State v. Kepler

2026 Ohio 223

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 26, 2026
• Docket: CA2025-04-026
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Kepler, 2026-Ohio-223.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

CLINTON COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, : CASE NO. CA2025-04-026 Appellee, : OPINION AND vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY 1/26/2026 AARON R. KEPLER, :

Appellant. :

:

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLINTON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CRI 2024-5022

Brian A. Shidaker, Clinton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nicholas R. Smith, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Cicero Adams, LLC, and Jay A. Adams, for appellant.

____________ OPINION

SIEBERT, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Aaron Kepler, appeals from his conviction in the Clinton County

Court of Common Pleas for improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle. Upon

review, we conclude that the search of Kepler's vehicle was a lawful search incident to Clinton CA2025-04-026

arrest, supported by probable cause arising from his traffic violation and impairment while

operating a vehicle. Furthermore, we find that Kepler's conviction is supported by

sufficient evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly,

we overrule both assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Factual and Procedural Background

January 9, 2024

{¶ 2} On January 9, 2024, Officers Jonathan Pullin and Homer Wisecup of the

Wilmington Police Department observed a blue pickup truck, driven by Kepler, traveling

without an illuminated rear license plate. The officers then saw Kepler make a right-hand

turn followed immediately by a left-hand turn into a United Dairy Farmers ("UDF") gas

station. Thereafter, Kepler pulled up to a gas pump, and the officers initiated a traffic stop.

Kepler exited his vehicle and refused commands to return to the driver's seat. Upon

contact, Officer Pullin noted that Kepler's speech was slurred and that he emitted an odor

of an alcoholic beverage. Officer Pullin also observed that Kepler had difficulty

maintaining his balance and saw an empty beer can in the bed of the truck.

{¶ 3} Kepler admitted to consuming one beer and stated that he had smoked

marijuana a few hours earlier. During the encounter, Kepler was "not very compliant" and

became "aggressive at certain points." Officer Pullin requested assistance from the Ohio

State Highway Patrol for field sobriety testing. Sergeant Michael Ross subsequently

arrived and administered the tests.

{¶ 4} Sergeant Ross testified that Kepler was unable to follow the stimulus during

the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, rendering the test invalid. Sergeant Ross then

conducted additional tests, including the walk-and-turn and the one-leg stand tests. On

the walk-and-turn test, Kepler exhibited seven of eight impairment clues, such as moving

his feet to maintain balance, failing to touch heel-to-toe, and walking backward contrary

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to instructions. On the one-leg stand test, Kepler displayed all four impairment clues,

including swaying, hopping, placing his foot down, and quitting after only a few seconds.

{¶ 5} Sergeant Ross also asked Kepler to count backward from 67 to 52. Kepler

stopped at "57 or 58" and asked what number he was supposed to reach. In addition to

these test results, Sergeant Ross observed that Kepler's eyes were red, bloodshot, and

glossy, his pupils were dilated, he swayed while standing, and he struggled to follow

directions. Based on these observations, Sergeant Ross concluded that Kepler was under

the influence of alcohol. Kepler was arrested and cited for operating a vehicle under the

influence ("OVI") and failing to illuminate his rear license plate.1

{¶ 6} During a search of Kepler's vehicle, officers located multiple, loaded

firearms. On February 23, 2024, a Clinton County Grand Jury indicted Kepler on one

count of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(D)(1),

a fifth-degree felony.

Motion to Suppress and Subsequent Hearing

{¶ 7} On August 1, 2024, Kepler filed a motion to suppress, arguing that no

violation of the rear license plate statute had occurred, that the field sobriety tests were

improperly administered, and that all evidence obtained following his arrest should be

suppressed as the "fruit of the poisonous tree."

{¶ 8} The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on September 18, 2024. The

State presented testimony from Officer Pullin and Sergeant Ross. Officer Pullin testified

that he observed Kepler driving without an illuminated rear license plate, making an

improper turn into the UDF gas station, and exhibiting signs of impairment during the stop.

He noted that Kepler emitted an odor of an alcoholic beverage, swayed, had difficulty

1. The record provides no additional details regarding the original charges. The case was subsequently bound over and proceeded exclusively on the improper handling charge. -3- Clinton CA2025-04-026

maintaining balance, and an open beer can was visible in the truck bed. Officer Pullin

also testified that Kepler was uncooperative and slipped his handcuffs from behind his

back in front of him. Sergeant Ross testified regarding the administration of the field

sobriety tests and his reasons for concluding that Kepler was under the influence.

{¶ 9} Following the hearing, the trial court received written arguments from both

parties. After taking the matter under advisement, the court issued a decision on

November 19, 2024, denying Kepler's motion to suppress. The court found that the initial

traffic stop was valid based on probable cause that Kepler's rear license plate was not

illuminated, that there was probable cause to arrest Kepler for operating a vehicle under

the influence, and that the subsequent search of the vehicle was a lawful search incident

to arrest.

Trial and Verdict

{¶ 10} The matter proceeded to a jury trial. The State presented testimony from

Officer Wisecup and Sergeant Ross regarding the incident and their interactions with

Kepler. The State also called Patrick McLaughlin, a firearms examiner with the Miami

Valley Regional Crime Lab, who testified that the firearms recovered from Kepler's vehicle

were operable. At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Kepler moved for acquittal

pursuant to Crim.R. 29, which the trial court denied. Kepler then rested without calling

any witnesses.

{¶ 11} The jury returned a verdict finding Kepler guilty of improperly handling

firearms in a motor vehicle. The trial court sentenced Kepler to community control and

imposed a six-month term of incarceration in the Clinton County Jail. Kepler now appeals,

raising two assignments of error for review.

Appeal

I. Motion to Suppress

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{¶ 12} In his first assignment of error, Kepler argues that the trial court erred in

denying his motion to suppress evidence.2

{¶ 13} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed

question of law and fact. State v. Owensby, 2022-Ohio-1702, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.). The trial

court, as the trier of fact, is in the best position to weigh the evidence to resolve factual

questions and evaluate witness credibility. State v. Casey, 2014-Ohio-2586, ¶ 16 (12th

Dist.). Therefore, when reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, this

court is bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent,

credible evidence. State v. Lynn, 2018-Ohio-3335, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.). "An appellate court,

however, independently reviews the trial court's legal conclusions based on those facts

and determines, without deference to the trial court's decision, whether as a matter of law,

the facts satisfy the appropriate legal standard." State v. Cochran, 2007-Ohio-3353, ¶ 12

(12th Dist.).

{¶ 14} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Bowling

Green v. Godwin, 2006-Ohio-3563, ¶ 11. A traffic stop is constitutionally valid where an

officer has probable cause or a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe a motorist

committed any criminal violation, including a minor traffic offense. Owensby at ¶ 16.

{¶ 15} Ohio recognizes two types of lawful traffic stops. State v. Ratliff, 2020-Ohio-

3315, ¶ 6 (12th Dist.). The first is a non-investigatory stop based on probable cause

arising from an observed traffic violation. Id. The second is an investigative or "Terry"

stop, which occurs when an officer has a reasonable suspicion based upon specific and

2. Kepler styled his motion to suppress as a "motion to suppress/dismiss," and he adopts the same approach in his appellate brief. However, the arguments he advances for suppression and dismissal are identical. Regardless of how Kepler characterizes his position—whether as a motion to suppress or a motion to dismiss—those arguments are overruled. -5- Clinton CA2025-04-026

articulable facts that criminal behavior has occurred or is imminent. State v. Hinkston,

2020-Ohio-6903, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.) citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).

{¶ 16} When law enforcement stops a driver in a vehicle based on probable cause

that a traffic violation has occurred, the stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Dayton v. Erickson, 1996-Ohio-431, syllabus. During such a stop, an officer may detain

the motorist for the time reasonably necessary to issue a citation and complete routine

procedures, including checking the driver's license, registration, and vehicle plates. State

v. Hill, 2015-Ohio-4655, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.). The authority for the stop ends when tasks

related to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—complete. State v.

Shaibi, 2021-Ohio-1352, ¶ 26 (12th Dist.). However, the detention may be extended when

additional facts arise that give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal

activity beyond the original purpose of the stop. State v. Batchili, 2007-Ohio-2204, ¶ 15.

In such cases, an officer may detain the vehicle for a reasonable period to confirm or

dispel that suspicion. State v. Williams, 2010-Ohio-1523, ¶ 18 (12th Dist.).

{¶ 17} Here, officers stopped Kepler after observing that he was operating a

vehicle without an illuminated rear license plate, in violation of R.C. 4513.05 ("Either a tail

light or a separate light shall be so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a white

light the rear registration plate, when such registration plate is required, and render it

legible from a distance of fifty feet to the rear."). Officer Pullin testified that Kepler's vehicle

had no light illuminating the rear plate. Kepler argues that the law enforcement did not

have reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop "solely because he did not see a

light in the license plate area of the vehicle." Kepler makes much of the fact that Officer

Pullin could not recall if the plate was legible from 50 feet because that is the "purpose"

of the statute. Kepler's argument is without merit. Under Ohio law, a vehicle must have a

light that illuminates the rear license plate, and that light must comply with the 50-foot

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legibility standard. Kepler's car had no light illuminating the rear license—if there's no

light, that light cannot "render" anything legible, from any distance. Based upon the

officer's observations regarding the missing light, the officers initiated a lawful non-

investigatory traffic stopped based upon probable cause.

{¶ 18} But our review of the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress does not

end at the missing rear light. The next question is whether additional facts gave rise to

the officers' reasonable, articulable suspicion that Kepler was engaged in criminal activity

beyond the original purpose of the stop, which would legally justify extending the stop into

a "Terry" stop. In short, they did.

{¶ 19} We are unpersuaded by Kepler's citations to cases holding the defendant

smelling of an alcoholic beverage without testimony regarding the intensity or strength of

the odor cannot support a reasonable and articulable suspicion of OVI. Upon approaching

the vehicle, Officer Pullin detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage and observed

additional indicia of impairment, including slurred speech, difficulty maintaining balance,

and an open beer can in the truck bed. These observations provided Officer Pullin with a

reasonable and articulable suspicion that Kepler was operating a vehicle under the

influence, legally justifying extending Kepler's detention beyond the initial traffic stop.

Batchili, 2007-Ohio-2204, at ¶ 15.

{¶ 20} Officer Pullin requested assistance from the Ohio State Highway Patrol to

conduct standardized field sobriety tests; the patrolman arrived within ten minutes of

Pullin's request. Kepler argues this delay amounted to an unconstitutional prolonged

detention of Kepler. Notably, Kepler did not argue to the trial court that the delay

associated with awaiting Sergeant Ross' arrival was impermissible. A ten minute delay to

ensure that a field sobriety test is conducted by an officer with a higher degree of relevant

training was not unreasonable when the officer considered the totality of the

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circumstances. See Hinkston, 2020-Ohio-6903, at ¶ 18. Upon arrival, Sergeant Ross

administered multiple field sobriety tests and concluded that Kepler was under the

influence. The officers subsequently arrested Kepler and searched his vehicle incident to

arrest. State v. Pirpich, 2007-Ohio-6745, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.). While Kepler argues otherwise,

we find that both the traffic stop and the arrest were supported by probable cause.

Kepler's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. The officers acted appropriately in

each step of the investigation, culminating in the lawful search incident to arrest. See

Owensby, 2022-Ohio-1702, at ¶ 26. We therefore find no constitutional infirmity in either

the traffic stop or the subsequent search that resulted in the discovery of the firearms.

{¶ 21} Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Kepler's motion to suppress.

Kepler's first assignment of error is overruled.

II. Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence

{¶ 22} In his second assignment of error, Kepler contends that his conviction was

not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 23} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a conviction, an

appellate court examines the evidence to determine whether such evidence, if believed,

would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Paul, 2012-Ohio-3205, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.). Therefore, "[t]he relevant inquiry is

whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond

a reasonable doubt." Id.

{¶ 24} A manifest weight of the evidence challenge examines the "inclination of

the greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side of the issue

rather than the other." State v. Barnett, 2012-Ohio-2372, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.). To determine

whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the reviewing court

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must look at the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider

the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether in resolving the conflicts in the

evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of

justice that the conviction must be reversed, and a new trial ordered. State v. Graham,

2009-Ohio-2814, ¶ 66 (12th Dist.). As we have previously stated, a finding that a

conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence is also dispositive of the

issue of sufficiency. State v. Whitt, 2018-Ohio-1257, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.).

{¶ 25} Kepler was convicted of improper handling of a firearm in a vehicle in

violation of R.C. 2923.16(D)(1), which provides that "[n]o person shall knowingly transport

or have a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle if, at the time of that transportation or

possession. . . [t]he person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a

combination of them." The plain language of this statute does not require the defendant

to be convicted of a separate OVI charge to sustain a conviction under the improper

handling of a firearm statute.

{¶ 26} After reviewing the record, we conclude that Kepler's conviction for

improper handling of a firearm in a vehicle was supported by sufficient evidence and was

not against the manifest weight of the evidence. There is no dispute that Kepler was the

driver of the vehicle and that loaded firearms were present. However, Kepler argues that

because the Clinton County Grand Jury did not indict him on an OVI charge, the State

failed to prove he was "under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse or a combination

of them." This argument rests solely on Kepler's "understanding" of the grand jury

proceedings, which is not part of the record. Grand jury proceedings are secret, and a

defendant may inspect transcripts only upon a showing of particularized need

outweighing the need for secrecy. State v. Greer, 66 Ohio St.2d 139 (1981), paragraph

two of the syllabus. Here, Kepler made no such showing, nor is there any indication that

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he made any attempt to do so. Accordingly, his claim that the grand jury declined to indict

on OVI—and that this somehow undermines his conviction for improper handling of a

firearm in a vehicle—is speculative and unsupported by the record. State v. Thompson,

2021-Ohio-2632, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.) (appellate courts will not speculate or guess about

matters not reflected in the record).

{¶ 27} Kepler also argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that he was under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them,

asserting that the testimony was inconsistent or insufficient. We disagree. In this case,

the testimony revealed that Kepler performed poorly on multiple field sobriety tests,

exhibiting seven of eight clues on the walk-and-turn test and all four clues on the one-leg

stand test. Kepler also failed the counting test and displayed physical signs of impairment,

including red, bloodshot eyes, dilated pupils, swaying, and drooping eyelids. Sergeant

Ross concluded that Kepler was under the influence of alcohol. Despite Kepler's

arguments, the jury was in the best position to assess witness credibility and weigh the

evidence. State v. Brown, 2021-Ohio-2381, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.). The jury did not lose its way

or create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that reversal is warranted. Accordingly,

Kepler's second assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 28} Judgment affirmed.

HENDRICKSON, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.

JUDGMENT ENTRY

The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.

It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Clinton County Court of Common

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Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.

Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.

/s/ Robert A. Hendrickson, Presiding Judge

/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Judge

/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge

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