OPINION
ANDELL, Justice.
The State brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s orders granting five motions to suppress physical evidence pursuant to Tex.Code Crim.P.ANN. art. 44.01(a)(5) (Vernon Supp.1995). Appellee, Jay Johnson, is charged with capital murder 1.in the shooting death of Edwina Prosen, his alleged common-law wife.2 In 13 points of error, the [280]*280State asserts the trial court erred in each order to suppress evidence obtained in five searches. We affirm all five suppression orders.
Johnson and Prosen jointly operated the Sweeny Funeral Home. They lived together in the upstairs portion of the building that housed the funeral home. Johnson owned the funeral home business, and Prosen owned the hearse they used in the business. Early on Sunday morning, September 29, 1991, Johnson called the Sweeny Police Department and reported that Prosen had been shot. The police arrived promptly and searched the funeral home. Over the next two-and-a-half weeks, the police conducted several more searches of the funeral home and the hearse. Johnson complains that each search was unlawful, and that the evidence gained from each should have been suppressed. The trial court agreed with Johnson in large part, and granted most of his suppression motions. The State appeals five orders to suppress. Each one must be considered in turn.
Johnson complained of evidence obtained from the following searches:
(1) Officers searched the Sweeny Funeral Home without a warrant on the day they received the report of the shooting, September 29, 1991.3
(2) Officers searched the hearse on September 30, 1991, without a warrant when they apprehended Johnson driving the hearse with Prosen’s body in it, stopped him, took him into custody, and impounded the hearse.
(8) Officers searched the hearse with a warrant on October 1, 1991.
(4) Officers received evidence, handed over to them by the sons of the decedent, that the three sons had taken from the Sweeny Funeral Home over the three-day period of October 1, 2, and 3, 1991.
(5) Officers searched the Sweeny Funeral Home with a warrant on October 16, 1991.
The trial court granted all the motions in whole or in part.4
[1,2] On a motion to suppress, the trial court is the exclusive finder of fact and may choose to believe or disbelieve any or all of a witness’s testimony. Meek v. State, 790 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). The standard of review is abuse of discretion. Id.; Tex.Code Crim.P.Ann. art. 28.01, § 1(6) (Vernon 1989). The standard of review is the same whether the trial court denied the motion to suppress or granted the motion to suppress. This Court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling. To hold that the trial court abused its discretion, we must determine that the evidence would not support a finding that the searches were unlawful.
The record contains no findings of fact or conclusions of law. Therefore, this Court must presume that the trial court found whatever facts were needed to support its ruling.5 This would end the entire inquiry unless the record shows either of the following: (1) that the evidence at the suppression hearing would not support any reasonable finding that the searches were unlawful; or (2) the evidence clearly and con[281]*281vincingly shows that suppression was erroneous as a matter of law.
The trial court granted six motions to suppress, which were directed at six separate, but related, searches. This appeal concerns only five of the six orders. In reviewing these five orders for abuse of discretion, it is necessary to differentiate each search and its corresponding motion. We must analyze separately the facts surrounding each search, to determine whether the trial court could reasonably have found that the given search was unlawful. If the trial court could reasonably have found, from the evidence before it at the suppression hearing, that the given search was unlawful, then its suppression order was proper. We must perform this analysis for each of the five suppression orders.
Each search, and its related motion to suppress, will be taken chronologically, accompanied by the corresponding points of error.
Search 1:
September 29, 1991, the day of the shooting; search of the funeral home without a warrant.
(Relevant to point of error one)
1. Facts
Johnson called the Sweeny police at 7:46 а.m. on Sunday, September 29, 1991, and reported that Edwina Prosen had been shot. When Sergeant Davis arrived a few minutes later, Johnson met him at the door and led him into the funeral home and up the stairs to Prosen’s body in the bedroom. Sergeant Davis secured the scene and removed the shotgun, shells, pillow, pillowcases, and bedding. Other officers arrived later that morning and videotaped the scene, including the stairs leading to the bedroom, the bedroom itself, and other portions of the building.
The trial court suppressed the entire audio portion of the videotape, which included officers discussing the possibility of illegal drugs on the premises. The trial court also suppressed the video portion where it showed the opening of drawers in the bedroom, and any portions outside the bedroom or stairway. Finally, the trial court suppressed any items6 taken from the premises during that warrantless search, other than the shotgun, shells, pillows, pillowcases and bedding that Sergeant Davis had removed. The trial court denied the portion of Johnson’s suppression motion that pertained to the shotgun, shells, pillow, pillowcases, and bedding. The trial court refused to suppress these items.
2. Analysis
In point of error one, the State asserts the trial court erred in suppressing the remainder of the videotape beyond the bedroom and stairs, along with the other evidence seized in the warrantless search.
In its suppression order, the trial court implicitly distinguished between the evidence that was in plain view and that which was not, but it gave no rationale for its ruling. We must look to the grounds Johnson urged in his motion to evaluate whether the trial court abused its discretion. Johnson claimed that the warrantless search of the funeral home on September 29, 1991, violated the following: (a) the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution; (b) the Texas Constitution, article I, section 9; and (e) the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Johnson points to the general rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable per se. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Fancher v. State, 659 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). He then acknowledges the exceptions to this rule, but urges that the State’s actions do not fall within any of the exceptions.
The State argues that it had consent. Consent is an exception to the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable per se. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, 93 [282]*282S.Ct. at 2043-44; Fancher, 669 S.W.2d at 839. The State has the burden to prove consent by clear and convincing evidence. Fancher, 659 S.W.2d at 839. Consent will be determined from the totality of the circumstances. Id. Without findings of fact, we must presume that the trial court made the necessary findings to support its ruling, and we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. This would end the analysis unless the facts at the suppression hearing require that the trial court find consent as a matter of law.
Sergeant Davis testified that other officers arrived at the scene with a video camera and videotaped the stairway, the bedroom, and the other rooms of the house. The State’s evidence of consent to search the premises rests on two bases: (1) Sergeant Davis’ testimony about communications from Johnson to the police dispatcher and to himself; and (2) communications from the decedent’s mother, Mrs. Reuter, to Sergeant Davis.
Sergeant Davis testified that he received a call that a shooting had been reported at the Sweeny Funeral Home. He proceeded immediately to the funeral home, where he met Johnson. Johnson invited him in and led him up the stairs to the living area and into the bedroom where Edwina Prosen’s body lay across the bed. Sergeant Davis saw a shotgun leaning against the bed. Johnson told Sergeant Davis that he dropped the shotgun and it fired accidentally. Johnson asked Sergeant Davis to help him get Prosen onto the backboard of the bed so he could get her down the stairs and into the hearse to take her to the hospital. Sergeant Davis told Johnson to leave everything as it was, and he called for an ambulance.
Sergeant Davis testified that he began investigating a “possible homicide” but he acknowledged that it might have been an accidental shooting. He testified that if Johnson’s story was correct that the shotgun fired accidentally, then he believed the shotgun presented a danger to himself and to anyone else who might come into the room. He could see that the shotgun contained more shells. He seized the shotgun and secured it in the trunk of his patrol car. In addition, Sergeant Davis testified that Johnson was there when he took the shotgun, shells, and the bedding, and that Johnson said nothing to stop him. Sergeant Davis testified that all these items were in plain view in the bedroom where Johnson had led him. Johnson did not testify at the hearing, but Sergeant Davis testified that Johnson refused to sign a consent to search form at 11:50 p.m. on the night of the killing. This refusal was some 16 hours after Sergeant Davis had arrived in response to Johnson’s call and had conducted the initial search.
Sergeant Davis testified that he received verbal consent from the decedent’s mother, Mrs. Reuter, who also lived on the premises, to “do and take what you have to.” Mrs. Reuter lived upstairs where Johnson and Prosen lived. Third persons who have equal control over and use of the premises being searched have authority to consent to the search. Fancher, 659 S.W.2d at 839. Mrs. Reuter testified later but neither the State nor defense counsel asked her if she consented to the search. If we assume, without concluding, that Mrs. Reuter had authority to consent to a search of the entire premises, then the question is whether her words to Sergeant Davis actually conveyed such consent.
In a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole finder of fact, and it may choose to believe or disbelieve any or all of the witnesses. Meek, 790 S.W.2d at 620. Mrs. Reuter testified at the suppression hearing, but not on this issue. The trial court could have chosen to disbelieve Sergeant Davis’s testimony that he received verbal consent from Mrs. Reuter. Or the trial court could have concluded that her consent did not extend beyond the bedroom into the other areas of the building. On the other hand, the trial court could reasonably have believed that, while Mrs. Reuter intended to give Sergeant Davis her consent to search the entire premises, she actually had no authority to consent to such an extensive search. There are several ways in which the trial court could reasonably have found or concluded that Sergeant Davis did not have explicit consent to search the entire premises.
[283]*283Even without explicit consent, the State has the authority in some instances to search the immediate area of a crime under the doctrine of implied consent adopted in Brown v. State, 856 S.W.2d 177, 182 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), in which the court held as follows:
We therefore hold that when a crime is reported to the police by an individual who owns or controls the premises to which the police are summoned, and that individual either states or suggests that it was committed by a third person, he or she implicitly consents to a search of the premises reasonably related to the routine investigation of the offense and the identification of the perpetrator. As long as the individual is not a suspect in the case or does nothing to revoke his consent, the police may search the premises for these purposes, and evidence obtained thereby is admissible. This implied consent is valid only for the initial investigation conducted at the scene and does not carry over to future visits to the scene.
(Emphasis added.)
The rule in Brown requires that the following three factors be satisfied before implied consent to search the premises goes into effect: (1) a person reports “a crime” to the police; (2) the reported crime must be on the reporting person’s premises; and (8) the reporting person “either states or suggests that it was committed by a third person.... ” Id. Once these three factors are satisfied, the police have implied consent to search. If any one of these factors is not satisfied, implied consent does not arise.
After implied consent has arisen, it may cease by either of two means: (1) the person reporting the crime becomes a suspect, id.; or (2) the person reporting the crime takes some action to revoke his consent. Id. Once the person reporting the crime becomes a suspect, federal and state constitutions override the doctrine of implied consent, and any consent to search must be explicit.7
In this situation, however, when Johnson notified the police of the shooting, he did not report it as a crime committed by a third person, but as an accidental shooting that had occurred at his own hands. Hence, there was no third person perpetrator to identify, and the Brown rule of implied consent could not go into effect in the first instance. The police could not investigate this as a crime scene unless they suspected Johnson was lying about the accidental nature of the shooting. If the police thought this, then Johnson was a suspect from the outset, and the Brown rule would prohibit, rather than permit, any finding of implied consent. Id. The searches would be limited by U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 9; and Tex.Code CRIM.P.Ann. art. 1.06 (Vernon 1977).
3. Conclusion
The State argues that consent is evident from the following: (1) Johnson’s call to the police; (2) Johnson’s act of leading Sergeant Davis up the stairs and into the bedroom to Prosen’s body; (3) Sergeant Davis’s testimony that Mrs. Reuter gave him her verbal consent to “do and take whatever you have to”; and (4) Johnson’s failure to object to Sergeant Davis’s removal of the shotgun, shells, pillow, pillowcases, and bedding. Evidence of consent must be clear and convincing. Fancher, 659 S.W.2d at 839. The trial court could have found that the evidence before it in the suppression hearing did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of consent to search the entire facility.
The trial court could have found from the totality of the circumstances that consent was limited to the items that were in plain view when Johnson led Sergeant Davis into the bedroom, and that neither Johnson nor Mrs. Reuter had consented to a search of the entire premises. If the trial court found that the State conducted the search without con[284]*284sent (whether express or implied), then the State has failed to show that its actions were within an exception to the general rule against warrantless searches. Therefore, the search beyond the stairs and bedroom was unreasonable and in violation of both the United States and Texas Constitutions. Fancher, 659 S.W.2d at 839.
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in suppressing the videotape showing investigation beyond the bedroom and stairs. We also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in suppressing any other evidence obtained pursuant to the warrantless search on the day of the shooting.
We overrule the State’s point of error one.
Search 2:
September 30, 1991; search of the hearse without a warrant. (Relevant to points of error two, three, four, and five)
After Edwina Prosen was pronounced dead at Sweeny Community Hospital, her body was taken to the Harris County Medical Examiner for an autopsy. When the medical examiner completed his work, her body was sent to Escort Embalming Service for embalming. On September 30, 1991, Johnson went to Escort Embalming Service, took Prosen’s body, and put it in the hearse that he and Prosen had used for the Sweeny Funeral Home business. The title of the hearse was in Prosen’s name, and Johnson was a named insured on the hearse auto policy.
Johnson was on Highway 288-B in Angle-ton, driving the hearse containing Prosen’s body, when Deputy David Cisneros of the Brazoria County sheriffs department received a call to look for Johnson in the hearse transporting a body. Deputy Cisneros saw Johnson on the highway and stopped him. Deputy Cisneros testified that it was getting dark (at 7:12 p.m.), and that he used his flashlight to glance inside the hearse as Johnson was getting out of it, but he did not search the hearse.
While Deputy Cisneros was talking with Johnson, standing at the back of the hearse, two more law enforcement officers drove up, Deputy Anderson and Lieutenant Jeff Gillen-waters. Deputy Cisneros testified that Lieutenant Gillenwaters was talking to someone on his ear phone, then got out and instructed him “to place Mr. Johnson in custody for investigative hold through Sweeny Police Department. And for — for the theft of this corpse.” At that time, Deputy Anderson, also of the Brazoria County sheriffs department, arrested Johnson and transported him to the county jail.
Deputy Cisneros drove the hearse to the sheriffs department patrol office. While he was in the hearse, he made a cursory visual search of the interior, and he saw Prosen’s body lying in the back of the hearse. He did not open the glove compartment at this time. When Deputy Cisneros delivered the hearse to the police station, they conducted an inventory search, which yielded, among other things, “some life insurance papers.” The trial court granted Johnson’s motion to suppress the evidence gained in this inventory search.
In points of error two, three, four, and five, the State asserts the warrantless inventory search of the hearse on September 30, 1991 was legal. In point of error two, the State alleges Johnson has no standing to challenge the search. Points of error three, four, and five contend the search was lawful.
For the State to obtain a reversal of this suppression order, it must show all three of the following: (1) the stop and arrest were lawful (point of error three); (2) the inventory search was in accordance with the United States Constitution (point of error four); and (3) the inventory search was in accordance with the Texas Constitution and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (point of error five).
In point of error five, the State asserts that “the arrest and the impoundment are lawful.” The State did not obtain any evi[285]*285dence as a result of the stop prior to the arrest. It obtained evidence only in the inventory search that followed the arrest. Thus, the controlling issue is whether the arrest was lawful.
In point of error two, the State asserts Johnson has no standing to contest the search of the hearse. The hearse belonged to Prosen, not to Johnson. Johnson’s fourth amendment right depends upon a subjective expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979). Johnson did not own the hearse. At the time of the stop, the hearse’s owner of title, Edwina Prosen, was recently deceased. The State argues that title to the hearse vested at her death in her legal heirs, which would be her three children. Tex. Probate Code Ann. §§ 3, 38 (Vernon 1980 & Supp.1995).8 The owner of title, Edwina Prosen, could not give Johnson consent to drive the hearse after she was deceased. And Johnson produced no evidence that he had received consent from the Prosen heirs to drive the hearse. Thus, the State contends that Johnson could not have held a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hearse.
Johnson did, however, own the business in which the hearse was used — namely, Sweeny Funeral Home.9 He was a named insured on the hearse insurance policy, which would suggest that the owner of the hearse expected Johnson to drive it. Non-owner occupants of vehicles may have standing to contest searches in some situations. In Wilson v. State, 692 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984), the Court held that the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in, and consequent standing to contest the search of, an automobile that he had borrowed. In State v. Bassano, 827 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref'd), the court held that the defendant had standing to contest the search of his wife’s vehicle. And in Chapa v. State, 729 S.W.2d 723, 729 (Tex. Crim.App.1987), the Court held that the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in, and consequent standing to contest the search of, the interior of a taxicab in which he was a passenger.
The trial court could have found that Johnson had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hearse, despite Edwina Prosen’s death the previous day, and despite the pending disposition of Prosen’s estate. The reasonableness of this expectation is a question for the finder of fact. At a suppression hearing, that is the trial court. Meek, 790 S.W.2d at 620.
The State raises the issue of standing for the first time on appeal. In the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law, we must assume that the trial court found the necessary facts to support its ruling. Standing, however, is a question of law, which should be reviewed de novo by the appellate court. Following the analysis above, we hold that Johnson had a reasonable subjective expectation of privacy in the hearse, and, therefore, standing to contest the search.
We overrule point of error two.
After holding that Johnson has standing to contest the search, we must now review the facts surrounding the search itself to determine whether the trial court could have found that the search was unlawful. If the trial court had no evidence before it from which it could reasonably conclude that the search was unlawful, then it abused its discretion in suppressing the evidence.
In point of error three, the State asserts the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence because it was reasonable for Deputy Cisneros to stop Johnson in light of the facts known to Deputy Cisneros at the time. We must determine whether the evidence before the trial court would support a reasonable finding that the stop was unlawful.
[286]*286Deputy Cisneros testified that he received a call that Johnson was transporting a “stolen body” in the hearse. This would be a sufficient basis for a reasonable stop. On cross-examination, however, Deputy Cisneros conceded that his report said nothing about the dispatcher informing him that the hearse was transporting a body illegally, but simply “transporting a body.” The trial court could have believed that the information that Deputy Cisneros had at the time he stopped the hearse was insufficient to make the stop reasonable. If the trial court so found, then it was within its discretion to suppress any evidence obtained as a result.
No evidence was obtained as a result of the stop itself, however, because neither Deputy Cisneros nor any other officer searched the hearse immediately following the stop. The search followed the arrest. Therefore, this Court must consider whether the arrest was valid. The State can legally conduct a search pursuant to a lawful arrest. If the record shows that the arrest was lawful, then the evidence obtained as a result thereof was lawful, and the trial court abused its discretion in suppressing it. On the other hand, if the trial court could reasonably have found that the arrest was unlawful, then it was within its discretion to suppress any evidence obtained as a result.
Deputy Cisneros testified that he and Deputy Anderson arrested Johnson on Lt. Gillen-waters’ orders. Neither Deputy Anderson nor Lt. Gillenwaters testified at the suppression hearing. The only testimony concerning the basis for Johnson’s arrest came from Deputy Cisneros on cross-examination:
A Then, my patrol lieutenant, Jeff Gillen-waters, showed up. And he was — I don’t know who he was talking to on his car phone, but he was talking to somebody on his car phone. At that time, nothing really happened for a couple of minutes.
Q What was going on during that time. Nothing? Nobody was—
A Yeah. We were just standing around.
Q Nobody was looking in the vehicle?
A No. No. Not at that time.
Q Okay.
A We waited. Myself and Mr. Anderson waited with Mr. Johnson, in back of the Cadillac hearse. And until lieutenant finally come out of his car. He got through talking on the phone. He. was — we were then told to place Mr. Johnson in custody for investigative hold through Sweeny Police Department. And for — for the theft of this corpse.
Q For the theft of the corpse?
A Right.
Q Okay. All right. So, that was Jeff Gillenwaters telling you those things, the deputy?
A Yes.
Q And he is with the Sheriffs department?
A Yes, sir. He was at the time.
Q Is he an investigator with the Sheriffs Department at the time?
A He was my patrol lieutenant.
Q Patrol lieutenant? Now, after — after you were advised by Jeff Gillenwaters to place him in custody, what did you do?
A I assisted Mr. Anderson, Deputy Anderson in placing the — Mr. Johnson in custody. He was searched and placed in back of the patrol car.
Q All right. Was he handcuffed?
A I don’t recollect.
Q You don’t recollect?
A I don’t recollect, because I didn’t actually handcuff him. Mr. Anderson did. And Mr. Anderson put him in back of his patrol car.
[[Image here]]
Q Okay. Do you know what type of offense theft of a corpse is under the Penal Code?
A No, sir. I’m not really familiar with it.
Q Can you tell me why you filled out a misdemeanor miscellaneous report in connection with this incident?
A Why?
Q Yes, sir.
A Because it wasn’t pertaining to our department. It was pertaining to the Sweeny Police Department.
[287]*287Q Well, do you use misdemeanor miscellaneous reports for incidents that arise out of other departments?
A Yes, we do.
Q Well, what was arising out of the other department was the allegation of murder; isn’t that correct? Investigative hold for murder?
A No, sir. From the point — I called dispatch, and she told me what was going on in Sweeny, that he was — from what I got out of that conversation was that the — this whole incident was, you know, was occurring from another police department. Not from us.
Q I understand that. But regarding investigative hold for the offense of murder, right?
A Right.
Q If there was a theft of a corpse, that was something that occurred in your presence, because you were there; and you saw the corpse in his possession, correct?
A Right. I don’t know where they got their information, but that was what I was told.
Q Would it be fair to say you didn’t have any probable cause at the time to stop and arrest Mr. Johnson for theft of a corpse, did you?
A For the theft of a corpse.
A Yes, sir?
A From the time that I got the phone call, yes, sir, I had — you know, I had reason to believe that he was possibly in possession of a corpse or a body.
Q Well that’s not—
A From what I was told by the dispatch office.
MR. STANSBERRY [defense counsel]: I’ll object to the response, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q Officer Cisneros, my question is that at the time that you had Mr. Johnson out there at the roadside, you did not have probable cause to arrest him for theft of a corpse, did you?
A That was the reason I stopped him. That he was — that he had illegally or unlawfully obtained a body from Houston and was back in route over here with it. That was my presumption.
MR. STANSBERRY: I’m sorry. I object. It’s still not responsive. It’s a yes or no question.
THE COURT: Well, I’m going to overrule it, now, as it stands. You may pursue your yes or no, if you’d like, though.
Q Yes or no. You didn’t have probable cause?
A Yes. I believe I did.
Q You felt you had probable cause?
A Yes, sir, I did.
Q What was the probable cause?
A The probable cause was due to the impending investigation from Sweeny, and from — and the information that I got. That. Yes. And I thought I was right in stopping that car.
Q Well, you didn’t have any details of the information out of Sweeny, did you. You didn’t have any details coming from Sweeny at that time, did you?
A No. They just gave me a brief rundown on what happened over there.
The “totality of the circumstances” test applies for determining probable cause for warrantless arrests. Hafford v. State, 828 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref'd), cert. denied, Hafford v. Texas,— U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1313, 122 L.Ed.2d 700 (1993). Deputy Cisneros did not testify that he stopped Johnson for suspicion of murder. He testified only that he stopped Johnson for illegally transporting a body. His testimony was then undermined when he acknowledged that his report only stated that the dispatcher said “transporting a body” without indicating that the transportation was in violation of the law. The trial court was within its discretion to find that the stop was unreasonable, and that the officers had no probable cause to arrest Johnson. If the trial court so found, it acted within its discretion in granting the motion to [288]*288suppress all the evidence obtained from the inventory search of the hearse.
We overrule point of error three.
By overruling point of error three, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in suppressing the evidence obtained in the warrantless inventory search of the hearse. State’s points of error four and five allege that the inventory search was lawful under the United States and Texas constitutions. The inventory search could not be constitutional if it followed an illegal arrest. Because we hold that the trial court could have found the arrest to be unlawful, the State’s constitutional arguments must fail.
We overrule points of error four and five.
To summarize the points of error relating to the warrantless search of the hearse (Search 2), the trial court could have found that the stop and arrest were unlawful. Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion to suppress the evidence obtained from the inventory search of the hearse.
We overrule points of error two, three, four, and five.
Search 3:
October 1, 1991; search of the hearse with a warrant.
(Relevant to Point of Error 6)
Following the inventory search of the hearse, the officers obtained a warrant to search the hearse. The next day, October 1, 1991, they searched it again, this time with a warrant. The trial court granted Johnson’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained in this search.
The affidavit that provided the basis for the warrant asserted that life insurance policies were in the hearse, and that these constituted evidence tending to show that Johnson committed murder. Johnson argues that the information in this affidavit was obtained by the unlawful warrantless search of the hearse. He claims that such information is the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine does not apply when knowledge or possession of evidence in question is obtained from a source independent of the government’s wrongful act. Autry v. State, 626 S.W.2d 758, 764 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S.Ct. 180, 74 L.Ed.2d 147 (1982).
The warrant specifically stipulated that the purpose of the search was to seize life insurance policies. The State alleged that the warrantless inventory search (from the preceding day) indicated that the vehicle contained such life insurance policies. The State alleged no other basis for suspecting that the hearse contained the life insurance policies. The previous day’s search provided the information upon which the warrant was based. The other assertions in the warrant do not provide a legal basis for searching the hearse. The State conceded that the warrant search of the hearse was a moot issue after the trial court suppressed the inventory search.
3.Conclusion
The testimony allows the trial court to conclude that the warrant search of the hearse violated Johnson’s constitutional rights. Although the trial court made no explicit finding to this end, we must presume that the trial court made whatever findings were necessary to support its ruling. The court did not abuse its discretion in suppressing the evidence obtained from the warrant search of the hearse.
We overrule point of error six.
Search 4:
October 1-3, 1991;
Police passively received, from the Prosen family, property that the Prosen family took from the funeral home.
(Relevant to points of error seven, eight, nine, 10, and 11)
On October 1 through October 3, 1991, all three sons of the decedent entered the Swee-[289]*289ny Funeral Home and removed items belonging to three of their family members: their deceased mother; their maternal grandmother (Mrs. Reuter); and Jeff Prosen, the youngest of the three Prosen sons. The decedent’s mother, Mrs. Mary Reuter, had lived at the funeral home for three years. After the shooting, she asked her grandson Robert Prosen to remove her items from the funeral home. The youngest brother, Jeff Prosen, had also lived at the funeral home for years, but he had married and moved out in August 1991, the month before the shooting, without taking all of his belongings.
Robert Prosen testified that among the items they removed were some insurance policies on the decedent. He admitted on cross-examination that they had also removed some documents belonging to Johnson. He further testified that Johnson’s attorney, Dean Johnson, was present on the premises of the funeral home on October 2, 1991, while the sons were removing items belonging to their mother, their grandmother, and the youngest son, Jeff Prosen. Robert Prosen testified that he had several conversations with Dean Johnson about ownership of some of the items they were removing. He testified that they left the disputed items in the hallway and photographed them with Dean Johnson’s permission. Dean Johnson was there on only one of the three days that the Prosen brothers were removing property from the funeral home.
After the Prosen brothers removed the items, Johnson’s attorney, Dean Johnson, filed a burglary complaint against them. Sweeny Police Chief Murphy testified that Dean Johnson’s complaint alleged that “[tjhere were items missing, that had been there the day before, when he took the pictures.”
Robert Prosen testified that when he became aware that Dean Johnson had filed the burglary complaint, he offered to return all the items to Dean Johnson that evening. He testified that Dean Johnson “requested it not be returned to him. So, we gave it to the police.”
Chief Murphy testified that: (1) Dean Johnson, appellant’s attorney, suggested to him that the police maintain custody of the items that were the subject of the burglary complaint; (2) the Prosens turned over boxes containing thousands of documents, that would fill “the equivalent of eight or 10 file drawers”; and (3) he considered it the duty of the police department to photograph, inventory, and list all of the items that were turned over to them in connection with this burglary charge.
The police presented the burglary complaint to the grand jury, which did not return an indictment against the Prosens. The trial court granted the motion to suppress all the evidence that the Prosens took from the funeral home and delivered to the Sweeny Police Department.
In points of error seven through 11, the State asserts that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence taken by the Pro-sen brothers and delivered to the police department. The suppression motion alleged that the search violated Tex.Code Ckxm. P.Ann. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon Supp.1995), which provides:
(a) No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.
In any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the jury shall be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event, the jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.
Johnson argues that when the Pro-sen brothers took the evidence that they later turned over to the police, they did so in violation of the law. At the suppression hearing, this contention found some support in the testimony of Chief Murphy that Dean Johnson had filed a burglary complaint against the Prosens for taking items from the office that he thought had been there the [290]*290day before. In addition, Robert Prosen testified that they entered the funeral home on three consecutive days, but he only testified to Dean Johnson’s presence during one of those three days. Robert Prosen also testified that among the documents they took from the funeral home were some of Johnson’s personal papers.
From the collective testimony before it at the suppression hearing, and despite the grand jury’s failure to issue an indictment, the trial court could have found that the evidence was seized illegally. Although the trial court made no formal findings of fact, it stated its reason for suppressing the evidence that the Prosens delivered to the police. It found that the items were seized unlawfully:
THE COURT: All right. First of all, I want to speak to the motion to suppress evidence seized by members of the Pro-sen family: While the entry by members of the Prosen family into the Sweeny Funeral Home may be questionable, the entry could very well be lawful as opposed to unlawful, based upon the evidence before the Court. But it’s clear to me that the seizure of Mr. Johnson’s property as opposed to that of the deceased and/or the deceased’ [sic] mother, was not lawful or proper.
[[Image here]]
And therefore, I don’t know from the evidence, what’s Mr. Johnson’s and what belongs to the estate of Mrs. Prosen or what belongs to the mother of the deceased. And it would seem to me that it’s the State’s burden to clear that up for me, but it’s clear to me that some of the items that were there in the Sweeny Police Department, in that room, were Mr. Johnson’s and were seized unlawfully.
And therefore, I’m going to grant the motion to suppress the items seized by members of the Prosen family.
The trial court acted within its discretion in this finding. In point of error seven, however, the State argues that the statute does not apply to the evidence taken by the Prosen brothers, because they are not within the meaning of the term “other person” in the first sentence of the code provision.
Points of error eight, nine, 10, and 11, rest upon our determination of this issue in point of error seven. In points of error eight and nine, the State asserts that the police department’s inventory was in accordance with the United States and Texas Constitutions. It will be unnecessary to address the constitutionality of the inventory search if the code provision does not apply to the evidence taken by the Prosens. In points of error 10 and 11, the State asserts that the inventory was in accordance with the United States and Texas Constitutions because the police had Dean Johnson’s consent to review the property.
The suppression motion in question here alleged only a single ground: that the evidence was “obtained illegally and in violation of Article 38.28(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.” The motion does not claim that the police violated either the United States or Texas Constitutions in receiving the evidence. The code provision itself incorporates both constitutions as they apply to the act of obtaining evidence. If the evidence was obtained “by an officer or other person” in violation of the federal or state constitutions or other federal or state laws, then that evidence cannot be used against the accused. Johnson argues that the violation was the Prosens’ alleged illegal entry and the alleged burglary. He does not contend that it was illegal for the police department to receive the evidence, but he does argue that it was illegal for the police to use the evidence as they did.
The State argues that the term “other person” in the statute should apply only to agents of the government, not to all natural persons generally. The State says in its brief, “This is a case of first impression because the Court of Criminal Appeals has never expressly ruled on this issue.” This Court has previously construed this statute to apply to private persons. Weaver v. State, 721 S.W.2d 495, 498 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st [291]*291Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd).10 Weaver, however, did not turn upon the construction of this code provision and was decided on other grounds.11 The case before us, on the contrary, does turn upon the construction of this code provision. We hold that the term “other person” in Tex.Code Crim.P.Ann. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon Supp.1995), includes private persons and is not limited to agents of the government.
In the present case, the trial court found that the Prosens violated the law in taking Johnson’s property from the funeral home. The statute prevents this property, even though taken by private persons, from being used in evidence against Johnson. Id.
We overrule point of error seven.
In points of error eight and nine, the State asserts that its inventory search was in accord with the United States and Texas constitutions. These contentions, however, do not address the ground upon which the motion was granted, namely, that the evidence was obtained in violation of Article 38.23(a). Johnson did not assert that the evidence should be suppressed because the inventory search violated either the United States or Texas Constitutions. Johnson’s motion appears to have addressed only the allegedly illegal actions of the Prosen brothers. The only grounds upon which the suppression could be ordered were those specified in the motion. Therefore, points of error eight and nine are inapposite.
We overrule points of error eight and nine.
In points of error 10 and 11, the State claims that the police had the consent of Dean Johnson, Johnson’s attorney, to review the property that the Prosens delivered to them. Consent is an exception to the general rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable per se. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, 93 S.Ct. at 2043; Fancher, 659 S.W.2d at 839. In the absence of findings of fact or conclusions of law, this Court must presume that the trial court made whatever findings were necessary to support its rulings.
Dean Johnson testified, but not about whether he consented to the police reviewing the evidence that the Prosens delivered to them. In light of the trial court’s verbal finding that the Prosens unlawfully seized the evidence, and its consequent ruling that the evidence was obtained in violation of Article 38.23(a), the consent issue is moot. Consent is an exception to the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, 93 S.Ct. at 2043 (1973); Fancher, 659 S.W.2d at 839. As discussed above, the code provision goes beyond this constitutional protection and extends to actions by private persons. Weaver, 721 S.W.2d at 498. The illegality of the Prosens’ act preempts the State’s argument that the police had consent to review the evidence delivered by the Prosens. To hold otherwise would mean that a person subjected to a wrongful seizure by a private person could not complain to the police without giving up the very rights that Article 38.23 was designed to protect.
We overrule points of error 10 and 11.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the items belonging to Johnson, which were seized by the Prosen brothers and delivered to the police, were obtained unlawfully. As such, they were inadmissible at trial, and it was proper for the trial court to suppress the evidence.
[292]*292We overrule points of error seven, eight, nine, 10, and 11.
Search 5:
October 16, 1991: search of the funeral home with a warrant
(Relevant to points of error 12 and 13)
While the Sweeny Police Department conducted its inventory search of the items delivered by the Prosens, investigator Matt Wingo, from the Brazoria County district attorney’s office, also investigated the evidence. Following his investigation, Matt Wingo prepared an affidavit that became the basis for a search warrant for the funeral home. He conducted this warrant search on October 16,1991. The trial court suppressed the evidence obtained in this warrant search.
The motion to suppress the evidence seized in the (Wingo) warrant search of Sweeny Funeral Home on October 16, 1991, urged that the evidence was obtained in violation of the constitutions of the United States and Texas and of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial court based its suppression order on its verbal finding that Investigator Wingo may have viewed unlawfully obtained items to prepare his warrant affidavit:
[THE COURT:] I cannot discern in my own mind, if he reviewed only that property that was taken, seized unlawfully; or did he view the property that was seized lawfully, which would’ve been the property that belonged to the estate of Mrs. Prosen or the mother of Mrs. Prosen. And Officer Wingo’s — Investigator Wingo’s testimony is that after reviewing the video and some photographs and some documents or a document, he used some of that to obtain probable cause, as set forth in his affidavit, to obtain the Wingo warrant. And that concerns me greatly.
As to the other matters for which counsel for Mr. Johnson argued I think there are merit with some of them and not merit with others. But the concern that I have with the inability of me, based upon the evidence before me, to discern whether or not Mr. Wingo, in drawing his affidavit, used items that I say that were obtained unlawfully or seized unlawfully, I’m going to grant the motion to suppress the Wingo warrant.
In point of error 12, the State claims that Johnson had no standing to contest the search and seizure on October 16, 1991, because he had conveyed the funeral home two days earlier to his attorney, Dean Johnson. Johnson was in jail at the time of the search. Johnson no longer owned nor occupied the premises. The State concludes that Johnson had no standing to contest the search of a place he neither owned nor occupied. If Johnson had no standing to contest the search, then the trial court erred in granting a suppression motion in his behalf, even if the search was unlawful.
Standing to contest a search depends upon whether the defendant has a reasonable, subjective expectation of privacy. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979). The earlier analysis of the warrantless search of the hearse also applies here. Johnson’s attorney, Dean Johnson, who was the new owner of title to the funeral home, testified that he allowed Johnson to resume using the funeral home as his residence upon his release from jail on October 21, 1991, five days after the warrant search. The trial court could have found that Johnson had a reasonable, subjective expectation of privacy despite the fact that he had conveyed the premises and was occupying a jail cell at the time. If the trial court so found, the suppression was proper.
We overrule point of error 12.
In point of error 13, the State asserts the trial court erred because the warrant was valid. The trial court found (as indicated verbally) that the warrant might have been based in part upon unlawfully-obtained evidence. The trial court was within its discretion to find this. Meek, 790 S.W.2d at -620. Suppression is the proper [293]*293remedy for evidence that is obtained in violation of the rights of an accused. Wade v. State, 814 S.W.2d 763, 764 (Tex.App.— Waco 1991).
We overrule point of error 13.
The trial court could reasonably have found that Johnson had a reasonable subjective expectation of privacy in the funeral home. He would, therefore, have standing to contest the search. The trial court could reasonably have found that the warrant was based in part upon unlawfully obtained evidence.
We overrule points of error 12 and 13.
To summarize, in 13 points of error, the State has appealed from five orders to suppress evidence. The trial court found, from the evidence before it at the suppression hearing, that the searches were unlawful. As the exclusive fact finder, the court could believe or disbelieve any or all of the testimony from any witness. Meek, 790 S.W.2d at 620. Accordingly, we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s findings, and suppression was the proper remedy. We hold that Johnson had a reasonable subjective expectation of privacy in both the hearse and the funeral home and, therefore, standing to contest each of the searches. We further hold that Tex. Code Crim.ProcAnn. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon Supp.1995) applies to actions of private persons. We overrule all 13 points of error.
We affirm all five orders to suppress evidence.
COHEN, J., files a concurring opinion.
WILSON, J., files a dissenting opinion.