State v. Jeter

2024 Ohio 1442

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 12, 2024
• Docket: E-23-034
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Jeter, 2024-Ohio-1442.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ERIE COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. E-23-034

Appellant Trial Court No. 2022 CR 0098

v.

Curtis Jeter DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellee Decided: April 12, 2024

*****

Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristin R. Palmer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

Karin L. Coble, for appellee.

SULEK, P.J.

{¶ 1} Appellant the state of Ohio appeals the judgment of the Erie County Court of

Common Pleas, which granted appellee Curtis Jeter’s motion to suppress the evidence

against him. Because the trial court failed to make any findings of fact or conclusions of

law in rendering its decision, thereby preventing any meaningful review, the judgment is

reversed and the matter is remanded. I. Factual Background and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On March 10, 2022, the Erie County Grand Jury indicted Jeter on one count

of possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(e), a felony of the

first degree, and one count of trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)

and (C)(4)(f), also a felony of the first degree. The charges stemmed from the discovery

of drugs in Jeter’s car following a traffic stop.

{¶ 3} After initially pleading not guilty, Jeter moved to suppress the evidence

against him, arguing that (1) there was no lawful cause to initiate the traffic stop or to

arrest him without a warrant, (2) there was no reasonable suspicion to justify extending

the stop for a K-9 drug sniff, (3) there was no probable cause to search his vehicle

without a warrant, and (4) any statements obtained from him were in violation of his right

against self-incrimination and his right to counsel.

{¶ 4} The trial court held a hearing on Jeter’s motion to suppress. At the hearing,

Ohio State Highway Patrol Troopers David Passet and Kyle Mayle testified. Passet, a

member of the criminal patrol team, testified that on August 12, 2020, he became aware

of a tip from a local Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agent that a white or

cream-colored Cadillac had left the residence of a suspect who the DEA was surveilling,

and that the Cadillac was travelling westbound on State Route 2 in Vermilion Township.

Passet had been positioned in the crossover observing the westbound traffic on State

Route 2 when he noticed a Cadillac matching the description in the far-right lane. He

2. testified that he saw the Cadillac commit the traffic violation of failing to maintain a safe

distance between moving vehicles. Specifically, he explained:

[G]iven that the traffic and the heavy traffic on that day was -- most

traffic would have been travelling between 60 and 70 miles per hour. I

observed the Defendant vehicle travelling at a distance of approximately

one and a half to two and a half car lengths, um, and just me knowing if

that front vehicle had slammed on the brakes, the rear vehicle would not

have the reaction time to come to a stop safely without rear-ending it.

***

With that heavy traffic, a lot of traffic was passing, moving in and

out of lanes, and so the first point I would make is that if one of those

vehicles that was overtaking or passing on the left needed to merge into that

right lane, there was not sufficient space for anyone to merge in front of

him.

{¶ 5} Later in his testimony, Passet further described that there was an SUV in the

right lane that was travelling at a lower rate of speed, causing the vehicles behind it to

brake. As the vehicles bunched up behind the SUV, Jeter’s Cadillac approached from

behind, did not brake in time to maintain a safe distance, and started following too

closely.

{¶ 6} In addition, Passet testified that as the Cadillac was passing him and as he

began to pursue it, he observed that the front bumper was not fully secured and the right

3. side of it was dipping down and flapping in the wind. Passet described the flapping as a

“mild to moderate flap.” He testified that the unsecured bumper constituted an

equipment safety violation that further justified his traffic stop.

{¶ 7} Upon observing these violations, Passet began to follow the vehicle, but

because of the heavy traffic, he was unable to pull out of the crossover right away. By

the time he caught up to Jeter’s vehicle, enough time had lapsed that his camera did not

record the traffic violation in the 90 seconds before he manually activated it.

Furthermore, the angle of the video camera did not show the Cadillac’s front bumper.

Thus, there was no video evidence of any of Jeter’s alleged traffic violations.

{¶ 8} After Passet initiated the traffic stop, he informed Jeter that he stopped him

for following too closely and also because Jeter’s front bumper was dangling down.

While the conversation was not discernable on the audio from Passet’s video camera,

Passet testified that Jeter informed him that he was aware that the bumper was broken.

Jeter also told him that he was coming from spending approximately one and a half hours

at the casino, which Passet found odd because the casino was more than an hour away

and thus Jeter would have spent more time driving than he would have spent at the

casino. Before returning to his patrol cruiser to process a ticket, Passet looked at Jeter’s

front bumper and noticed that several of the zip-ties holding it up had broken.

{¶ 9} Once Passet began processing Jeter’s information, he discovered that Jeter

had an active misdemeanor arrest warrant that included cautions of drug trafficking and

drug abuse. Passet, however, was outside of the arrest pickup radius for the warrant.

4. {¶ 10} While Passet was processing the ticket, Trooper Mayle arrived with his K-9

dog, Ure. Mayle had been positioned in the same crossover as Passet, but because of the

location of the vehicles, he could not see the alleged traffic violations. After a brief

discussion with Passet, Mayle and Ure conducted a free-air sniff of the vehicle, during

which Ure alerted to the presence of drugs.

{¶ 11} Mayle also recalled seeing that the right portion of the bumper was hanging

down and that two zip ties had snapped but others were still holding the bumper on. He

admitted, though, that it was a quick observation because he was focused on Ure and on

not getting hit by traffic.

{¶ 12} Approximately seven minutes elapsed from the time when Passet initiated

the traffic stop to when Ure alerted. Jeter was then secured in Passet’s cruiser while

Passet and Mayle performed a search of the vehicle. The search uncovered the suspected

drugs. As Mayle was returning to Passet’s cruiser following the discovery, Jeter

exclaimed “Man, you got me.” Off camera, the audio then captured the troopers advising

Jeter of his Miranda rights. A few minutes later, Jeter admitted that the marijuana and

cocaine were for his personal use.

{¶ 13} Jeter did not present any evidence at the suppression hearing.

{¶ 14} Following the hearing, the parties submitted supplemental briefs. Jeter

maintained that Passet’s testimony should not be believed because Passet was simply

trying to find a way to justify stopping him to investigate the suspicions of drug

trafficking.

5. {¶ 15} Furthermore, he argued that Passet’s testimony did not establish the offense

of failure to maintain a safe space between moving vehicles under R.C. 4511.34(A),

which provides, “The operator of a motor vehicle * * * shall not follow another vehicle *

* * more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such

vehicle * * * and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.” Jeter asserted that,

based upon Passet’s testimony, he must have been maintaining a safe distance because

when the SUV and the traffic in front of him slowed down, Jeter was able to apply his

brakes in time to avoid an accident.

{¶ 16} Finally, he argued that no evidence was presented demonstrating that he

committed a bumper height violation simply by securing the right side of his bumper with

zip ties. R.C. 4513.021 prescribes that it is a minor misdemeanor to operate a vehicle that

does not conform to standards for bumpers. Ohio Administrative Code 4501-43-04(A)

states that “[t]he horizontal bumper shall be at least 4.5 inches in vertical height, centered

on the vehicle’s centerline, and extend no less than the width of the respective wheel

track distances. Bumpers shall be horizontal load-bearing bumpers and attached to the

vehicle frame to effectively transfer impact when engaged.” Jeter contended that no

evidence was presented to demonstrate that the bumper, which was attached to the

vehicle frame by zip ties, was not load bearing and could not effectively transfer impact

when engaged.

{¶ 17} The state, in opposition, argued that Passet’s testimony demonstrated that,

based on the amount of traffic and the rate of travel, Jeter was following the car in front

6. of him too closely such that he would not be able to avoid an accident if the vehicle in

front of him stopped abruptly. The state also maintained that the bumper hanging from

the car provided a separate basis for the stop because the broken zip ties were no longer

effectively keeping the bumper attached as required.

{¶ 18} On May 24, 2023, the trial court summarily granted Jeter’s motion to

suppress, stating: “At this time the Court finds Defendant’s Motion well-taken and the

Motion to Suppress is hereby GRANTED.”

II. Assignment of Error

{¶ 19} The state timely appealed the trial court’s May 24, 2023 judgment,

asserting one assignment of error for review:

1. The trial court erred by granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.

III. Analysis

{¶ 20} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8;

State v. Escobedo, 2023-Ohio-3410, 224 N.E.3d 1274, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.). “When

considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is

therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of

witnesses.” Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992).

“Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are

supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id.; Escobedo at ¶ 34. “Accepting these

facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to

7. the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.”

Id.; Escobedo at ¶ 34.

{¶ 21} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that

“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” Article I, Section 14 of the

Ohio Constitution is nearly identical and “affords the same protection in felony cases.”

State v. Eatmon, 169 Ohio St.3d 1, 2022-Ohio-1197, 201 N.E.3d 818, ¶ 27.

{¶ 22} In determining whether the traffic stop and discovery of the drugs

constituted an unreasonable search and seizure, several issues are implicated.1

{¶ 23} First, it must be determined whether Passet had probable cause to believe

that Jeter committed a traffic violation. In Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12,

665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996), the Ohio Supreme Court held that “where an officer has an

articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal

violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid regardless

of the officer’s underlying subjective intent or motivation for stopping the vehicle in

question.”

1 In the trial court, Jeter also argued generally that the trial court should suppress any statements that he made before he was given the Miranda warnings. He appears to have abandoned this argument as he did not raise it in his post-hearing brief nor does he address it on appeal. Moreover, the video recording shows that Jeter’s exclamation “Man, you got me” was not made in response to any question from the troopers, and his confession to possessing the drugs was only made after he had been read the Miranda warnings.

8. {¶ 24} Second, it must be determined whether the traffic stop was unreasonably

delayed to conduct the K-9 free air sniff. It is well-settled that “[t]he use of a drug dog to

sniff the exterior of a vehicle, lawfully detained, is not a search within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment.” State v. Jones, 2019-Ohio-3704, 143 N.E.3d 1170, ¶ 18 (6th Dist.),

citing State v. Bordieri, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-04-1321, 2005-Ohio-4727, ¶ 22; U.S. v.

Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). And, “law

enforcement officials do not need reasonable suspicion of drug related activity in order to

subject a lawfully detained vehicle to a drug dog sniff.” Id. But, absent additional

reasonable suspicion of drug activity, “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle

the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against

unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350, 135 S.Ct. 1609,

191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). The time needed to handle a traffic violation includes “the

period of time sufficient to run a computer check on the driver’s license, registration, and

vehicle plates.” State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d

1282, ¶ 12.

{¶ 25} Finally, it must be determined whether an exception to the warrant

requirement permitted Passet and Mayle to search the vehicle. “Once a law enforcement

officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may

search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile

exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51, 734 N.E.2d

804 (2000); State v. Kendall, 6th Dist. Williams No. WM-19-024, 2021-Ohio-1551, ¶ 50.

9. {¶ 26} An analysis of these issues, however, is stymied by the lack of any

explanation by the trial court in how it reached its decision.2 Without factual findings

and conclusions of law, it is impossible to determine the factual basis for the trial court’s

decision in order to conduct a de novo review of the court’s legal conclusions. Burnside,

100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, at ¶ 8.

{¶ 27} The trial court’s May 24, 2023 judgment, therefore, is reversed and the

matter is remanded to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law to support

its decision. State v. Edwards, 2016-Ohio-4771, 68 N.E.3d 228, ¶ 24 (10th Dist.) (“The

trial court’s failure to make the essential findings prevents this court from conducting a

meaningful review of the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress and constitutes

reversible error.”); see also State v. Benson, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2018-A-0054,

2019-Ohio-3234, ¶ 73 (“Because the trial court failed to provide us with a sufficient basis

upon which to determine whether its decision was supported by competent, credible

evidence, we remand for the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law

based on the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as to whether the drugs seized

were the result of an unlawful search.”); State v. Dennis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27692,

2 The state could have, but did not, move the trial court for findings of fact or conclusions of law under Crim.R. 12(F), which provides that “[w]here factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its essential findings on the record.” While a lack of factual findings does not require remand as a blanket rule, if factual issues are in dispute and the record does not provide a sufficient basis to review the appellant’s assigned errors on appeal, Crim.R. 12(F) supports reversal and remand to the trial court for factual findings. State v. Brandon, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2014-0039, 2015- Ohio-2072 (remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law based on evidence adduced at the suppression hearing).

10. 2016-Ohio-8136, ¶ 6; State v. Brandon, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2014-0039, 2015-

Ohio-2072, ¶ 12.

{¶ 28} Accordingly, the state’s assignment of error is well-taken.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 29} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Erie County Court of

Common Pleas is reversed. This matter is remanded to the trial court for it to make

findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the evidence adduced at the suppression

hearing. Pursuant to App.R. 24(A), costs of this appeal are ordered to be shared evenly

by the parties.

Judgment reversed and remanded.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Gene A. Zmuda, J. ____________________________ Charles E. Sulek, P.J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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