State v. Johnson

Ohio Supreme Court

State v. Johnson

64 Ohio St. (N.S.) 270

DecidedMarch 12, 1901

StatusPublished

This text of 64 Ohio St. (N.S.) 270 (State v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Johnson, 64 Ohio St. (N.S.) 270 (Ohio 1901).

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Opinion

By tiie Court:

General words, following particular words must, as a general rule, be confined to things of the same kind as those specified. Shultz v. Cambridge, 38 Ohio St., 659. But this is a rule which is designed to be used in aid of the interpretation of a statute, and ought not to be so used as to limit or defeat the legislative intent. The things specified in section 6835 of the Revised Statutes are not in any respect “things of the same kind,” except that they are all buildings: so that the effect of the amendment to the section (82 O. L., 161), by adding the words “or any other building,” is to extend the crime of burglary to any building whatever. This indictment with appropriate averments as to time, place and intent, charges that the burglary was committed by breaking and entering “a certain building, to-wit, a certain store room then and there situate, the property of one J. M. Durkin.” This designates the building with sufficient certainty, whether the store room is the whole or only a part of the building; for breaking into such a room is necessarily breaking into the building of which it is a part. The case of Hagar v. The State, 35 Ohio St., 268, does not apply since the amendment of the statute. Exceptions sustained.

Minshauu, O J., Wiuuiams, Burket, Spear, Davis and Shauck, JJ., concur.

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By tiie Court:

General words, following particular words must, as a general rule, be confined to things of the same kind as those specified. Shultz v. Cambridge, 38 Ohio St., 659. But this is a rule which is designed to be used in aid of the interpretation of a statute, and ought not to be so used as to limit or defeat the legislative intent. The things specified in section 6835 of the Revised Statutes are not in any respect “things of the same kind,” except that they are all buildings: so that the effect of the amendment to the section (82 O. L., 161), by adding the words “or any other building,” is to extend the crime of burglary to any building whatever. This indictment with appropriate averments as to time, place and intent, charges that the burglary was committed by breaking and entering “a certain building, to-wit, a certain store room then and there situate, the property of one J. M. Durkin.” This designates the building with sufficient certainty, whether the store room is the whole or only a part of the building; for breaking into such a room is necessarily breaking into the building of which it is a part. The case of Hagar v. The State, 35 Ohio St., 268, does not apply since the amendment of the statute. Exceptions sustained.

Minshauu, O J., Wiuuiams, Burket, Spear, Davis and Shauck, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

64 Ohio St. (N.S.) 270, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-johnson-ohio-1901.