State v. Jankowski

281 N.W.2d 717, 1979 Minn. LEXIS 1617
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedJuly 13, 1979
Docket48209, 48465
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 281 N.W.2d 717 (State v. Jankowski) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Jankowski, 281 N.W.2d 717, 1979 Minn. LEXIS 1617 (Mich. 1979).

Opinion

*718 CHARLES W. KENNEDY, Justice. *

Jerome A. Jankowski and Randon Louis Garcia appeal from convictions of aggravated forgery for aiding Franklin Bower in uttering a forged cashier’s check at Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis on March 3, 1977, in violation of Minn.St. 609.-625, subd. 1(1), and 609.05.

Appellants contend that their warrantless arrests were illegal because made without probable cause and because the officers did not first give notice of their office and purpose before entering appellant’s motel room to make the arrests, and that the warrantless seizure of luggage and an automobile, for a later search at the police station with a warrant, was unreasonable. Garcia also contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the convictions.

On March 3, 1977, Franklin Bower was arrested at the Marquette National Bank in Minneapolis while uttering a forged cashier’s check purporting to be issued by Aurora State Bank, Aurora, Illinois, for $2,974.30. He had uttered a similar check at the same bank 10 or 15 minutes earlier and obtained $2,974.30.

Bower told officers he had flown to Minneapolis with J. Reynolds the previous night for an illegal lobster sales venture; that they stayed at the Guest House Motel; and that he had received two forged cashier’s checks from one “Rick,” whom he described, and to whom he gave the proceeds of the first check. Police learned from personnel of the Guest House Motel that J. Reynolds, of Sarasota, Florida, driving an Oldsmobile, had registered for a room for two persons, and that on March 3, some time after Bower’s arrest, J. Reynolds and his companion had checked out of the Guest House Motel.

A check of the Oldsmobile’s license number, given with the registration, disclosed that the automobile was owned by Budget Rent-A-Car and rented on March 3, 1977, to J. Jankowski. Bower then admitted to police that Reynolds was Jankowski, but denied that Jankowski was involved in the check-cashing scheme.

On Bower’s person, officers had found a matchbook from the North Star Inn. Checking with the North Star Inn, they learned that J. Reynolds of Sarasota, Florida, with the same automobile, had registered with one Mitchell for Room 904 during the evening of March 3.

On the morning of March 4, the officers went to the North Star Inn. At a registration desk on the 7th floor they verified the registration of Reynolds and Mitchell in Room 904. They learned that the automobile rented by Jankowski was in the motel parking ramp. They asked a motel clerk to accompany them to the 9th floor to help them enter Room 904 if entry was refused.

As the officers and clerk got into the elevator at the 7th floor, two young men entered the elevator. At the 9th floor, the two men left the elevator, and the officers followed them down the hall, walking a few feet behind. At Room 904, the two men stopped and one unlocked the door. When the door was opened and the men walked in, the officers followed them through the doorway. Inside the room the officers, with guns drawn, required the two men to go against the wall. When they identified themselves as Reynolds and Mitchell they were told they were under arrest. Identification then showed that Reynolds was Jan-kowski and that Mitchell was Garcia.

1. The warrantless arrests were justified. When the officers came to the North Star Inn they believed, based on information that Bower had given them and on corroborating facts, that they had probable cause to arrest whoever could be identified as Reynolds and Mitchell. A felony had been committed by Bower, and early in the investigation the police determined that Bower had had assistance. Bower had only $20 on his person when arrested, rather than the $2,974.30 he had obtained from the first forged check 10 or 15 minutes earlier. *719 The officers knew that when Bower was in custody, an unidentified man had telephoned a bank employee asking whether charges against Bower would be dropped if the money was returned. As the investigation continued, officers had reason' to believe, from what Bower told them and from what they learned from employees of two motels and a car rental agency, that Bower had two travelling companions — J. Reynolds (Jankowski) and Ralph Mitchell (Garcia). Nothing credible in the investigation suggested that Bower’s help came from anyone but his companions. Thus, it was reasonable for the officers to conclude that “Reynolds” and “Mitchell” had assisted Bower in the criminal venture. Additionally, Jankowski resembled the description Bower had given of “Rick,” and Garcia resembled the description of a person whom a bank employee had observed suspiciously watching Bower’s arrest in the bank lobby.

We accept the officers’ assessment of probable cause because it was reasonable in the circumstances. State v. Cox, 294 Minn. 252, 200 N.W.2d 305 (1972); State v. Bruno, 293 Minn. 84, 196 N.W.2d 459 (1972). Bower had committed a felony, and the officers had reasonable cause for believing that Jan-kowski and Garcia were accomplices in that felony. Therefore, the officers were authorized to arrest Jankowski and Garcia without a warrant. Minn.St. 629.34.

2. Appellants contend that the officers’ entry was a violation of Minn.St. 629.-34, the Fourth Amendment, and Minn. Const, art. 1, § 10, because the officers, in plain clothes, did not give notice of their office and purpose until after they made the arrests within the room. Minn.St. 629.-34 provides in relevant part:

“A peace officer may, without warrant, arrest a person:
“(3) When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it; * * *
“To make such arrest the officer may break open an outer or inner door or window of a dwelling house if, after notice of his office and purpose, he shall be refused admittance.”

The method of entry did not render the arrests illegal. The kind of entry referred to in the statute did not occur, so the statute was not violated.

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Related

State v. DeWald
463 N.W.2d 741 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1990)
United States v. Thomas J. Licata
761 F.2d 537 (Ninth Circuit, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
281 N.W.2d 717, 1979 Minn. LEXIS 1617, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-jankowski-minn-1979.