State v. Janosky

2026 Ohio 158

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 20, 2026
• Docket: CA2025-03-008
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Janosky, 2026-Ohio-158.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

MADISON COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, : CASE NO. CA2025-03-008 Appellee, : OPINION AND vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY 1/20/2026 LOREN C. JANOSKY, :

Appellant. :

:

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM MADISON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CRI20240081

Nicholas A. Adkins, Madison County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael S. Klamo, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Shannon M. Treynor, for appellant.

____________ OPINION

HENDRICKSON, P.J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Loren C. Janosky, appeals from the sentence he received in the

Madison County Court of Common Pleas following his guilty plea to failure to comply with Madison CA2025-03-008

the order or signal of a police officer. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm his

sentence.

{¶ 2} On July 19, 2024, the London Police Department was advised that appellant

had an outstanding warrant for his arrest out of the State of Tennessee. Officers located

appellant driving a vehicle through London, Ohio, and attempted a traffic stop of the

vehicle, employing the police cruiser's lights and sirens. Appellant refused to stop and led

the police on a chase lasting over 10 minutes and covering more than 9 miles. Appellant

led officers out of the city limits and into the country, traveling at speeds of 55 to 60 m.p.h.

in areas where there were 90-degree turns and an inability to see whether any oncoming

traffic was approaching. Appellant ran through multiple stop signs, overtook at least two

vehicles, and traveled onto a bridge where people were fishing at Madison Lake, causing

the fishermen to take evasive action in order to avoid being struck. Officers eventually

deployed stop sticks. In an effort to avoid the stop sticks, appellant swerved his vehicle

towards an officer, coming within four or five feet of the officer. Appellant eventually drove

his vehicle into a soybean farm before exiting the vehicle and fleeing on foot. Inside the

vehicle, officers found a passenger (appellant's girlfriend), a firearm, and two sets of

fictitious plates—one that was on the vehicle already, and another in the trunk of the

vehicle. Officers searched for appellant but were unable to locate him for four days. He

was arrested on July 23, 2024, near Madison Lake.

{¶ 3} Appellant was indicted on August 9, 2024 on one count of failure to comply

with an order or signal of a police officer in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), a felony of the

third degree. The indictment alleged that appellant's operation of a motor vehicle and his

failure to stop the vehicle caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons

or property. Appellant initially pled not guilty to the charge. However, on the morning a

jury trial was set to commence, appellant pled guilty as charged. Following a Crim.R.

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11(C) plea colloquy, the trial court accepted appellant's guilty plea and found him guilty.

The court ordered a presentence-investigative report (PSI) and scheduled sentencing for

February 14, 2025.

{¶ 4} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard from defense counsel,

appellant, and an assistant prosecutor. Defense counsel indicated appellant suffered from

mental health issues and had been diagnosed with PTSD, depression, and

schizophrenia. When the failure to comply offense occurred in July 2024, appellant was

not taking his medication, which counsel indicated not only affected appellant's behavior

but also affected his memory from that day. Nonetheless, counsel noted, appellant took

responsibility for his actions when he pled guilty to the offense. Appellant spoke to the

court about needing help and treatment, stating, "I know I need help. And putting me in

prison is not going to get me the help that I need." Appellant admitted he chose to stop

taking prescribed mental-health medications because he did not like how the medications

made him feel and he wanted to be "normal." Appellant claimed he could not recall the

specifics of his behavior on July 19, 2024.

{¶ 5} The prosecutor argued that a prison sentence of 30 or 36 months was

warranted given the seriousness of appellant's conduct and his risk of recidivism. The

prosecutor noted that appellant's actions in refusing to stop his vehicle and leading the

officers on a more than 8-mile chase threatened substantial risk of serious physical harm

to persons and property, namely other motorists appellant encountered on the road, the

people fishing on the bridge who had to take evasive action to avoid being hit, and the

officer that appellant nearly hit when swerving to avoid the stop sticks. Appellant had also

destroyed approximately $1,000 worth of crops when he drove into the soybean field. The

prosecutor further indicated that appellant had committed a number of burglaries after he

fled from the soybean field, stealing food, water, and clothing while evading arrest.

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{¶ 6} The prosecutor noted that at the time appellant committed this offense, he

was on community supervision or parole for felonies committed in Tennessee, namely

aggravated rape and especially aggravated kidnapping.1 Appellant had violated his parole

a number of times, including by failing to appear for a supervision violation hearing and

by removing a tracking device or ankle monitor. In October 2023, a search of appellant's

residence revealed that he was in possession of a firearm and ammunition, also a

violation of the terms of his parole.

{¶ 7} The trial court indicated it had reviewed the PSI and was familiar with the

facts that comprised the failure to comply offense and was familiar with appellant's

criminal history and history of parole violations. The court noted that in 1998, appellant

had been convicted in Tennessee of carrying concealed weapons and placed on

probation. Then, in 2002, he was convicted of two counts of aggravated rape and one

count of especially aggravated kidnapping in Tennessee. Appellant was sentenced to an

18-year prison sentence. Upon his release in November 2017, appellant was placed on

lifetime community supervision or parole. Appellant successfully had his supervision

transferred to the State of Ohio, where the court commented supervision was

"unremarkable" for some time. However, on a home visit, the Ohio Adult Parole Authority

("Ohio APA") found firearms inside appellant's home, which appellant was prohibited from

possessing. The Ohio APA indicated it would "no longer supervise Mr. Janosky" and

appellant's supervision was transferred back to Tennessee. In August 2018, appellant

committed four violations of his community supervision and was sentenced to an 11-

month and 29-day jail sentence. The trial court further noted that though there was a no-

contact order prohibiting appellant from having contact with the victim of his rape offense,

1. "Especially aggravated kidnapping" is a crime under Tennessee Code § 39-13-305. -4- Madison CA2025-03-008

the PSI indicated "contacts have indeed occurred over a period of time, and it's rather

evident that the victim has expressed concerns." Finally, the court noted that appellant

had tampered with an ankle monitor that he was required to wear which "appear[ed] to

be what triggered the warrants that ultimately caused London PD to have its encounter

with [appellant]."

{¶ 8} The court then spoke about other "alarming concerns" that had been

discovered since the failure to comply offense. The court noted that the appellant's

girlfriend had been found in the vehicle that appellant abandoned in the soybean field,

and that appellant's girlfriend had gained admission to the Peace Officer Training

Academy, "apparently with some fraudulent documents that were ultimately discovered,

resulting in a security alert being sent out regarding her as well as [appellant]." When a

search warrant was executed, numerous firearms were located in the residence, as were

items that would identify the wearer of the items as a law enforcement officer. The trial

court noted, "[t]hat has particularly troubling implications because of the fact pattern

related to [appellant's] rape charges which involve him utilizing his position as a security

officer to initiate a traffic stop where he ultimately asserts authority that he simply didn't

have and ultimately utilizes that authority to commit rape."

{¶ 9} After hearing from defense counsel, appellant, and the prosecutor,

reviewing the PSI, and considering relevant sentencing statutes, the trial court found

appellant was not amenable to community control sanctions. The court found that "the

offense is more serious than that normally constituting the offense" and that "[t]he

recidivism factors indicate a high risk of recidivism." The court imposed a 36-month prison

sentence and advised appellant he would be subject to a mandatory one-to-three-year

period of postrelease control upon his release from prison.

{¶ 10} Appellant appealed his sentence, raising the following as his sole

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assignment of error:

{¶ 11} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPOSING A

MAXIMUM SENTENCE.

{¶ 12} Appellant maintains that the trial court erred when it sentenced him to 36

months in prison on his failure to comply conviction. He argues that the trial court

"improperly considered factors outside the statutory parameters when imposing [his]

sentence," thereby rendering a sentence that is contrary to law.

{¶ 13} As an initial matter, we note that contrary to the caption of appellant's

assignment of error, an appellate court "does not review the sentencing court's decision

for an abuse of discretion." State v. Scott, 2020-Ohio-3230, ¶ 54 (12th Dist.), citing State

v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 10. Rather, a felony sentence is reviewed under the

standard set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Marcum at ¶ 1. Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2),

an appellate court can modify or vacate a sentence only if it clearly and convincingly finds

either of the following:

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

As used in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b), the phrase "otherwise contrary to law" means "'in

violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time.'" State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729,

¶ 34, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). See also State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-

1878, ¶ 22. "A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where [a] trial court

'considers the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed in

R.C. 2929.12, properly imposes postrelease control, and sentences the defendant within

the permissible statutory range.'" State v. Haruyama, 2022-Ohio-4225, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.),

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quoting State v. Ahlers, 2016-Ohio-2890, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.).

{¶ 14} "R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not permit an appellate court to conduct an

independent review of a trial court's sentencing findings under R.C. 2929.12 or its

adherence to the purposes of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11." (Emphasis added.)

Bryant at ¶ 21, citing Jones at ¶ 41-42. Nothing within the statute permits an appellate

court to "independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for

that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C.

2929.11 and 2929.12." Jones at ¶ 42. See also State v. Lopez-Cruz, 2023-Ohio-257, ¶ 7

(12th Dist.). However, an appellate court is not prohibited from reviewing a sentence

"when the claim is that the sentence was imposed based on impermissible

considerations—i.e., considerations that fall outside those that are contained in R.C.

2929.11 and 2929.12." Bryant at ¶ 22.

{¶ 15} Following our review of the record, we find that appellant's sentence is not

contrary to law. The imposition of a 36-month prison term falls within the permissible

statutory range for a third-degree felony offense; see R.C. 2929.14(A)(3); and a one-to-

three-year mandatory term of postrelease control was properly imposed for the offense.

See R.C. 2937.28(B)(4). Though the trial court did not specifically cite to R.C. 2929.11 or

2929.12 at the sentencing hearing, it is not required to do so. See State v. Motz, 2020-

Ohio-4356, ¶ 43 (12th Dist.). "The fact that R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are not expressly

referenced during a sentencing hearing is immaterial when the court's sentencing entry

cites to both statutes." State v. Luttrell, 2022-Ohio-1148, ¶ 25 (12th Dist.), citing State v.

Murphy, 2021-Ohio-4541, ¶ 27 (12th Dist.). Here, the trial court stated in its entry, that

[a]fter reviewing the seriousness of the offense, recidivism factors as set forth in Revised Code §2929.12, and weighing those factors against the purposes and principles of sentencing as set forth in §2929.11 of the Revised Code, the Court finds the Defendant is not amenable to Community

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Control Sanctions and a prison term is commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the Defendant's conduct and is consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.

Furthermore, the record from the sentencing hearing indicates the court considered all

"relevant factors," when imposing appellant's sentence, including that "the offense is more

serious than that normally constituting the offense" and the "recidivism factors indicate a

high risk of recidivism."

{¶ 16} The record further demonstrates that in addition to considering the factors

set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, the court also considered the factors set forth in

R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b). This provision provides that where a defendant is convicted of

third-degree failure to comply under section (B) of R.C. 2951.331 where the operation of

the motor vehicle either proximately caused serious physical harm to persons or property

or caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property, the

sentencing court

shall consider, along with the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12 and 2929.13 of the Revised Code . . . all of the following:

The duration of the pursuit;

(ii) The distance of the pursuit;

(iii) The rate of speed at which the offender operated the motor vehicle during the pursuit;

(iv) Whether the offender failed to stop for traffic lights or stop signs during the pursuit;

(v) The number of traffic lights or stop signs for which the offender failed to stop during the pursuit;

(vi) Whether the offender operated the motor vehicle during the pursuit without lighted lights during a time when lighted lights are required;

(vii) Whether the offender committed a moving violation during the pursuit;

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(viii) The number of moving violations the offender committed during the pursuit;

(ix) Any other relevant factors indicating that the offender’s conduct is more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense.

R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b). Here, the court detailed the length of the pursuit (9.2 miles), the

duration of the pursuit (11 minutes), appellant's rate of speed (between 50 and 60 m.p.h.),

appellant's failure to stop at two stop signs and his commission of other moving violations,

as well as other factors the court found serious and concerning. Such factors included

appellant coming within four-to-five feet of striking an officer when trying to avoid stop

sticks, appellant causing individuals fishing and playing near Madison Lake to take

evasive action, and appellant driving into a soybean field before fleeing on foot and

evading capture for four days. We find such factors relevant when considering the

seriousness of appellant's conduct and crime.

{¶ 17} Appellant argues that the trial court considered factors beyond those

permitted by R.C. 2929.11, 2929.12, and 2921.331(C)(5)(b) in imposing his sentence.

Specifically, appellant argues the trial court impermissibly considered the following

factors:

(1) The Ohio APA would no longer supervise appellant as requested because it found weapons in his home;

(2) That appellant was suspected of having contact with a victim out of a Tennessee case in violation of a "no contact" order;

(3) That appellant's girlfriend had gained admission to the Ohio Peace Officers Training Academy with purportedly fraudulent documents;

(4) That during a search of the appellant's and his girlfriend's home, some articles of police officer uniform/regalia were discovered, again only relating to a case out of Tennessee; and

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(5) That appellant claimed his Second Amendment rights to the probation staff during his PSI.

{¶ 18} We find no merit to appellant's arguments. The aforementioned facts that

appellant argues were "impermissible" considerations are facts relevant to his risk of

recidivism and the need for the court to fashion a sentence that protects the public from

future crime by the offender. See R.C. 2929.12 and 2929.11. Many of the facts appellant

complains the trial court should not have considered were relevant considerations of

appellant's past failures to abide by court orders and parole conditions.2 For instance, the

court noted that appellant had contact with his rape victim despite a no contact order and

he possessed firearms in his home in violation of the terms of his parole and supervision,

thereby causing the Ohio APA to transfer parole supervision back to Tennessee. The

court's reference to "Ohio [APA] saying we could no longer supervise Mr. Janosky" was

in reference to his parole supervision being transferred back to Tennessee. It was not

considered by the court as a prohibition on the court's ability to impose a community

control sanction. Appellant's "second amendment style statements" were considered by

the court in combination with appellant's possession of prohibited firearms, with the court

noting it was troubling that the statements "seem to evince a suggestion that he's not

subject to limitations when it comes to firearms." We find that the trial court was entitled

to consider appellant's statements and conduct in assessing his risk of recidivism and the

need to protect the public from future crime by the offender. Appellant's sentence was not

2. One of the statements appellant claims was improper related to the conduct of appellant's girlfriend. The court noted, "[t]he female in the vehicle that was stopped identified herself as Mr. Janosky's girlfriend; and while this has nothing to do directly with Mr. Janosky, she apparently had gained admission to the Peace Officer Training Academy, apparently with some fraudulent documents that were ultimately discovered, resulting in a security alert being sent out regarding her as well as Mr. Janosky. A search warrant was conducted for the[ir] residence shortly after the pursuit." (Emphasis added.) There is no indication the trial court held appellant's girlfriend's conduct against him when imposing a sentence. Rather, the court indicated the girlfriend's conduct "ha[d] nothing to do" with appellant. The court appeared to mention appellant's girlfriend's conduct only to shed light on how a security alert was issued for appellant and his girlfriend. - 10 - Madison CA2025-03-008

based on impermissible considerations and was not clearly and convincingly contrary to

law. We therefore overrule appellant's sole assignment of error.

{¶ 19} Judgment affirmed.

BYRNE and SIEBERT, JJ., concur.

JUDGMENT ENTRY

The assignment of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.

It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Madison County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.

Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.

/s/ Robert A. Hendrickson, Presiding Judge

/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Judge

/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge

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