State v. Kaminski

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 29, 2026
• Docket: 2025CA0047-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Kaminski, 2026-Ohio-2012.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF MEDINA )

STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 2025CA0047-M

Appellee

v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE TIMOTHY LEE KAMINSKI MEDINA MUNICIPAL COURT COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 25TRD01767

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: May 29, 2026

HENSAL, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Timothy Kaminski appeals his conviction by the Medina Municipal Court. This

Court affirms.

I.

{¶2} Mr. Kaminski, who holds a commercial driver’s license, ran a red light at the

intersection of State Route 18 and Gateway Drive in Medina Township while operating a heavy-

duty tow truck. State Troopers charged him with a red-light violation under Revised Code Section

4511.13(C). A magistrate found him guilty, fined him $100, and assessed two points against his

license. Mr. Kaminski objected to the magistrate’s decision, arguing that the magistrate failed to

consider whether he had acted out of necessity. The trial court concluded that Section 4511.13(C)

states a strict-liability offense and that the defense of necessity did not apply. In the alternative,

the trial court concluded that even if the defense was available, Mr. Kaminski had not established

that he acted under duress. 2

{¶3} The trial court overruled Mr. Kaminski’s objections to the magistrate’s decision,

found Mr. Kaminski guilty, and sentenced him. Mr. Kaminski appealed, assigning two errors for

this Court’s review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION TO THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION AND IN REJECTING THE DEFENDANT’S NECESSITY DEFENSE, DESPITE UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS LAWFULLY OPERATING A COMMERCIAL VEHICLE, AND THAT STOPPING BEFORE THE INTERSECTION WHEN THE LIGHT TURNED YELLOW WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN A GREATER HARM.

{¶4} Mr. Kaminski’s first assignment of error is that the trial court erred by overruling

his objection to the magistrate’s decision. Specifically, he maintains that the affirmative defense

of necessity excused his failure to stop at the red light. This Court does not agree.

{¶5} Proceedings in traffic cases that are conducted before a magistrate are governed by

Criminal Rule 19. Traf.R. 14(C). Rule 19, in turn, provides that when objections to a magistrate’s

decision are filed, the trial court “shall undertake an independent review as to the objected matters

to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied

the law.” Crim.R. 19(D)(4)(d). Because the relevant provisions of Rule 19 and Civil Rule 53 are

identical, it is appropriate for this Court to rely on our precedent interpreting Civil Rule 53 when

considering cases that implicate Criminal Rule 19. See State v. Perkins, 2018-Ohio-2240, ¶ 6 (9th

Dist.). As a general rule, “this Court reviews a trial court’s action with respect to a magistrate’s

decision for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Crawford, 2021-Ohio-1686, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.), quoting

In re L.M.W., 2020-Ohio-6856, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.). We do so, however, with consideration for the 3

nature of the underlying matter. Id., quoting Tabatabai v. Tabatabai, 2009-Ohio-3139, ¶ 18 (9th

Dist.).

{¶6} Necessity is an affirmative defense. See generally State v. Cross, 58 Ohio St.2d

482, 485-486 (1979). “The burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense,

and the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense other than

self-defense, defense of another, or defense of the accused’s residence . . . is upon the accused.”

R.C. 2901.05(A). This Court considers the manifest weight of the evidence to determine whether

an accused has met the burden of persuasion regarding an affirmative defense under Section

2901.05(A). See State v. Consiglio, 2022-Ohio-2340, ¶ 16 (7th Dist.); Brook Park v. Gannon,

2019-Ohio-2224, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.). When considering whether a conviction is against the manifest

weight of the evidence, this Court must:

review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.

State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist. 1986). A reversal on this basis is reserved for

the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Id., citing State

v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).

{¶7} The affirmative defenses of duress and necessity are “often used interchangeably

and are often indistinguishable.” State v. Floyd, 2012-Ohio-3551, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.), quoting Cross

at 483 fn. 2. The affirmative defense of necessity “is strictly and extremely limited in application

and will probably be effective in very rare occasions.” Cross at 488. An “essential feature” of

necessity is “the sense of present, imminent, immediate and impending death, or serious bodily

injury.” Id. at 487. In other words, an “imminent, immediate danger or threat of danger” must

prevent the individual “from exercising his own will,” leaving no alterative path of action. Id. at 4

483 fn. 2. As a result, “the actor is forced to choose between the lesser of two evils.” Id. The

primary difference between the defenses of duress and necessity is that while duress involves a

human threat, “necessity involves a threat from natural or physical forces . . . .” State v. Flinders,

2012-Ohio-2882, ¶ 30 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Lawson, 2008-Ohio-1311, ¶ 20-21 (2d Dist.).

Consequently, to establish the presence of necessity, a defendant must prove five elements:

(1) a harm due to the pressure of a physical or natural force, rather than human force; (2) the harm sought to be avoided was greater than, or at least equal to that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; (3) the actor reasonably believed at the moment that his act was necessary and was designed to avoid the greater harm; (4) the actor was without fault in bringing about the situation; and (5) the threatened harm was imminent, leaving no alternative by which to avoid the greater harm.

Lawson, at ¶ 20.

{¶8} Two troopers testified that they saw Mr. Kaminski’s truck run the red light at the

intersection of State Route 18 and Gateway Drive. Both explained that the light was red before

Mr. Kaminski crossed the marked stop line. One testified that it appeared the truck sped up as it

went through the light. The other observed that it did not appear that the truck slowed down while

the light was yellow. Mr. Kaminski testified that he saw the traffic light change from green to

yellow and that he was paying attention at the time. He explained that he was driving downhill,

and he reasoned that if he tried to stop, he may have ended up in the middle of the intersection and

“scorched the tires.” He acknowledged that, under the circumstances, it was “a decision that, you

know, could go either way.” He testified that he “just let it go. I didn’t accelerate . . . . I made a

decision to go through.”

{¶9} Mr. Kaminski did not demonstrate that he had “the sense of present, imminent,

immediate and impending death, or serious bodily injury.” Cross at 487. Nor did he demonstrate

that an “imminent, immediate danger or threat of danger” prevented him “from exercising his own 5

will,” leaving no alterative path of action. Id. at 483 fn. 2. Specifically, he failed to establish that

the existence of a harm due to a physical or natural force that was greater than or equal to the harm

that Section 4511.13(C) seeks to prevent, that he was without fault in bringing about the situation,

and that the threatened harm was imminent, leaving him with no alternative but to run the red light.

See Lawson at ¶ 20.

{¶10} Assuming, without deciding, that the defense of necessity is available for violations

of Section 4511.13(C), the trial court did not err by concluding that Mr. Kaminski failed to

establish the defense in this case. Mr. Kaminski’s first assignment of error is overruled.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY APPLYING R.C. 4511.13(C) TO IMPOSE STRICT CRIMINAL LIABILITY ON THE DEFENDANT FOR CONDUCT THAT WAS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO AVOID, THEREBY VIOLATING THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE OHIO AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.

{¶11} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Kaminski argues that the trial court applied

Section 4511.13(C) in a manner that was unconstitutional because it was impossible for him to

comply.

{¶12} It is well-established that courts should not reach constitutional questions unless it

is absolutely necessary and should “avoid reaching a constitutional question when ‘other issues

are apparent in the record which will dispose of the case on its merits.’” In re D.S., 2017-Ohio-

8289, ¶ 7, quoting Greenhills Home Owners Corp. v. Greenhills, 5 Ohio St.2d 207, 212 (1966).

In this case, we need not consider whether Section 4511.13(C) is unconstitutional as applied to

Mr. Kaminski because the evidence does not support the fundamental premise of his argument that

it was impossible for him to comply. 6

{¶13} In this respect, the testimony at trial is decidedly more equivocal than his argument

on appeal. One of the troopers testified that he saw Mr. Kaminski when he was still 50-75 feet

away from the light and that he appeared to speed up through the intersection. Mr. Kaminski

testified that he was going the speed limit and the decision about whether to attempt a stop at the

red light was one that could have gone either way. The clear implication of Mr. Kaminski’s

impossibility argument is that every truck of the size that he was driving would be excused from

stopping at the intersection in question. That result is untenable.

{¶14} Mr. Kaminski has not demonstrated that it was impossible for him to comply with

Section 4511.13(C). His second assignment of error is overruled on that basis.

III.

{¶15} Mr. Kaminski’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Medina

Municipal Court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Medina Municipal

Court, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 7

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT

SUTTON, J. STEVENSON, J. CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

JOHN Y. KIM, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

GREGORY A. HUBER, Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.