Opinion of the Court By
MOON, C.J.
Plaintiff-appellant State of Hawai‘i (the prosecution) appeals from the September 27, 2000 order of the Second Circuit Court, the Honorable Artemio C. Baxa presiding, granting defendants-appellees Kristine K. Kaleo-hano and Leanda M. Rawlins’s [hereinafter, collectively, the defendants1] motion to suppress evidence. Briefly stated, this case involves a routine traffic stop for suspicion of driving under the influence, which ultimately resulted in the discovery of a glass pipe that contained what appeared to be crystal methamphetamine residue. In justifying its war-rantless search of Kaleohano’s automobile and bag (which contained the glass pipe belonging to Rawlins), the prosecution relies upon a theory of voluntary consent and argues that it was error for the circuit court to find that Kaleohano was at any point unlawfully detained and to conclude that Kaleoha-no’s consent to search was invalidated by the failure of police officers to provide her with Miranda warnings. We agree that, under the facts of this case, Miranda warnings were not mandated because the police did not possess probable cause to arrest Kaleo-hano. We also conclude that the police officer’s temporary detention of Kaleohano was lawful because it was supported by reasonable suspicion that she was driving while impaired. However, because the circuit court failed to make appropriate findings and conclusions regarding the voluntariness of Kaleohano’s consent to the search of her vehicle, we vacate the circuit court’s suppression order and remand this case for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
On appeal, the prosecution challenges one finding of fact (FOF)—i.e., FOF No. 13—and all of the seven conclusions of law (COL), except for COL No. 3. The findings and conclusions of the court indicate the following:
In the late evening hours on February 19, 1999, Kaleohano was driving eastbound on Molokai’s Kamehameha V Highway and was accompanied by Rawlins, who occupied the front passenger seat. At approximately 11:38 p.m., police officer Jay Serle (Officer Serle) observed Kaleohano’s black Mustang swerve within its lane of travel and cross the solid double center line twice. Officer Serie suspected that the driver of the car was impaired. He, therefore, decided to stop the vehicle and turned on his blue lights.
At the time he stopped the vehicle, Officer Serle was aware that it belonged to Kaleoha-no. He also knew that she had been arrested on drug charges in the past, that the car had previously been searched pursuant to a warrant, and that drugs had been recovered. Officer Serle, however, was not involved in the previous arrest or search of Kaleohano’s vehicle.
When he approached the vehicle to cheek on the driver’s impairment, Officer Serle recognized both Kaleohano and Rawlins. He observed that Kaleohano’s eyes were red and glassy, but did not detect an odor of alcohol. When questioned, Kaleohano denied having had anything to drink that night. When asked to explain why her car had been weaving, Kaleohano claimed that “she was just toed.” At the suppression hearing, Officer Serle testified that he ruled out alcohol as a cause of impairment and opted not to subject Kaleohano to field sobriety tests.
Officer Serle had never arrested anyone for driving under the influence of drugs and was not trained in testing for drug impairment. Nevertheless, based on his observation of Kaleohano’s erratic driving, her red [373]*373and glassy eyes, his knowledge that drugs had been recovered from her car in the past, and “the fact that [he] knew she had been arrested for drug use before[,]” Officer Serle suspected Kaleohano was impaired or “possibly a drug carrier at that time or might be in possession of drugs.” Officer Serle then asked Kaleohano “for her consent to search the vehicle and told her that she didn’t have to consent to the search, that she had the right to refuse, and that she was free to go.” He did not read her any Miranda warnings, but did inform Kaleohano that she was not under arrest.
Officer Serle had also decided, by this point, that he would not allow Kaleohano to regain control of her ear “[b]eeause of possible evidentiary value of the vehicle[ ] and also due to her possible impairment.” Although the circuit court recognized that Officer Serle would not allow Kaleohano to regain possession of her car, it also found that Officer Serle “would have alloived ... Kaleohano to leave after he was done vvith his investigation.” (Emphasis added.)
Kaleohano responded to Officer Serle’s request for consent to search the vehicle by stating that “she had nothing to hide.” Officer Serle testified that Kaleohano “was compliant. She didn’t seem to have a problem. She agreed.” Although he had obtained oral consent to a search, Officer Serle did not proceed to inspect Kaleohano’s vehicle. Instead, he awaited the arrival of police backup while Kaleohano and Rawlins remained in the ear. Officer Serle had never before applied for a search warrant; however, he indicated that he would have done so had Kaleo-hano left the area. He believed he had enough information to obtain a warrant.
Once he was joined by Officer Manaois, Officer Serle asked Kaleohano and Rawlins to exit the vehicle in order to memorialize her consent on Maui Police Department Form # 118A (consent to search form) and to facilitate the search of the vehicle. Officer Serle filled out the consent to search form, which Kaleohano read and signed.
Kaleohano and Rawlins were left under the supervision of Sergeant Aoki, who also appeared at the scene, while Officers Serle and Manaois searched the vehicle. While searching the interior of the vehicle, Officer Serle found a blue, floral print bag. After ascertaining that the bag belonged to Kaleohano, Officer Serie asked for her consent to search it. Officer Serle testified that he informed Kaleohano “that the procedure was that if she didn’t consent to a search, that the standard procedure is that, we are obligated to apply for a search warrant.” Kaleohano again responded that she had nothing to hide and that she would allow Officer Serle to search the bag. Officer Serle then listed the bag on the consent form and had Kaleohano initial next to the addition. He proceeded to search the bag and discovered a glass pipe with residue resembling that of crystal methamphetamine. At that point, Rawlins informed Officer Serle that the pipe belonged to her. Kaleohano and Rawlins were formally arrested and taken to the Molokai Police Station, where they were read their Miranda rights and waived them. Kaleohano thereafter made incriminatory oral and written statements. Kaleohano and Rawlins were subsequently indicted and charged with promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712-1243(1) (1993)2, and prohibited acts related to drug paraphernalia, in violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a) (1993).3
On May 19, 2000, Kaleohano moved to suppress the statements and the evidence gathered by Officers Serle and Manaois during the February 19, 1999 traffic stop and search. Rawlins filed a joinder in the motion on June 15, 2000. A hearing was held on June 23, 2000 during which Kaleohano and Rawlins presented different arguments in favor of suppression. Kaleohano argued that her consent to search was vitiated because the police had failed to give her Miranda warnings prior to asking her questions likely to elicit an incriminating response even though they had probable cause to arrest her [374]*374for driving while impaired. Rawlins, on the other hand, maintained that Officer Serle lacked reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle. Rawlins argued. that, although Ka-leohano’s erratic driving may have provided a valid basis for the traffic stop, it was an insufficient predicate to justify the request to search the vehicle, the request that Kaleoha-no exit the car to give written consent, and the request that Rawlins exit the ear to facilitate the search. The record demonstrates that the circuit court believed the two positions were inconsistent inasmuch as Ka-leohano’s argument depended on a finding of probable cause to arrest while Rawlins’ argument was premised on there being no reasonable suspicion to search.4 At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court ruled in favor of the defendants and ordered the evidence suppressed.
The circuit court adopted the “probable cause” argument and concluded that suppression was necessary inasmuch as Kaleohano’s right to Miranda warnings had been violated because Kaleohano was in police custody as a result of the traffic stop and that she was subjected to interrogation when Officer Serle asked her whether she had been drinking.5 Because Officer Serle failed to advise Kaleo-hano of her Miranda rights prior to asking her a question “designed and reasonably likely to elicit an incriminatory response[,]” the circuit court concluded that “[a]ny statements made by Ms. Kaleohano after Officer Serle questioned her about whether she had anything to drink [could not] be admitted against her in trial because Officer Serle’s violation of Ms. Kaleohano’s Miranda rights cultivated a poisonous tree.” Furthermore, the circuit court concluded that “Kaleohano’s consent to search her vehicle and bag was invalid” because.it was tainted by the prior illegality. Finally, the circuit court concluded that the glass pipe containing residue found in Kaleohano’s bag, as well as any incriminating statements by Kaleohano and Rawlins following the search of the bag, would also have to be “suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree.”
Before entry of the FOFs and COLs, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration on July 10, 2000. At the hearing on September 15, 2000, the prosecution reiterated its original position that no probable cause to arrest existed. Rawlins again advanced her alternative argument that, in the absence of reasonable suspicion, the evidence should be suppressed, and Kaleohano’s attorney indicated that he was “leaning more towards [Rawlins’] analysis[.]”6 The circuit court denied the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration, and the FOFs and COLs were filed on [375]*375September 27, 2000. A timely appeal was filed by the prosecution on October 18, 2000.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Motion to Suppress
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed de novo to determine whether the ruling was “right” or “wrong.” State v. Edwards, 96 Hawai'i 224, 231, 30 P.3d 238, 245 (2001) (citing State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai‘i 87, 100, 997 P.2d 13, 26 (2000)). The proponent of the motion to suppress has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the statements or items sought to be excluded were unlawfully secured and that his or her right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures was violated under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution. See State v. Wilson, 92 Hawai'i 45, 48, 987 P.2d 268, 271 (1999) (citations omitted).
B. Probable Cause Determination
In light of article I, section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution, which provides Hawaii’s citizens greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the United States Constitution, the determination whether probable cause to arrest exists, such that Miranda warnings are warranted, is reviewed under a de novo standard on appeal. See State v. Navas, 81 Hawai'i 113, 123, 913 P.2d 39, 49 (1996).
C. Findings of Fact
A court's FOF are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, Dan v. State, 76 Hawaii 423, 428, 879 P.2d 528, 533 (1994), and “will not be set aside on appeal unless they are determined to be clearly erroneous.” State v. Joyner, 66 Haw. 543, 545, 669 P.2d 152, 153 (1983) (citations omitted). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, despite evidence to support the finding, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction in reviewing the entire evidence that a mistake has been committed.” Dan, 76 Hawai'i at 428, 879 P.2d at 533 (citation and internal quotations omitted); see also State v. Nelson, 69 Haw. 461, 469, 748 P.2d 365, 370 (1987).
State v. Meyer, 78 Hawai'i 308, 311, 893 P.2d 159, 162 (1995).
D.Conclusions of Law
The “right/wrong” standard of review also applies to the trial court’s COLs, which allows the appellate court to “examine the facts and answer the question without being required to give any weight to the trial court’s answer to it.” State v. Lopez, 78 Hawai'i 433, 440, 896 P.2d 889, 896 (1995) (quoting State v. Miller, 4 Haw.App. 603, 606, 671 P.2d 1037, 1040 (1983)). “Thus, ‘[a] COL is not binding upon the appellate court and is freely reviewable for its correctness.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Bowe, 77 Hawai'i 51, 53, 881 P.2d 538, 540 (1994)).
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, the prosecution advances two points of error. It contends that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that “Officer Serle would have allowed Ms. Kaleohano to leave after he was done with his investigation,” FOF No. 13, because it implies that thei’e was a specified period of time during which Kaleohano was not free to leave. The prosecution also argues that it was error for the circuit court to conclude that Officer Serle’s failure to give Kaleohano Miranda warnings prior to his initial questioning of her required suppression of Kaleohano’s statements, invalidated her consent to search, and rendered inadmissible the contraband that was recovered, as well as Raw-lins’s spontaneous, admission of ownership of the contraband. We address each of these points of error in turn.
A. FOF No. IS Not Clearly Erroneous
A review of the record indicates that FOF No. 13 mirrors testimony that Officer Serle acknowledged he had given before the grand jury that issued the indictment.7 The prosecution argues that the cir-[376]*376euit court erred in crediting this isolated statement, rather than Officer Serle’s repeated affirmations that Kaleohano was free to leave at any time prior to her arrest. It is well-settled that “[t]he trial court, as the finder of fact, may draw reasonable and legitimate inferences and deductions from the evidence. Moreover, it is for the trial court to assess the credibility of witnesses ... and it may accept or reject such testimony in whole or in part.” State v. Kekona, 77 Hawai'i 403, 407, 886 P.2d 740, 744 (1994) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court’s finding that Officer Serle would not have permitted Kaleohano to leave until after he had terminated his investigation is not clearly erroneous.
B. Miranda Warnings Not Warranted
In reaching its conclusion that Kaleohano was entitled to Miranda warnings when she was first questioned by Officer Serle, the circuit court relied heavily on State v. Blackshire, 10 Haw.App. 123, 861 P.2d 736 (1993), in which the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) held that a person who is “seized” is in custody and that interrogation (as opposed to general questioning) begins when an individual has become the focus of an investigation and the questions are designed to elicit incriminating responses. See id. at 134-35, 861 P.2d at 742. Applying the holding in Blackshire to the facts of this case, the circuit court concluded8 that Kaleohano was in “custody” as a result of the traffic stop, that she was the focus of an investigation, and that the questions posed by Officer Serle were designed to elicit an incriminating response. The circuit court reasoned that, by omitting Miranda warnings prior to questioning Kaleohano regarding her drinking, Officer Serle had planted the seed from which the poisonous tree grew.
On September 27, 2000, the same day that the circuit court issued its FOFs, COLs, and order granting the defendants’ motion to suppress, this court published its opinion in State v. Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i 207, 10 P.3d 728, reconsideration denied, 94 Hawai'i 207, 10 P.3d 728 (2000), wherein “we overrule[d] Blackshire to the extent that it stands for the proposition that, as a per se matter, a person is ⅛ custody’ the moment he or she has been ‘seized.’ ” Id. at 211,10 P.3d at 732.
As Ah Loo makes clear, Kaleoha-no was not in custody for purposes of Miranda merely because she had been pulled over pursuant to a valid traffic stop. In Ah Loo, we reaffirmed
the principle that, when an officer lawfully “seizes” a person in order to conduct an investigative stop, the officer is not required to inform that person of his or her Miranda rights before posing questions that are reasonably designed to confirm or dispel—as briefly as possible and without any coercive connotation by either word or conduct—the officer’s reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
Ah Loo, 94 Hawaii at 212, 10 P.3d at 733; see also State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw. 293, 300-01, 687 P.2d 544, 550 (1984) (holding that, after stopping a motorist for driving without headlights, police officer who detected smell of alcohol emanating from vehicle was not required to issue Miranda, warnings prior to asking motorist if she had been drinking); State v. Kuba, 68 Haw. 184, 185, 706 P.2d 1305, 1307 (1985) (holding that, after police officer had witnessed car straddling two [377]*377lanes of highway and driving at abnormally slow speed, investigative questioning regarding suspicion of alcohol or drug impairment did not require Miranda warnings). Of course, questions posed by police officers during the course of a lawful temporary investigative detention may sometimes amount to custodial interrogation requiring the protections afforded by Miranda warnings. However, Ah Loo recognized that, “if neither probable cause to arrest nor sustained and coercive interrogation are present, then questions posed by the police do not rise to the level of ‘custodial interrogation’ requiring Miranda warnings.” Id. at 210, 10 P.3d at 731. We, therefore, examine whether Officer Serle had probable cause to arrest Kaleoha-no.
In State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142, 433 P.2d 593, 597 (1967), this court held that “probable cause” exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of police officers and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man or woman of reasonable caution to believe that a crime was being committed. At the time Officer Serle questioned Kaleohano as to whether she had been drinking, he had witnessed Kaleohano’s car swerve within its own traffic lane and cross the dividing line twice; he was aware that the car belonged to a known drug user and that, at some point in the past, á lawful search of the car had resulted in the confiscation of drags; he had also observed Kaleohano’s eyes and noted that they were red and glassy. Although these factors may give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Ka-leohano was driving while impaired, they do not amount to probable cause for an arrest. See Kernan v. Tanaka, 75 Haw. 1, 38 n. 23, 856 P.2d 1207, 1226 n. 23 (1993) (noting that fading a field sobriety test is what usually provides police with probable cause to arrest for driving under the influence), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1119, 114 S.Ct. 1070, 127 L.Ed.2d 389 (1994).
In the past, this court has rejected the idea-that “police observations of conduct which was as consistent with innocent activity as it was with criminal activity” is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. See State v. Kanda, 63 Haw. 36, 48, 620 P.2d 1072, 1080 (1980). Imperfect driving is susceptible of innocent as well as culpable interpretation. The same may be said of Officer Serle’s observation that Kaleohano’s eyes were red and glassy. As he readily admitted at the suppression hearing, Kaleohano’s explanation that she was tired was completely plausible, especially given the late hour at which she was stopped.
This court has also rejected the notion that a person’s prior reputation as a drug user, standing alone, was sufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest and, at best, was entitled to only minimal weight when combined with other elements. See State v. Chong, 52 Haw. 226, 232, 473 P.2d 567, 571 (1970). To hold differently would undermine the constitutional protections of all citizens. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has noted:
If the law were otherwise, any person with any sort of criminal record—or even worse, a person with arrests but no convictions—could be subjected to a Terry-type[9] investigative stop by a law enforcement officer at any time without the need for any other justification at all. Any such rule would clearly run counter to the requirement of a reasonable suspicion, and of the need that such stops be justified in light of a balancing of the competing interests at stake.
United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 543 (10th Cir.1994) (emphasis omitted); see also United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 963 (7th Cir.2002) (J. Rovner, dissenting) (“Many people who have been arrested and/or who have spent time in jail will naturally be skittish when stopped and questioned by the police on subsequent occasions, even if they are doing nothing wrong. The fourth amendment demands that an investigatory detention be supported by facts that objectively point to current criminal activity.” (Emphasis added.)). We conclude that red and glassy eyes, a criminal record, and imperfect driving, standing alone, are insufficient to establish probable cause to arrest a person [378]*378for driving under the influence of drugs.10 Because Officer Serle did not have probable cause to arrest Kaleohano and because he did not subject her to sustained and coercive questioning, the circuit court’s COLs cannot stand. Miranda, warnings were simply not warranted when Kaleohano was questioned about her alcohol consumption.11
C. Reasonable Suspicion to Search the Vehicle
On appeal, both Rawlins and Kaleo-hano advance the alternative argument that Officer Serle lacked reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle. Although the circuit court viewed this ease with a focus on constitutional safeguards against self-incrimination, the FOFs included in the September 27, 2000 decision and order are sufficient to address whether Officer Serle’s request for consent to search Kaleohano’s vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion.
Here, the parties do not dispute, and we agree, that the traffic stop initiated by Officer Serle was valid at its inception. This court has consistently held that, in determining the validity of wholly discretionary automobile stops,
the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. The ultimate test in these situations must be whether from these facts, measured by an objective standard, a [person] of reasonable caution would be warranted in believing that criminal activity was afoot and that the action taken was appropriate.
State v. Powell, 61 Haw. 316, 321-22, 603 P.2d 143, 148 (1979) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the trial court found that “Officer Serle observed [Kaleohano’s] vehicle swerving within its lane of travel and crossing over the solid double center line twice.” The officer’s observations were sufficient to warrant an investigative traffic stop to determine whether Kaleohano was driving while impaired. See Park v. Tanaka, 75 Haw. 271, 280, 859 P.2d 917, 921-22 (1993) (holding that testimony that driver weaved and swerved provided reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle); Kernan, 75 Haw. at 39, 856 P.2d at 1226 (holding that police officer’s observation that car was speeding and weaving onto another lane justified investigative traffic stop). In light of the particular circumstances that gave rise to the traffic stop, Officer Serle was also authorized to detain Kaleohano and carry out an investigation to confirm or dispel, in as brief a time as possible, his reasonable suspicion that she was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).
Here, the defendants argue that Officer Serle exceeded the permissible scope of the traffic stop when he requested Kaleo-hano’s consent to search the vehicle for drugs.12 We disagree. In State v. Silva, 91 Hawai'i 80, 979 P.2d 1106 (1999), we clarified that “police [may not] prolong the detention of individuals subjected to brief, temporary investigative stops—once such stops have failed to substantiate the reasonable suspicion that initially justified them[.]” Id. at 81, 979 P.2d at 1107. Because temporary investigative stops involve an exception to the general rule requiring that searches and seizures be supported by probable cause, the [379]*379scope of such detentions must be narrow. Id. (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-08, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979)). We recently outlined, in State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawai'i 107, 34 P.3d 1006 (2001), the permissible scope of a temporary investigative stop, noting that
it is well settled that a temporary investigative detention must, of necessity, be truly temporary . and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the detention—i.e., transpire for no longer than necessary to confirm or dispel the officer’s reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. In other words, a temporary investigative detention must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the detention in the first place, and, thus, must be no greater in intensity than absolutely necessary under the circumstances.
Id. at 125, 34 P.3d at 1024 (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). Determining whether a seizure pursuant to a temporary investigative stop is constitutional also involves a “weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.” Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979).
Officer Serle had reasonable suspicion to believe that Kaleohano was driving while impaired by drugs.13 He witnessed her vehicle repeatedly crossing the highway dividing line and, upon noting the license plate, realized that the vehicle in question was one in which illegal drugs had been recovered in an earlier search conducted pursuant to warrant. Officer Serle’s suspicions were heightened when he recognized the motorist as an individual who had been arrested for drug [380]*380charges in the past. Although we have already emphasized that a person’s prior history of drug arrests is insufficient to establish probable cause, awareness of past arrests may, when combined with other specific ar-ticulable facts indicating the probability of current criminal activity, factor into a determination that reasonable suspicion, sufficient to warrant a temporary investigative stop, exists. See United States v. Feliciano, 45 F.3d 1070, 1074 (7th Cir.1995) (emphasizing that “[k]nowledge of ... recent relevant criminal conduct, while of doubtful evidentia-ry value in view of the strictures against proving guilt by association or by a predisposition based on past criminal acts, is a permissible component of the articulable suspicion required for a Terry stop.” (Emphasis in original.)).
Officer Serle testified that, after realizing that he was dealing with somebody who had prior arrests for drug possession and who was driving a vehicle in which drugs had previously been discovered, he suspected the erratic driving pattern may have been due to Kaleohano’s drug impairment or her attempt to hide drugs after spotting the police vehicle on the road behind her. Officer Serie’s inference that Kaleohano may have been impaired and that drugs might be involved was supported by his observation that Kaleoha-no’s eyes were red and glassy. When Officer Serle failed to detect an odor of alcohol emanating from Kaleohano’s person, it was reasonable for him to infer, through a process of elimination, that Kaleohano’s impairment could be drug-related and that Kaleohano’s vehicle might contain drugs. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (rational inferences arising from specific facts may support the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop).
The dissent suggests that, “[i]f the officers believed Kaleohano was impaired so as to make driving hazardous,” dissenting op., 99 Hawaii at 383, 56 P.3d at 151, they had only a limited number of options available to them, i.e., they could have “secured the ear and parked it or moved it and called someone to pickup Kaleohano and her co-defendant or notified them they could make such calls.” Dissenting opinion at 383, 56 P.3d at 151. We disagree. Although Officer Serie’s initial contact with Kaleohano allowed him to exclude alcohol as a cause of impairment, his suspicion that the impairment may have been drug-related was not similarly dispelled, and, therefore, brief questioning aimed at confirming or dispelling his remaining suspicion was justified in light of its reasonableness. Admittedly, Officer Serie’s lack of training made it impossible for him to conduct a test that might have provided him with probable cause to arrest Kaleohano for driving while impaired. See Kernan, 75 Haw. at 38 n. 23, 856 P.2d at 1226 n. 23. However, we emphasize that Officer Serie’s lack of training to conduct a field sobriety test did not disqualify him from briefly questioning Kaleohano. Neither the fourth amendment nor the Hawaii Constitution
require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. C)n the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). Weighing the strong public interest in minimizing the dangers presented by impaired drivers on our highways against the slight intrusion on Kaleohano’s privacy, we cannot say that Officer Serie’s attempt to confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicion through a request for consent to search was constitutionally impermissible. We, therefore, hold that, in detaining Kaleohano for the purpose of determining if she was impaired and if she would consent to a search of her vehicle, Officer Serle did not exceed the scope of a temporary investigative stop premised upon circumstances that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Kaleohano was driving while impaired or that her vehicle might contain illicit substances.
D. Voluntariness of Kaleohano’s Consent
At the hearing, and again in their appeal to this court, the defendants have maintained that Kaleohano’s consent—although it appeared voluntary—was tainted either by the absence of Miranda warnings [381]*381or by the unlawful detention to which Kaleo-hano was subjected when Officer Serle exceeded the permissible scope of the traffic stop. As discussed supra, however, we hold that no illegality preceded Officer Serle’s request for consent to search.14 And, although we have concluded that Kaleohano was effectively seized when she agreed to the search of her vehicle, we also hold that her lawful detention does not, as a per se matter, validate or invalidate her consent. State v. Price, 55 Haw. 442, 444, 521 P.2d 376, 377 (1974) (stating that “ ‘the mere fact that a suspect is under arrest does not negate the possibility of a voluntary consent’ ”) (quoting United States ex rel. Lundergan v. McMann, 417 F.2d 519, 521 (2d Cir.1969) (citations omitted)).
In this case, the trial court made no specific findings addressing voluntariness. In the absence of such findings, we are unable to exercise our proper appellate function. As we have previously stated,
whether consent to search has been given voluntarily is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court from the “totality of all the circumstances.” Considerable deference must be given in this regard to ’ the findings of the trier of fact, who is best situated to decide the question of volun-tariness ....
The power to judge credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial court. On appeal[,] all presumptions favor proper exercise of that power, and the trial court’s findings—whether expressed or implied—must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.
The role of the revieiving court on this issue is thus quite limited.
State v. Patterson, 58 Haw. 462, 468, 571 P.2d 745, 749 (1977) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The dissent attempts to usurp the role of the fact finder and posits that the record as developed is sufficient to establish that Kaleohano’s consent was involuntary. We disagree.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, we vacate the circuit court’s suppression order of September 27, 2000 and remand this case for further proceedings.