1 This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 2 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 3 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 4 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 5 not include the filing date. 6 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
7 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
8 Plaintiff-Appellant,
9 v. NO. 30,697
10 LANCE PATRICK JOSEPH KELLY,
11 Defendant-Appellee.
12 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 13 Reed S. Sheppard, District Judge
14 Gary K. King, Attorney General 15 Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General 16 Albuquerque, NM
17 for Appellant
18 Chief Public Defender 19 Nancy Hewitt, Appellate Defender 20 Santa Fe, NM
21 for Appellee
22 MEMORANDUM OPINION
23 KENNEDY, Judge.
24 The State appeals from the district court’s dismissal based on a violation of 1 Defendant’s constitutional speedy trial rights. Our notice proposed to affirm and the
2 State filed a timely memorandum in opposition pursuant to a granted motion for
3 extension of time. We remain unpersuaded by the State’s arguments and therefore
4 affirm.
5 Issues
6 The State’s issues relate to the central contention that the district court erred in
7 dismissing the case based on speedy trial grounds. [DS 5-6] This Court applies the
8 four-factor balancing set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), to
9 determine whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been
10 violated. State v. Plouse, 2003-NMCA-048, ¶ 34, 133 N.M. 495, 64 P.3d 522. Under
11 the Barker test, we balance, in light of the facts and circumstances of the particular
12 case, (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the assertion of the
13 right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Id.
14 The first factor, the length of the delay, involves a two-fold inquiry. State v.
15 Laney, 2003-NMCA-144, ¶ 11, 134 N.M. 648, 81 P.3d 591. We consider first
16 whether the length of the delay was presumptively prejudicial, and, if so, we then
17 balance the four Barker factors to assess whether the defendant's constitutional rights
18 have been violated. State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 23, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d
19 387. We are deferential to the district court’s fact finding, but independently examine
2 1 the record to determine whether a speedy trial violation has taken place. State v.
2 Tortolito, 1997-NMCA-128, ¶ 6, 124 N.M. 368, 950 P.2d 811. We analyze speedy
3 trial claims on a case-by-case basis, examining all four factors in order to weigh the
4 conduct of both the prosecutor and defense, with no one factor as dispositive. State
5 v. Urban, 2004-NMSC-007, ¶ 11, 135 N.M. 279, 87 P.3d 1061.
6 Length of Delay and Assertion of the Speedy Trial Right
7 The State does not contest our analysis regarding the length of delay and
8 Defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial. [MIO 1-2] As addressed in our
9 notice, the twenty-five month delay exceeds the presumptively prejudicial fifteen-
10 month period by ten months, and the length of delay is weighed against the State.
11 Further, Defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial at least six times, which also
12 weighs this factor against the State.
13 Reasons for Delay
14 The State argues that “most of the delay in this case was justifiable and should
15 not be held against either party.” [MIO 3] We disagree and instead agree with the
16 district court’s conclusion that “the delay primarily rests with the State’s inability to
17 collect discovery and conduct witness interviews.” [RP 256] As noted by the district
18 court [RP 256], twenty-one days before the initial July 13, 2009, trial date, the State
19 added five more witnesses to its amended witness list and was unable to conduct
3 1 interviews before the scheduled trial [RP 256], thereby requiring an extension. [RP
2 104, 111] Further, although Defendant did not oppose the State’s initial two requests
3 for continuances and resultant six months of delay, [RP 30, 52, 147, 170-71] the
4 record provides that the lack of opposition was because the State had failed to provide
5 needed discovery with regard to safe house videos and interviews of the State’s
6 witnesses. [RP 147, 153, 168, 171, 178, 227] See, e.g., State v. Johnson,
7 2007-NMCA-107, ¶¶ 15, 25, 142 N.M. 377, 165 P.3d 1153 (holding that the delay
8 resulting from the state’s failure to make its witnesses available for pretrial interviews,
9 which in turn prevented the defendants from preparing for trial, was delay attributable
10 to the state and, thus, weighed against it for purposes of the speedy trial analysis). In
11 this regard, the State acknowledges that much of the delay was caused by locating and
12 providing a 2001 safe house interview tape. [MIO 4]
13 The State argues, however, that the delay should not be counted against the
14 State because the 2001 safe house interview was not readily accessible to the Second
15 Judicial District from the Thirteenth Judicial District and because it was not relevant
16 to the case. [MIO 4] The State’s assessment of the value of the safe house interview
17 to the defense is not a valid reason for any delay in providing the interview. And
18 while the State’s difficulty in accessing the records may not have been intentional or
19 to gain a strategic advantage, it is nevertheless weighed against the State. See Garza,
4 1 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 26 (providing that negligent delay weighs “less heavily but
2 nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
3 circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.”).
4 Apart from any discovery delays, the State also argues that “[a]pproximately
5 the last nine months of delay should be held either against Defendant or should be
6 considered justifiable delay and not held against either party.” [MIO 3] In this regard,
7 the State argues that the judge’s unexpected recusal on the day of the scheduled
8 January 25, 2010, trial [RP 140] which caused an additional six-month delay at the
9 end of the twenty-five month period should not be held against the State. However,
10 unlike State v. White, 118 N.M. 225, 226, 880 P.2d 322, 323, [MIO 5] where the delay
11 was caused by a judge’s surgery and recovery time, the delay in this case was caused
12 by the judge’s unexpected recusal and the resultant time it took to replace the judge
13 and schedule another trial. [MIO 6] We view this as falling within the administrative
14 burdens on the criminal justice system, which is considered negligent delay and is
15 weighed against the State. See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 29 (providing that delay
16 attributable to the unavailability of a judge is negligent delay for which the state is
17 responsible). Moreover, even if the final few months of the delay were to
18 accommodate defense counsel [MIO 6; RP 201, 204, 211], this does not negate the
19 greater amount of delay that was attributable to the State.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 2 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 3 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 4 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 5 not include the filing date. 6 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
7 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
8 Plaintiff-Appellant,
9 v. NO. 30,697
10 LANCE PATRICK JOSEPH KELLY,
11 Defendant-Appellee.
12 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 13 Reed S. Sheppard, District Judge
14 Gary K. King, Attorney General 15 Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General 16 Albuquerque, NM
17 for Appellant
18 Chief Public Defender 19 Nancy Hewitt, Appellate Defender 20 Santa Fe, NM
21 for Appellee
22 MEMORANDUM OPINION
23 KENNEDY, Judge.
24 The State appeals from the district court’s dismissal based on a violation of 1 Defendant’s constitutional speedy trial rights. Our notice proposed to affirm and the
2 State filed a timely memorandum in opposition pursuant to a granted motion for
3 extension of time. We remain unpersuaded by the State’s arguments and therefore
4 affirm.
5 Issues
6 The State’s issues relate to the central contention that the district court erred in
7 dismissing the case based on speedy trial grounds. [DS 5-6] This Court applies the
8 four-factor balancing set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), to
9 determine whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been
10 violated. State v. Plouse, 2003-NMCA-048, ¶ 34, 133 N.M. 495, 64 P.3d 522. Under
11 the Barker test, we balance, in light of the facts and circumstances of the particular
12 case, (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the assertion of the
13 right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Id.
14 The first factor, the length of the delay, involves a two-fold inquiry. State v.
15 Laney, 2003-NMCA-144, ¶ 11, 134 N.M. 648, 81 P.3d 591. We consider first
16 whether the length of the delay was presumptively prejudicial, and, if so, we then
17 balance the four Barker factors to assess whether the defendant's constitutional rights
18 have been violated. State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 23, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d
19 387. We are deferential to the district court’s fact finding, but independently examine
2 1 the record to determine whether a speedy trial violation has taken place. State v.
2 Tortolito, 1997-NMCA-128, ¶ 6, 124 N.M. 368, 950 P.2d 811. We analyze speedy
3 trial claims on a case-by-case basis, examining all four factors in order to weigh the
4 conduct of both the prosecutor and defense, with no one factor as dispositive. State
5 v. Urban, 2004-NMSC-007, ¶ 11, 135 N.M. 279, 87 P.3d 1061.
6 Length of Delay and Assertion of the Speedy Trial Right
7 The State does not contest our analysis regarding the length of delay and
8 Defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial. [MIO 1-2] As addressed in our
9 notice, the twenty-five month delay exceeds the presumptively prejudicial fifteen-
10 month period by ten months, and the length of delay is weighed against the State.
11 Further, Defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial at least six times, which also
12 weighs this factor against the State.
13 Reasons for Delay
14 The State argues that “most of the delay in this case was justifiable and should
15 not be held against either party.” [MIO 3] We disagree and instead agree with the
16 district court’s conclusion that “the delay primarily rests with the State’s inability to
17 collect discovery and conduct witness interviews.” [RP 256] As noted by the district
18 court [RP 256], twenty-one days before the initial July 13, 2009, trial date, the State
19 added five more witnesses to its amended witness list and was unable to conduct
3 1 interviews before the scheduled trial [RP 256], thereby requiring an extension. [RP
2 104, 111] Further, although Defendant did not oppose the State’s initial two requests
3 for continuances and resultant six months of delay, [RP 30, 52, 147, 170-71] the
4 record provides that the lack of opposition was because the State had failed to provide
5 needed discovery with regard to safe house videos and interviews of the State’s
6 witnesses. [RP 147, 153, 168, 171, 178, 227] See, e.g., State v. Johnson,
7 2007-NMCA-107, ¶¶ 15, 25, 142 N.M. 377, 165 P.3d 1153 (holding that the delay
8 resulting from the state’s failure to make its witnesses available for pretrial interviews,
9 which in turn prevented the defendants from preparing for trial, was delay attributable
10 to the state and, thus, weighed against it for purposes of the speedy trial analysis). In
11 this regard, the State acknowledges that much of the delay was caused by locating and
12 providing a 2001 safe house interview tape. [MIO 4]
13 The State argues, however, that the delay should not be counted against the
14 State because the 2001 safe house interview was not readily accessible to the Second
15 Judicial District from the Thirteenth Judicial District and because it was not relevant
16 to the case. [MIO 4] The State’s assessment of the value of the safe house interview
17 to the defense is not a valid reason for any delay in providing the interview. And
18 while the State’s difficulty in accessing the records may not have been intentional or
19 to gain a strategic advantage, it is nevertheless weighed against the State. See Garza,
4 1 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 26 (providing that negligent delay weighs “less heavily but
2 nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
3 circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.”).
4 Apart from any discovery delays, the State also argues that “[a]pproximately
5 the last nine months of delay should be held either against Defendant or should be
6 considered justifiable delay and not held against either party.” [MIO 3] In this regard,
7 the State argues that the judge’s unexpected recusal on the day of the scheduled
8 January 25, 2010, trial [RP 140] which caused an additional six-month delay at the
9 end of the twenty-five month period should not be held against the State. However,
10 unlike State v. White, 118 N.M. 225, 226, 880 P.2d 322, 323, [MIO 5] where the delay
11 was caused by a judge’s surgery and recovery time, the delay in this case was caused
12 by the judge’s unexpected recusal and the resultant time it took to replace the judge
13 and schedule another trial. [MIO 6] We view this as falling within the administrative
14 burdens on the criminal justice system, which is considered negligent delay and is
15 weighed against the State. See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 29 (providing that delay
16 attributable to the unavailability of a judge is negligent delay for which the state is
17 responsible). Moreover, even if the final few months of the delay were to
18 accommodate defense counsel [MIO 6; RP 201, 204, 211], this does not negate the
19 greater amount of delay that was attributable to the State.
5 1 In the end, although none of the delay in this case was the consequence of
2 intentional delay caused by the State, the case was nonetheless delayed ten months
3 beyond the presumptively prejudicial period for intermediate cases, predominantly
4 due to the State’s failure to complete discovery matters and to negligent and
5 administrative delay. Ultimately, it is the state’s burden to bring a defendant to trial.
6 See State v. LeFebre, 2001-NMCA-009, ¶ 9, 130 N.M. 130, 19 P.3d 825 (holding that
7 the state bears the primary responsibility for bringing cases to trial within a reasonable
8 time). We accordingly weigh the delay factor against the State. See Garza, 2009-
9 NMSC-038, ¶ 29 (providing that the weight counted against the state for a negligent
10 delay depends on the amount of time that has passed beyond the threshold required
11 to trigger the speedy trial inquiry).
12 Prejudice
13 As set forth in our notice, we consider three types of prejudice relevant to the
14 speedy trial analysis: (1) oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) the accused’s anxiety
15 and concern; and (3) the possibility of an impairment to the defense. See Plouse,
16 2003-NMCA-048, ¶ 51, 133 N.M. 495, 64 P.3d 522. To support a finding of
17 prejudice, “the evidence [must show] a nexus between the undue delay in the case and
18 the prejudice claimed.” Salandre v. State, 111 N.M. 422, 431, 806 P.2d 562, 571
19 (1991), modified on other grounds by Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 19-22.
6 1 In the present case, Defendant spent over two years in jail. [RP 259] Given
2 that ten of the twenty-five months exceeded the fifteen-month intermediate minimum,
3 we agree with the district court’s finding that the incarceration was oppressive. [RP
4 259] See State v. Moreno, 2010-NMCA-044, ¶ 37, 148 N.M. 253, 233 P.3d 782
5 (concluding that the defendant suffered some prejudice from being incarcerated
6 pending trial for almost two years); State v. Marquez, 2001-NMCA-062, ¶ 12, 130
7 N.M. 651, 29 P.3d 1052 (recognizing that the presumption that pretrial delay has
8 prejudiced the accused intensifies over time).
9 We further agree with the district court that Defendant’s defense was potentially
10 compromised as a result of the delay. [RP 260] See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 36
11 (recognizing that prejudice to the defense is the most serious type of prejudice).
12 During the delay beyond the presumptively prejudicial period, a witness (Defendant’s
13 girlfriend) whose testimony Defendant intended to offer in support of his character
14 died. [RP 229] We do not consider it determinative that Defendant’s girlfriend was
15 on the State’s witness list, rather than on Defendant’s witness list. [MIO 7] Instead,
16 we consider that Defendant planned to call his girlfriend for purposes of presenting
17 the jury “with a compelling picture [of Defendant] as the concerned and appropriate
18 parent he has been for his children and step children.” [RP 229] Because his
19 girlfriend died during the delay, Defendant was unable to preserve her testimony.
7 1 [MIO 8] And because this case appears to have boiled down to a swearing match
2 between Defendant and Victim, [RP 151, 224] we conclude that the loss of this
3 potential witness was prejudicial to the defense because she was intended to bolster
4 Defendant’s credibility.
5 We acknowledge the State’s argument that the girlfriend’s testimony was
6 irrelevant because she never observed any interactions between Defendant and the
7 Victim [MIO 7] (who was the daughter of a woman with whom Defendant “was a
8 roomer” DS 3) and because Defendant’s interactions with children other than the
9 Victim did not reflect on his guilt or innocence with regard to Victim. [MIO 8; RP
10 181] However, while Defendant may have been able to elicit testimony about his
11 treatment of children from his own children and step children [MIO 8] and while the
12 State questions the evidentiary weight of the evidence, it nonetheless was reasonable
13 for Defendant to assert that his girlfriend’s view of his interactions with children was
14 useful to his defense. See generally Rule 11-404(A)(1) NMRA (character of accused).
15 Last, while the girlfriend was deceased at the time the first judge considered and
16 denied Defendant’s previous January 8, 2010, motion to dismiss, [DS 5] it was within
17 the second judge’s prerogative as fact finder to determine that the loss of the witness
18 prejudiced Defendant, [RP 260-61] albeit perhaps only slightly. See State v. Marquez,
19 2001-NMCA-062, ¶ 12 (recognizing that the presumption that pretrial delay has
8 1 prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.
2 CONCLUSION
3 Having analyzed each of the Barker factors, we now balance them. Because all
4 of the Barker factors weigh against the State, including the prejudice factor, we
5 affirm. See Salandre, 111 N.M. at 425, 431, 806 P.2d at 565, 571 (concluding that it
6 was a “close case” but that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated where the
7 prejudice was slight and the other three factors weighed in his favor “but not
8 heavily”).
9 IT IS SO ORDERED.
10 ___________________________________ 11 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge
12 WE CONCUR:
13 ___________________________ 14 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
15 ___________________________ 16 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge