State v. Jennings

2024 Ohio 602

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Jennings, 2024-Ohio-602.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 29895 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 03316 : DUSTIN W. JENNINGS : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :

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OPINION

Rendered on February 16, 2024

CHRISTOPHER BAZELEY, Attorney for Appellant

LUCAS T. CHRISTENSEN, Attorney for Appellee

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TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Dustin W. Jennings appeals from his conviction,

following a plea of no contest, for aggravated possession of drugs. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background -2-

{¶ 2} On September 7, 2022, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Moraine Police Officer

Bryon Watson was on routine patrol when he observed a tan Chevrolet Silverado traveling

on Main Street. Watson saw that the vehicle’s license plate tags were expired. When

he ran the license plate through his computer, he discovered that the plate belonged to a

2000 Ford F-350. Watson initiated a traffic stop for expired and fictitious license plates.

{¶ 3} When he approached the truck, Watson observed three males inside.

Jennings was seated in the front passenger seat. Other officers arrived on the scene.

The officers observed that Jennings was holding a backpack. Additionally, the officers

observed flashlights and tools. A canine unit was requested, which arrived within

approximately 10 minutes. During that time, Watson continued to speak with the driver.

He subsequently discovered that the driver of the truck did not have a valid operator’s

license. Watson decided to have the truck towed.

{¶ 4} Thereafter, the three men were removed from the truck. Jennings did not

have the backpack in his possession when he exited the vehicle. The canine unit

conducted a free air sniff and alerted to the driver’s side of the vehicle. During the

subsequent search of the truck, the officers opened the backpack previously held by

Jennings; the contents included a small black combination safe and letters with

Jennings’s name on them. A search warrant was obtained to search the safe. The

search revealed the safe contained narcotics. Jennings denied ownership of the

backpack and the safe.

{¶ 5} On December 16, 2022, Jennings was indicted on one count of aggravated

possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). He filed a motion to suppress, which -3-

was overruled following a hearing. Thereafter, Jennings entered a plea of no contest

and was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced him to community control for

a period of five years.

{¶ 6} Jennings appeals.

II. Suppression

{¶ 7} The first assignment of error states:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING JENNINGS’

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

{¶ 8} Jennings does not contest the propriety of the initial traffic stop. Instead, he

argues that the motion to suppress should have been sustained because the police

impermissibly extended the length of the traffic stop in order to conduct a canine sniff.

He further argues that the State failed to demonstrate that the circumstances required the

vehicle to be towed, thereby negating the claim that the police were entitled to conduct

an inventory search of the vehicle.

{¶ 9} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals

from unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868,

20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). A traffic stop by a law enforcement officer must comply with the

Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.

806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). “[A] police stop exceeding the time needed

to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield against

unreasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, -4-

therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to

complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez v. United States,

575 U.S. 348, 350, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015), citing Illinois v. Caballes,

543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005).

{¶ 10} When a law enforcement officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, the

officer may detain the motorist for a period of time sufficient to issue the motorist a citation

and perform routine procedures such as a computer check on the motorist's driver's

license, registration, and vehicle plates. State v. Thomas, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

22833, 2009-Ohio-3520, ¶ 14, citing State v. Pryor, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20800,

2005-Ohio-2770, ¶ 15. In determining whether an officer completed the tasks of a traffic

stop within a reasonable length of time, the court must evaluate the duration of the stop

in light of the totality of the circumstances and consider whether the officer diligently

conducted the investigation. State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865

N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 17.

{¶ 11} Reasonable suspicion that a vehicle contains drugs is not required prior to

conducting a canine sniff of the vehicle during a traffic stop so long as the duration of the

traffic stop is not extended beyond what is reasonably necessary to resolve the issue that

led to the stop and issue a traffic citation. State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

20624, 2005-Ohio-1367, ¶ 19. Furthermore, the use of a trained narcotics dog to sniff an

automobile does not constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. Pryor at ¶ 13;

Caballes at 409. If a trained canine alerts to the odor of drugs from a lawfully stopped

and detained vehicle, an officer has probable cause to search the vehicle for contraband. -5-

State v. Heard, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19323, 2003-Ohio-1047, ¶ 17.

{¶ 12} Here, the evidence demonstrates that Officer Watson made a valid traffic

stop after observing the expired license plates on the vehicle. During the first five

minutes of the stop, Watson called for a canine unit. The evidence establishes that the

canine unit appeared on the scene within ten minutes of being called. When the canine

unit arrived, Watson was still speaking with the driver regarding the expired and fictitious

license plates. During this discussion, Watson also learned the driver’s operator’s

license was suspended. Watson then returned to his cruiser, where the dashcam

recorded a conversation between him and another officer; Watson noted the fictitious

license plates and the driver’s suspended license and indicated that he was going to have

the vehicle towed.

{¶ 13} Jennings contends that Watson did not have authority to tow the vehicle.

In support, he cites Moraine Municipal Ordinance 3.07, which he claims does not permit

a vehicle to be towed for expired or fictitious plates. However, we note that section

307.02(i) does permit a vehicle to be towed if the driver does not have a valid operator’s

license. Jennings further claims that the officers should have allowed him or the other

passenger to drive the vehicle after issuing citations to the driver. However, the officers

were under no obligation to permit operation of a vehicle that had expired and fictitious

license plates.

{¶ 14} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents mixed questions of law

and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier

of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the -6-

credibility of witnesses. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797

N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. “Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings

of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. * * * Accepting these facts

as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the

conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.”

(Citations omitted.) Id.

{¶ 15} The trial court did not err in overruling the motion to suppress. When the

canine unit arrived, Watson was diligently investigating the issues created by the stop.

As such, the stop was not prolonged to allow the free air sniff. The canine’s alert

provided probable cause to search the vehicle and eventually led to the drugs found in

the safe. Given this sequence of events, Jennings’s arguments regarding the vehicle

tow and inventory search are irrelevant.

{¶ 16} The first assignment of error is overruled.

III. Plea

{¶ 17} Jennings asserts the following as his second assignment of error:

JENNINGS’ PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY, AND

INTELLIGENTLY GIVEN.

{¶ 18} Jennings contends the trial court erred in accepting his plea because it was

not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

{¶ 19} “In order for a plea to be given knowingly and voluntarily, the trial court must -7-

follow the mandates of Crim.R. 11(C).” State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 24520,

24705, 2012-Ohio-199, ¶ 13. To that end, a court shall not accept a plea of guilty in a

felony case without first addressing the defendant personally and determining whether he

is making the plea voluntarily and with full understanding of the nature of the charge and

of the maximum penalty involved. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). The court must also determine

that he “understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon

acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b).

Finally, the court must determine the defendant understands he “is waiving the rights to

jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for

obtaining witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require the state to prove the

defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be

compelled to testify against himself or herself.” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).

{¶ 20} Jennings does not contest that the trial court complied with Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(b) and (c). Instead, his argument rests upon the claim that his plea must be

vacated because it was made without his understanding that he would remain subject to

electronic monitoring. In support, he cites to the following colloquy which occurred

between him and the court during sentencing:

JENNINGS: Okay. And what’s going on with this ankle monitor?

THE COURT: Well, when you go to Star [drug treatment program], it’ll

come off.

JENNINGS: Okay. I didn’t - - I didn’t really agree to that. That’s not what

I thought I was agreeing to last time. -8-

THE COURT: Well, it’s part of probation and it’s a sanction, and so your

probation officer will get ahold of me and then we can talk about this further,

but right now that’s a sanction of your probation, is to participate with the

program.

JENNINGS: Okay.

Sentencing Tr. p. 63.

{¶ 21} From our review of the record, we find no basis for Jennings’s assertion that

he was not made aware that he would be subject to electronic monitoring. At the

beginning of the plea hearing, the trial court specifically noted that Jennings wanted to

terminate his electronic monitoring. The court, however, also noted that Jennings had

failed to comply with terms of his probation in other pending cases before the court and

had had multiple positive drug tests during the previous six months, including a positive

test the week prior to the plea hearing. The court explicitly stated that the electronic

monitoring order would not end until Jennings showed compliance with the terms of his

community control sanctions. Thereafter, the court asked Jennings if he was prepared

to go forward with a no contest plea. Jennings answered affirmatively. The trial court

then conducted a Crim.R. 11 colloquy, after which Jennings entered a plea of no contest.

{¶ 22} Based upon the record before us, we find no merit to the claim that Jennings

did not understand that he would remain subject to electronic monitoring. Further, we

conclude that the record demonstrates Jennings’s no contest plea was knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily made. Accordingly, the second assignment of error is

overruled. -9-

IV. Jail Time Credit

{¶ 23} Jennings’s third assignment of error states as follows:

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CALCULATE HOW MANY, IF ANY,

DAYS OF JAIL TIME CREDIT JENNINGS WAS ENTITLED TO AT

SENTENCING

{¶ 24} Jennings asserts the trial court should have included a calculation of jail

time credit in his judgment entry.

{¶ 25} In State v. Bradley, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2002-CA-35, 2003-Ohio-4707,

this court found no error when a trial court failed to calculate jail time credit where the

defendant was sentenced to community control. Specifically, we stated, “Defendant

presently is serving a term of community control, and not a term of imprisonment[.]

Therefore, there is no issue concerning jail time credit that can be determined at this time,

either by the trial court or by this court. In other words, the issue Defendant raises in this

appeal is not ripe for judicial review at this time. The appropriate time to raise that issue

is when, and if, the trial court reimposes a sentence of imprisonment following

Defendant's violation of his present community control sanctions.” Id. at ¶ 8; accord

State v. Noonan, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2018-10-203, CA2018-10-204, 2019-Ohio-

2960, ¶ 33.

{¶ 26} Because Jennings has been sentenced to community control rather than a

term of imprisonment, we find no error in the failure to calculate jail time. Therefore, the

third assignment of error is overruled. -10-

V. Conclusion

{¶ 27} All of Jennings’s assignments of error being overruled, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

EPLEY, P.J. and LEWIS, J., concur.