against the manifest weight of the evidence."

{¶ 4} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues that his conviction for breaking and entering is not supported by sufficient evidence. In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree with both arguments.

{¶ 5} As a preliminary matter, we note that sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight of the evidence are distinct legal concepts. State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, paragraph two of the syllabus. When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must determine whether the prosecution has met its burden of production, while a manifest weight challenge requires the court to examine whether the prosecution has met its burden of persuasion. Id. at 390 (Cook, J., concurring).

{¶ 6} On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, "`the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493,2003-Ohio-4396, at ¶ 50, quoting Jackson v. Virginia (1979),443 U.S. 307, 319.

{¶ 7} When a defendant asserts that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court must:

"review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered." State v. Otten (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 339,340.

{¶ 8} Only in the exceptional case, where the evidence presented weighs heavily in favor of the defendant, will the appellate court reverse and order a new trial. Id.

"Because sufficiency is required to take a case to the jury, a finding that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence must necessarily include a finding of sufficiency. Thus, a determination that [a] conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency." (Emphasis omitted). State v. Roberts (Sept. 17, 1997), 9th Dist. No. 96CA006462, at 4.

{¶ 9} R.C. 2911.13(A) provides that: "No person by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in an unoccupied structure, with purpose to commit therein any theft offense, as defined in [R.C. 2913.01], or any felony."

{¶ 10} At trial, the State presented testimony from several witnesses, including Daniel DeVenture (the alleged victim), and three police officers: Officer James Cunningham, Detective Candace Grubb, and Detective Pierre Irvine. Their testimony discloses the following account of the events leading to the charges against the Appellant.

{¶ 11} Daniel DeVenture lives with his girlfriend in a house on Triplett Boulevard, in Akron. Shortly after 6:00 a.m. on January 20, 2003, DeVenture's girlfriend arose to make coffee and noticed that the garage door had been opened. She alerted DeVenture to the open door, and he began to investigate. He walked out to his driveway, where he observed two sets of footprints in the fresh-fallen snow. The prints led to both doors of his vehicle, which was parked in the driveway, and continued into his garage. DeVenture noticed that a large tool box was missing from his garage. He surmised that someone had opened the unlocked driver's side door of his vehicle, and then used the automatic garage door opener inside the car to gain access to his garage and take the tool box. DeVenture then asked his girlfriend to call the police. While waiting for the police to arrive, DeVenture began to track the footprints, focusing his attention on one of the sets, which had a particularly distinctive tread.

{¶ 12} Officer Cunningham of the Akron Police Department responded to the scene at approximately 7:40 a.m. After speaking with DeVenture, Officer Cunningham investigated the tracks surrounding DeVenture's vehicle, noticing that one set of the prints had an unusually distinct tread pattern. He followed the pattern from the vehicle to the garage, then down the driveway. Officer Cunningham continued to follow the prints eastbound on Triplett Boulevard, observing that they traveled through several yards and up several driveways, and then back out to Triplett Boulevard. He noticed that the prints went up to several vehicles which were parked in driveways, and that the prints led up to the newspaper box of one of the homes on Triplett Boulevard.

{¶ 13} At this point in his investigation, according to Officer Cunningham, "it became obvious * * * that the person who was delivering papers on Triplett Boulevard that morning was the same person that made the shoe prints in Mr. DeVenture's driveway." Officer Cunningham contacted his sergeant, requesting assistance; Detective Grubb of the Akron Police Department's crime scene unit arrived shortly thereafter. After speaking with Officer Cunningham, Detective Grubb began to take photographs of the footprints.

{¶ 14} Meanwhile, Officer Cunningham contacted the Akron Beacon Journal and learned that Jana Rollison was the carrier assigned to the neighborhood where DeVenture lived. After Detective Grubb finished taking photographs of the scene, she accompanied Officer Cunningham to Rollison's neighborhood, where they met a third Akron police officer, Officer Meadows. The three proceeded to Rollison's home.

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Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
State v. Moore, Unpublished Decision (12-17-2003)
2003 Ohio 6817 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2003)
State v. Otten
515 N.E.2d 1009 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1986)
State v. Thompkins
678 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1997)
State v. Williams
794 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2003)

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Bluebook (online)
2004 Ohio 2667, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-kirk-unpublished-decision-5-26-2004-ohioctapp-2004.