State v. Jarmul

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: May 6, 2026
• Docket: 25-599
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Judge April Wood

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-599

Filed 6 May 2026

Wake County, Nos. 23CR219200-910, 23CR223729-910, 23CR223730-910, 23CR223733-910

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

CHRISTOPHER ROBERT JARMUL

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 29 February 2024 by Judge Paul

C. Ridgeway in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11

February 2026.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Sarah N. Cibik, for the State.

Center for Death Penalty Litigation, by Ryan Christopher Kuchinski, for the defendant.

WOOD, Judge.

Christopher Robert Jarmul (“Defendant”) appeals one of the six judgments

entered against him following jury verdicts finding him guilty on two counts of first- STATE V. JARMUL

Opinion of the Court

degree statutory sexual offense,1 three counts of first-degree sexual exploitation of a

minor, and twenty counts of second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor. Defendant

appeals only the judgment containing the two counts of first-degree statutory sexual

offense. Defendant argues the relevant consolidated judgment must be remanded for

resentencing because the trial court plainly erred by instructing the jury on the

incorrect charge and then sentencing him in accordance with the allegedly incorrect

greater charge. After careful review of the record, we conclude Defendant received a

fair trial free from prejudicial error. We remand the relevant judgment for the sole

purpose of correcting clerical errors.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On 2 and 5 December 2022, Detective Joseph Lengel (“Detective Lengel”) of

the Cary Police Department received cybertips from the National Center for Missing

and Exploited Children (“NCMEC”), which brought Defendant to his attention. The

cybertips originated from complaints of apparent child pornography submitted to

NCMEC by Omegle.com LLC and Globtech LLC on 25 August 2022 and 22 September

2022 respectively. The cybertip reports sent to Detective Lengel contain the IP

address the websites connected to the apparent child pornography; the IP address in

these reports was linked to Defendant.

1 As discussed further throughout this opinion, the indictments and judgment contain

clerical errors. On remand, the judgment shall be corrected to show Defendant was convicted of two counts of statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult in all places first-degree statutory sexual offense is notated.

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On 24 January 2023, the Cary Police Department executed a search warrant

on Defendant’s home based on the information in the cybertips from NCMEC and

surveillance conducted on Defendant revealing he had a young daughter.2 Officers

seized all electronic devices in the home with the exception of Defendant’s wife’s work

computer. Among the seized devices were Defendant’s homemade desktop computer

and his iPhone 12 mini. Relevant to this appeal, forensic processing of the desktop

computer revealed two images and a video of Defendant touching his young

daughter’s genitals and penetrating her inner labia with his finger. The images and

video were identified as taken with Defendant’s iPhone 12 mini. Defendant was

arrested the next day.

On 21 February 2023, Defendant was indicted on two counts of first-degree

statutory sexual offense,3 three counts of first-degree sexual exploitation of a minor,

and twenty counts of second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor.

The matter came on for trial beginning 26 February 2024 in Wake County

Superior Court. On 29 February 2024, the jury found Defendant guilty on all charges.

The trial court entered six judgments sentencing Defendant to (1) 300 to 420 months

of imprisonment for the two counts of first-degree statutory sexual offense; (2) 60 to

132 months of imprisonment for one count of first-degree sexual exploitation of a

2 Defendant’s daughter was three-years old at this time. 3 As discussed further throughout this opinion, the indictments support the charge of

statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult despite the indictments labeling the charges as first-degree statutory sexual offense.

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minor; (3) 60 to 132 months of imprisonment for one count of first-degree sexual

exploitation of a minor; (4) 60 to 132 months of imprisonment for one count of first-

degree sexual exploitation of a minor; (5) 25 to 90 months of imprisonment for ten

counts of second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor; and (6) 25 to 90 months of

imprisonment for the final ten counts of second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor.

All sentences are to run consecutively. Defendant entered notice of appeal in open

court.

II. Analysis

Defendant argues the trial court plainly erred by instructing the jury on the

charge of statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult because he was indicted

on its lesser included charge of first-degree statutory sexual offense. Defendant

argues this instructional error impacted his sentence because the charge of statutory

sexual offense with a child by an adult carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 300

months, which is higher than would be permitted for a charge of first-degree statutory

sexual offense. Importantly, Defendant is not requesting dismissal of the charges or

reversal of his conviction, he is asking only that this Court remand for resentencing

in accordance with the lesser charge of first-degree statutory sexual offense pursuant

to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.29.

In contrast, the State argues the trial court did not err because the indictments

properly allege facts to support the elements of statutory sexual offense with a child

by an adult pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.28 and Defendant’s argument reveals

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no more than a “clerical error” in the indictments and other places the incorrect

statute citation and offense title are notated. We agree.

A. Clerical Error in Indictment

Defendant asserts the underlying issue in this appeal is whether he was

indicted on the charge of statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult pursuant

to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.28 or first-degree statutory sexual offense pursuant to N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 14-27.29. As Defendant asserts he was indicted on the lesser charge of

first-degree statutory sexual offense, he argues on appeal the trial court erred by

instructing the jury on the greater charge of statutory sexual offense with a child by

an adult and then sentencing him accordingly. Defendant concedes he did not object

to the jury instructions he purports were given in error.

Unpreserved issues related to jury instructions may be reviewed for plain error

where “the judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to

amount to plain error.” State v. Scarboro, 287 N.C. App. 184, 186, 882 S.E.2d 139,

142 (2022) (quoting N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4)). To be successful on a plain error review:

First, the defendant must show that a fundamental error occurred at trial. Second, the defendant must show that the error had a probable impact on the outcome, meaning that absent the error, the jury probably would have returned a different verdict. Finally, the defendant must show that the error is an exceptional case that warrants plain error review, typically by showing that the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

State v. Gillard, 386 N.C. 797, 820, 909 S.E.2d 226, 250-51 (2024) (quoting State v.

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Reber, 386 N.C. 153, 158, 900 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2024) (cleaned up)). “[T]he plain error

standard requires a determination that the jury probably would have returned a

different result[,]” to meet the second prong. Reber, 386 N.C. at 160, 900 S.E.2d at

787 (quoting State v. Towe, 366 N.C. 56, 57, 732 S.E.2d 564, 564-65 (2012)). When a

defendant “fails to specifically and distinctly contend that the jury instruction

amounted to plain error, he is not entitled to appellate review under this rule.”

Scarboro, 287 N.C. App. at 187, 882 S.E.2d at 142. Further, a defendant must offer

support for each prong of the plain error analysis, including reason or argument for

why this case “is an exceptional case or why this case will seriously affect the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” State v. Patterson, 269 N.C.

App. 640, 645, 839 S.E.2d 68, 72 (2020)). Here, Defendant fails to specifically and

distinctly contend that the alleged error amounts to plain error as he offers no

argument that the jury probably would have returned a different result if it was not

for the alleged error nor does he offer an argument for why this case is an exceptional

one, thus, “we cannot impart any meaningful review for plain error.” Id.

Defendant’s failure to assert a complete plain error analysis notwithstanding,

we note the trial court did not err by providing the instruction given as all elements

for the charge of statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult are asserted in the

relevant indictments. The indictments for the two charges at issue are titled “FIRST

DEGREE STATUTORY SEX OFFENSE” and contain the statute citation for first-

degree statutory sexual offense though the factual allegations stated within each give

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notice of the offense of statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult pursuant to

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.28. The indictments state in relevant part:

defendant named above unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did engage in a sexual act other than vaginal intercourse with . . . a child under the age of thirteen years. At the time of the act the Defendant was at least eighteen years of age, having a date of birth of [] 1985. This act was done in violation of NCGS § 14-27.29.

A person is guilty of first-degree statutory sexual offense “if the person engages

in a sexual act with a victim who is a child under the age of 13 years and the defendant

is at least 12 years old and is at least four years older than the victim.” N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 14-27.29(a). A person is guilty of the greater charge of statutory sexual offense

with a child by an adult “if the person is at least 18 years of age and engages in a

sexual act with a victim who is a child under the age of 13 years.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §

14-27.28(a). First-degree statutory sexual offense is a lesser included offense of

statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.28(d). While

similar and both Class B1 felonies, the element establishing the age of the defendant

differs between the two charges and statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult

requires a minimum active punishment of 300 months while the lesser charge does

not allow a minimum sentence of 300 months when sentencing within the

presumptive range. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.28; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.29. As the

indictments assert facts to support every element for the charge of statutory sexual

offense with a child by an adult and an “[e]rror in the citation or its omission is not

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ground for dismissal of the charges or for reversal of a conviction,” we conclude

Defendant was properly indicted on the charges for which instructions were given

and for which he was sentenced. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-924(a)(5), (6). Therefore, the

trial court did not err by instructing the jury on the charges of statutory sexual offense

with a child by an adult.

However, we agree with the State that clerical errors exist that must be

corrected. The consolidated judgment describes each offense as “FIRST DEGREE

STATUTORY SEX[UAL] OFF[ENSE]” and lists each “G.S. No.” as “14-27.29.” “A

clerical error is defined as an error resulting from a minor mistake or inadvertence,

especially in writing or copying something on the record, and not from judicial

reasoning or determination.” State v. Gillespie, 240 N.C. App. 238, 245, 771 S.E.2d

785, 790 (2015) (cleaned up). On appeal, when “a clerical error is discovered in the

trial court’s judgment or order, it is appropriate to remand for correction because of

the importance that the record speak the truth.” Id. This Court has held that a

clerical error has occurred when the error on the judgment form does not affect the

sentence imposed, “warranting remand for correction but not for resentencing.” Id.

The sentence imposed on Defendant is appropriate for his convictions of

statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-

27.28 and correcting the offense description and general statute number on the

judgment sheet will not affect the sentence. Therefore, the errors stated in the

judgment are clerical, and we remand to the trial court for the sole purpose of

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correcting the offense descriptions and general statute number to the greater offense

of statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.28.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, we hold the trial court did not plainly error by

instructing the jury on the charge of statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult.

We remand the relevant consolidated judgment for the sole purpose of correcting the

clerical error contained in such judgment.

NO PLAIN ERROR; REMANDED TO CORRECT CLERICAL ERROR.

Judges COLLINS and STADING concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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