State v. Jones

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: February 18, 2014
• Docket: 13-859
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-859 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 18 February 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Guilford County Nos. 10 CRS 76967, 10 CRS 76969, 10 CRS 76972 RICARDO DONNELL JONES

Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 7 March 2013 by

Judge Ronald E. Spivey in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard

in the Court of Appeals 27 January 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General Adrian Dellinger, for the State.

Daniel F. Read for Defendant.

DILLON, Judge.

Defendant Ricardo Donnell Jones appeals from judgments

entered after he admitted to violating his probation. Defendant

contends the trial court erred by finding all of the alleged

violations, when the State had abandoned some of the

allegations, and abused its discretion by failing to adequately

consider the impact of his mental illness on his ability to -2- comply with the terms of his probation. After careful review,

we affirm.

I. Background

On 10 May 2011, Defendant pled guilty to one count of

misdemeanor larceny and two counts of felonious larceny. In the

misdemeanor case, the trial court sentenced Defendant to 120

days imprisonment, but suspended the sentence and placed

Defendant on supervised probation for 60 months. In the felony

cases, the trial court sentenced Defendant to consecutive terms

of 10 to 12 months, but again suspended the sentences and placed

Defendant on supervised probation for 60 months.

On 27 July 2012, a probation officer filed a violation

report in the misdemeanor case alleging that Defendant had

tested positive for marijuana and cocaine. On 6 December 2012,

the officer signed additional violation reports in all three

cases alleging more positive drug screens, arrearages on

Defendant’s financial obligations, and new criminal convictions.

The officer signed violation reports in February of 2013

alleging that Defendant had committed an assault that could be

the basis for revocation if it resulted in conviction, but that

the charge was still pending. -3- The matter of Defendant’s probation violations came on for

hearing on 27 February 2013. Defendant did not admit to a

violation based on the pending assault charge, but admitted to

the remaining violations. Defendant contended that he had

physical and mental health problems and requested that the trial

court allow him another chance to comply with the terms of his

probation. Defendant further requested that, if the court were

to revoke his probation, he be able to serve his activated

sentences concurrently rather than consecutively. The trial

court revoked probation, but ordered that Defendant’s activated

sentence in the misdemeanor case run concurrently with one of

the felony cases. Defendant appeals.

II. Analysis

Defendant’s first argument is that the trial court erred by

finding multiple grounds to revoke his probation when the State

abandoned all of the allegations other than the new convictions.

This argument lacks merit.

At the outset, we note that all of Defendant’s probation

violations occurred after 1 December 2011, and, therefore, his

probation was subject to revocation only for obtaining

additional criminal convictions or for absconding from

supervision. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(a) (2011); State v. -4- Hunnicutt, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 740 S.E.2d 906, 910-11 (2013)

(citation omitted).

Defendant, however, admitted to willfully violating his

probation and stipulated to the factual basis to support the

violations, including the new criminal convictions. The trial

court found all of the violations alleged in the 6 December 2012

violation reports and further found that each violation, in and

of itself, was a sufficient basis upon which to revoke

Defendant’s probation. Accordingly, the trial court made

sufficient findings to support revocation of Defendant’s

probation pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(1) (2011)

and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(a) (2011). State v. Henderson,

179 N.C. App. 191, 197, 632 S.E.2d 818, 822 (2006) (findings on

pre-printed form sufficient to support probation revocation).

In light of Defendant’s admitted violations, we decline to hold

that any findings of grounds other than those authorized by N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(a) prejudiced Defendant or that the trial

court failed to exercise its discretion in revoking probation.

See State v. Seay, 59 N.C. App. 667, 670-71, 298 S.E.2d 53, 55

(1982) (a finding of a violation of any valid condition of

probation is sufficient to support revocation). -5- In Defendant’s second argument, he contends the trial court

abused its discretion by failing to sufficiently consider his

mental health issues. We disagree.

Because “probation is an act of grace by the State to one

convicted of a crime[,] . . . an alleged violation of a

probationary condition need not be proven beyond a reasonable

doubt.” State v. Hill, 132 N.C. App. 209, 211, 510 S.E.2d 413,

414 (1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Although a

trial court is required to make findings showing it considered

the evidence presented at a revocation hearing, it is not

required to make findings addressing each of the defendant’s

excuses for non-compliance. State v. Belcher, 173 N.C. App.

620, 625, 619 S.E.2d 567, 570 (2005) (citation omitted).

Here, Defendant admitted to violating the terms of his

probation and the trial court’s findings support its decision to

revoke probation. Furthermore, we note that Defendant asked the

trial court to allow him to continue on probation due to his

physical and mental health issues, or to consider running his

sentences concurrently, rather than consecutively, if they were

activated. The trial court revoked probation, but elected to

alter the original judgments to permit the misdemeanor sentence

to run concurrently with one of the felony sentences. Thus, the -6- record demonstrates that the trial court not only considered

Defendant’s excuse, but also altered the judgments to

Defendant’s benefit. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s ruling.

AFFIRMED.

Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge HUNTER, JR. concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).