Supreme Court
No. 2024-14-C.A. (P1/20-1021A)
State :
v. :
Jose Lantigua. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Robinson, for the Court. The defendant, Jose Lantigua, appeals
from a November 22, 2023 judgment of conviction and commitment on one count
of first-degree child molestation and one count of second-degree child molestation
following a jury trial held in the Providence County Superior Court. On appeal, the
defendant contends that the trial justice erred in allowing a medical expert to
“impermissibly bolster” the complaining witness’s testimony that she had been
sexually abused even though the medical expert’s opinion “was based only on
statements from [the complaining witness] and her mother, and not due to any
medical or physical findings.”
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the
Superior Court.
-1- I
Facts and Travel
This case involves allegations of child molestation made by the complaining
witness against defendant.
On March 12, 2020, a grand jury indicted defendant on one count of
first-degree child molestation (Count 1) and two counts of second-degree child
molestation (Count 2 and Count 3). On September 28, 2022, defendant was
convicted by a jury on the count of first-degree child molestation and on one of the
two counts of second-degree child molestation.1 Later, on October 30, 2023,
defendant was sentenced to a sixty-year sentence, with twenty-five years to be
served, on the count of first-degree child molestation. On the second-degree child
molestation count, defendant received a concurrent sentence of twenty-five years.
A notice of appeal was filed on November 16, 2023. We relate below the salient
aspects of the pretrial hearing and of the trial itself.
A
The Motion in Limine to Allow the Testimony of Doctor Amy Goldberg
On August 26, 2022, the state filed a motion in limine to allow Amy Goldberg,
M.D., to testify as to statements that the complaining witness and her mother, Luisa
1 As will be discussed infra, the trial justice granted defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on one of the two counts of second-degree child molestation (Count 3). -2- Mora, made to Dr. Goldberg in the course of her medical examination of the
complaining witness at the Aubin Center of the Hasbro Children’s Hospital. The
state asserted that those statements were admissible pursuant to Rule 803(4) of the
Rhode Island Rules of Evidence since the proffered statements were made to Dr.
Goldberg for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment. A hearing on the
state’s motion was held on September 15, 2022, but the trial justice made no decision
at that time.
In the course of trial, the trial justice readdressed the issue raised by the motion
in limine and provided the parties another opportunity to present arguments.
Counsel for defendant contended that Dr. Goldberg was being “called to bolster the
testimony of the witnesses.” In response, the state asserted that the “only thing she’s
going to say is that * * * the disclosure that [the complaining witness] gave was
consistent with child sexual abuse. She can’t say whether or not this child was
sexually abused.” In ruling on the motion, the trial justice indicated that, while he
was going to “wait to see what the doctor will actually testify to,” the medical reports
prepared by Dr. Goldberg would not be admitted into evidence. The trial justice
further ruled that (1) an allegation that defendant abused a child other than the
complaining witness would not be admissible; (2) the history of sexual abuse given
by the complaining witness to Dr. Goldberg would be admissible; and (3) the
findings from the physical examination would be admissible. The trial justice
-3- ultimately ruled that Dr. Goldberg would be permitted to testify and would be subject
to cross-examination.
B
The Trial
There follows the testimony of those witnesses whose testimony we deem
relevant to our resolution of the issues on appeal.
1. The Testimony of Luisa Mora
Ms. Mora first testified to the following: she is the mother of the complaining
witness; her own mother is Dulce Lantigua; and defendant is her stepfather. Ms.
Mora testified that, when the complaining witness was a “few months old,” she (i.e.,
Ms. Mora) moved into a house located at 44 Alton Street in Providence, where her
mother and defendant then resided. She stated that the house was a two-story
building with two bedrooms and a bathroom on the first floor as well as three more
bedrooms and a bathroom on the second floor. The house also had a basement,
where defendant stored tools. Ms. Mora added that, when the complaining witness
was an infant, she and her daughter slept in the same room on the second floor.
Ms. Mora testified that, at some point when her daughter was still a child, she
moved out of the 44 Alton Street house to move in with her husband, Yonathan
Jimenez. She added that her daughter remained at the 44 Alton Street house with
defendant and Ms. Lantigua (Ms. Mora’s mother). It was Ms. Mora’s testimony
-4- that, while her daughter was still living at the 44 Alton Street house, defendant had
moved out of the house and married someone other than Ms. Lantigua. However,
Ms. Mora further stated that defendant at some point returned to live at the 44 Alton
Street house.
Ms. Mora next testified as to certain events that occurred in April of 2019.
She stated that, while driving with her brother, her husband, and her children, they
began talking about defendant. Ms. Mora testified that, in the course of the
conversation, her daughter spoke from the back seat of the car and stated that
defendant used to touch her and that it “was a game that she used to play with” him.
It was her further testimony that, upon being apprised of this information, they
returned to the 44 Alton Street house to confront defendant regarding what they had
just been told by the complaining witness.
Ms. Mora stated that she did not report the alleged abuse to the police. She
testified that, after the alleged abuse had been disclosed, she noticed that her
daughter, the complaining witness, refused to eat, had nightmares, did not want to
bathe, and started bed-wetting. Ms. Mora added that, in May of 2019, she received
a call from her daughter’s school principal, who informed her that her daughter had
been “cutting herself and that she had suicidal thoughts.” It was Ms. Mora’s
testimony that, after receiving that phone call, she sought counseling for her daughter
and also went to the police department to report the alleged abuse; she added that
-5- they went to the Aubin Center at the Hasbro Children’s Hospital. Ms. Mora testified
that, while her daughter was being seen at the Aubin Center, she informed the
doctors that defendant had been touching her daughter’s “private parts.”
2. The Testimony of the Complaining Witness
The complaining witness testified that defendant is her step-grandfather and
that, when she was growing up, she would call him “Daddy.” She described several
instances of molestation in the course of her testimony.
The complaining witness first testified to an alleged occurrence that took place
when she was four-years-old. She stated that defendant had informed her that “there
was a Barbie house in the basement” and that he asked her “to go downstairs to the
basement with him to help him bring it up.” The complaining witness further
testified that, once they were down in the basement, defendant placed her on top of
a “flat ironing table” and started “touching [her] uncomfortably,” such that he
“started moving his hands towards * * * [her] thighs and down and he pulled [her]
pants down a little bit * * *.” She added that “he was kissing [her] legs.”
The complaining witness also testified as to an event that allegedly occurred
when she was seven-years-old. She stated that defendant came into a room on the
first floor of the 44 Alton Street house where she was playing on her tablet.
According to the complaining witness, when defendant entered the room, she
pretended to be asleep. She testified that, after defendant tried to wake her up from
-6- her pretended sleep, he took off her pants and underwear and performed oral sex on
her.
The complaining witness testified to a third alleged incident of molestation
that occurred when she was eight-years-old. According to the complaining witness,
while she was in the basement with defendant, he pulled her pants down. She further
testified that he then “pulled his pants down and start[ed] playing with his private
spot in front of [her].”
The complaining witness also testified that defendant had touched her more
than the three times about which she had already testified.
3. The Testimony of Doctor Amy Goldberg
Doctor Goldberg testified that she was employed as a pediatrician at Hasbro
Children’s Hospital with a subspecialty in the area of child abuse and neglect. She
was qualified as an expert at trial. Doctor Goldberg testified that, in July of 2019,
at the Aubin Center of the Hasbro Children’s Hospital, she evaluated the
complaining witness, who was then ten-years-old. Doctor Goldberg indicated that,
before interviewing the complaining witness, she first took a history from Ms. Mora.
She testified without objection that, as a result of being briefed about the pertinent
history, she learned the following: (1) Ms. Mora first became aware of the disclosure
of the abuse when she and the complaining witness were driving in the car together;
and (2) the complaining witness was four-years-old at the time of the first alleged
-7- sexual abuse. Doctor Goldberg also testified that she spoke with the complaining
witness before undertaking her physical examination. Among other disclosures
relative to the specifics of the alleged abuse, Dr. Goldberg testified that the
complaining witness identified defendant as the perpetrator and stated that the
alleged abuse took place from the time when she was four-years-old until she was
eight-years-old.
Doctor Goldberg testified that, after obtaining the relevant history from both
Ms. Mora and the complaining witness, she conducted a physical examination of the
complaining witness. She stated that “[e]verything was normal on her physical
examination.” Doctor Goldberg additionally confirmed that she was aware of the
“information that was obtained at the forensic interview.” Importantly, the
following exchange next occurred:
“[PROSECUTOR]: Doctor, based on your training and experience, the physical exam that was done on [the complaining witness], the history that was taken from both mom and [the complaining witness], the information obtained at the forensic interview, do you have an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to whether or not [the complaining witness’s] disclosure is consistent with child sexual abuse?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.
“* * *
“THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.
“[THE WITNESS]: Yes. -8- “[PROSECUTOR]: And what is that opinion?
“[THE WITNESS]: That she was sexually abused.
“[PROSECUTOR]: It was consistent?
“[THE WITNESS]: That it’s consistent with child sexual abuse.”
On cross-examination, Dr. Goldberg confirmed that there had been no
physical evidence of sexual abuse and that her opinion was based on “all of the
information that [she] had from the evaluation” which she had performed—namely,
the information obtained from Ms. Mora and the complaining witness.
C
The Subsequent Travel of the Case
At the close of the prosecution’s case, defense counsel moved for a judgment
of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure
as to one of the counts of second-degree child molestation (Count 3), contending
that there was no evidence of the “hand to thigh [contact] that is charged in the
indictment.” The trial justice granted the motion for judgment of acquittal as to
Count 3.
After the parties presented their closing arguments, the jury began
deliberations on September 28, 2022. Later that same day, the jury found defendant
guilty on the remaining counts—viz., one count of first-degree child molestation
-9- (Count 1) and on one count of second-degree child molestation (Count 2). Notably,
counsel for defendant did not file a motion for a new trial.
On January 11, 2023, defendant’s trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw his
appearance, which the trial justice granted. The court referred defendant to the
Office of the Public Defender for representation at the sentencing hearing. On
October 30, 2023, defendant was sentenced to: a sixty-year sentence, with
twenty-five years to be served, on the first-degree child molestation count (Count 1);
and a concurrent sentence of twenty-five years on the second-degree child
molestation count (Count 2).
A judgment of conviction and commitment was entered on November 22,
2023. The defendant filed a premature but valid notice of appeal on November 16,
2023.
II
Issue on Appeal
The defendant argues on appeal that the trial justice committed reversible
error when he allowed the state’s medical expert, Dr. Goldberg, to present
“bolstering testimony” in that said expert testified that she “believed the complaining
witness’s allegations to be true in a case that rested entirely on the girl’s credibility.”
- 10 - III
Standard of Review
This Court has stated that “[w]hen reviewing the decision of a trial justice to
admit certain evidence, * * * questions as to the admissibility vel non of evidence
are confided to the sound discretion of the trial justice.” State v. Pitts, 990 A.2d 185,
189 (R.I. 2010) (internal quotation marks and deletion omitted). Accordingly, “[w]e
will not overturn the ruling of a trial justice with respect to an evidentiary issue
unless it constitutes an abuse of the justice’s discretion and prejudices the
complaining party.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, we have
further made it clear that “[w]e are disinclined to perceive an abuse of discretion so
long as the record contains some grounds for supporting the trial justice’s decision.”
Id. at 189-90 (internal quotation marks and deletion omitted).
IV
Analysis
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial justice erred in allowing Dr.
Goldberg to testify that the complaining witness had been sexually abused even
though her expert opinion was based only on statements made by the complaining
witness and her mother. The defendant further argues that this testimony “far
exceeded the scope of a permissible expert opinion and crossed well into bolstering
territory.” It is defendant’s further contention that the prejudicial nature of this
- 11 - testimony was particularly harmful because this case “rested entirely on the
[complaining witness’s] testimony.”
Among other arguments, the state emphasizes that defendant did not properly
object to the questions posed by the state and that he did not move to strike Dr.
Goldberg’s answers to those questions. Specifically, the state contends that
defendant failed to preserve his objection to Dr. Goldberg’s testimony for appellate
review. We agree.
This Court has held that a “trial justice’s rulings on motions in limine are
preliminary in nature.” State v. Colon, 198 A.3d 1249, 1255 (R.I. 2019); see State v.
Buchanan, 81 A.3d 1119, 1126 (R.I. 2014) (noting that “this Court repeatedly has
stated that the grant or denial of a motion in limine is by no means a final ruling on
the admissibility of the evidence addressed in the motion”). It follows that “an in
limine ruling is not final and a trial justice is vested with broad discretion to
reconsider the ruling as the trial unfolds.” Buchanan, 81 A.3d at 1126. As such, it
is “incumbent upon counsel to raise timely and appropriate evidentiary objections
throughout the trial in order to preserve the issues for appeal.” Colon, 198 A.3d at
1255 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Pursuant to this Court’s raise or waive rule, “a litigant must make a timely and
appropriate objection during the lower court proceedings before this Court will
indulge the issue on appeal.” State v. Grant, 840 A.2d 541, 546 (R.I. 2004). This
- 12 - Court has further cautioned that a “general objection does not suffice to preserve an
issue for appellate review; rather, assignments of error must be alleged with
sufficient particularity so it will call the trial justice’s attention to the basis of the
objection.” Id. at 546-47; see Colon, 198 A.3d at 1258 (“[W]hen an evidentiary issue
is raised on appeal, Rule 103(a)(1) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence explicitly
provides that a finding of error must be based upon a timely objection or motion to
strike of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was
not apparent from the context.”) (internal quotation marks, deletion, and emphasis
omitted).
The admissibility of Dr. Goldberg’s testimony was first addressed when the
state filed its motion in limine to permit Dr. Goldberg to testify pursuant to Rule
803(4); but the trial justice did not rule on that issue at the in limine stage. When the
trial justice later revisited the issue at a mid-trial hearing, it was then that counsel for
defendant argued that Dr. Goldberg was being “called to bolster the testimony of the
witnesses.” The trial justice stated that he was going to “wait to see what the doctor
will actually testify to,” which indicates to this Court that the trial justice’s attitude
towards the testimony that Dr. Goldberg would provide was tentative in nature and
that defendant still had the responsibility to lodge an objection to the specific aspects
of that testimony in order to preserve the issue for appeal. See State v. Ciresi, 45
A.3d 1201, 1212 (R.I. 2012).
- 13 - At trial, defendant’s only objection as to the admission of this testimonial
evidence was to the state’s question: “Doctor, based on your training and experience,
the physical exam that was done on [the complaining witness], the history that was
taken from both mom and [the complaining witness], the information obtained at the
forensic interview, do you have an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty as to whether or not [the complaining witness’s] disclosure is consistent
with child sexual abuse?” The defendant failed to object to the two subsequent
questions, which constitute the basis for this appeal—viz., what was Dr. Goldberg’s
expert medical opinion and whether that opinion was consistent with child abuse.2
Simply put, defense counsel objected only to the question as to whether Dr.
Goldberg had an opinion, not the substance of her expert opinion.
Additionally, at the time when he did voice an objection, defendant did not
voice a specific basis for his objection. We further reject any argument that the
context of the examination provided the basis for the objection. As we have noted,
defense counsel solely objected to the question about whether Dr. Goldberg had an
opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to whether the complaining
witness’s disclosure was consistent with child sexual abuse. See Pollard v. Acer
Group, 870 A.2d 429, 433 (R.I. 2005) (“The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has
been steadfast in its adherence to the general proposition that no issues may be raised
2 See State v. Colon, 198 A.3d 1249, 1255 (R.I. 2019), as quoted supra. - 14 - on appeal unless such issues were presented to the trial court in such a posture as to
alert the trial justice to the question being raised.”) (quoting Joseph R. Weisberger,
Rhode Island Appellate Practice, Rule 16.5 at 89 (1993)); see also State v.
Diefenderfer, 970 A.2d 12, 30 (R.I. 2009) (“It should be borne in mind that, in order
to satisfy the strictures of our ‘raise-or-waive’ rule, an evidentiary objection must be
‘sufficiently focused so as to call the trial justice’s attention to the basis for said
objection.’”) (deletion omitted) (quoting State v. Warren, 624 A.2d 841, 842 (R.I.
1993)). It therefore cannot fairly be said that it was contextually clear that defense
counsel was objecting on the basis of bolstering. See State v. Adefusika, 989 A.2d
467, 479 (R.I. 2010) (noting that an evidentiary objection “must be sufficiently
focused” and articulated with reasonable specificity) (internal quotation marks
Finally, defense counsel similarly failed to move to strike Dr. Goldberg’s
answers; he also did not request a cautionary instruction relative to Dr. Goldberg’s
testimony. See State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1077 (R.I. 1981) (noting that the
defendants’ failure to move to strike certain testimony “was a decision on their part
not to take advantage of the long-observed practice in this state of eliminating from
the record testimony that is improper, erroneous, or prejudicial by means of a motion
to strike”); see also State v. Lyons, 725 A.2d 271, 276 (R.I. 1999) (holding that,
because the defendant failed to object specifically to certain testimony at the trial
- 15 - level and did not move to strike the answer and did not request a cautionary
instruction or a mistrial, the issue was waived).
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed herein, the evidentiary issue now
before this Court has not been preserved for appellate review, and we therefore deem
it to have been waived.
V
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the
Superior Court. The record may be returned to that tribunal.
- 16 - STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case State v. Jose Lantigua.
No. 2024-14-C.A. Case Number (P1/20-1021A)
Date Opinion Filed July 3, 2025
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Justices Long, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice William P. Robinson III
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Stephen P. Nugent
For State:
Devon Flanagan Hogan Department of Attorney General Attorney(s) on Appeal For Respondent:
Angela M. Yingling Rhode Island Public Defender