State v. Kerrigan

860 N.E.2d 816, 168 Ohio App. 3d 455, 2006 Ohio 4279
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedAugust 18, 2006
DocketNo. 2005-CA-114.
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 860 N.E.2d 816 (State v. Kerrigan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Kerrigan, 860 N.E.2d 816, 168 Ohio App. 3d 455, 2006 Ohio 4279 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).

Opinions

*458 Fain, Judge.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Patrick Kerrigan, appeals from his conviction and sentence upon five counts of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance, in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3). Kerrigan argues that the evidence is insufficient, that the trial judge, who was the finder of fact in his bench trial, applied an incorrect standard of law to the evidence, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for having failed to move for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s case.

{¶ 2} With respect to four of the five counts upon which Kerrigan was convicted, we conclude that the video materials do not support a conviction, because they do not involve a lewd exhibition or a graphic focus on the genitals. Therefore, we agree with his contention that these convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence, these convictions are reversed, and Kerrigan is ordered discharged as to these convictions.

{¶ 3} With respect to the fifth count upon which Kerrigan was convicted, which was based upon his possession of a brochure advertising video materials, we conclude that a reasonable finder of fact might find that this brochure involves a lewd exhibition or a graphic focus on the genitals. We agree with Kerrigan, however, that the trial judge, acting as the finder of fact in his bench trial, applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating this evidence. Accordingly, Kerrigan’s conviction on this count is reversed, and this cause is remanded for reconsideration of the verdict on this count.

{¶ 4} Our disposition of Kerrigan’s first assignment of error renders moot his second assignment of error, which asserts ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

I

{¶ 5} In June, 2004, Detective Craig Poison, of the Beavercreek Police Department, acting undercover, contacted Kerrigan about purchasing certain nudist videos. They met the same day, and Poison attempted to negotiate a purchase of videos. During the transaction, Kerrigan became apprehensive and attempted to terminate the transaction. Kerrigan was arrested and consented to a search of his vehicle, resulting in the seizure of three videotapes, one DVD, and a brochure, which became the basis for Kerrigan’s indictment on five counts of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance, in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3).

{¶ 6} Kerrigan waived his right to a jury. Following a bench trial, Kerrigan submitted a posttrial memorandum, the state submitted a posttrial memorandum, and Kerrigan submitted a response to the state’s memorandum. The trial court *459 entered a decision announcing its verdict of guilty on all five counts, which included the trial court’s legal reasoning. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Kerrigan to five years of community-control sanctions, and advised him that violation of the terms of the community-control sanctions would lead to a prison sentence of 11 months on each of the five counts, to be served concurrently.

{¶ 7} From his conviction and sentence, Kerrigan appeals.

II

{¶ 8} Kerrigan’s first assignment of error is as follows:

{¶ 9} “The court erred when it found the defendant-appellant guilty of counts one, two, three, four and five of the indictment when said findings were not supported by sufficient evidence.”

{¶ 10} Although this assignment of error is framed exclusively in terms of insufficiency of the evidence, Kerrigan also argues, in support of this assignment of error, that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating the evidence.

A. The Legal Standard for Illegal Use of a Minor in Nudity-Oriented Material

{¶ 11} R.C. 2907.323, under which Kerrigan was charged and convicted, provides:

{¶ 12} “(A) No person shall do any of the following:

{¶ 13} “(3) Possess or view any material or performance that shows a minor who is not the person’s child or ward in a state of nudity, unless one of the following applies:

{¶ 14} “(a) The material or performance is sold, disseminated, displayed, possessed, controlled, brought or caused to be brought into this state, or presented for a bona fide artistic, medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental, judicial, or other proper purpose, by or to a physician, psychologist, sociologist, scientist, teacher, person pursuing bona fide studies or research, librarian, clergyman, prosecutor, judge, or other person having a proper interest in the material or performance.

{¶ 15} “(b) The person knows that the parents, guardian, or custodian has consented in writing to the photographing or use of the minor in a state of nudity and to the manner in which the material or performance is used or transferred.”

{¶ 16} Because all of the materials upon which Kerrigan’s convictions are based show persons who are indisputably minors, in states of nudity, who Kerrigan *460 stipulated at trial were not his children or wards, and because Kerrigan has never claimed that either of the lettered exceptions to R.C. 2907.323(A)(3) applies, this case would be easily disposed of but for the interpretation of R.C. 2907.323(A) set forth in State v. Osborne, sub nom. State v. Young (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 249, 525 N.E.2d 1363, and Osborne v. Ohio (1990), 495 U.S. 103, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98.

{¶ 17} State v. Young involved a constitutional attack upon R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), based upon the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, on the theory that the private possession of child pornography cannot be outlawed. In holding that R.C. 2907.323(A)(3) does not violate the First Amendment, the Ohio Supreme Court gave it a restrictive interpretation. In his opinion for the court, Justice Douglas noted that the statute “does not expressly limit the prohibited state of nudity to a lewd exhibition or a graphic focus on the genitals.” 37 Ohio St.3d at 251, 525 N.E.2d 1363. In his initial analysis following this observation, Justice Douglas focuses upon the purpose of the statute as prohibiting the possession or viewing of material depicting nude minors when that conduct is not morally innocent, “i.e., the possession or viewing of the described material for prurient purposes.” Id. at 252, 525 N.E.2d 1363. But in the following paragraph, where the statute is expressly construed, the focus is entirely on the character of the material or performance itself, rather than on the presence or absence of a prurient purpose in possessing or viewing it:

{¶ 18} “As we construe it today, R.C. 2907.323(A)(3) prohibits the possession or viewing of material or performance of a minor who is in a state of nudity, where such nudity constitutes a lewd exhibition or involves a graphic focus on the genitals, and where the person depicted is neither the child nor the ward of the person charged.”

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Bluebook (online)
860 N.E.2d 816, 168 Ohio App. 3d 455, 2006 Ohio 4279, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-kerrigan-ohioctapp-2006.