State v. Johnson

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )

)

v. ) ID No. 1503017603 )

RAYSHAUN JOHNSON, )

Defendant. )

Submitted: January 31, 2025 Decided: March 20, 2025

Upon Defendant Rayshaun Johnson’s Second Motion for Postconviction Relief, SUMMARILY DISMISSED.

ORDER

This 20th day of March 2025, upon Defendant Rayshaun Johnson’s Second

Motion for Postconviction Relief (D.I. 123), and the record in this matter, it appears

to the Court that:

(1) Mr. Johnson was indicted by a grand jury in 2015 for first-degree

murder, conspiracy, and related weapons counts.1 These charges were brought after

a manhunt for one person led to the 2014 fatal shooting of the wholly innocent

Theodore “Teddy” Jackson.2

1 D.I. 1.

2 For a more detailed recounting of the homicide, the interested reader can turn to the Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions resolving Mr. Johnson’s earlier postconviction motion and his codefendant ’s direct appeal. Johnson v. State, 2023 WL 8596001, at *1-2 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2023) (“Johnson III”); Clark v. State, 224 A.3d 997, 997-1101 (Del. 2020).

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(2) A five-day jury trial was held for the charges against Mr. Johnson.3

During trial, one witness was the State’s forensic firearms examiner, Carl Rone.4

His testimony, while helpful, was far from critical—demonstrating only: (a) that

weapons of at least two different calibers were fired during the homicide; and

(b) that a firearm recovered about four months later in Laurel, Delaware, was one of

those weapons.5

(3) The jury found Mr. Johnson guilty of three crimes: Murder in the First

Degree, Conspiracy in the First Degree, and Possession of a Firearm during

Commission of a Felony.6 The Court sentenced him to life plus 30 years in prison.7

(4) And for behavior wholly unrelated to Mr. Johnson’s case, the firearms

examiner, Mr. Rone, was later prosecuted and pleaded guilty to falsifying time

sheets.8

(5) Mr. Johnson’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct

appeal.9

3 D.I. 66.

4 2/14/2017 Trial Tr. at 85-105 (D.I. 74).

5 2/14/2017 Trial Tr. at 92-103; 2/16/2017 Trial Tr. at 13-14, 21-24 (D.I. 76).

6 D.I. 66.

7 D.I. 78.

8 See Dixon v. State, 2021 WL 3404223 (Del. Aug. 4, 2021) (describing Mr. Rone’s own later legal troubles). 9 Johnson v. State, 2019 WL 4180617 (Del. Sept. 3, 2019) (“Johnson I”).

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(6) In 2020, he filed a motion for postconviction relief and requested

counsel.10 Mr. Johnson was appointed counsel who then filed an amended motion

for postconviction relief.11 That motion was denied.12 And that denial was affirmed

on appeal.13

(7) Now before the Court is Mr. Johnson’s second motion for

postconviction relief, which he has filed pro se. 14

(8) According to Mr. Johnson, he’s now entitled to postconviction relief—

i.e. “dismissal of his conviction, for ‘time served’”—because he qualifies under

Rule 61’s actual-innocence exception and his postconviction counsel provided

ineffective assistance during his first Rule 61 round.15

(9) As to his new-evidence-of-actual-innocence claim, Mr. Johnson insists

that the forensic firearms examiner’s testimony was “false evidence” and his jury

was not instructed on the lesser offense of manslaughter.16

(10) He also claims that his postconviction counsel was ineffective because

10 D.I. 91 (Mr. Johnson’s first pro se Rule 61 motion); D.I. 92 (Mr. Johnson’s motion for appointment of counsel to prosecute his first Rule 61 motion). 11 D.I. 107 (Postconviction counsel’s amended Rule 61 motion).

12 State v. Johnson, 2023 WL 2495538 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2023) (“Johnson II”).

13 Johnson III, 2023 WL 8596001.

14 See generally D.I. 123 (“Def.’s 2nd Rule 61 Mot.”).

15 Def.’s 2nd Rule 61 Mot. at 2-3, 16.

16 Def.’s 2nd Rule 61 Mot. at 7-8, 10-15.

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her amended motion only raised an evidentiary issue regarding in-court

identification of him by a witness—not the other ten arguments he penned in his

original pro se Rule 61 motion—a strategy he says he was neither informed of nor

consented to.17

(11) The Court has engaged in the preliminary consideration of

Mr. Johnson’s current application required under Superior Court Criminal Rule

61(d)(2). The Court finds that, consistent with Rules 61(i)(1) and (i)(2), his motion

should be SUMMARILY DISMISSED because it is both untimely and successive.

(12) This Court’s Criminal Rule 61 provides one with an efficacious, but

honed, instrument for use in seeking postconviction relief. It “‘balances’ the law’s

interest in conviction finality ‘against . . . the important role of the courts in

preventing injustice.’”18 Consequently, when considering applications for

postconviction relief, this Court addresses any applicable procedural bars before

turning to the merits.19 Turning to the merits of any case that does not meet

procedural requirements effectively renders our procedural rules meaningless.20

17 Def.’s 2nd Rule 61 Mot. at 6-7, 9-10.

18 State v. Thompson, 2022 WL 1744242, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. May 31, 2022), aff’d, 223 WL 2979523 (Del. Apr. 18, 2023) (quoting Zebroski v. State, 12 A.3d 1115, 1120 (Del. 2010)). 19 See, e.g., Ayers v. State, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 2002); see also Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991); Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990) (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989)). 20 See State v. Chao, 2006 WL 2788180, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 2006) (“To protect the integrity of the procedural rules, the Court should not consider the merits of a postconviction claim where a procedural bar exists.”); State v. Jones, 2002 WL 31028584, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept.

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(13) First, Mr. Johnson’s motion must comply with Rule 61(i)(1)’s time

limitation.21 Thereunder, “[a] motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more

than one year after the judgment of conviction is final.”22 His judgment of

conviction became final when the Delaware Supreme Court issued its mandate upon

the affirmance of Mr. Johnson’s direct appeal in September 2019.23

(14) In addition, as this is his second, Mr. Johnson’s motion is controlled by

61(i)(2)’s bar on repetitive Rule 61 petitions.24

(15) But these time and repetition bars are inapplicable when one’s claim is

based either on (a) new evidence of actual factual innocence or (b) a new, retroactive

constitutional rule that is applicable thereto.25 Only the newly discovered evidence

exception is invoked by Mr. Johnson here.

(16) Mr. Johnson claims that there are two, independent forms of “new”

evidence.

10, 2002) (citing State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 1995)) (same). 21 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).

22 Id.; Peters v. State, 2015 WL 1280628, at *2 (Del. Mar. 20, 2015) (“Rule 61 (i)(1) bars any claim for postconviction relief that is not filed within one year of a final judgment of conviction. A conviction becomes final when this Court issues the mandate following a defendant’s direct appeal.” That Rule 61 movant, therefore, had to show that the then-existing exception to the rule’s one-year filing deadline applied.). 23 Johnson I, 2019 WL 4180617.

24 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).

25 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). The bars also don’t apply to a claim that the Court lacked jurisdiction. See State v. Washington, 2021 WL 5232259, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2021), aff’d, 2022 WL 1041267 (Del. Apr. 7, 2022) (explaining Rule 61’s current procedural bars and the exceptions thereto).

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(17) First, Mr. Johnson suggests that Mr. Rone’s testimony is now fatally

vulnerable to attack because: (a) he was later convicted for falsifying time sheets;

and (b) he was allegedly “prepped-up by the government” to inaccurately testify

about the murder weapon.26

(18) To avail himself of the exception he invokes, Mr. Johnson must reveal

“new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that [he] is actually innocent in

fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was convicted.”27

(19) And of equal import here, a movant cannot successfully navigate the

“actual innocence” standard with evidence that is “merely cumulative or

impeaching.”28 Indeed, any new evidence “that goes only to the weight or credibility

of that which was presented to the [factfinder] is almost never adequate to meet the

demanding bar for being granted a new trial.”29 Resultingly in instances like this,

our Supreme Court has previously explained that Mr. Rone’s later misconduct does

not constitute new evidence of actual innocence as envisaged by Rule 61(i) and is

insufficient to incite review of a successive Rule 61 motion.30 This is particularly

26 Def.’s 2nd Rule 61 Mot. at 11-14.

27 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2)(i) and (d)(2)(i).

28 Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053, 1100 (Del. 2021).

29 Id. at 1098.

30 See Dixon, 2021 WL 3404223, at *3-4 (such impeachment evidence, under facts like these, simply does not “speak with such result-changing force as would justify a new trial,” much less the dismissal that Mr. Johnson seeks); id. at *3 (“All of these facts could have been—and were— established by witnesses other than Rone. And, more to the point, a reasonable juror could find

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so given the other evidence of Mr. Johnson’s guilt.31

(20) There is also nothing behind Mr. Johnson’s bald assertion that the

firearms examiner was “prepped-up” by the prosecutor. That, too, dooms this

specific “new evidence” claim under Rule 61’s applicable strict standard.32

(21) In his second “new evidence” claim, Mr. Johnson says his jury was

never instructed on manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of first-degree

murder.33

(22) “Innocence of the ‘acts underlying the charges’ requires ‘more than

innocence of intent; it requires new evidence that a person other than the petitioner

committed the crime.’”34 Perforce, a complaint of an excluded lesser-included

offense instruction is in no way a claim that now “new evidence exists that creates a

that, based on this evidence, Dixon was guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see also Washington, 2021 WL 5232259, at *8 (“Additionally, Rone’s testimony was not central to Washington’s conviction because other more significant evidence supported the jury’s verdict.”). 31 Johnson I, 2019 WL 4180617, at *1 n.2 (“Not only was Johnson identified as one of three men—one of them agitated and armed—who were looking for the murder victim earlier on the evening of the murder, later that night Johnson made a statement indicative of his participation in the crime. In particular, he said, ‘Remember the boy . . . I was telling you about? . . . I think we got him.’ Moreover, the investigating officers found shell casings of two different calibers at the scene, suggesting the possibility of two weapons, and therefore, two shooters.”); Johnson III, 2023 WL 8596001, at *1-2 (describing the crime and non-forensic evidence against Mr. Johnson). 32 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) (stating that one must plead “with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was convicted”) (emphases added). 33 Def.’s 2nd Rule 61 Mot. at 14-15.

34 Purnell, 254 A.3d at 1095 (quoting State v. Taylor, 2018 WL 3199537, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. June 28, 2018), aff’d, 2019 WL 990718 (Del. Feb. 27, 2019)).

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strong inference that [Mr. Johnson] is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying

the charges of which he was convicted.”35 Simply put, in Rule 61 terms, an alleged

missing jury instruction is neither “evidence,” nor “new.”36 And what’s more, even

if one’s quibble over a missing jury instruction could ever possibly shoulder a

movant’s 61(i)(2)(i) and (d)(2)(i) burden, it can’t here. Mr. Johnson’s jury was

instructed to consider manslaughter as a lesser-included offense.37

(23) Since there is no viable claim of new evidence of actual factual

innocence, the (i)(1) and (i)(2) bars remain intact.

(24) Lastly, Mr. Johnson’s claim that his postconviction counsel was

ineffective because her amended Rule 61 motion didn’t include all of the claims he

dumped into his original pro se motion that was filed before obtaining counsel

cannot except this successive petition. A claim of ineffective assistance of first-

35 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2)(i) and (d)(2)(i). Cf. State v. Ploof, 2017 WL 7804294, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 2017), aff’d, 194 A.3d 908 (Del. 2018) (“Defendant’s argument that ‘no reasonable juror would have found [him] guilty of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt’ because this evidence somehow belies his intent to commit first degree murder is unavailing. The Court agrees with the State’s arguments that ‘[i]f this evidence existed in 2001, it is not new evidence[ ]’ and ‘it is not evidence that [Defendant] did not shoot his wife[.]’”) (underline in original) (citations omitted). 36 See State v. Lampkins, 2023 WL 6368315, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 8236690 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 28, 2023), aff’d, 2024 WL 3576185 (Del. July 29, 2024) (stating that “‘new’ evidence is evidence discovered after trial which could not have been discovered before trial with due diligence”). 37 2/16/2017 Jury Instructions at 15-16 (defining manslaughter as one of two included offenses of first-degree murder) (D.I. 64); id. at 36 (verdict form providing the jury with the potential verdict of “Guilty of the included offense of Manslaughter”); 2/16/2017 Completed Verdict Form at 1 (D.I. 65) (jury recording first-degree murder verdict in lieu of the lesser options of second-degree murder and manslaughter).

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round postconviction counsel can’t be engaged to relieve one of the burdens of

satisfying the pleading requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(2) to

avoid summary dismissal of a second or subsequent motion for postconviction

relief.38

(25) Accordingly, Mr. Johnson’s Second Motion for Postconviction Relief

is SUMMARILY DISMISSED as being procedurally barred.39

SO ORDERED this 25th day of March, 2025,

____________________________

Paul R. Wallace, Judge

Original to Prothonotary

cc: Rayshaun E. Johnson, pro se Matthew C. Bloom, Deputy Attorney General

38 Sykes v. State, 2018 WL 454461, at *2 (Del. Oct. 10, 2018); Durham v. State, 2107 WL 5450746, at *2 (Del. Nov. 13, 2017); State v. Brisco, 2025 WL 660270, at *1-2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2025). 39 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2), (i)(1), and (i)(2).