[Cite as State v. Keefer, 2019-Ohio-2419.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT HOCKING COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : : Case No. 19CA2 Plaintiff-Appellant, : : vs. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT : ENTRY CHRISTOPHER KEEFER, : : Defendant-Appellee. : Released: 06/13/19 _____________________________________________________________ APPEARANCES:
Benjamin E. Fickel, Hocking County Prosecutor, Logan, Ohio, for Appellant.
Timothy P. Gleeson, Logan, Ohio, for Appellee. _____________________________________________________________
McFarland, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Hocking County Court of Common
Pleas judgment entry granting Christopher Keefer’s motion to suppress
evidence obtained from a search warrant. Pursuant to the evidence
discovered from the search warrant, the State charged Appellee with seven
drug-related offenses. The State appeals the trial court’s judgment that
granted Appellee’s motion to suppress contending that 1) the trial court erred
when it found the affidavit for the search warrant did not sufficiently support
a finding of probable cause, and (2) the trial court erred when it found that Hocking App. No. 19CA2 2
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply to prevent
exclusion of the evidence recovered pursuant to the search warrant. Because
we sustain the State’s second assignment of error, we reverse the judgment
of the trial court and remand the cause for proceedings consistent with this
decision.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} On March 28, 2017, Detective Dustin Robison, seeking a search
warrant, filed an affidavit alleging that he had good cause to believe
numerous drug-related offenses were occurring at 18692 Laurel Run Road in
Nelsonville, Ohio. The following is a summary of the averments made in
Robison’s affidavit:
1. Robison was a detective with the Hocking County Sheriff’s Office
with fifteen years of experience and eight years of narcotics
experience, which familiarized him with the methods used by drug
traffickers.
2. On July 27, 2016, law enforcement received an anonymous tip that
drug trafficking was occurring at 18692 Laurel Run Road,
Nelsonville, Ohio 45764.
3. On August 8, 2016, the Hocking County Sheriff’s Office executed,
and attempted to serve, an arrest warrant on Appellee at the Laurel Hocking App. No. 19CA2 3
Run Road address, but Jessica Gilmore, Appellee’s girlfriend, said
that she had not seen Appellee for some time and did not know where
he was. Upon executing a consent search of the premises, officers
found $2,080.00 and three firearms. Gilmore stated that the money
was from illicit drug sales. The money and firearms were confiscated.
4. On March 25, 2017, a “reliable confidential informant” told detective
Downs that Appellee and Randy Loring were going to drive to
Columbus in a white Chevy Malibu to buy drugs to bring back to
Keefer’s residence, which he shares with Robin Zuransky, Denver
Hutchinson, and Jessica Gilmore.
5. Detectives unsuccessfully attempted to intercept Appellee and Loring
upon their return.
6. The informant stated that Hutchinson, Zuransky, and Appellee all had
outstanding warrants in other counties. Detective Downs verified that
the named individuals in fact did have outstanding warrants, including
Appellee for drug trafficking in Franklin County.
7. On March 27, 2017, the informant contacted the affiant and stated that
Appellee was again going to Columbus in the White Malibu to
purchase drugs, but officials decided not to act at that time. Hocking App. No. 19CA2 4
8. On March 28, 2017, the informant stated that Appellee, Gilmore,
Zuransky and Hutchinson were at the residence along with drugs,
money, and firearms.
9. The informant asserted that on March 28, 2017 Keefer was shooting
guns.
{¶3} Pursuant to the affidavit, a municipal judge signed the warrant.
In executing the warrant, the State alleges that law enforcement officers
recovered 60 grams of heroin, 10 grams of cocaine, 32 grams of
methamphetamines, 2 firearms, 2 cell phones, and $3,000.00 at the Laurel
Run Road address.
{¶4} On May 4, 2018, the State charged Appellee with possession of
heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(6)(E), trafficking in heroine in
violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)(C)(6)(F), possession of cocaine in violation
of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(4)(B), trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C.
2925.03(A)(1)(C)(4)(C), two counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs in
violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)(C)(1)(D), and having weapons while under
a disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), all with forfeiture
specifications in violation of R.C. 2941.1417.
{¶5} On October 2, 2018, Appellee filed a motion to suppress the
evidence obtained pursuant to a March 28, 2017 search warrant because it Hocking App. No. 19CA2 5
was defective and the evidence recovered from the warrant should be
suppressed. The State filed a motion in opposition.
{¶6} In a January 2, 2019 judgment entry, the trial court addressed
whether Detective Robison’s affidavit provided sufficient probable cause to
support the search warrant that had been issued. Generally, the trial court
determined the overall reliability of the confidential information, as well as
his or her assertions in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the affidavit were
not sufficiently corroborated, and the information regarding the issuance and
execution of the arrest warrant for Appellee made in paragraphs 3 and 4 was
stale.
{¶7} The court determined that “[t]he information in paragraphs 3 and
4, while stale, does provide some corroboration as to the CI’s tip. Some
further corroboration is provided in paragraph 4 as to a relationship between
[Appellee] and Ms. Gilmore.” But, ultimately, the court concluded that it
was not enough, under the totality of the circumstances, to find that there
was probable cause to support the warrant.
{¶8} The court then set a hearing to determine if the evidence should
be suppressed under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The
court indicated that this judgment was not a final order. Hocking App. No. 19CA2 6
{¶9} At that hearing, on direct examination, Detective Robison
testified that he had been employed with the Hocking County Sheriff’s
Office for 19 years. He testified that he received peace officer training, a
college education, as well as ongoing police training. Detective Robison
testified that he was part of the Sheriff’s interdiction unit for narcotics and
was investigating Appellee and others. He testified that he “worked on well
over a hundred [search warrants].”
{¶10} Detective Robison testified that met with the Hocking County
Prosecutor and obtained a search warrant pertaining to Appellee at the
Laurel Run Road address. Detective Robison testified that both the
prosecutor and the judge reviewed the warrant and that the warrant was
signed by Judge Moses from the Municipal Court.
{¶11} On cross examination, after Detective Robison told Appellee’s
counsel that there was no record regarding his application for the warrant,
Appellee’s counsel did not cross examine Detective Robison, asserting that
review of the warrant was limited to the four corners of the affidavit.
{¶12} On February 13, 2019, the trial court issued a final judgment
entry recognizing its prior ruling that the search warrant was not supported
by probable cause, but the majority of the decision addressed the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. Hocking App. No. 19CA2 7
{¶13} The court found its review of the Good Faith Exception was
limited to the four corners of the affidavit, citing State v. Klosterman, 114
Ohio App.3d 327, 332, 683 N.E.2d 100 (2nd Dist.1992). The court stated
“that the defects in warrant are such that there was very little information as
to the reliability of the informant and that some of the information relied on
was stale,” with the lack of information regarding the reliability of the
informant being the more serious defect. Therefore, the court found “that a
well-trained deputy would have known that the information in the affidavit
did not establish probable cause because it did not contain information
which would allow the issuing judge to find that the informant was reliable.”
Consequently, the trial court held that the Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule did not apply and granted Appellee’s motion to suppress
the evidence discovered pursuant to the search warrant.
{¶14} It is from this judgment that the State appeals, asserting two
assignments of error.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE AFFIDAVIT FOR THE SEARCH WARRANT DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DID NOT APPLY TO THE SEARCH WARRANT. Hocking App. No. 19CA2 8
{¶15} The State argues that the trial court erred when it found that the
affidavit did not support probable cause so as to justify the search warrant.
Specifically, the State argues that the informant’s personal observation
demonstrates the basis of his knowledge (i.e. the informant gave names,
addresses, and the type of car that Appellee drove), and that detailed
information, along with verifiable information, offered an “indicia or
reliability” regarding the informant’s knowledge. Therefore, the State
asserts that there were sufficient facts discernable from the affidavit to find
that there was probable cause to hold that the search warrant was valid.
{¶16} Alternatively, the State argues that even if there was
insufficient probable cause to justify the search warrant, the evidence should
not be excluded under the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, in
pertinent part, because the affidavit was not “so lacking in indicia of
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable” and the warrant was approved by a neutral and detached
magistrate.
{¶17} Appellee acknowledges hearsay may support probable cause so
as to justify the issuance of a search warrant. However, Appellee argues that
the informant’s assertions in this case are nothing more than uncorroborated
hearsay. Therefore, Appellee argues that the affidavit lacked probable cause Hocking App. No. 19CA2 9
and the evidence recovered from the search warrant should be excluded from
consideration under the exclusionary rule.
{¶18} Appellee also argues that the Good Faith exception to the
Exclusionary Rule is not applicable. Appellee echoes the trial court’s
conclusion that a reasonably well-trained deputy would not have been in a
position to have formed an objectively reasonable belief that the affidavit
established probable cause.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
1. Standard of Review
{¶19} The standard of review of a decision addressing a motion to
suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Ralston, 4th
Dist. Highland No. 16CA9, 2017-Ohio-7057, ¶ 6. On review, we must
accept the trial court’s determination of factual issues and evaluation of
credibility of witnesses if supported by competent, credible evidence. Id.
However, accepting those facts as true, we have a duty to conduct a de novo
review of “whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id.,
citing State v. Hobbs, 133 Ohio St.3d 43, 2012-Ohio-3886, 975 N.E.2d 965,
¶ 8, see also State v. Klosterman, 114 Ohio App.3d 327, 333, 683 N.E.2d
100, 104 (2nd Dist.1996). Hocking App. No. 19CA2 10
{¶20} “In reviewing the sufficiency of probable cause in an affidavit,
neither a trial court nor an appellate court should “ ‘substitute [its] judgment
for that of the issuing magistrate by conducting a de novo determination.’ ”
State v. Landis, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2005-10-428, 2006-Ohio-3538,
¶ 15, quoting State v. George 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 330, 544 N.E.2d 640
(1989). And “ ‘[a]lthough in a particular case it may not be easy to
determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause,
the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely
determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.’ ” State v. Baker,
4th Dist. Washington No. 16CA30, 2018-Ohio-762, ¶ 10, quoting United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684
(1965).
2. The Fourth Amendment
{¶21} “ ‘The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 14, prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures.’ ” State v. Taylor, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 15CA12, 2016-
Ohio-2781, ¶ 31, quoting State v. Emerson, 134 Ohio St.3d 191, 2012-Ohio-
5047, 981 N.E.2d 787, ¶ 15. “The constitutional provisions contain nearly
identical language and have been interpreted to afford the same protection.” Hocking App. No. 19CA2 11
Id., citing State v. Hoffman, 141Ohio St.3d 428, 2014-Ohio-4795, 25 N.E.3d
993 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 11.
3. Search Warrants and Probable Cause
{¶22} To conduct a lawful search both constitutions require officers to
secure a warrant supported by probable cause supported by an oath or
affirmation. State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251, 261, 490 N.E.2d 1236
(1986), see also Crim R. 41(C) (“A warrant shall issue under this rule only
on an affidavit or affidavits sworn to before a judge of a court of record and
establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant.”) “A neutral and detached
magistrate or other person authorized under Crim.R. 4(A)(1) must make a
probable-cause determination before an arrest warrant can be issued.” State
v. Hoffman, 141 Ohio St.3d 428, 2014-Ohio-4795, 25 N.E.3d 993. ¶ 14.
{¶23} “[P]robable cause deals ‘with probabilities ˗ the factual and
practical nontechnical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent men act ˗ and is a fluid concept, to be based on the totality of
the circumstances, and not reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ ” State v.
Richards, 4th Dist. Athens No. 14CA1, 2015-Ohio-669, ¶ 27, quoting State
v. Ingram, 20 Ohio App.3d 55, 61, 484 N.E.2d 227, 230 (1984), citing
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232-33, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527
(1983). In determining probable cause, “[a] magistrate must make a Hocking App. No. 19CA2 12
practical determination, upon all circumstances set forth in the warrant,
whether there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.” State v. Ralston, 4th Dist. Highland No. 16CA9, 2017-
Ohio-7057, ¶ 11, citing State v. Vaughters, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 2086, 1993
WL 63464, (Mar. 2, 1993). Probable cause requires only a showing that a
probability of criminal activity exists ˗ not a prima facie showing of criminal
activity. State v. Underwood, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 03CA2930, 2005-Ohio-
2309, ¶ 16, citing George, 45 Ohio St.3d at 329, 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989).
{¶24} “The finding of probable cause may be based upon hearsay in
whole or in part, provided there is a substantial basis for believing the source
of the hearsay to be credible and for believing that there is a factual basis for
the information furnished.” Crim. R. 41(C). However, the magistrate’s
finding of probable cause “ ‘cannot be a mere ratification of the bare
conclusions of others.’ ” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915, 104
S.Ct. 3405, 3416, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 237, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), see also Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948)
(magistrates must determine probable cause for themselves; they cannot rely
on the conclusions of the police). “[A]nonymous confidential informants’
statements require stringent scrutiny and independent corroboration.” State Hocking App. No. 19CA2 13
v. McGorty, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2007CA00257, 2008-Ohio-2643, ¶ 16, see
also Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d at 300, 720 N.E.2d 507 (Anonymous
informants are generally treated as unreliable, and police must corroborate
their tips with independent police work.). An assertion by an affiant that his
or her informant was reliable alone is not enough to support a finding of
probable cause. State v. Gill, 49 Ohio St.3d 177, 360 N.E.2d 693 (1977).
But an anonymous tip, when corroborated by independent police work, may
have sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion. State v.
Koueviakoe, 5th Dist. Gallia No. 04CA11, 2005-Ohio-852, ¶ 20, see also
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301
(1990).
4. The Exclusionary Rule and the Good Faith Exception
{¶25} “When evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its
use in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and
seizure.” State v. Johnson, 48 Ohio App.3d 256, 259, 549 N.E.2d 550
(1988), citing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94
L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58
L.Ed. 652 (1914), Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d
1081 (1961). Hocking App. No. 19CA2 14
{¶26} However, the exclusionary rule does not “bar evidence obtained
by law enforcement officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a
search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, even though the
warrant was ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.” State v.
Owens, 3rd Dist. Marion No. 9-16-40, 2017-Ohio-2590, 90 N.E.3d 189,
¶ 20-21, citing State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 330, 544 N.E.2d 640
(1989), United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82
L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). “The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule
necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very
least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right.
* * * Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith,
however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.” United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3418-3419, 82 L.Ed.2d 677
(1984), quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2365,
41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974).
{¶27} Nevertheless, under the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, suppression remains an appropriate remedy in four
circumstances: (1) the magistrate was misled by information in an affidavit
that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his
reckless disregard of the truth, (2) the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned Hocking App. No. 19CA2 15
his judicial role, (3) an officer purports to rely upon a warrant based on an
affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief
in its existence entirely unreasonable,” or (4) the warrant may be so facially
deficient that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.
Id.
5. Evaluating the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Beyond the “Four Corners” of the Affidavit
{¶28} The trial court held that in determining whether the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule should apply, a reviewing court is limited
reviewing the four corners of the affidavit.
{¶29} The law is unsettled as to whether a reviewing court may look
beyond the four corners of the affidavit in determining whether the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. It does not appear that the
Supreme Court of Ohio, nor this court, have addressed the issue, but other
courts have. See e.g. State v. Berry, 5th Dist. Delaware No.
2006CA0600035, 2007-Ohio-4122, ¶ 43 (court may look beyond affidavit),
State v. Mays, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 23986, 2011-Ohio-2684, ¶ 31
(court may look beyond affidavit), State v. Landis, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2005-10-428, 2006-Ohio-3538, ¶ 21 (court may look beyond affidavit),
but see State v. Klosterman, 114 Ohio App.3d 327, 333 (court may not look Hocking App. No. 19CA2 16
beyond the affidavit), State v. Dibble, 2017-Ohio-9321, ¶¶ 27-30, 92 N.E.3d
893 (court may not look beyond the affidavit)1.
{¶30} We are in agreement with the appellate districts that permit trial
courts to look beyond the affidavit to determine the Good Faith Exception.
In particular, we agree that permitting a court to look beyond the affidavit to
determine whether the good faith exception applies “ ‘is consistent with the
statement in Leon that ‘all of the circumstances’ may be considered in
determining whether a reasonably well-trained police officer would have
known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization.”
Berry at ¶ 43.
6. The Trial Court Erred in Rejecting the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
{¶31} The trial court held that the search warrant was not supported
by sufficient probable cause from the affidavit. We agree.
{¶32} Detective Robison averred in the affidavit in support of the
search warrant that the confidential informant was “reliable.” However,
there was nothing alleged in that affidavit that corroborated the informant’s
1 Dibble is currently on appeal in the Supreme Court of Ohio on the issue of “whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to a search conducted under a search warrant, a court can consider sworn but unrecorded oral information that the police gave to the judge at the time of the approval of the warrant.” State v. Dibble, 2018-552. http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Clerk/ecms/#/caseinfo/2018/552 Hocking App. No. 19CA2 17
general reliability, such as history of successfully working law enforcement.
See e.g. State v. Beauford, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25767, 2011-Ohio-5628,
¶ 15 (affiant and another officer had averred as to the confidential
informant's reliability based on previous information the informant had
provided regarding specific drug possession and trafficking issues within the
affiant's investigative jurisdiction).
{¶33} Moreover, many of the informant’s specific assertions appear to
be nothing more than uncorroborated hearsay. Twice the informant told law
enforcement that Appellee was travelling to Columbus to buy illegal drugs.
On the first trip deputies tried, unsuccessfully, to intercept Appellee upon his
return trip. The second time deputies decided not to attempt to intercept
him. Similarly, the averment that the informant asserted that Appellee,
Gilmore, Zuransky, and Hutchinson were at Appellee’s residence with
illegal drugs and firearms on March 28, 2017 was also uncorroborated.
{¶34} However, we find that some of Detective Robison averments do
provide information that corroborates the informant’s tip. For example, his
averment that in July 2016 law enforcement officials received an anonymous
tip that drug trafficking was occurring at the 18692 Laurel Run Road
address, and subsequently the Sheriff’s Office executed an warrant in
August 2016 to arrest Appellee on drug charges. Detective Robison further Hocking App. No. 19CA2 18
averred that although Appellee was not at his Laurel Run Road residence at
the time the arrest warrant was executed, his girlfriend, Jessica Gilmore, was
present and $2,080.00 and firearms were discovered. And, Gilmore told
officers that the money was proceeds from the sale of narcotics.
Consequently, officers confiscated the money.
{¶35} Detective Robison also averred that his informant alleged that
Appellee had an outstanding warrant for trafficking and possession in
Franklin County, which notably was confirmed by Detective Downs.
{¶36} In the end, we are left with some information from the affidavit
(arrest warrant for Appellee, evidence recovered from execution of that
warrant, and the outstanding warrant for Appellee’s arrest for drug offenses
in Franklin County) that to a degree corroborated the informant’s tip that
drug trafficking was occurring at the Laurel Run Road address in 2017, but
under the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the trial court it was
simply not enough to find probable cause.
{¶37} Applying the standard that “a well-trained deputy would have
known that the information in the affidavit did not establish probable cause
because it did not contain information which would allow the issuing judge
to find the informant was reliable,” the trial court also held that the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. We disagree. Hocking App. No. 19CA2 19
{¶38} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the good faith exception
does not apply if “an officer purports to rely upon “* * * a warrant based on
an affidavit ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable’ ” (Emphasis added.) George,
45 Ohio St.3d 325, 331, 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989).
{¶39} Considering the affidavit, Detective Robison’s testimony, and
applying an objective standard, we hold that Detective Robison acted in
good faith for two reasons.
{¶40} First, Detective Robison testified that he relied upon the
prosecutor and the judge to acquire the warrant and there are no allegations
that the prosecutor or judge acted improperly. Although reliance on these
officials alone does not necessarily validate Detective Robison’s action as
being in good faith, when considered along with our second reason, it does.
{¶41} Second, although we find the warrant affidavit lacking in
probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant, we also
find that it was not “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” As we discussed
previously, a warrant for Appellee’s arrest for trafficking was executed in
2016 at the Laurel Run Road address and even though he was not there, his
girlfriend was, and she stated that cash found in the house was from the sale Hocking App. No. 19CA2 20
of narcotics. Further, as verified by Detective Downs, Appellee had an
outstanding warrant in Franklin County for possession and trafficking. We
find that from an objective perspective Detective Robison was not “entirely
unreasonable” in believing that his affidavit provided probable cause
sufficient to support a search warrant. When a warrant has been issued, the
legal sufficiency of the underlying affidavit has already been determined by
the magistrate, and the magistrate's determination is entitled to credence.
Courts cannot make the good faith of an officer turn upon whether his
reliance on a warrant was misplaced. It is only when the reliance was wholly
unwarranted that good faith is absent. State v. Gray, 4th Dist. Ross No.
1295, 1986 WL 14457, *6.
{¶42} Because we find that the trial court erred in holding that the
Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule did not apply, we sustain the
State’s second assignment of error.
CONCLUSION
{¶43} In this case, after review of the record, we hold that the trial
court erred in failing to hold that the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule applied in this context. As such, we reverse the judgment of the trial
court that granted Appellee’s motion to suppress and remand the cause to the
trial court for further proceedings. Hocking App. No. 19CA2 21
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. Hocking App. No. 19CA2 22
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be reversed and remanded and costs be assessed to Appellee.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Hocking County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ______________________________ Matthew W. McFarland, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.