State v. John Jones
This text of State v. John Jones (State v. John Jones) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JULY 1997 SESSION FILED July 23, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9608-CR-00253 Appellee, ) ) SHELBY COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. JOHN P. COLTON, JR., ) JUDGE JOHN W. JONES, ) ) (Post-Conviction) Appellant. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
MICHAEL E. SCHOLL JOHN KNOX WALKUP 212 Adams Ave. Attorney General & Reporter Memphis, Tennessee 38103 CLINTON J. MORGAN Assistant Attorney General 450 James Robertson Parkway Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0493
WILLIAM L. GIBBONS District Attorney General
LORRAINE CRAIG Assistant District Attorney General Criminal Justice Complex 201 Poplar, Ste. 301 Memphis, Tennessee 38103
OPINION FILED: _________________
AFFIRMED- RULE 20 ORDER
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
ORDER The petitioner, John W. Jones, appeals as of right from the denial of post-
conviction relief. In 1991, petitioner was indicted for second degree murder. He pled
guilty to voluntary manslaughter pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced
as a Range I, standard offender, to six (6) years. He filed a petition for post-
conviction relief, pro se, claiming 1) that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel, and 2) that the guilty plea was involuntarily and unknowingly entered. The
court appointed counsel, and petitioner filed an amended petition which was denied
after an evidentiary hearing. The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED pursuant to
Rule 20 of this Court.
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel. At the
evidentiary hearing, the testimony of the petitioner and his former trial counsel was in
conflict. Trial counsel testified that she obtained adequate discovery and had
extensive discussions with petitioner prior to his guilty plea. Pre-trial matters were
handled by consent. Counsel personally interviewed one state witness as well as the
witness suggested by petitioner. Counsel also informed petitioner that this sentence
would have to run consecutively to his parole violation.
Although petitioner testified to the contrary on these various issues, the trial
court found that trial counsel (1) extensively discussed the case with petitioner; (2)
conducted an adequate investigation; (3) properly advised petitioner that this
sentence would run consecutively to his parole violation; and (4) rendered effective
assistance of counsel. The evidence clearly supports these findings and
conclusions. This issue is without merit.
II. Guilty Plea
2 Petitioner argues that he entered a guilty plea believing that his sentence
would run concurrently to his time for a parole violation; therefore, his guilty plea was
unknowingly and involuntarily entered. He also contends that the trial court failed to
question him regarding the plea arrangement pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner relies upon alleged statements by his parole officer that his
sentence would run concurrently to his time for a parole violation. The parole officer
did not testify. As previously stated, trial counsel testified that she informed
petitioner that , “by law, [the sentence] had to run consecutive.” After reviewing the
guilty plea hearing, the testimony at the post-conviction hearing, and noting that the
petitioner was a “veteran of the Shelby County Criminal Justice Center, and had
knowingly entered a guilty plea to previous counts of armed robbery,” the post-
conviction court found petitioner freely and knowingly entered the instant guilty plea.
We agree.
After a full consideration of the record, the briefs, and the law governing the
issues presented, we find the evidence does not preponderate against the trial
court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED pursuant to Rule 20 of this Court.
___________________________ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
_________________________ JOE B. JONES, JUDGE
_________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
3 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9608-CR-00253 Appellee, ) ) SHELBY COUNTY No. P-13052 vs. ) ) ) (Post-Conviction) ) JOHN W. JONES, ) ) AFFIRMED-RULE 20 Appellant. )
ORDER
Came the appellant, John W. Jones, by counsel, and the state, by the
Attorney General, and this cause was heard on the record on appeal from the
Criminal Court of Shelby County; and upon consideration thereof, this court is of the
opinion that there is no reversible error.
It is, therefore, ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED pursuant to Rule 20, and the case is remanded to the Criminal Court of
Shelby County for execution of the judgment of that court and for collection of costs
accrued below.
It appears the appellant is indigent. Costs of the appeal are taxed to the State
of Tennessee.
PER CURIAM
Joe B. Jones, Judge
David H. Welles, Judge
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