State v. James Jones

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
• Decided: February 11, 1998
• Docket: 01C01-9612-CC-00522
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE FILED JANUARY SESSION, 1998 February 11, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Court Clerk STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9612-CC-00522 ) Appellee, ) ) VAN BUREN COUNTY ) V. ) ) HON. CHARLES D. HASTON, JUDGE JAMES RONALD JONES, ) ) Appe llant. ) (POST-C ONVIC TION)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

JAME S RO NALD JON ES, pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP 1102 4-074 , Shelb y Unit Attorney General & Reporter P.O. Box 34550 Memphis, TN 38184-0550 ELIZABETH B. MARNEY Assistant Attorney General 2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243

WILLIAM M. LOCKE District Attorn ey Ge neral 111 Professional Building McMinnville, TN 37110

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE OPINION The Petitioner, James Ronald Jones, appeals the order of the Van Buren

Circu it Court dismissing his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court

found that the pe tition was filed outside th e statute o f limitations. W e affirm the

judgm ent of the tria l court.

From the rec ord on appe al, it appears that Petitioner was convicted of arson

in Van Buren County in October, 1989 following a plea of guilty. At the time of his

guilty plea, there was a three-year statute of limitations for filing post-conviction

petitioners pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102 (repealed

1995). Therefore, Petitioner had until October, 1992 in which to timely file a petition

for post-conviction relief. However, Petitioner did not file his petition for p ost-

conviction relief until Ma y 10, 199 6. The tria l court sub seque ntly dismissed the

petition be cause it was time -barred.

Petitioner relies on this Court’s decision in Arnold C arter v. State , C.C.A. No.

03C01-9509-CC-00270, Monro e Cou nty (Ten n. Crim. A pp., Knoxville, July 11,

1996), holding that the new Post-Con viction Procedu re Act, effective May 10, 1995,

granted an ad ditiona l one-y ear pe riod, un til May 1 0, 199 6, to file a post-conviction

petition. Howe ver, ou r supre me c ourt re verse d this Cour t’s decision in Carter. See

Carter v. State, 952 S.W.2d 417 (T enn. 19 97); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-

201 et seq. In Carter, our sup reme c ourt held the followin g:

[The new Act] is not intended to revive claims that were barred by the previous statute of lim itations. W e agree w ith the view th at the statu te was intended to restrict the tim e and o pportu nity to seek post-conviction relief. Clearly, this purpose is not served by a statutory construction

-2- that allows ad ditional time and op portunity for petitioners whose claims are alrea dy barred by the prior statute of lim itations.

Carter v. State, 952 S.W .2d at 420. Th erefore, “petitioners for whom the statute of

limitations expired prior to the effective date of the new Act, i.e., May 10, 1995, do

not have an additional year in which to file petitions for post-conviction relief.” Id. at

418.

According ly, we conclude that the trial court correctly found that the petition

was barred by the statue of limitations, and therefore, a summary dismissal of the

petition wa s appro priate. Te nn. Co de Ann . § 40-30 -206(b).

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

____________________________________ THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge

CONCUR:

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES , Judge

___________________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, Judge

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