State v. Kellam

Superior Court of Delaware

State v. Kellam

DecidedMarch 31, 2026

Docket1506014357

StatusPublished

This text of State v. Kellam (State v. Kellam) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Kellam, (Del. Ct. App. 2026).

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Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) v. ) Crim. ID No. 1506014357 ) ) ) STEVEN KELLAM, ) ) Defendant. )

Submitted: March 24, 2026 Decided: March 31, 2026

ORDER DENYING RELIEF

This 31st day of March 2026, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion for

Correction of an Illegal Sentence and the record in this matter, it appears to the Court

that:

(1) On September 25, 2017, after a jury trial, Steven Kellam (“Defendant”)

was convicted of 38 criminal offenses, including one count of Racketeering, two

counts of First Degree Murder, three counts of Home Invasion, two counts of First

Degree Robbery, three counts of Second Degree Conspiracy, one count of First

Degree Attempted Robbery, one count of Third Degree Assault, one count of Second

Degree Assault, one count of Wearing a Disguise during the Commission of a

Felony, and 23 counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony “PFDCF”). On March 23, 2018,1 he was sentenced to two life sentences plus

769 years at Level 5.2 On June 13, 2019, his conviction was upheld by the Delaware

Supreme Court on direct appeal.

(2) On August 28, 2019, Defendant filed a timely pro se Rule 61 Petition

and Request for Appointment of Counsel. On October 15, 2021, Postconviction

Counsel, having been appointed, filed an Amended Rule 61 Petition. On May 22,

2024, I granted the Petition with respect to Defendant’s two convictions for First

Degree Murder (Counts 3 and 8) and the six related convictions for PFDCF (Counts

4, 5, 6, 9, 10 and 11) and vacated those convictions. I denied the Petition with

respect to the remaining convictions.

(3) On May 13, 2025, the Delaware Supreme Court held that trial counsel's failure

to object to a first-degree felony-murder jury instruction that was an incorrect

statement of law constituted deficient performance by trial counsel, but was not

prejudicial to Defendant's defense, as required for an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim. It affirmed the judgment but reversed the Superior Court's partial

grant of Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief and the vacatur of his felony-

murder convictions and related PFDCF offenses. It remanded the case for

1 This Sentence Order was modified on March 27, 2018, and corrected on August 2, 2018, to correct scrivener’s errors. 2 A chart is attached as Exhibit A hereto summarizing the Counts in the Indictment, the Offenses charged of which Mr. Kellam was convicted, the number of years of Level 5 incarceration given for each, and, where appropriate, additional comments. 2 reinstatement of those convictions and corresponding resentencing.

(4) On June 5, 2025, I vacated the 2018 Sentence Orders, reinstated the two

felony-murder convictions and resentenced Defendant to life for each. I also

reinstated the six PFDCF convictions and reinstated the 25-year Level V sentence

for each. The sentences for the rest of the convictions remained the same.3

(5) On July 25, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Modify Sentence.4 That Motion

was subsequently withdrawn.

(6) On March 24, 2026, Defendant pro se filed a Motion for Correction of Illegal

Sentence (the “Motion”),5 which claims that existing rules of constitutional law6

render his sentence invalid.7 The Court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.8

A sentence is illegal if it violates double jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to the

time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term

required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or

is a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.9 Here, I need only

3 The June 5, 2025, Sentence Order was corrected later on June 5, 2025, and again on June 11, 2025, to correct scrivener’s errors therein. 4 Pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b). 5 Pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a). The grounds for this Rule 35(a) Motion were different from the grounds for the earlier Rule 35(b) Motion. 6 Defendant cites Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which are precursors to the recent case of Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). 7 Defendant did not request the appointment of counsel to represent him in connection with the Motion. 8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a). 9 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 3 consult the Indictment and the 2025 Sentencing Orders to determine that Defendant

is not entitled to relief under the Motion. Defendant argues that his sentence was

illegally enhanced in violation of Apprendi, Blakely, and Erlinger which provide that

a fact that increases a defendant’s exposure to punishment, whether by triggering a

higher maximum or minimum sentence, must be submitted to a jury and found

unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.10 In this case, the sentencing judge

made no factual determinations that exposed Defendant to a higher maximum or

minimum sentence. He simply considered the enumerated aggravating factors that

guided his determination of an appropriate sentence within the statutory range under

Delaware law and the voluntary and nonbinding Delaware sentencing standards. The

Delaware Habitual Criminal Act wasn’t applied to any of Defendant’s sentences.

Thus, Apprendi, Erlinger and similar cases are not implicated. The factors

considered by the sentencing judge, whether aggravating or mitigating, are not

separate offenses used to enhance a sentence, but simply factors a sentencing judge

may consider in determining the proper sentence within the statutory range of

punishments.

This Court recently held that Erlinger is of no moment to first-degree murder

or PFDCF sentences.11 Delaware law mandates that, “[a]ny person who is convicted

10 See, e.g., Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). 11 State v. Johnson, 2025 WL 1431003 (Del. Super. May 19, 2025). 4 of first-degree murder for an offense that was committed after the person had reached

the person's eighteenth birthday shall be punished by imprisonment for the

remainder of the person's natural life without benefit of probation or parole or any

other reduction.”12 And anyone sentenced for baseline PFDCF must receive a

minimum three-year of imprisonment and may receive up to 25 years.13 Thus, Mr.

Johnson's first-degree murder and PFDCF sentences are each within the statutorily

prescribed ranges; neither was enhanced in any way on either the minimum or

maximum end.

(7) Even if Defendant’s PFDCF “stacking” claims were meritorious (which they

are not), that issue has “no significant current impact”:14 Defendant must serve the

rest of his natural life in prison for the two first-degree murders he committed. Thus,

any argument about the “stacking” of his PFDCF Level V terms does not appear to

present an “actual controversy” because he will never be made to serve it. 15

Consequently, this Court need not expend judicial resources to answer a question

that has no significant current impact.16

12 11 Del. C. § 4209(a); Id. at 636(b) (“Murder in the first degree is a class A felony and shall be punished ...

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