OPINION
JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice.
The State of Texas appeals the trial court’s order granting appellee Juan Za-rate Lopez’s motion to suppress evidence. The trial court granted appellee’s motion on the ground that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the investigative stop that led to appellee’s arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI). We will reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand the case to the trial court.
At 9:40 p.m. on November 23, 2002, Officer John Wesley Galloway responded to a call that painting equipment had just been burgled from the back of a couple’s truck, which was parked in front of their home. It was dark outside, and visibility was poor because there were no street lights. While Galloway was talking with the complainants in their front yard, appel-lee and a companion drove by very slowly. The complainants told Galloway that they had seen the same truck — or what they thought was the same truck — drive by very slowly several times that night and therefore suspected that it might have been involved in the burglary.
Although he had only about fifteen months’ experience as a Fort Worth police officer, Galloway was assigned to the police department’s burglary unit. He knew from his experience that it was common for burglars to return to the scene of the crime if they had found particular equipment to steal the first time. Based on the complainants’ information, the fact that a burglary had just occurred, his observation of the vehicle’s slow driving, and his knowledge of burglars’ behavior patterns, Galloway decided to stop appellee’s truck.
Upon waiving him down, Galloway explained to appellee and his passenger that he was investigating a burglary of painting equipment and asked to see a driver’s license and proof of insurance. As soon as appellee spoke, Galloway noticed that he smelled of alcohol, that his eyes were watery, and that he exhibited other symptoms of intoxication. At that point, Galloway began to investigate appellee for the offense of DWI. Ultimately, appellee was arrested and charged with misdemeanor DWI.
Appellee moved to suppress any evidence the police had seized as a result of the November 23 stop. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. This appeal followed.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Lemmons v. State, 133 S.W.3d 751, 755 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref'd). We afford almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of historical facts that the record supports, especially when the trial court’s fact findings are based upon an
evaluation of credibility and demeanor. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). We afford the same amount of deference to the trial court’s rulings on mixed questions of law and fact, if the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demean- or. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 332; Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). We review de novo, however, the trial court’s application of law to the facts in determining whether reasonable suspicion supported an investigative detention. See Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327; [589] Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89; Lemmons, 133 S.W.3d at 755.
An investigative “stop” by law enforcement personnel is a sufficient intrusion on an individual’s privacy to implicate the Fourth Amendment’s protections. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2579, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Nevertheless, an officer is generally justified in briefly detaining an individual on less than probable cause to investigate the possibility of criminal behavior. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880; Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). An investigative detention is justified when the officer possesses a reason able suspicion; that is, the officer is able to point to specific, articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the detention. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). The articulable facts used by the officer must indicate that some activity out of the ordinary is occurring or has occurred, that the detainee is connected with the unusual activity, and that the unusual activity is related to a crime. Garza, 771 S.W.2d at 558; State v. Adkins, 829 S.W.2d 900, 901 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref'd).
The reasonable suspicion determination is made by considering the totality of the circumstances. Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Lemmons, 133 S.W.3d at 756. The facts and circumstances that provide a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity need not be criminal in nature themselves as long as they include facts that in some way would increase the likelihood of the presence or occurrence of criminal activity. See Crockett v. State, 803 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Under the reasonable suspicion standard, if circumstances are consistent with criminal activity, “they permit— even demand — an investigation: the public rightfully expects a police officer to inquire into such circumstances” in the proper discharge of the officer’s duties. Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 37.
In deciding whether the facts of the situation would justify an investigative detention, it is expected that an officer will draw on his experience and personal knowledge. Garza, 771 S.W.2d at 558. “[Wjhen used by trained law enforcement officers, objective facts, meaningless to the untrained, can be combined with permissible deductions from such facts to form a legitimate basis for suspicion of a particular person....” Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 37-38 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695-96, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). Information given to an officer by a civilian can be used in the officer’s decision to make a stop. See State v. Stolte, 991 S.W.2d 336, 341 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.).
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OPINION
JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice.
The State of Texas appeals the trial court’s order granting appellee Juan Za-rate Lopez’s motion to suppress evidence. The trial court granted appellee’s motion on the ground that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the investigative stop that led to appellee’s arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI). We will reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand the case to the trial court.
At 9:40 p.m. on November 23, 2002, Officer John Wesley Galloway responded to a call that painting equipment had just been burgled from the back of a couple’s truck, which was parked in front of their home. It was dark outside, and visibility was poor because there were no street lights. While Galloway was talking with the complainants in their front yard, appel-lee and a companion drove by very slowly. The complainants told Galloway that they had seen the same truck — or what they thought was the same truck — drive by very slowly several times that night and therefore suspected that it might have been involved in the burglary.
Although he had only about fifteen months’ experience as a Fort Worth police officer, Galloway was assigned to the police department’s burglary unit. He knew from his experience that it was common for burglars to return to the scene of the crime if they had found particular equipment to steal the first time. Based on the complainants’ information, the fact that a burglary had just occurred, his observation of the vehicle’s slow driving, and his knowledge of burglars’ behavior patterns, Galloway decided to stop appellee’s truck.
Upon waiving him down, Galloway explained to appellee and his passenger that he was investigating a burglary of painting equipment and asked to see a driver’s license and proof of insurance. As soon as appellee spoke, Galloway noticed that he smelled of alcohol, that his eyes were watery, and that he exhibited other symptoms of intoxication. At that point, Galloway began to investigate appellee for the offense of DWI. Ultimately, appellee was arrested and charged with misdemeanor DWI.
Appellee moved to suppress any evidence the police had seized as a result of the November 23 stop. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. This appeal followed.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Lemmons v. State, 133 S.W.3d 751, 755 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref'd). We afford almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of historical facts that the record supports, especially when the trial court’s fact findings are based upon an
evaluation of credibility and demeanor. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). We afford the same amount of deference to the trial court’s rulings on mixed questions of law and fact, if the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demean- or. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 332; Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). We review de novo, however, the trial court’s application of law to the facts in determining whether reasonable suspicion supported an investigative detention. See Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327; [589] Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89; Lemmons, 133 S.W.3d at 755.
An investigative “stop” by law enforcement personnel is a sufficient intrusion on an individual’s privacy to implicate the Fourth Amendment’s protections. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2579, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Nevertheless, an officer is generally justified in briefly detaining an individual on less than probable cause to investigate the possibility of criminal behavior. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880; Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). An investigative detention is justified when the officer possesses a reason able suspicion; that is, the officer is able to point to specific, articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the detention. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). The articulable facts used by the officer must indicate that some activity out of the ordinary is occurring or has occurred, that the detainee is connected with the unusual activity, and that the unusual activity is related to a crime. Garza, 771 S.W.2d at 558; State v. Adkins, 829 S.W.2d 900, 901 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref'd).
The reasonable suspicion determination is made by considering the totality of the circumstances. Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Lemmons, 133 S.W.3d at 756. The facts and circumstances that provide a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity need not be criminal in nature themselves as long as they include facts that in some way would increase the likelihood of the presence or occurrence of criminal activity. See Crockett v. State, 803 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Under the reasonable suspicion standard, if circumstances are consistent with criminal activity, “they permit— even demand — an investigation: the public rightfully expects a police officer to inquire into such circumstances” in the proper discharge of the officer’s duties. Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 37.
In deciding whether the facts of the situation would justify an investigative detention, it is expected that an officer will draw on his experience and personal knowledge. Garza, 771 S.W.2d at 558. “[Wjhen used by trained law enforcement officers, objective facts, meaningless to the untrained, can be combined with permissible deductions from such facts to form a legitimate basis for suspicion of a particular person....” Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 37-38 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695-96, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). Information given to an officer by a civilian can be used in the officer’s decision to make a stop. See State v. Stolte, 991 S.W.2d 336, 341 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.).
In this case, the trial court concluded that Galloway’s stop of appellee was based on a “mere hunch” that appellee’s vehicle “might” have been connected to the burglary rather than on specific, articulable facts that raised a reasonable suspicion as to appellee’s involvement in the crime. Consequently, the trial court concluded that Galloway’s initial stop of appellee was unreasonable. We disagree.
Galloway articulated several specific facts upon which he based his suspicion that appellee’s truck might have been involved in the burglary: the burglary had just occurred, the complainants had noticed appellee’s truck drive very slowly by their residence — the scene of the crime— several times that evening, Galloway also noticed appellee drive slowly past the residence, and Galloway knew it was common [590] for burglars to return to the crime scene if their first attempts to steal property had been successful.
Even appellee’s attorney conceded at the motion to suppress hearing that Galloway’s stop of appellee’s vehicle was proper based on these facts. His sole complaint was that Galloway had exceeded the scope of the detention by investigating appellee for DWI after discovering that he smelled of alcohol. Defense counsel argued:
Judge, I have no problems, as a matter of fact, up to the point that the officer stopped this vehicle. I think that was a legal thing for the officer to do. ... [T]he people said, Well, you know, that vehicle has been driving real slowly in front of us.... May be enough to find out, Okay. Do you have arty stolen property? and that’s the extent of the intrusion that’s allowed.
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I maintain that only a very limited intrusion is allowed under these facts, and “odor of alcoholic beverage” is not sufficient to go forward. Once that was determined, who the person was, the driver, the passenger, ... and the owners of the stolen property could see that there was nothing stolen, that all — all they should have done is just let them go.1 [Emphasis supplied.]
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we hold that Galloway reasonably suspected that some activity out of the ordinary was occurring or had occurred that justified his stop of appellee. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244; Garza, 771 S.W.2d at 558. While appellee’s action of driving slowly down the street was not apparently criminal in itself, when combined with the information available to Galloway, appellee’s conduct was consistent with criminal activity and demanded further investigation. See Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 37. Accordingly, the trial court erred by concluding otherwise and granting appellee’s motion to suppress. See Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327; Lemmons, 133 S.W.3d at 755.
We sustain the State’s points, reverse the trial court’s order granting the motion to suppress, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
WALKER, J. filed a dissenting opinion.