IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
MAY 1999 SESSION FILED July 8, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr. STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate Court Clerk ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9710-CC-00420 Appellee, ) ) GIBSON COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. DICK JERMAN, JR., JAMES HYDE, ) JUDGE ) Appellant. ) (Aggravated Robbery, Aggravated Rape, Reckless Endangerment & Unlawful Weapon Possession)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
GERALD S. GREEN PAUL G. SUMMERS 147 Jefferson Ave., Suite 404 Attorney General & Reporter Memphis, TN 38103 (On Appeal) R. STEPHEN JOBE Asst. Attorney General JESSE H. FORD, III John Sevier Bldg. P.O. Box 1625 425 Fifth Ave., North Jackson, TN 38302 Nashville, TN 37243-0493 -and- DONNIE W. KNOTT CLAYBURN L. PEEPLES P.O. Box 547 District Attorney General Milan, TN 38358 (At Trial) TED NEWMAN Asst. District Attorney General 110 South College St., Suite 200 Trenton, TN 38382
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge OPINION
The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, aggravated rape,
reckless endangerment, and unlawful possession of a weapon and was sentenced as a
Range I standard offender to an effective sentence of twenty-three years in the
Tennessee Department of Correction. He now appeals, arguing that he was placed in
double jeopardy by being tried as an adult in criminal court after participating in a juvenile
transfer hearing that was essentially a delinquency hearing. He also complains that the
police officers lacked probable cause for a warrantless search and seizure and that their
investigatory conduct “shocks the conscience.” Finding no merit to the defendant’s
arguments, we affirm.
The record on appeal contains only the technical record and the transcript
from the juvenile transfer hearing, which reveals the following. A Trenton church daycare
provider was robbed and raped at gunpoint one afternoon at work. After the incident, the
victim summoned the Trenton police authorities and described her attacker as a very tall,
thin black man wearing a red and black “Bulls” jacket. Because her attacker wore a ski
mask during the incident, she could not identify his face. However, because her attacker
forced her to perform oral sex on him, she described his genital area, stating, “He was
long, little hair, a lighter color there.”
The victim was taken to the hospital where a rape kit and pelvic examination
was performed. Around the same time, an anonymous person called the Trenton police
and said that the perpetrator had fled to Timmy Hyde’s residence, which was a short
distance from the crime scene. Officer William Sanders went to the residence and
knocked on the front and back doors for ten minutes, but no one answered. A short time
2 later, Officer Sanders learned that after he had left the Hyde residence, two other police
officers had stopped and released a vehicle in which the sixteen-year-old defendant, a
relative of Timmy Hyde, was riding. Officer Sanders returned to the Hyde residence,
where he talked with Tommy Hyde, the defendant’s uncle, who volunteered to find the
defendant and bring him to the police department.
Later, the defendant, accompanied by his relatives, arrived at the police
department. Officer Sanders obtained permission to search the Hyde residence, which
uncovered a red and black “Bulls” jacket matching the victim’s description. The
defendant agreed to submit to a blood sample for DNA analysis. Because of the nature
of the victim’s descriptions, Officer Sanders asked the defendant to accompany him into
the bathroom and show him his genital area. According to Officer Sanders, the
defendant voluntarily consented. In Officer Sanders’ assessment, the defendant’s penis
was “long,” as the victim had described. The DNA comparison of the defendant’s blood
sample with male cells taken from the victim’s vagina produced a four-probe match that
would have a 1 in 638,000,000 chance of occurring randomly in the black population.
Based on this and other evidence presented at the hearing, the juvenile
court judge found that the statutory grounds for transferring the defendant to criminal
court existed. The case then proceeded to indictment and ultimately a jury trial, where
the defendant was convicted as charged.
The defendant first argues that the juvenile transfer hearing was essentially
a trial on the merits of the delinquency petition against the defendant and that when he
was tried as an adult in criminal court, he was placed in double jeopardy. As support for
this conclusion, the defendant asserts that because the juvenile court found at the
3 conclusion of the transfer hearing that the offenses were committed in an aggravated
manner, the court necessarily determined that the offenses were actually committed and
thus determined his guilt.
According to the transfer hearing transcript, the juvenile court judge
enumerated the factors under T.C.A. § 37-1-134 he must consider in determining whether
the State could try the defendant as an adult in criminal court. One of these factors, the
juvenile court judge stated, is whether “the alleged offense was committed in an
aggravated pre-meditated manner.” The juvenile court judge later stated, “I could restate
on the record what I have just gone over [the § 37-1-134 factors], but I do specifically find
in my docketing that each of those grounds of 37-1-134 were met at today’s hearing.”
A review of § 37-1-134 reveals that the juvenile court judge misspoke; the
applicable factor to be considered is not whether the defendant committed the offense
in “an aggravated pre-meditated manner,” but whether he committed the offense in “an
aggressive and premeditated manner.” T.C.A. § 37-1-134(b)(4). Even so, we fail to
discern how the juvenile court judge’s finding necessarily constitutes a finding of guilt so
as to implicate double jeopardy concerns, as the defendant contends. The record reflects
that the juvenile court judge repeatedly acknowledged that the sole purpose of the
transfer hearing was to determine whether the defendant should be tried as an adult.
Never did the judge suggest that based on the evidence, he found the defendant to be
delinquent or guilty; rather, he specifically limited his review of the evidence in context of
determining “whether or not there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child
committed the delinquent act as alleged,” as required by § 37-1-134(a)(4)(A). Thus,
contrary to the defendant’s argument, jeopardy did not attach in the juvenile transfer
hearing, and the defendant’s trial as an adult, therefore, did not twice place him in
4 jeopardy. State v. Davis, 637 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982)(where court
simultaneously found that “reasonable grounds to believe” an offense had been
committed and that the defendants were delinquent, jeopardy attached; but had the court
found only “reasonable grounds” without a finding of guilt, “we would have no hesitancy
in saying that double jeopardy did not attach”).
Next, the defendant contends that because the reliability of the anonymous
informant cannot be assessed, the police officers did not have probable cause for the
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
MAY 1999 SESSION FILED July 8, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr. STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate Court Clerk ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9710-CC-00420 Appellee, ) ) GIBSON COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. DICK JERMAN, JR., JAMES HYDE, ) JUDGE ) Appellant. ) (Aggravated Robbery, Aggravated Rape, Reckless Endangerment & Unlawful Weapon Possession)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
GERALD S. GREEN PAUL G. SUMMERS 147 Jefferson Ave., Suite 404 Attorney General & Reporter Memphis, TN 38103 (On Appeal) R. STEPHEN JOBE Asst. Attorney General JESSE H. FORD, III John Sevier Bldg. P.O. Box 1625 425 Fifth Ave., North Jackson, TN 38302 Nashville, TN 37243-0493 -and- DONNIE W. KNOTT CLAYBURN L. PEEPLES P.O. Box 547 District Attorney General Milan, TN 38358 (At Trial) TED NEWMAN Asst. District Attorney General 110 South College St., Suite 200 Trenton, TN 38382
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge OPINION
The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, aggravated rape,
reckless endangerment, and unlawful possession of a weapon and was sentenced as a
Range I standard offender to an effective sentence of twenty-three years in the
Tennessee Department of Correction. He now appeals, arguing that he was placed in
double jeopardy by being tried as an adult in criminal court after participating in a juvenile
transfer hearing that was essentially a delinquency hearing. He also complains that the
police officers lacked probable cause for a warrantless search and seizure and that their
investigatory conduct “shocks the conscience.” Finding no merit to the defendant’s
arguments, we affirm.
The record on appeal contains only the technical record and the transcript
from the juvenile transfer hearing, which reveals the following. A Trenton church daycare
provider was robbed and raped at gunpoint one afternoon at work. After the incident, the
victim summoned the Trenton police authorities and described her attacker as a very tall,
thin black man wearing a red and black “Bulls” jacket. Because her attacker wore a ski
mask during the incident, she could not identify his face. However, because her attacker
forced her to perform oral sex on him, she described his genital area, stating, “He was
long, little hair, a lighter color there.”
The victim was taken to the hospital where a rape kit and pelvic examination
was performed. Around the same time, an anonymous person called the Trenton police
and said that the perpetrator had fled to Timmy Hyde’s residence, which was a short
distance from the crime scene. Officer William Sanders went to the residence and
knocked on the front and back doors for ten minutes, but no one answered. A short time
2 later, Officer Sanders learned that after he had left the Hyde residence, two other police
officers had stopped and released a vehicle in which the sixteen-year-old defendant, a
relative of Timmy Hyde, was riding. Officer Sanders returned to the Hyde residence,
where he talked with Tommy Hyde, the defendant’s uncle, who volunteered to find the
defendant and bring him to the police department.
Later, the defendant, accompanied by his relatives, arrived at the police
department. Officer Sanders obtained permission to search the Hyde residence, which
uncovered a red and black “Bulls” jacket matching the victim’s description. The
defendant agreed to submit to a blood sample for DNA analysis. Because of the nature
of the victim’s descriptions, Officer Sanders asked the defendant to accompany him into
the bathroom and show him his genital area. According to Officer Sanders, the
defendant voluntarily consented. In Officer Sanders’ assessment, the defendant’s penis
was “long,” as the victim had described. The DNA comparison of the defendant’s blood
sample with male cells taken from the victim’s vagina produced a four-probe match that
would have a 1 in 638,000,000 chance of occurring randomly in the black population.
Based on this and other evidence presented at the hearing, the juvenile
court judge found that the statutory grounds for transferring the defendant to criminal
court existed. The case then proceeded to indictment and ultimately a jury trial, where
the defendant was convicted as charged.
The defendant first argues that the juvenile transfer hearing was essentially
a trial on the merits of the delinquency petition against the defendant and that when he
was tried as an adult in criminal court, he was placed in double jeopardy. As support for
this conclusion, the defendant asserts that because the juvenile court found at the
3 conclusion of the transfer hearing that the offenses were committed in an aggravated
manner, the court necessarily determined that the offenses were actually committed and
thus determined his guilt.
According to the transfer hearing transcript, the juvenile court judge
enumerated the factors under T.C.A. § 37-1-134 he must consider in determining whether
the State could try the defendant as an adult in criminal court. One of these factors, the
juvenile court judge stated, is whether “the alleged offense was committed in an
aggravated pre-meditated manner.” The juvenile court judge later stated, “I could restate
on the record what I have just gone over [the § 37-1-134 factors], but I do specifically find
in my docketing that each of those grounds of 37-1-134 were met at today’s hearing.”
A review of § 37-1-134 reveals that the juvenile court judge misspoke; the
applicable factor to be considered is not whether the defendant committed the offense
in “an aggravated pre-meditated manner,” but whether he committed the offense in “an
aggressive and premeditated manner.” T.C.A. § 37-1-134(b)(4). Even so, we fail to
discern how the juvenile court judge’s finding necessarily constitutes a finding of guilt so
as to implicate double jeopardy concerns, as the defendant contends. The record reflects
that the juvenile court judge repeatedly acknowledged that the sole purpose of the
transfer hearing was to determine whether the defendant should be tried as an adult.
Never did the judge suggest that based on the evidence, he found the defendant to be
delinquent or guilty; rather, he specifically limited his review of the evidence in context of
determining “whether or not there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child
committed the delinquent act as alleged,” as required by § 37-1-134(a)(4)(A). Thus,
contrary to the defendant’s argument, jeopardy did not attach in the juvenile transfer
hearing, and the defendant’s trial as an adult, therefore, did not twice place him in
4 jeopardy. State v. Davis, 637 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982)(where court
simultaneously found that “reasonable grounds to believe” an offense had been
committed and that the defendants were delinquent, jeopardy attached; but had the court
found only “reasonable grounds” without a finding of guilt, “we would have no hesitancy
in saying that double jeopardy did not attach”).
Next, the defendant contends that because the reliability of the anonymous
informant cannot be assessed, the police officers did not have probable cause for the
“warrantless search and seizure” of the defendant’s groin area. The defendant also
contends that the police officer’s personal assessment of the size of the defendant’s
genitalia cannot give rise to “the probable cause necessary for further investigation and
prosecution.” The limited record on appeal contains no indication that the defendant ever
raised this issue in the trial court. Because this issue was not previously litigated, it has
been waived. See, e.g., State v. Lunati, 665 S.W.2d 739, 749 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).
Even so, contrary to the defendant’s claim that Officer Sanders “forced” him to “exhibit
his phallus,” the limited record before us indicates that the defendant voluntarily
consented. Further, the defendant cites no authority that “probable cause” is needed to
merely investigate a suspect of a crime when the suspect voluntarily supplies authorities
with incriminating evidence. The defendant’s contentions lack merit.
Finally, the defendant asserts simply that the Trenton police department’s
investigation “shocks the conscience” and that the “search which began this investigation
was humiliating and intrusive.” The defendant also claims, “The whole prosecution was
based on the fabrication of the Trenton Police.” The defendant never specifies what this
“fabrication” might be. Because of the conclusive nature of the defendant’s assertions
and the lack of authoritative citations, this issue is waived. Rules of the Court of Criminal
5 Appeals of Tennessee 10(b). Even so, because nothing in the record supports the
defendant’s bald assertions, this issue lacks merit.
Finding no merit to the defendant’s arguments, the judgments are affirmed.
_______________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
CONCUR:
______________________________ JOE G. RILEY, Judge
______________________________ THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge