State v. Jenkins

2025 Ohio 5146

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Jenkins, 2025-Ohio-5146.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : Nos. 114969 and 114970 v. :

ORLANDO JENKINS, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: VACATED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 13, 2025

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-24-690037-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristen Hatcher, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Joseph V. Pagano, for appellant.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

Appellant Orlando Jenkins (“Jenkins”) challenges his conviction and

sentence for drug trafficking. He raises four assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred by accepting Appellant’s guilty plea because it was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made. 2. The trial court erred by denying appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

3. Appellant was deprived of his right to due process and effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, §10 of the Ohio Constitution.

4. The trial court’s maximum sentence is contrary to law because it was based on a mistake of fact.

The State has conceded the first assignment of error, specifically noting

that Jenkins’s plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made because the

trial court failed to advise him of the mandatory period of postrelease control that

would be imposed upon him. After a thorough review of the applicable law and facts,

we find that the first assignment of error is dispositive, vacate Jenkins’s conviction

and sentence, and remand this matter for further proceedings.

I. Procedural History

Jenkins was indicted on various charges of drug trafficking, possession

of drugs, and having weapons while under a disability, along with forfeiture and

firearm specifications. Jenkins pled guilty to an amended count of drug trafficking,

a felony of the first degree, along with a one-year firearm specification. At the plea

hearing, he was advised that he faced a mandatory prison term of 3 to 11 years along

with a mandatory fine.

The court sentenced Jenkins to the maximum term of 11 years in prison,

plus one year for the attendant firearm specification, to be served consecutively. The

court further imposed postrelease control for a mandatory minimum of two years

up to a five-year maximum. Following his sentencing, Jenkins moved to vacate his plea. The State

opposed the motion, and the court denied it. Jenkins filed an appeal of the denial of

his motion to vacate his plea and was granted leave to file a delayed appeal of his

conviction and sentence.

II. Law and Analysis

“When a party concedes an error that is dispositive of the appeal, this

court conducts its own review of the record to determine whether the concession

accurately reflects settled law based on the record presented for review.” State v.

Green, 2024-Ohio-2174, ¶ 1 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Forbes, 2022-Ohio-2871, ¶ 2

(8th Dist.); Cleveland v. Patterson, 2020-Ohio-1628, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.); Loc.App.R.

16(B).

The parties agree that the trial court failed to advise Jenkins during the

plea hearing about the mandatory period of postrelease control that would be part

of his sentence. While the court did discuss with Jenkins the fact that he had been

on postrelease control from a prior offense, it did not advise him that he would be

subject to further postrelease control.

Crim.R. 11(C) sets forth certain constitutional and procedural

requirements that a trial court must comply with prior to accepting a guilty plea.

The Ohio Supreme Court has summarized appellate review of compliance with

Crim.R. 11(C) as follows:

Properly understood, the questions to be answered are simply: (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?

State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 17. Relevant to the instant matter,

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requires the trial court to address the defendant personally and

“determine that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of

the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved.”

“This court has held that postrelease control constitutes ‘a portion of

the maximum penalty involved in an offense for which a prison term is imposed’

under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).” State v. Ponomarenko, 2024-Ohio-4789, ¶ 19

(8th Dist.), quoting State v. Simmons, 2013-Ohio-5026, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.). Pursuant to

Dangler, a “‘“trial court’s total failure to inform a defendant of a distinct component

of the maximum penalty during a plea colloquy constitutes a complete failure to

comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), thereby requiring the vacation of the defendant’s

guilty or no contest plea.”’” (Emphasis added.) State v. Lucas, 2024-Ohio-4496,

¶ 15 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Rogers, 2020-Ohio-4102, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.), quoting

State v. Fabian, 2020-Ohio-3926, ¶ 20 (12th Dist.). See also State v. Sarkozy,

2008-Ohio-509, ¶ 22 (trial court completely failed to comply with Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(a) when the court entirely failed to mention postrelease control in the plea

colloquy, despite the fact the defendant was subject to a mandatory period of

postrelease control).

The record in this matter is clear — at the plea hearing, the court made

no mention of the mandatory postrelease control that Jenkins faced. By not informing Jenkins of the mandatory postrelease control, the trial court completely

failed to comply with the rule. Therefore, Jenkins’s plea was not made knowingly,

voluntarily, and intelligently. The first assignment of error is sustained, and the

remaining assignments of error are rendered moot.

Judgment vacated, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR