State v. Kidd

2025 Ohio 3167

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 5, 2025
• Docket: 2025-CA-3
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Kidd, 2025-Ohio-3167.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 2025-CA-3 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CR 143 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas AARON THOMAS KIDD : Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION

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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on September 5, 2025, the judgment

of the trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE

LEWIS, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. -2- OPINION CHAMPAIGN C.A. No. 2025-CA-3

JACOB S. SEIDL, Attorney for Appellant JANE A. NAPIER, Attorney for Appellee

HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Aaron Thomas Kidd appeals from his conviction, following a guilty plea, to one

count of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (“OVI”), with a specification

for an additional prison term for certain repeat OVI offenders. For the reasons that follow,

the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} Around midnight on October 5, 2024, Kidd committed multiple traffic infractions

in Urbana before crashing his vehicle into a tree and fleeing on foot. He was later found

hiding in nearby bushes and was arrested. On October 7, 2024, Kidd was indicted on one

count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer and one count of OVI with

the specification for an additional prison term as a repeat offender.

{¶ 3} On December 2, 2024, at a pretrial conference, Kidd admitted multiple bond

violations involving positive tests for alcohol and THC. On December 11, 2024, Kidd

entered his guilty plea to OVI and the attendant specification, and the other charge was

dismissed. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a prison sentence of 60 months for OVI,

plus a mandatory five years on the specification to be served prior and consecutively to the

sentence.

Assignments of Error and Analysis

{¶ 4} Kidd’s three assignments of error relate to sentencing, and we will address

them together. In the text of his first assignment of error, Kidd claims that the trial court -3- erred in imposing the maximum aggregate sentence of ten years. In the body of this

assignment, Kidd claims that the trial court relied upon unsubstantiated allegations in a

pending petition for a protection order against him in imposing the maximum sentence, which

violated his right to due process.

{¶ 5} In his second assignment of error, Kidd argues that the “proportionality and

consistency” requirement of R.C. 2929.11(B) violates due process. According to Kidd, “the

absence of reliable sentencing data directly undermines defense counsel’s constitutional

duty to provide effective assistance. Without objective data, counsel are significantly

hindered in their ability to advocate meaningfully regarding consistency and proportionality.”

Kidd asks this Court to declare the proportionality requirement “void for vagueness and

unenforceable until adequate empirical resources are made available to defense counsel.”

{¶ 6} Finally, in his third assignment of error, Kidd argues that the court failed to apply

the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 in a manner

consistent with established scientific and medical authority regarding addiction. Citing his

“extraordinary childhood trauma,” including the discovery of the murdered bodies of his best

friend and his friend’s father at the age of 13, harsh corporal punishment as a child, and

childhood sexual abuse, Kidd argues that his experiences “correlate with significant

psychological harm and can heighten the severity of addiction.” Kidd argues that the court

oversimplified how persistent trauma can complicate a defendant’s ability to maintain

sobriety and abide by bond conditions, and he contends that the court’s “unscientific views”

prevented it from applying the purposes and principles of sentencing appropriately.

According to Kidd, “the widely accepted model of addiction treats relapse as a common

phase of recovery – not a sign of irredeemable failure.” Kidd claims that the court treated

his alcoholism as “fully volitional, willful disobedience.” -4- {¶ 7} The State responds that Kidd is attempting to improperly obtain a de novo

review by challenging the validity of the trial court’s findings, notwithstanding that the

legislature and the Ohio Supreme Court have clearly stated that appellate courts may not

review sentences de novo.

{¶ 8} We will first review the sentencing transcript and the reasoning stated in the trial

court’s judgment.

Sentencing

{¶ 9} At sentencing, the court indicated that it accepted Kidd’s childhood trauma as

true but noted that, “when somebody provides information in mitigation that occurs when

they were young, . . . the longer they are from the incident and the more intervening

opportunities they had for treatment, the lower level of effectiveness or weight that mitigation

evidence should be given.” The court also noted Kidd’s criminal history of 32 adult

convictions from 1991 to 2024. The court found it reasonable to infer that Kidd’s struggles

with alcohol and drugs were rooted in his childhood experiences but pointed out that he had

had prior opportunities “to pull [himself] out of that situation.” Of particular note, the court

observed that Kidd had previously served a prison term for the same conduct and, in this

circumstance, had crashed his car into a tree and could have killed himself, and yet he had

tested positive for alcohol three times in October and November 2024, gone to an alcohol

detox program, and then again tested positive for alcohol in December 2024 and January

2025. The court stated:

And so when we look at the purposes and principles of sentencing and

we look at has Aaron Thomas Kidd been deterred from committing the same

kinds of behavior and we look at your conduct on bond and we look at your

history of alcohol and what alcohol has led to when you are drinking, which is -5- the eight OVIs. And when we look at the fact that even though this time you

were still testing positive for alcohol, even after you went through the detox

program and even after this case is hanging over your head, it is difficult for

the Court to accept, number one, your attorney’s statement that you are as

close as you’ve ever been to staying sober for an extended period of time. . . .

And, number two, to the extent that relapse may be part of recovery,

that used to be, in the Court’s view, 1970’s and 1980’s thinking when people

talk about cocaine addiction. In today’s world of drug abuse, the Court slaps

back at that. And I’m not saying this is a case like that. But Fentanyl and

heroin don’t give you the opportunity to relapse because they will put you in

the ground. But to the extent that we want to say, well, relapse is part of

recovery when it comes to alcoholism, you have demonstrated through your

criminal history that when you get drunk, bad things happen. Meaning, you

get drunk and you’ve had eight prior OVIs. And putting an exclamation mark

on all of it.

Judgment Entry

{¶ 10} The judgment entry of conviction reflected that the court had considered the

presentence investigation report (“PSI”), the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth

in R.C. 2929.11, and the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12. The

judgment entry also stated that while Kidd was on bond, his girlfriend (who was also the

registered owner of the vehicle Kidd was operating at the time of his OVI arrest) had filed a

petition for a protection order. She alleged that, while intoxicated, Kidd made separate

threats to have a third party harm and/or kill her child, engaged in forced sexual conduct

against her, and made threats that he possessed a firearm. -6- {¶ 11} The court made findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.11. Specifically, the court

found that Kidd’s sentence was consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes

committed by similar offenders.

Applicable Law

{¶ 12} “When reviewing felony sentences, a court of appeals must apply the standard

of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G).” State v. Williams, 2022-Ohio-2897, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.),

citing State v. Farra, 2022-Ohio-1421, ¶ 73 (2d Dist.). Under that statute, an appellate court

may increase, reduce, or modify a sentence, or vacate it altogether and remand for

resentencing, if it clearly and convincingly finds that either (1) the record does not support

certain specified findings or (2) the sentence imposed is contrary to law. State v. Worthen,

2021-Ohio-2788, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 13} We “may not independently ‘weigh the evidence in the record and substitute

[our] judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance

with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.’ ” State v. Bartley, 2023-Ohio-2325, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), quoting

State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 42. “The inquiry is simply whether the sentence is

contrary to law. A sentence is contrary to law when it falls outside the statutory range for

the offense or if the sentencing court does not consider R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id.,

citing State v. Dorsey, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.)

{¶ 14} The three overriding purposes of felony sentencing are “to protect the public

from future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the

effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines

accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local

government resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). “To achieve those purposes, the sentencing

court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and -7- others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of

the offense, the public, or both.” Id. A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably

calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony sentencing, “commensurate

with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and its impact upon

the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar

offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B).

{¶ 15} R.C. 2929.12 addresses several factors to be considered by the trial court

when imposing a sentence under R.C. 2929.11, underscoring that a court imposing a

sentence upon an offender for a felony has discretion to determine the most effective way

to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11. R.C.

2929.12(A). R.C. 2929.12(B) through (F) then set out factors for the court to consider

relating to matters such as the seriousness of the offender's conduct, the likelihood of the

offender's recidivism, and the offender's service in the armed forces of the United States.

The trial court may also “consider any other factors that are relevant to achieving those

purposes and principles of sentencing.” R.C. 2929.12(A). Put differently, “a trial court is

not confined to those factors when determining an appropriate sentence.” State v. Bodkins,

2011-Ohio-1274, ¶ 42 (2d Dist.).

This court has recognized that a trial court may rely on “a broad range of

information” at sentencing. State v. Bowser, 186 Ohio App.3d 162, 926

N.E.2d 714, 2010–Ohio–951, ¶ 13. “The evidence the court may consider is

not confined to the evidence that strictly relates to the conviction offense

because the court is no longer concerned . . . with the narrow issue of guilt.”

Id. at ¶ 14, 926 N.E.2d 714. Among other things, a court may consider

hearsay evidence, prior arrests, facts supporting a charge that resulted in an -8- acquittal, and facts related to a charge that was dismissed under a plea

agreement. Id. at ¶ 15-16, 926 N.E.2d 714. “[B]ased on how the court

perceives true facts in a case, it may believe that the offender committed a

crime other than, or in addition to, the one to which he pleaded.” Id. at ¶ 20,

926 N.E.2d 714. Notably, a court may consider “allegations of uncharged

criminal conduct found in a PSI report[.]” Id. at ¶ 15, 926 N.E.2d 714.

Id. at ¶ 43.

{¶ 16} Despite the implication in Kidd’s brief, consistency and proportionality in

sentencing are not the same. State v. Moore, 2014-Ohio-5135, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.). “For

purposes of R.C. 2929.11(B), ‘consistency’ relates to the sentences in the context of

sentences given to other offenders; ‘proportionality’ relates solely to the punishment in the

context of the offender’s conduct (does the punishment fit the crime).” Id. Kidd relies on

R.C. 2929.11(B), which requires that a sentence imposed for a felony be “consistent with

sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”

. . . [S]entencing consistency is not derived from the trial court's comparison of

the current case to prior sentences for similar offenders and similar offenses.

State v. Lloyd, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2006-L-185, 2007-Ohio-3013, ¶ 51, citing

State v. Spellman, . . . 2005-Ohio-2065, . . . ¶12 (11th Dist.). Instead, “it is

the trial court's proper application of the statutory sentencing guidelines that

ensures consistency.” Id., quoting State v. Swiderski, 11th Dist. Lake No.

2004-L-112, 2005-Ohio-6705, ¶ 58. The factors and guidelines contained in

R.C. 2929.12, R.C. 2929.13, and R.C. 2929.14, along with R.C. 2929.11,

create consistency in sentencing. Id., quoting State v. Quine, 9th Dist. Summit

No. 20968, 2002-Ohio-6987, ¶ 13. Thus, in order to show a sentence is -9- inconsistent, a defendant must show the trial court failed to properly consider

the statutory guidelines and factors. Id.

State v. Anthony, 2019-Ohio-5410, ¶ 154 (11th Dist.).

{¶ 17} Finally, the trial court cited several statutes that govern sentencing for a third-

degree felony OVI offense with a specification for an additional prison term for certain repeat

OVI offenders (like Kidd). R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(e)(i) applies specifically to an offender who

has previously been convicted of OVI and is being sentenced for a felony OVI offense under

R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), such as Kidd. The statute mandates a specific sentencing

framework for such offenders, including a mandatory term of one to five years if the offender

is also convicted of a repeat offender specification under R.C. 2941.1413 (as specified in

Kidd’s indictment). The repeat offender specification applies when the offender has been

convicted of five or more equivalent OVI offenses within the past 20 years. See also R.C.

2929.13(G)(2). The sentence for the specification must be served prior to and

consecutively to the sentence for the underlying felony. See State v. South, 2015-Ohio-3930,

¶ 19. “The General Assembly's decision to punish repeat drunk-driving offenders more

harshly than other criminal offenders speaks volumes about the purpose of the

punishment—to deter people from driving drunk and unnecessarily placing Ohioans at risk

and to punish those who choose to do so more than twice in a ten-year period.” State v.

O’Malley, 2022-Ohio-3207, ¶ 69.

{¶ 18} R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) applies to specific third-degree felonies that are

considered more serious, and it authorizes definite prison terms ranging from 12 to 60

months. This includes a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A) if the offender has previously been

convicted of a violation of that section that was a felony.

{¶ 19} Based upon the foregoing, Kidd’s three assignments of error lack merit. -10- Kidd’s aggregate sentence of ten years was not contrary to law. The court was free to

consider the information contained in the PSI regarding his girlfriend’s petition for a

protection order against Kidd in imposing sentence, particularly because the alleged conduct

involved the use of alcohol. The court properly considered the statutory guidelines and

factors, and Kidd has not shown that his sentence was inconsistent with other sentences.

Finally, Kidd mischaracterizes the record in asserting that the court treated his alcoholism

as “willful disobedience.” The court merely noted that Kidd had had several opportunities

for rehabilitation in multiple prior alcohol-related cases but had not been deterred from

drinking and driving. Kidd’s ongoing inability to control his alcohol consumption, his

behavior when intoxicated, his failure to obey law enforcement, his lack of compliance with

pretrial services, and his failure to respond favorably to treatment in the past were significant

to the court. Kidd’s assignments of error are overruled.

{¶ 20} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

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LEWIS, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.