State v. Kapicsky

73 A. 830, 105 Me. 127, 1909 Me. LEXIS 69
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedFebruary 10, 1909
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 73 A. 830 (State v. Kapicsky) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Kapicsky, 73 A. 830, 105 Me. 127, 1909 Me. LEXIS 69 (Me. 1909).

Opinion

Whitehouse, J.

This is an indictment against the defendant under section 1 of chapter 22 of the Revised Statutes, for maintaining a common nuisance from the first day of May, 1908, to the day of the finding of the indictment at the September term, 1908, of court in Androscoggin county. It is alleged that the defendant kept and maintainéd a certain tenement as a place of resort where intoxicating liquors were "unlawfully kept, sold, given away, drank and dispensed in a manner not provided for by law.”

.The defendant was one of 204 members of the St. Bartholomew Society occupying the premises mentioned in the indictment. The Society had occupied the premises from April, 1908, to the time of the trial of the case in September. The premises consisted of one large lodge room, a billiard room and a small bar room so called, in connection with the latter. The Society itself was regularly organized, having a constitution and by-laws and from the dues assessed to the members, sick and death benefits were paid. The billiard room was open practically all of the time for the recreation of the members. The defendant claimed that the bar room was open three times each week and that at these times cigars and nonintoxicating drinks were sold to the members, the profits of the sales being devoted to the payment of rent, lights, heat and other expenses incident to the running of the rooms. A member of the Society acted as janitor and keeper of the bar room, each in turn for two weeks and without compensation.

The State introduced evidence tending to prove that on two separate occasions during the time mentioned in the indictment, [130]*130intoxicating liquors were sold upon the premises by the respondent. The first occasion was on the evening of August 29, when the officer looking through a window saw the defendant making numerous sales of what they claimed to have been ale; the other occasions that of September 5, when the officers looking through a hole in the curtain overhanging this same window, saw the respondent making sales of beer alleged to be intoxicating and later in the evening searched the premises and found the beer which proved upon analysis to contain sufficient alcohol to be in fact intoxicating. The defendant claimed that the beer seized was bought in common by the members of the Society in anticipation of labor day, September 7, each contributing a certain amount for which he was to receive his proportionate part of the beer. It was in evidence that some of the members began to drink their allowance during the afternoon of September 5,- and that the drinking continued and was in progress from that time to the time of the seizure late in the afternoon.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty and the case comes to this court on exceptions to certain instructions to the jury given in the charge of the presiding Justice.

It is provided by section 1 of chapter 22 of the Revised Statutes that "all places used . . . for the illegal sale or keeping of intoxicating liquors, and all houses, shops, or places where intoxicating liquors are sold for tippling purposes, and all places of resort where intoxicating liquors are kept, sold, given away, drank or dispensed in any manner not provided for by law, are common nuisances.”

It was obviously the intention of the legislature by this enactment to declare all places to be common nuisances whenever they should commonly and habitually be used for the illegal sale or keeping of intoxicating-' liquors, and also whenever commonly and habitually used as places of resort where such liquors are "given Jaway, drank or dispensed in any manner not provided for by law.” State v. McIntosh, 98 Maine, 397; State v. Stanley, 84 Maine, 555.

[131]*131But it is not incumbent upon the State to show that the place was used for such unlawful purposes during the entire period named in the indictment. Proof that the defendant kept and maintained a tenement for any one of such purposes during any part of the time comprised within the days named in the indictment, will warrant a conviction. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 115 Mass. 141, and cases cited. In Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 1 Allen, 592, the defendants erected a temporary tent or booth, constructed of boards and covered with cloth, and on the following day had there several kinds of intoxicating liquors, and between the hours of nine and eleven o’clock in the forenoon, made four or more sales of such liquors. Thé land on which the booth was erected was hired for three days, but the booth was torn down by the officers at eleven o’clock of the first day.

The defendants were found guilty of maintaining a common nuisance. In the opinion the court says: "The evidence was. sufficient to warrant the jury in convicting the defendants. A disturbance of the public peace by the assembly of noisy and dissolute persons, the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors, and other similar acts which tend to make disorder and injure public morals, and thus to create a common nuisance in a house or tenement, may be proved to have occurred in the course of a few hours as well as during a number of days, a week or a month. It is the nature of the acts done, not the length of time during which they are committed, that constitutes the offense.”

In the case at bar the presiding Justice correctly defined the word resort and sufficiently explained the meaning of the phrase "place of resort,” as employed in the statute. The following instruction was then giving to the jury :

"All places of resort where liquors are ‘given away’, and again all places of resort where liquors are ‘drank,’ even if they are not ‘sold’ or ‘given away,’ if it is a place of resort under the definition I have given you, and, when there, those men drink.the liquor which is intoxicating, that makes it a nuisance under the laws of this State,”

[132]*132In further defining what constitutes a nuisance under the law, the presiding Justice used the following quotation in instructing the jury, viz:

" ‘Among other things the legislature has said, and it applies to this case, that any place of resort where intoxicating liquors are kept, sold, given away, drank, or dispensed in any manner not provided for by law, is a nuisance. Any place that is resorted to, that is, a place of resort for the mere purpose of drinking intoxicating liquors, is a nuisance; any place of resort where liquors are illegally kept is a nuisance; any place of resort where liquors are given away is a nuisance. It must be a place of resort; and then the statute goes on to say that any person keeping or maintaining such a place shall be found guilty and be punished therefor.’ ”

" ‘In this case, the State says, that between the first day of May last, and the day of the finding of this indictment, at some time between those dates, this place described here, the tenement and so forth, was a place contrary to the form of this statute, a place of resort, and that at that place of resort at some time during this space of time, liquors were kept, sold, given away, drank, or dispensed in some manner not provided by law. The State need not prove that this place was so kept and used during the whole of that time. The case is made out, the offence is committed, if for a single day between those dates that place was so used. Nay, if for a single hour in the day it was so used, for that hour it was a common nuisance and whoever for that hour maintained the place was guilty of keeping and maintaining a common nuisance.’ ”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
73 A. 830, 105 Me. 127, 1909 Me. LEXIS 69, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-kapicsky-me-1909.