State v. . King

Supreme Court of North Carolina

State v. . King

74 N.C. 177

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedJanuary 5, 1876

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 74 N.C. 177 (State v. . King) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. . King, 74 N.C. 177 (N.C. 1876).

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Opinion

Bynum, J.

This case is governed by tbe decisions In tbe State v. Ray, 1 Ired. 39, and tbe State v. Covington, 70 N. C., 71, where it is held, that to constitute a forcible trespass, there must be some demonstration of force, as distinguished from mere words, as by a display of weapons, or other outward signs of violence, or by numbers, which supply the place of force, and are equally calculated to intimidate or put in fear, as was tbe case _of tbe State v. Armfield, 5 Ired., 307, *179 and State v. Pearman, Phil. 371, cited by the Attorney Gfen-eral. There was no such parade of force or numbers in our •case, but bare words only. There is error.

The other count, for cheating by false pretenses, on the intimation of the court that it could not be sustained, was abandoned by the Solicitor. Perhaps, as framed, it is insufficient, but the attention of prosecuting officers is called to the case of the State v. Phifer, 65 N. C. 321, and the law of this State, as there announced, as affording an indictable remedy in most cases of fraud and meanness like this. It is there laid down that where there is a false representation of a subsisting fact, calculated to deceive, whether the representation be in writing or in words or in acts, by which the defendant obtains something of value from another without compensation to him, it is indictable as a cheat by false pretenses. The defendant here, in substance, represented to the merchant, that he had the money in his pocket, and would pay down the-cash as soon as the cloth was measured, and, by this false rep-resention, obtained the goods. I incline to think that Phifer’s case covers this, but the question is not now presented, and we do not decide it. Certain it is, that unless such offences' can be thus reached, it is incumbent upon the Legislature, in these times of homesteads and exemptions, where a civil action affords no redress, to protect society and trade against such dishonesty, by some adequate legislation.

Per Curiam. Judgment reversed and venire de novo„

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Bynum, J.

This case is governed by tbe decisions In tbe State v. Ray, 1 Ired. 39, and tbe State v. Covington, 70 N. C., 71, where it is held, that to constitute a forcible trespass, there must be some demonstration of force, as distinguished from mere words, as by a display of weapons, or other outward signs of violence, or by numbers, which supply the place of force, and are equally calculated to intimidate or put in fear, as was tbe case _of tbe State v. Armfield, 5 Ired., 307, *179 and State v. Pearman, Phil. 371, cited by the Attorney Gfen-eral. There was no such parade of force or numbers in our •case, but bare words only. There is error.

The other count, for cheating by false pretenses, on the intimation of the court that it could not be sustained, was abandoned by the Solicitor. Perhaps, as framed, it is insufficient, but the attention of prosecuting officers is called to the case of the State v. Phifer, 65 N. C. 321, and the law of this State, as there announced, as affording an indictable remedy in most cases of fraud and meanness like this. It is there laid down that where there is a false representation of a subsisting fact, calculated to deceive, whether the representation be in writing or in words or in acts, by which the defendant obtains something of value from another without compensation to him, it is indictable as a cheat by false pretenses. The defendant here, in substance, represented to the merchant, that he had the money in his pocket, and would pay down the-cash as soon as the cloth was measured, and, by this false rep-resention, obtained the goods. I incline to think that Phifer’s case covers this, but the question is not now presented, and we do not decide it. Certain it is, that unless such offences' can be thus reached, it is incumbent upon the Legislature, in these times of homesteads and exemptions, where a civil action affords no redress, to protect society and trade against such dishonesty, by some adequate legislation.

Per Curiam. Judgment reversed and venire de novo„

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74 N.C. 177, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-king-nc-1876.

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