[Cite as State v. Kent, 2024-Ohio-4851.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MAHONING COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
STEVEN E. KENT,
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Case No. 23 MA 0104
Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio Case No. 2022 CR 00189
BEFORE: Cheryl L. Waite, Mark A. Hanni, Katelyn Dickey, Judges.
JUDGMENT: Affirmed. Stay of Execution Terminated.
Atty. Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General and Atty. Andrea K. Boyd, Assistant Attorney General, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Atty. John B. Juhasz, for Defendant-Appellant
Dated: September 16, 2024 –2–
WAITE, J.
{¶1} Appellant Steven E. Kent appeals his conviction and sentence on one count
of tampering with evidence. Appellant argues that the jury conviction was based on
insufficient evidence on all the material elements of the crime. The charge arose after
Appellant, who was a police officer and school resource officer at Poland High School,
was accused of sexually assaulting a student. The same day that the abuse was being
reported to high school officials, he erased all information from his cell phone. He was
later charged with sexual battery and tampering with evidence. The record shows that
Appellant sent the victim’s cell phone many texts, images, and videos from his cell phone.
The data on Appellant's phone would have been valuable as evidence against him
regarding the assault charges. The timing of the erasure of evidence, as well as his
knowledge as a police officer that an investigation was likely to start, support the jury
verdict for tampering with evidence.
{¶2} Appellant also argues that his one-year prison sentence was
disproportionate. Appellant did not provide the sentencing transcript for this appeal.
Therefore, we must presume the regularity of the trial court sentencing proceedings
regarding this issue. Additionally, the one-year sentence was well within the 9-to-36-
month range of prison sentences for a third degree felony, and the court's sentencing
entry stated that the court complied with the requirements of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12
in sentencing Appellant. Appellant's arguments are not persuasive and are not supported
by the record. His two assignments of error are overruled, and his conviction and
sentence are affirmed.
Case No. 23 MA 0104 –3–
Facts and Procedural History
{¶3} On April 7, 2022, Appellant was indicted on three counts of sexual battery
pursuant to R.C. 2907.03(A)(1), third degree felonies; and one count of tampering with
evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a third degree felony. The charges arose out
of Appellant's relationship with a minor student at Poland Seminary High School (aka
Poland High School) in Mahoning County. At the time, Appellant was 54 years old and a
police officer, working at the school as a school resource officer. He exchanged many
messages and photos with the child, including nude photos. (Tr., pp. 60, 138.) He
eventually forced her to have oral sex with him. (Tr., pp. 60, 132.) An investigation took
place after an extra-marital girlfriend of Appellant, who knew and was in contact with the
victim, reported the abuse to the high school principal. The principal then contacted the
police. The same day that the crime was reported, Appellant performed a reset of his cell
phone, permanently and irretrievably deleting all the data.
{¶4} The case went to jury trial on August 7, 2023. The state called seven
witnesses. The witnesses included the victim, Appellant's extra-marital girlfriend Carla
Bobbey, a social worker who interviewed the victim, two special agents and an analyst
from the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI), and Chief of Police Greg Wilson
from the Poland Township Police Department. Appellant called one witness (his
daughter), and personally testified.
{¶5} In 2020, Appellant was the school resource officer at Poland High School.
He became a police officer in 2002 and worked as an officer in Poland Township starting
in 2009. He received additional training in 2013 to become a school resource officer,
taking that position for Poland schools in 2014. He was responsible for students from
Case No. 23 MA 0104 –4–
kindergarten through twelfth grade. A school resource officer acts as both a police officer
and a liaison between the police department and the school. The duties of the school
resource officer were to function as a police officer to protect the students and teachers
from violence, act as a counselor, and to engage in educational activities such as health
class, drug awareness, and "stranger danger." (Tr., p. 531.) While Appellant was
employed by the school, he continued as a Poland Township police officer. He remained
in this dual capacity of police officer and school resource officer throughout the time of
his relationship with the victim.
{¶6} Appellant began speaking to the victim, C.C., one-on-one starting in 2019.
She was in the tenth grade. She had been aware of him for a number of years as the
school resource officer but did not speak to him until he approached her in 2019. Both
C.C. and Appellant had recently experienced the loss of close family members, and he
ostensibly wanted C.C. to speak to his own teenage daughter about her grief issues.
Appellant and C.C. began contacting each other at the high school, but in early 2020 they
began meeting outside of school. They also communicated extensively by text message,
Snapchat, and Instagram. When Appellant began making comments about her body,
C.C. was afraid to challenge him about this behavior. Appellant then began sending nude
photos of himself, including pictures of his penis. C.C. also began sharing with him
intimate photos of herself. They each exchanged approximately 50 photos.
{¶7} Sometime during C.C.'s sophomore year, a friend of hers saw Appellant's
name in C.C.'s phone contact list. The friend told her mother about it, who then made
C.C. call Appellant and tell him they must stop communicating with each other. While
communications did appear to briefly stop, this did not last long. Appellant began asking
Case No. 23 MA 0104 –5–
C.C. to meet him away from school at places in the community while he was on duty as
a Poland Township Police Officer. During these encounters, Appellant would touch C.C.’s
body, while in police uniform.
{¶8} In C.C.'s junior year they began meeting during both Appellant’s on-and off-
duty time. The first time they kissed was in Appellant's truck. He informed her he had a
gun in the truck at the time, which she found intimidating.
{¶9} By early 2021, they were meeting outside of school several times per week
and the relationship became more physical. Appellant "made it clear what he wanted,
and [C.C.] felt threatened to agree." (Tr., pp. 132-133.) C.C. performed oral sex on
Appellant three times during this period. Appellant told C.C. not to save any
communications on her phone, because other police officers were becoming suspicious.
He was also constantly on guard that no one see them together in public.
{¶10} During this same time, Carla Bobbey and Appellant were having an
extramarital affair. In May of 2021, Bobbey and Appellant attended a Cleveland Indians
baseball game, and a photo of the two of them together was posted on Snapchat. The
photo eventually circulated to both Bobbey's and Appellant's families, as well as to C.C.
{¶11} Bobbey was the mother of one of C.C.'s friends. On June 1, 2021, Bobbey
found out from C.C. that Appellant and C.C. were communicating with each other. The
next day Bobbey told Appellant to stop contacting C.C., or she would tell his wife and
C.C.'s father about the relationship. C.C. was 17 years old at this time.
{¶12} On the evening of June 5, 2021, Bobbey texted C.C. to meet and discuss
Bobbey's recent conversation with Appellant. They met for over an hour. C.C. told
Bobbey that she was in a sexual relationship with Appellant and that she had performed
Case No. 23 MA 0104 –6–
oral sex on him multiple times. This was the first time Bobbey had heard about the sexual
aspects of their relationship. Bobbey told C.C. that they had to tell someone about the
relationship, because it was wrong and was not normal. That evening Bobbey called
Appellant via FaceTime, which provides both audio and video communication. She told
Appellant that she was going to report what C.C. had told her to both C.C.'s father and to
the school. (Tr., p. 265.) Appellant volunteered to quit his job and leave the community.
Bobbey responded, "that's not how this is gonna go, because my fear was this would
happen somewhere else." (Tr., p. 265.)
{¶13} On the morning of June 6, 2021, Bobbey had a face-to-face meeting with
the principal of Poland High School, Kevin Snyder. Snyder and Bobbey then contacted
C.C. and her father and asked them to come to the school immediately for an important
discussion. They did meet at the school to discuss the relationship between Appellant
and C.C., and during this meeting the principal specifically stated that he intended to
contact the local police. Snyder did contact Police Chief Greg Wilson of the Poland
Township Police Department on June 6, 2021. A formal investigation began on June 7,
2021. Various staff from Ohio BCI became involved. One important part of the
investigation was collection and examination of digital sources of information, such as cell
phones, laptops, and tablets. During the investigation, Appellant's cell phone was taken
as evidence. An examination of the phone revealed that a factory reset had been
performed on the phone at 12:54 p.m. on June 6, 2021. Appellant admitted at trial that
he had done the factory reset, himself, on June 6, 2021.
Case No. 23 MA 0104 –7–
{¶14} The evidence at trial showed that Appellant had experience with conducting
investigations, including sexual assault investigations, and that he knew the law
concerning sexual battery and tampering with evidence.
{¶15} On August 14, 2023, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty as to the three
counts of sexual battery, but convicted Appellant of tampering with evidence. Appellant
was sentenced on September 20, 2023. The court imposed a one-year prison term and
the sentencing entry was filed on September 22, 2023. The notice of appeal was filed on
September 28, 2023. Appellant filed a motion for stay of execution of sentence, which
was granted by this Court on October 3, 2023. Appellant raises two assignments of error
on appeal.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS COUNT 4, AND IN
SENTENCING THE APPELLANT THEREON.
{¶16} Appellant contends that his conviction for tampering with evidence was
based on insufficient evidence of guilt. Appellant claims that this crime could only have
been proven if it was shown that an official investigation was in progress or was about to
be initiated, and that he knew about this investigation. Based on Appellant's reading of
the record, at the time he reset the phone there was no imminent investigation, so the
crime of tampering with evidence could not have been committed. Even if an investigation
was about to commence on, or about, the time he erased his phone, he claims there is
no evidence he knew anything about such an investigation. He contends the state did
not connect the erasure of the phone’s data to any criminal purpose or activity at the time
Case No. 23 MA 0104 –8–
the phone was erased. Therefore, he concludes that there was insufficient evidence to
convict him of the crime.
{¶17} “Sufficiency of the evidence is a legal question dealing with adequacy.”
State v. Pepin-McCaffrey, 2010-Ohio-617, ¶ 49 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins, 78
Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). “Sufficiency is a term of art meaning that legal standard
which is applied to determine whether a case may go to the jury or whether evidence is
legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Draper, 2009-
Ohio-1023, ¶ 14 (7th Dist.); Thompkins at 386. When reviewing a conviction for
sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court does not determine “whether the state's
evidence is to be believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant
would support a conviction.” State v. Rucci, 2015-Ohio-1882, ¶ 14 (7th Dist.), citing State
v. Merritt, 2011-Ohio-1468, ¶ 34 (7th Dist.).
{¶18} In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence argument, the evidence and all
rational inferences are evaluated in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State v.
Goff, 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 138 (1998). A conviction cannot be reversed on sufficiency
grounds unless the reviewing court determines that no rational juror could have found the
elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
{¶19} Appellant was convicted of tampering with evidence as found in R.C.
2921.12(A)(1):
(A) No person, knowing that an official proceeding or investigation is
in progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted, shall do any of the
following:
Case No. 23 MA 0104 –9–
(1) Alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or thing,
with purpose to impair its value or availability as evidence in such
proceeding or investigation.
{¶20} There are three elements to tampering with evidence: "(1) the knowledge
of an official proceeding or investigation in progress or likely to be instituted, (2) the
alteration, destruction, concealment, or removal of the potential evidence, (3) the purpose
of impairing the potential evidence's availability or value in such proceeding or
investigation." State v. Straley, 2014-Ohio-2139, ¶ 11.
{¶21} "Knowledge of a likely investigation may be inferred when the defendant
commits a crime that is likely to be reported . . . ." State v. Thompson, 2023-Ohio-2942,
¶ 34; State v. Martin, 2017-Ohio-7556, ¶ 118. Knowledge that a criminal investigation is
imminent is based upon a reasonable person standard. State v. Workman, 2015-Ohio-
5049, ¶ 51 (3d Dist.).
{¶22} Appellant argues that most of the communications between himself and
C.C. were by means of Snapchat, and that Snapchat communications are destroyed
automatically by the Snapchat software. He contends that the erasure and reset of his
phone had nothing to do with the deletion of his Snapchat messages. In other words,
there was no purposeful act involved in deleting the Snapchat messages because he
assumed they had already been deleted. C.C. testified, though, that Snapchat
communications can be automatically deleted or can be saved, so his argument is not
fully supported by the record. Appellant appears to concede that even if most of the
evidence of communication between him and C.C. would have disappeared
automatically, not all of it would automatically delete. Appellant essentially concedes that
Case No. 23 MA 0104 – 10 –
not all communications or evidence would have been automatically destroyed if not for
his actions.
{¶23} The testimony as to whether Snapchat communications are automatically
deleted was largely anecdotal and was not expert testimony. The state's BCI expert Erica
Moore, on the other hand, testified that she used special software to extract all the data
from Appellant's phone. She extracted a calendar, call log, chats, contacts, emails,
instant messages, notes, searched items, voice mails, web history, and all audio, image,
and video files. She also found a dot obliterated file that indicated when a factory reset
was performed on the phone. The date was June 6, 2021. She testified that when a
phone is reset all data is erased. Therefore, the only data on the phone of calls, emails,
messages, searches, web history, and media files was from June 6, 2021 and forward.
No data could be recovered, from Snapchat or otherwise, before June 6, 2021, because
Appellant erased it.
{¶24} Even if only one piece of evidence might have remained on his phone
relating to the sexual battery charges prior to his reset, that evidence would have
impacted trial in this matter. Any evidence from Instagram or text messages would not
have been automatically deleted. There were many photographs introduced at trial based
on C.C.'s text and Instagram records. C.C. testified that Appellant sent her nude photos
of him from his cell phone. Although C.C. deleted the sexually explicit photos, Appellant's
phone data may have corroborated C.C.'s testimony about the photos. Therefore, the
record refutes Appellant’s contention that his act of erasing the phone could not have
involved a purposeful decision to destroy evidence relating to crimes he committed
against C.C.
Case No. 23 MA 0104 – 11 –
{¶25} Appellant aims the bulk of his argument attempting to show there was no
official investigation of the matter until June 8, 2021, two days after he erased his phone.
The record reflects that the police department was contacted on June 7, 2021 and that
an investigation into the allegations began that day. He argues that he could not have
known about an active investigation on the day he erased his phone, June 6, 2021,
because no investigation was taking place that day. He discounts the testimony of his
ex-paramour Carla Bobbey because, according to Appellant, she threatened only to tell
C.C.'s father and Appellant's wife, and not police officials. The record reveals Appellant
is mistaken. He also argues that her threat to tell people about his relationship with C.C.
was conditioned on whether he stopped seeing C.C. The record shows that this condition
was his suggestion, not Bobbey's. Finally, he argues that there was no evidence Bobbey
had actually told anyone about his relationship with C.C. at the time he erased his phone.
The record shows that she told the school principal on June 6, 2021 (the same day
Appellant erased the phone), and then Bobbey attended a meeting with C.C., her father,
and the school principal so that C.C. could reveal the details of the relationship, including
her allegations of oral sex. (Tr., pp. 266-270.)
{¶26} Even if Bobbey had not disclosed to anyone C.C.’s sexual abuse on or
before June 6, 2021, the fact that she had knowledge of Appellant's sexual relationship
with the child, knew who to contact to report the improper sexual relationship, and
specifically told Appellant she was going to report it, was enough to establish that an
investigation was likely to take place. In addition, there was evidence that more and more
people were suspicious of the relationship, including fellow police officers. Even without
Case No. 23 MA 0104 – 12 –
Bobbey's testimony, the jury could infer that an investigation was inevitable and that
Appellant knew he would soon be questioned.
{¶27} Whether or not Bobbey told authorities about the relationship on or before
June 6, 2021 is not crucial in this case. The issue is whether her statement to Appellant
on June 5, 2021, that she intended to report Appellant’s unlawful relationship to
authorities would have led a reasonable person to believe that an investigation was likely
to begin imminently. Based on Appellant's knowledge as a police officer and school
resource officer, or simply using the knowledge of a 54-year old man being told that his
ex-girlfriend was going to report to a school official that he was having an affair with a 17-
year old high school student, a jury could infer that Appellant knew an investigation was
very likely imminent.
{¶28} It is not mere speculation to assume Appellant knew an investigation would
begin immediately after the school principal was told. Appellant had experience with
these types of investigations. (Tr. p. 454.) He knew what would take place if allegations
of sexual abuse were disclosed. (Tr., p. 560.) He was required to know the law
surrounding sexual battery and tampering with evidence. (Tr., p. 561.) Thus, Appellant
cannot claim he had no idea an investigation would take place soon after Bobbey told the
school principal about his relationship with C.C.
{¶29} Appellant relies primarily on two cases to argue that there was insufficient
evidence to support his conviction for tampering with evidence. In State v. Straley, 2014-
Ohio-2139, the court found insufficient evidence of tampering when Amanda Straley
threw away a baggie filled with cocaine after she was stopped for a minor traffic violation.
The baggie was only found after Straley was taken to the police station and then
Case No. 23 MA 0104 – 13 –
demanded she be allowed to urgently run outside to urinate. An officer found the baggie
on the ground in the spot where she had urinated. Because Straley was not being
investigated for any drug crime, or even for public urination, the court held there was no
ongoing or likely investigation that could possibly have been related to the disposal of the
baggie of cocaine.
{¶30} Straley is not particularly relevant to this appeal. Here, ample evidence
supports that an investigation was being initiated into Appellant’s unlawful relationship
with a minor and that Appellant was told about it directly by the person who reported the
crime. As a police officer, as well as being the school resource officer, Appellant was well
aware of the consequences that follow when a student reports a sexual crime to the
principal of the school, particularly when it involves a school employee. He knew or
should have known an investigation would have begun regarding these allegations
immediately, which coincided with his reset of his phone the next day. Unlike Straley,
Appellant knew there would be an investigation into these specific allegations in this
appeal.
{¶31} The situation in State v. Barry, 2015-Ohio-5449 is similar to that in Straley.
The accused was caught having inserted a condom filled with heroin into her vagina. The
circumstances of her arrest, however, again started with a traffic stop. A friend of
Appellant had asked her to hide the heroin and promised to give her part of the proceeds
when the heroin was sold. Appellant and three others were pulled over for violating minor
traffic laws. Marijuana was found in the car during the stop. During the investigation of
the traffic stop and the discovery of marijuana, an officer suspected Barry had concealed
heroin inside a body cavity. She admitted it and removed the condom in the presence of
Case No. 23 MA 0104 – 14 –
a female officer. She was charged with trafficking and possession of heroin and with
tampering with evidence.
{¶32} The question in Barry was "[w]hether a person who hides evidence of a
crime that is unmistakable to him or her commits tampering with evidence in the absence
of evidence that a victim or the public would report a crime?” Barry at ¶ 1. The court held
that no, there was no evidence of tampering absent evidence that a victim or the public
would surely report the crime. "Ohio law does not impute constructive knowledge of an
impending investigation based solely on the commission of an offense[.]" Id. at ¶ 2. "In
this case, there is no evidence that at the time she concealed the heroin in her body in
Middletown, Ohio, Barry knew or could have known that a state trooper would stop her
car in Scioto County and begin an investigation of her for drug trafficking and drug
possession." Id. at ¶ 3.
{¶33} Just two years later the Ohio Supreme Court implicitly reversed, or at least
severely limited, Barry. State v. Martin, 2017-Ohio-7556. Martin involved tampering with
evidence in a case involving a shooting and murder. Along with the murder, David Martin
was charged with tampering after he burned the clothes he wore during the shooting.
Fully aware of its recent Barry holding, the Martin Court nevertheless concluded: "Barry
does not foreclose the possibility that knowledge of a likely investigation may be inferred
when the defendant commits a crime that is likely to be reported." Id. at ¶ 118. In other
words, whether a court can impute constructive knowledge of an impending investigation
solely based on the commission of the crime depends on the facts of the case. When a
homicide is involved, an investigation is almost certainly going to occur, and any
destruction of evidence may lead to a tampering charge.
Case No. 23 MA 0104 – 15 –
{¶34} Here, the state did not rely on the mere commission of the crime to impute
knowledge to Appellant that an imminent investigation would occur. The state relied on
Appellant's training as a police officer and school resource officer, testimony that other
police officers were suspicious of his relationship with C.C., the fact that Appellant was
showing concern that others would learn about the relationship, the fact that C.C. told
others about the sexual assaults, and Bobbey's statements that she was going to tell the
school principal about Appellant's sexual relationship with C.C. in order to prove such
knowledge. Bobbey met with Appellant on June 5, 2021 and told him directly that she
intended to report his conduct to the school. (Tr., pp. 264-265.) Appellant performed a
factory reset on his phone the next day, wiping out all data and preventing investigators
from reconstructing that data. Bobbey did in fact tell the principal on June 6, 2021 about
Appellant's sexual relationship with C.C. Principal Snyder reported the crime to Chief
Wilson. The investigation began the next day.
{¶35} The record contains sufficient evidence to establish the elements of
tampering with evidence, and Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO ONE
YEAR IN PRISON, AS SUCH A SENTENCE WAS DISPROPORTIONATE.
{¶36} Appellant contends that his one-year prison sentence is disproportionate to
other sentences for tampering with evidence. Appellant argues he had no prior criminal
record, the crime was a low-level non-violent felony, there was no harm to the victim, and
Case No. 23 MA 0104 – 16 –
that the felony sentencing law encourages the use of non-prison sentences for low-level
felony crimes, such as tampering with evidence.
{¶37} It appears that Appellant did not raise the issue of disproportionate
sentencing to the trial court, and therefore, the matter is waived. "Appellant waived his
disproportionate sentencing argument because he failed to raise it before the trial court."
State v. Tylke, 2022-Ohio-2010, ¶ 59 (7th Dist.). "[A]ppellant failed to raise this issue
before the trial court and has therefore waived all but plain error." State v. Ahmed, 2004-
Ohio-4190, ¶ 55. In addition, Appellant did not provide a sentencing transcript on appeal,
and relies solely on caselaw in making this argument. Without a sentencing transcript,
we cannot determine whether Appellant objected to the length of his sentence on the
ground that it was disproportionate. When a transcript is necessary to resolve the matter
raised on appeal, and no transcript is provided, a reviewing court will presume the
regularity of the trial court proceedings and affirm the judgment. "It is appellant's
responsibility to provide the court with a record of the facts, testimony, and evidence in
support of her assignments of error." State v. Bugaj, 2007-Ohio-964, ¶ 11 (7th Dist.).
"Absent a complete transcript of proceedings, we must presume the regularity of the
proceedings." State v. James, 2016-Ohio-4662, ¶ 10 (7th Dist.), citing Knapp v. Edwards
Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199 (1980).
{¶38} Even if Appellant had provided an appropriate transcript, there is otherwise
no basis in the record to challenge the sentence. "An appellate court may vacate or
modify any sentence that is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law only if the
appellate court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support
the sentence." State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 25. "Clear and convincing evidence
Case No. 23 MA 0104 – 17 –
is that measure or degree of proof * * * which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts
a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established." Cross v. Ledford, 161
Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶39} When determining whether a prison sentence is appropriate for a third-
degree felony, the sentence must be within the range provided for that sentence and must
comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing found in R.C. 2929.11 and
2929.12. See R.C. 2929.13(C). The trial court is not required to state its reasons or make
findings with respect to R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, but is only required to carefully
consider the factors. State v. Mathis, 2006-Ohio-855, ¶ 38.
{¶40} The one-year sentence is well within the 9-to-36 month range for third
degree felonies. Appellant’s real complaint is that he believes he should have received
the minimum sentence because he is a first-time offender. The trial court could have
relied on many factors in sentencing Appellant more than the minimum, including the
overall circumstances of this crime, involving a person in authority (who was also a police
officer) at the victim's high school initiating a sexual relationship with the victim and then
destroying evidence of that crime. We must keep in mind "that a sentencing court may
consider facts introduced at trial relating to other charges, even if the defendant has been
acquitted of those charges." State v. Hudson, 2017-Ohio-645, ¶ 41. Without a transcript
to establish that error occurred, we presume that the trial court did, in fact, carefully
consider all the relevant factors when imposing the one-year sentence.
{¶41} Appellant’s second assignment of is overruled.
Case No. 23 MA 0104 – 18 –
Conclusion
{¶42} Appellant argues that the state did not sufficiently prove the three elements
necessary to convict him of the crime of tampering with evidence. We disagree. The
state established the value of the potential evidence on Appellant's cell phone and that
he erased his phone the day after he was told his crime would be reported to school
authorities. Appellant also objects to the length of his sentence. Appellant did not provide
a sentencing transcript and it appears he did not raise this issue with the trial court.
Appellant received a one-year sentence, which is well within the 9-to-36 month range for
third degree felonies. Appellant's argument that his sentence is disproportionate is not
supported by any part of the record. Appellant's two assignments of error are overruled
and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The stay of execution of sentence that was
granted for this appeal is hereby terminated.
Hanni, J. concurs; see concurring opinion
Dickey, J. concurs.
Case No. 23 MA 0104 – 19 –
Hanni, J., concurring opinion.
{¶43} I respectfully concur with my colleagues and the majority opinion. I write
separately only to emphasize that Appellant’s experience as a police officer, and even
more specifically as a school resource officer, makes his argument that he could not have
been aware that an investigation was likely to ensue not credible. It is undisputed that
Appellant reset his cellphone after Bobbey told him she knew about his relationship with
C.C. and she was going to report it. Armed with this information, Appellant reset his
phone. These facts alone constitute sufficient evidence of tampering with evidence.
Case No. 23 MA 0104 [Cite as State v. Kent, 2024-Ohio-4851.]
For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, Appellant’s assignments of
error are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment
of the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. The stay of
execution of sentence that was granted for this appeal is hereby terminated. Costs to be
taxed against the Appellant.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.