An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-220
Filed 18 March 2026
Nash County, No. 22CR051483-630
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
USAMAH JIHAD, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 26 October 2023 by Judge
Timothy W. Wilson in Nash County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
26 August 2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph R. Mouer, for the State-appellee.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender David S. Hallen, for defendant-appellant.
GORE, Judge.
Defendant Usamah Jihad appeals his conviction for robbery with a dangerous
weapon. Defendant specifically argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress. Upon review of the record and the briefs, we discern no error.
I. STATE V. JIHAD
Opinion of the Court
On 11 May 2022, Samuel Parham was robbed at gun point after pulling into
his driveway. Two men approached his vehicle from both sides just after he parked.
Both men were wearing ski masks; the man on the driver’s side pointed a gun at
Parham’s head and threatened to kill him if he did not give them money. Parham
handed his wallet to the man with the gun while the man on the passenger’s side of
the car reached in and took his phone and charger. The men fled after robbing
Parham and drove away in a two-toned Lexus.
Prior to the robbery, a series of shootings took place on a nearby street.
Trayvon Finch was considered a person of interest in the second shooting because
police overheard Finch say he would get revenge after his brother was injured during
the first shooting. Police were aware Finch drove a gold Infiniti with black wheels
due to investigating the first shooting where Finch lived. The suspect of the first
shooting became the victim in the second shooting. While at the scene of the second
shooting, Sergeant Robinson noticed the gold Infiniti drive by the house twice and
decided to follow the vehicle, because his training and experience taught him that
perpetrators return to the crime scene to observe officers investigating the scene.
Sergeant Robinson initiated a stop after following the vehicle and noticing the
temporary registration tag was crumpled and difficult to read from his vantage point.
Defendant was the passenger in the vehicle driven by Finch. Sergeant Robinson
detained defendant and Finch, and searched the vehicle after finding marijuana ash
on Finch’s clothing. Upon searching the vehicle, Robinson found Parham’s wallet, a
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bag of marijuana, .45-caliber ammunition, and dark colored masks. Sergeant
Robinson also searched Finch and defendant and found handguns and money in their
pockets and pant legs. Officers later discovered the two-toned Lexus at defendant’s
house.
Defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, possession of
marijuana, possession of stolen goods, and robbery with a dangerous weapon. Prior
to trial, the State dismissed all of defendant’s charges except robbery with a
dangerous weapon. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence based upon
Sergeant Robinson’s stop and search of the gold Infiniti. The trial court denied
defendant’s motion to suppress. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and defendant
was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon. Defendant was sentenced to 64
to 89 months’ imprisonment. Defendant timely appealed the judgment.
II.
Defendant appeals of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27(b) and 15A-1444(a).
Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. We review
the denial of a motion to suppress to “determine whether competent evidence
supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the
conclusions of law.” State v. Williams, 366 N.C. 110, 114 (2012). We review
conclusions of law de novo. Id. “The trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to
suppress are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the
evidence is conflicting.” Id.
-3- STATE V. JIHAD
In the present case, defendant challenges finding five of the trial court’s order
denying his motion to suppress the evidence. Finding five states, “[d]ue to the
crumpled state of the tag and the way it was affixed to the rear of the Infiniti, [Officer]
Robinson could not read the numbers and lettering on the temporary license plate
from his position behind the gold Infiniti.” Defendant argues the exhibits
demonstrate the license plate was legible and clearly visible. Whereas, the State
argues the following evidence supports the trial court’s finding: Sergeant Robinson’s
testimony that the temporary license plate was “disheveled, crumpled, difficult to
read” and that he could not read it while driving behind it; a photo of Sergeant
Robinson’s vantage point of the tag while on the roadway; and the body camera
footage of the stop.
Notably, some of the exhibits of the temporary registration tag appear legible
while some of the images make the tag appear illegible. Additional body camera
footage showed angles that either made the tag appear legible or illegible. Despite
the conflicting evidence, there is competent evidence to support the trial court’s
finding five that Sergeant Robinson could not read the temporary registration tag
from his position behind the vehicle.
Defendant also challenges the trial court’s conclusion twenty-seven in the
order. Conclusion twenty-seven says, “The State proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that the May 11 stop of the gold Infiniti was supported by reasonable,
-4- STATE V. JIHAD
articulable suspicion.” Defendant argues Sergeant Robinson lacked a reasonable
suspicion he committed a traffic violation to justify the stop.
An officer may initiate a traffic stop for a traffic violation or suspicion of
criminal activity. “A traffic stop is permitted if the officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412,
414 (2008) (cleaned up). “Reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic
stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely
suspected.” Id. at 415 (cleaned up). “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding
standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 414.
We consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether the
officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. Id. “Our Court has held
thirty-day tags that were unreadable, or on which parts of the tag were concealed,
obstructed, or illegible, justified the officers in those cases stopping the vehicles
involved.” State v. Burke, 212 N.C. App. 654, 658 (2011), aff’d, 365 N.C. 415 (2012).
In the present case, the trial court found that the registration tag was
crumpled in a way that Sergeant Robinson could not read the tag. It further found
that Sergeant Robinson considered this a violation of Chapter 20 of the North
Carolina General Statutes. N.C.G.S.
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-220
Filed 18 March 2026
Nash County, No. 22CR051483-630
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
USAMAH JIHAD, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 26 October 2023 by Judge
Timothy W. Wilson in Nash County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
26 August 2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph R. Mouer, for the State-appellee.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender David S. Hallen, for defendant-appellant.
GORE, Judge.
Defendant Usamah Jihad appeals his conviction for robbery with a dangerous
weapon. Defendant specifically argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress. Upon review of the record and the briefs, we discern no error.
I. STATE V. JIHAD
Opinion of the Court
On 11 May 2022, Samuel Parham was robbed at gun point after pulling into
his driveway. Two men approached his vehicle from both sides just after he parked.
Both men were wearing ski masks; the man on the driver’s side pointed a gun at
Parham’s head and threatened to kill him if he did not give them money. Parham
handed his wallet to the man with the gun while the man on the passenger’s side of
the car reached in and took his phone and charger. The men fled after robbing
Parham and drove away in a two-toned Lexus.
Prior to the robbery, a series of shootings took place on a nearby street.
Trayvon Finch was considered a person of interest in the second shooting because
police overheard Finch say he would get revenge after his brother was injured during
the first shooting. Police were aware Finch drove a gold Infiniti with black wheels
due to investigating the first shooting where Finch lived. The suspect of the first
shooting became the victim in the second shooting. While at the scene of the second
shooting, Sergeant Robinson noticed the gold Infiniti drive by the house twice and
decided to follow the vehicle, because his training and experience taught him that
perpetrators return to the crime scene to observe officers investigating the scene.
Sergeant Robinson initiated a stop after following the vehicle and noticing the
temporary registration tag was crumpled and difficult to read from his vantage point.
Defendant was the passenger in the vehicle driven by Finch. Sergeant Robinson
detained defendant and Finch, and searched the vehicle after finding marijuana ash
on Finch’s clothing. Upon searching the vehicle, Robinson found Parham’s wallet, a
-2- STATE V. JIHAD
bag of marijuana, .45-caliber ammunition, and dark colored masks. Sergeant
Robinson also searched Finch and defendant and found handguns and money in their
pockets and pant legs. Officers later discovered the two-toned Lexus at defendant’s
house.
Defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, possession of
marijuana, possession of stolen goods, and robbery with a dangerous weapon. Prior
to trial, the State dismissed all of defendant’s charges except robbery with a
dangerous weapon. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence based upon
Sergeant Robinson’s stop and search of the gold Infiniti. The trial court denied
defendant’s motion to suppress. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and defendant
was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon. Defendant was sentenced to 64
to 89 months’ imprisonment. Defendant timely appealed the judgment.
II.
Defendant appeals of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27(b) and 15A-1444(a).
Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. We review
the denial of a motion to suppress to “determine whether competent evidence
supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the
conclusions of law.” State v. Williams, 366 N.C. 110, 114 (2012). We review
conclusions of law de novo. Id. “The trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to
suppress are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the
evidence is conflicting.” Id.
-3- STATE V. JIHAD
In the present case, defendant challenges finding five of the trial court’s order
denying his motion to suppress the evidence. Finding five states, “[d]ue to the
crumpled state of the tag and the way it was affixed to the rear of the Infiniti, [Officer]
Robinson could not read the numbers and lettering on the temporary license plate
from his position behind the gold Infiniti.” Defendant argues the exhibits
demonstrate the license plate was legible and clearly visible. Whereas, the State
argues the following evidence supports the trial court’s finding: Sergeant Robinson’s
testimony that the temporary license plate was “disheveled, crumpled, difficult to
read” and that he could not read it while driving behind it; a photo of Sergeant
Robinson’s vantage point of the tag while on the roadway; and the body camera
footage of the stop.
Notably, some of the exhibits of the temporary registration tag appear legible
while some of the images make the tag appear illegible. Additional body camera
footage showed angles that either made the tag appear legible or illegible. Despite
the conflicting evidence, there is competent evidence to support the trial court’s
finding five that Sergeant Robinson could not read the temporary registration tag
from his position behind the vehicle.
Defendant also challenges the trial court’s conclusion twenty-seven in the
order. Conclusion twenty-seven says, “The State proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that the May 11 stop of the gold Infiniti was supported by reasonable,
-4- STATE V. JIHAD
articulable suspicion.” Defendant argues Sergeant Robinson lacked a reasonable
suspicion he committed a traffic violation to justify the stop.
An officer may initiate a traffic stop for a traffic violation or suspicion of
criminal activity. “A traffic stop is permitted if the officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412,
414 (2008) (cleaned up). “Reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic
stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely
suspected.” Id. at 415 (cleaned up). “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding
standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 414.
We consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether the
officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. Id. “Our Court has held
thirty-day tags that were unreadable, or on which parts of the tag were concealed,
obstructed, or illegible, justified the officers in those cases stopping the vehicles
involved.” State v. Burke, 212 N.C. App. 654, 658 (2011), aff’d, 365 N.C. 415 (2012).
In the present case, the trial court found that the registration tag was
crumpled in a way that Sergeant Robinson could not read the tag. It further found
that Sergeant Robinson considered this a violation of Chapter 20 of the North
Carolina General Statutes. N.C.G.S. § 20-63(g) states, “Any operator of a motor
vehicle who shall willfully mutilate, bend, twist, cover or cause to be covered or
partially covered . . . any part or portion of a registration plate or the figures or letters
-5- STATE V. JIHAD
thereon, . . . shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.” N.C.G.S. § 20-63(g) (2021).
These findings support the trial court’s conclusion that the State proved by a
preponderance of the evidence the May 11 stop of the gold Infiniti was supported by
reasonable, articulable suspicion.
Defendant argues his case is similar to Burke, and distinguishable from State
v. Hudson. We disagree. In Burke, the officer testified the registration tag was dirty
and worn but he could read the tag and only stopped the vehicle because the number
on the tag appeared “fictious” to him. 212 N.C. App. at 655–56. The Burke Court
articulated that the law requires the information “appear clearly and indelibly on the
face of the temporary registration plate or marker.” Id. at 658. Because the officer
“did not observe anything illegal about Defendant’s thirty-day tag,” it reversed and
vacated the judgment. Id. at 658–59.
In Hudson, the police officer conducted a traffic stop because the temporary
registration tag numbers and expiration date were “faded out” and “illegible.” 103
N.C. App. 708, 715 (1991). We stated that this was sufficient competent evidence for
the trial court to conclude the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic
stop for a traffic violation. Id.
In the present case, the officer testified he could not read the registration tag
from his vantage point because it was crumpled. The officer’s body camera video and
some of the images supported the officer’s testimony. Accordingly, there was
reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation pursuant to Chapter 20 of the North
-6- STATE V. JIHAD
Carolina General Statutes, and this justified the officer’s traffic stop. Because the
findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and in turn support the
conclusions of law, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the
evidence.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion
to suppress the evidence.
NO ERROR.
Chief Judge DILLON and Judge STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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