State v. Karpin

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: March 13, 2025
• Docket: 2405007312
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) v. ) ID# 2405007312 ) STEVEN KARPIN, ) ) Defendant. )

Submitted: February 13, 2025 Decided: March 13, 2025

ORDER This 13th day of March, 2025, upon consideration of defendant Steven

Karpin’s (“Karpin”) motion to suppress, the State’s responses, and supplemental

filings, it appears to the court that:

1. Karpin is charged with carrying a concealed deadly weapon, driving

under the influence (“DUI”), possession of a firearm while under the influence, and

several motor vehicle infractions.

2. On May 15, 2024, a Delaware State Police trooper noticed that one of

Karpin’s headlamps was not working. The trooper did a u-turn and followed Karpin,

who eventually pulled into a parking spot at a local restaurant. The trooper

approached Karpin and explained the reason for the stop. When asked for his driver’s

license, Karpin handed over an identification card, thinking it was his license. 3. While speaking with Karpin, the trooper noted there were signs of

possible intoxication, including a strong odor of alcohol and slow and slurred speech.

When asked about those possible signs, however, Karpin denied consuming any

alcohol prior to driving. Instead, Karpin attributed the smell of alcohol to the fact

that there were “a bunch of cans in the back seat” that were “from the shooting

range.” The trooper asked if Karpin was willing to perform field sobriety tests, but

Karpin said that he would not take any tests.

4. The trooper then asked Karpin to exit his vehicle while the trooper ran

Karpin’s license. Before the trooper could run the license, Karpin informed the

trooper that there was a firearm in his vehicle.

5. The trooper again asked if Karpin was willing to do any field tests and

Karpin again—politely but firmly—stated he would not perform any field tests.

Karpin explained that he had “already went down that road before” and that if the

trooper wanted to “get on with it” and get a phlebotomist, he could. At that point,

the trooper arrested Karpin for DUI. He obtained a search warrant for a sample of

Karpin’s blood.

6. Karpin, through counsel, filed a motion to suppress challenging the

probable cause set forth in the search warrant. The State filed a response. Although

labeled as a four-corners motion to suppress, the motion asserted some of the

trooper’s observations set out in the search warrant did not match what could be seen

2 on the officer’s body worn camera (“BWC”). For example, Karpin claimed that his

speech was not slow and slurred, as claimed in the warrant. At an office conference

to discuss whether a Franks hearing was needed or whether a four-corners review

would suffice, the court gave Karpin an opportunity to supplement his motion to

suppress. The parties filed supplements and agreed that the court could view the

BWC footage without the need for a hearing. The court has done so, and the matter

is ripe for decision.

7. A defendant bringing a motion to suppress bears the burden of proving

by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to relief. 1 A search warrant

may only be issued upon a showing of probable cause, which must be demonstrated

by a warrant application containing “sufficient facts—viewed under the totality of

the circumstances—to allow a neutral magistrate to conclude that there is a ‘fair

probability’ both that a crime will be found in the particular place identified in the

warrant.”2

8. In the context of a DUI, “probable cause is generally based on the

arresting officer’s observations of the arrestee . . . .”3 The officer is not required to

1 State v. Huntley, 777 A.2d 249, 253 (Del. Super. Ct. 2000). 2 Terreros v. State, 312 A.3d 651, 661–62 (Del. 2024); see U.S. Const. amend. IV; Del. Const. art. I, § 6. 3 Rybicki v. State, 119 A.3d 663, 671 (Del. 2015). 3 “rule out potentially innocent, alternative explanations for a driver's conduct.”4 It is

well settled that:

[W]hen determining whether a police officer has the requisite level of

suspicion to justify a detention or arrest, the expertise and experience of the

officer are to be taken into account. Hence, a trained and experienced police

officer can develop a justifiable suspicion when an untrained lay person might

not. This frequently comes into play when an officer relies upon his sense of

smell in suspecting that an illegal substance is present.5

9. In reviewing the magistrate’s decision to approve a search warrant this

court “has the duty of ensuring ‘that the magistrate had a substantial basis for

concluding that probable cause existed.’ A magistrate’s determination of probable

cause ‘should be paid great deference by reviewing courts’ and should not, therefore,

‘take the form of a de novo review.’”6

10. Karpin argues that the facts set out in the search warrant do not establish

probable cause, and that some of those facts are contradicted by the trooper’s

interaction with Karpin as seen in the BWC footage. Karpin points out that certain

4 Id. 5 Houston v. State, 251 A.3d 102, 114 (Del. 2021). 6 State v. Holden, 60 A.3d 1110, 1114 (Del. 2013) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983)). 4 facts are absent to support a finding that Karpin was intoxicated, such as poor

driving, trouble exiting the vehicle, or unusual behavior.

11. Karpin is correct to a point. The warrant mentions the following facts

to establish probable cause: strong odor of alcohol, glassy eyes, flushed face, and

slowed and slurred speech. Most of these claims were not readily observable on the

BWC. While Karpin slurred his speech a few times, it was not significantly slurred.

These observations themselves might not have been enough to establish probable

cause.

12. But the search warrant also states that there were numerous empty and

crushed beer cans inside the vehicle and in the bed of the truck, undermining

Karpin’s claim that he had not been drinking. Although these cans could have been

old, Karpin’s explanation that the odor of alcohol must have been from the cans

would indicate recent consumption.

13. Furthermore, the warrant includes the fact that Karpin refused to

perform any field sobriety tests. This court has held that a refusal of tests “may

properly be considered in determining probable cause.”7 Likewise, the Delaware

Supreme Court found that a “defendant’s refusal to submit to testing may be used

for any relevant purpose, including to show consciousness of guilt.”8

7 State v. Drake, 2018 WL 7021957, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2018). 8 Church v. State, 2010 WL 5342963, at *2 (Del. Dec. 22, 2010); see also Rybicki, 119 A.3d at 670, 671. 5 14. Taken together—and with the deference given to the experience and

training of the trooper and to the magistrate who approved the search warrant—the

facts set forth in the warrant and supported by the BWC are sufficient to establish

probable cause.

THEREFORE, Karpin’s motion to suppress is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Robert H. Robinson, Jr.

Robert H. Robinson, Jr., Judge

pc: James Edwards, Esquire James Murray, Esquire