09/01/2026
DA 24-0449
Case Number: DA 24-0449
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 208
STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
JASON ALLEN MILLER, Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Lincoln, Cause No. DC-23-24 Honorable Danni Coffman, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Joseph P. Howard, Joseph P. Howard, P.C., Helena, Montana For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Katie Schulz, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Marcia Boris, Lincoln County Attorney, Thorin Geist, Special Deputy County Attorney, Libby, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 20, 2026 Decided: September 1, 2026 Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 In the Montana Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, Jason Allen Miller was found guilty of five felonies: (1) attempted deliberate homicide in violation of §§ 45-4-103, and 45-5-102, MCA; (2) criminal endangerment in violation of § 45-5-207, MCA; (3) criminal mischief in violation of § 45-6-101, MCA; (4) criminal possession of dangerous drugs in violation of § 45-9-102, MCA; and (5) aggravated kidnapping in violation of § 45-5-303, MCA. Miller appeals the District Court’s rulings regarding the presence of law enforcement officers in the gallery during trial, the admission of a crime scene photograph, and contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. We restate and address the following issues:
Issue 1: Whether the District Court abused its discretion by allowing law enforcement officers to attend trial in uniform.
Issue 2: Whether Miller received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Issue 3: Whether the District Court abused its discretion by admitting a photograph of the crime scene.
¶2 We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶3 In the afternoon of February 16, 2023, Deputy Clint Heintz of the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office (LCSO) attempted to arrest Miller pursuant to an active arrest warrant. Deputy Heintz located Miller loading tires into a truck near Eureka, Montana. As Deputy Heintz approached Miller in his squad car, Miller entered the truck, drove away, and a pursuit ensued on Highway 37 during which speeds reached up to 100 miles per hour.
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Montana Highway Patrol Trooper Lewis Johnson, LCSO Deputy Scott Welchons, and LCSO Sergeant Bo Pitman joined the pursuit after Deputy Heintz requested assistance. The pursuit continued onto Camp 32 Road (Camp 32 Road or “the road”), a snowy and icy United States Forest Service Road. ¶4 Miller briefly lost control of the vehicle once he turned onto Camp 32 Road. Trooper Johnson proceeded up the road approximately 100 feet beyond Miller’s vehicle and parked parallel, partially blocking the road. Deputy Heintz parked at the turn off to Camp 32 Road. Deputy Welchons and Sergeant Pitman, who were in the same vehicle, were approximately 30 to 40 yards behind Trooper Johnson when he turned onto Camp 32 Road. Trooper Johnson and Deputy Heintz exited their vehicles, drew their weapons, and ordered Miller to stop the vehicle. Miller straightened the vehicle to travel further up Camp 32 Road, rapidly accelerated, and struck Johnson as he proceeded up the road. The impact knocked Trooper Johnson from the road onto the shoulder of the road covered in pine needles. Deputy Heintz rendered aid to Trooper Johnson and contacted emergency medical services. Deputy Heintz’s body camera and dash camera on his squad car captured the incident. ¶5 Deputy Welchons and Sergeant Pitman pursued Miller up Camp 32 Road. The passenger in Miller’s vehicle, Michelle Emerson, exited the vehicle when Miller slowed to make a left hand corner. Deputy Welchons and Sergeant Pitman apprehended Miller after Miller struck a Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks (FWP) truck that had been parked in the road to obstruct Miller’s path.
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¶6 Law enforcement executed a search warrant on the vehicle Miller was driving, recovering methamphetamine, testosterone enanthate and a pistol. The State charged Miller with five felonies: (1) attempted deliberate homicide for Miller allegedly striking Trooper Johnson with his vehicle; (2) criminal endangerment for Miller allegedly fleeing in a vehicle at a high rate of speed; (3) criminal mischief for Miller allegedly damaging the FWP vehicle; (4) criminal possession of dangerous drugs for the drugs recovered from the vehicle Miller used during the pursuit; and (5) aggravated kidnapping for Miller allegedly not letting Emerson exit the vehicle. ¶7 A jury trial was held from April 16, 2024, through April 19, 2024. After the State called Deputy Heintz as its first witness, Miller noted the “large presence” of uniformed law enforcement officers in the gallery and moved the District Court to order the officers to wear civilian clothes, arguing that their presence would intimidate the jury and deprive Miller of his right to a fair trial. Miller alternatively requested the District Court to instruct the jury to not let external factors, “including the large presence of law enforcement,” influence their deliberations. The State responded that the officers’ presence had not been disruptive, that the State informed them to stay away from the jurors, that the jurors would not be surprised that the officers attended the trial given the circumstances of the charges, and clarified that the State did not request the officers to attend trial. The State did not oppose the District Court broadly instructing the jury that they should not be influenced by who appears in the gallery if the instruction was “broadly worded for both sides.” The District Court denied Miller’s request to order the officers to wear civilian clothing, determining that it would be unreasonable to interpret the officers’ presence as intimidating
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given the nature of the case. The District Court stated it would consider a curative instruction if Miller proposed one. Miller did not renew his concern about the presence of the officers for the remainder of the trial and did not propose a curative instruction. ¶8 The State called the remainder of its witnesses, including Trooper Johnson, Sergeant Pitman, Deputy Welchons, and DCI1 Agent Kevin McCarvel. Miller stipulated to the admission of all the State’s trial exhibits except for a close-up, color photograph of the uniform vest that Trooper Johnson wore on the day of the incident. The photograph depicted pine needles in Trooper Johnson’s vest pocket and Trooper Johnson’s badge partially covered in blood. Miller objected to the State introducing the photograph based on M. R. Evid. 403, arguing that the prejudicial effect of the photo outweighed any potential probative value. The District Court overruled Miller’s objection, concluding that the risk of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the photo’s probative value. After the State concluded its case-in-chief, Miller rested without calling any witnesses. The jury found Miller guilty of all five charges.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶9 We review matters concerning trial administration for abuse of discretion. State v. Lord, 2025 MT 302, ¶ 13, 425 Mont. 398, 581 P.3d 392 (citation omitted). We exercise plenary review over issues of constitutional law. State v. Sebastian, 2013 MT 347, ¶ 14, 372 Mont. 522, 313 P.3d 198 (citation omitted). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims
1 Because Trooper Johnson and Deputy Heintz discharged their service weapons during the incident, the Montana Department of Justice, Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), investigated the incident.
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are mixed questions of fact and law that we review de novo. State v. Ward, 2020 MT 36, ¶ 15, 399 Mont. 16, 457 P.3d 955 (citations omitted). “We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion to the extent the ruling does not involve an interpretation or conclusion of law.” State v. Smith, 2026 MT 106, ¶ 16, 428 Mont. 119, 591 P.3d 1054 (citation omitted). A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason. Smith, ¶ 16 (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶10 Issue 1: Whether the District Court abused its discretion by allowing law enforcement officers to attend trial in uniform.
¶11 “A criminal defendant has a right to a fair trial under both the United States and Montana Constitutions.” State v. Griffin, 2016 MT 231, ¶ 9, 385 Mont. 1, 386 P.3d 559 (citing State v. Aker, 2013 MT 253, ¶ 24, 371 Mont. 491, 310 P.3d 506). The right to a fair trial encompasses the accused’s right to the presumption of innocence and the accused’s right “to have his [or her] guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on . . . other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.” Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567, 106 S. Ct. 1340, 1345 (1986) (citation and internal quotations omitted); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1692 (1976) (“The presumption of innocence . . . is a basic component of a fair trial[.]”). The trial court fulfills its duty to ensure the accused receives a fair trial by being alert to and addressing courtroom practices and arrangements that may undermine the fact-finding process.
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Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503, 96 S. Ct. at 1693; Griffin, ¶ 9 (“The district court bears the duty to [e]nsure that the defendant receives a fair trial.”). ¶12 Certain courtroom practices and arrangements, such as requiring the accused to wear prison clothes and restraints in front of the jury, inherently prejudice an accused’s right to a fair trial because the accused’s appearance undoubtedly creates the potential of undermining his or her presumption of innocence. See Estelle, 425 U.S. at 504, 96 S. Ct. at 1693 (citations omitted). Other courtroom practices, such as the presence of security personnel, are not inherently prejudicial because they do not unmistakably identify the accused as dangerous or culpable, and the jury may draw a range of benign inferences from their presence or draw no inferences at all. Kills on Top v. State, 273 Mont. 32, 57, 901 P.2d 1368, 1384 (1995) (citation omitted); Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 568-69, 106 S. Ct. at 1345-46. We address whether non-inherently prejudicial courtroom practices and arrangements rise to the level of posing an unacceptable threat to the accused’s right to a fair trial on a case-by-case basis. Kills on Top, 273 Mont. at 57, 901 P.2d at 1384 (citing Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569, 106 S. Ct. at 1346). ¶13 Miller contends the number of uniformed law enforcement officers in the gallery during trial created the risk of intimidating the jury as a show of force. Miller argues the District Court abused its discretion by failing to ameliorate the potential prejudice because it denied Miller’s request to require the law enforcement officers to dress in civilian clothes, and the District Court failed to poll the jury to determine whether the officers’ presence impacted their impartiality. The State argues the District Court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the law enforcement officers to attend the trial in uniform because their
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presence did not pose an unacceptable risk of impairing Miller’s right to a fair trial under the circumstances. ¶14 The District Court did not abuse its discretion by addressing Miller’s concerns regarding the officers’ presence and ruling accordingly. The District Court recognized that the State charged Miller for allegedly attempting to cause the death of Trooper Johnson and that a large number of Trooper Johnson’s colleagues attended the trial in uniform. The District Court determined that the officers’ presence in the gallery would not surprise the jury given the nature of the case and that the jury could have reasonably interpreted the officers’ presence as showing support for Trooper Johnson rather than perceiving their presence as intimidation or show of force. E.g., California v. Ramirez, 479 P.3d 797, 821-22 (Cal. 2021) (jury could have drawn benign inference from 17-18 uniformed officers in gallery during trial involving murder of law enforcement officer, including showing support for victim, victim’s family, and organization); Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569, 106 S. Ct. at 1346 (stating jurors may draw a range of benign inferences from officers’ presence or draw no inferences at all). The State represented that the officers were not disruptive during trial and nothing in the record suggests otherwise. The record also does not demonstrate the officers drew attention to themselves or attempted to engage the jury as the record is silent on the courtroom arrangements except that the officers were in uniform and attended at least part of the trial. ¶15 Miller relies on State v. Taylor, 2010 MT 94, 356 Mont. 167, 231 P.3d 79, to contend that the officers’ presence created an unacceptable risk of violating his right to a fair trial. In Taylor, a group of approximately ten individuals “dressed in black and blue uniforms”
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entered the courtroom and stood along the backwall on the prosecution’s side while the district court instructed the jury. Taylor, ¶¶ 9, 24. After Taylor’s counsel brought the group’s presence to the district court’s attention, the district court instructed the group to be seated, at which time they left the courtroom without further incident. Taylor, ¶ 9. Taylor moved for a mistrial, arguing the group’s presence intimidated the jury and violated his right to a fair trial. Taylor, ¶ 9. We affirmed the district court’s denial of Taylor’s motion, holding that the district court acted within its discretion by “declin[ing] to grant a mistrial based on this single, brief incident.” Taylor, ¶ 25. ¶16 Miller’s reliance on Taylor is misplaced. The record establishes only that there was, according to Miller, a “large presence” of uniformed officers in the courtroom for at least parts of the trial. The record does not indicate what constitutes a “large presence,” and Miller did not take specific issue with the officers’ conduct, manner, or duration of their attendance. Miller’s argument essentially amounted to his contention that the mere presence of multiple officers in uniform was sufficient to intimidate the jury and deprive him of a fair trial. ¶17 Despite denying Miller’s request to require the officers to wear civilian clothes, the District Court remained open to consider ways to ameliorate any potential risk that the officers’ presence might influence the jury’s deliberations by permitting Miller to propose a curative jury instruction. Although Miller did not propose such an instruction, the District Court instructed the jurors that they must execute their duty “uninfluenced by passion or prejudice,” that they were “governed solely by the evidence introduced in this trial,” and
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that the law forbid them from being “governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.” ¶18 The State contends we should decline to address Miller’s argument that the District Court erred by failing to poll the jury to assess whether the officers’ presence impacted their impartiality because Miller raises this argument for the first time on appeal. Miller requested the District Court to address the officers’ potential impact on Miller’s right to a fair trial and requested the District Court to provide two remedies: either order the officers to wear civilian clothes or give a curative jury instruction concerning their presence. Miller did not request the District Court to poll the jury, and we will not fault the District Court for a request that it did not have an opportunity to consider. Unified Indus., Inc. v. Easley, 1998 MT 145, ¶ 15, 289 Mont. 255, 961 P.2d 100 (citation omitted). We do not consider whether the District Court should have polled the jury as Miller did not preserve this issue for appeal and does not argue we should exercise plain error review. State v. Ament, 2025 MT 97, ¶ 11, 421 Mont. 502, 568 P.3d 535 (litigant carries the burden to establish we should exercise plain error review); State v. Cybulski, 2009 MT 70, ¶ 13, 349 Mont. 429, 204 P.3d 7 (we do not develop legal analysis on behalf of parties). ¶19 While recognizing that the presence of law enforcement officers can, under certain circumstances, present a possibility of improper influence, the mere possibility does not make their presence inherently prejudicial. E.g., Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 570-71, 106 S. Ct. at 1347 (“We do not minimize the threat that a roomful of uniformed and armed policemen might pose to a defendant’s chances of receiving a fair trial.”). The District Court did not abuse its discretion because it addressed Miller’s concern regarding the officers’ presence
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and determined that the officers’ presence did not create an unacceptable risk that their presence would impermissibly influence the jury’s deliberation. Based on the record before us, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in how it addressed Miller’s concerns regarding the presence of uniformed law enforcement officers during the trial. ¶20 Issue 2: Whether Miller received ineffective assistance of counsel. ¶21 A defendant establishes that he or she received ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) by proving that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. State v. Johnston, 2010 MT 152, ¶ 15, 357 Mont. 46, 237 P.3d 70 (citation omitted). “IAC claims may be [addressed] on direct appeal when the record sufficiently answers why counsel did or did not take a particular action.” Ward, ¶ 18 (citation omitted). “Claims involving alleged omissions of trial counsel are often ill-suited for consideration on direct appeal.” State v. Sinz, 2021 MT 163, ¶ 22, 404 Mont. 498, 490 P.3d 97 (citation and internal quotations omitted). ¶22 We will consider IAC claims on direct appeal when an attorney is presented with an obligatory, non-tactical action, or there is no plausible justification for defense counsel’s actions. State v. Kougl, 2004 MT 243, ¶ 15, 323 Mont. 6, 97 P.3d 1095 (citation omitted). “Whether the reasons for defense counsel’s actions are found in the record or not is irrelevant. What matters is that there could not be any legitimate reason for what counsel did.” State v. Crider, 2014 MT 139, ¶ 36, 375 Mont. 187, 328 P.3d 612 (citation omitted). Such situations are “relatively rare.” Crider, ¶ 36 (citation omitted). ¶23 Miller argues his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because his counsel expressed concern about the officers’ presence influencing the jury yet failed to propose a
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curative jury instruction despite the District Court stating it would consider such an instruction. Miller contends we can resolve his IAC claim on direct appeal because no plausible justification exists for Miller’s counsel’s actions when the State did not object to the District Court providing a broadly worded curative instruction and Miller’s counsel had nothing to lose by proposing an instruction given the gravity of the charged offenses and the presence of the uniformed officers. The State contends Miller’s IAC claim is inappropriate to address on direct appeal because there were legitimate reasons for Miller’s counsel not to request such an instruction and the record does not explain why Miller’s counsel chose to forego proposing an instruction. ¶24 Miller’s motion concerning the officers’ presence clearly indicates that his counsel contemplated requesting the District Court to provide a curative instruction; but there are numerous legitimate reasons as to why Miller’s counsel may have decided to forego proposing a curative instruction. Miller requested the District Court to provide a curative instruction specifically identifying “the large presence of law enforcement” as an external factor the jury should not let influence them rather than a broadly worded instruction that applied to both sides that was acceptable to the State. As the State argues, Miller’s counsel may have thought it worked in Miller’s favor to not propose a jury instruction concerning spectators in the gallery because Miller’s counsel may have wanted to avoid drawing attention to the officers, may not have wanted an instruction that applied broadly, or that Miller’s counsel thought the instructions the District Court gave that instructed the jury to render their decision based solely on the evidence presented at trial while remaining uninfluenced by passion, public opinion, or sympathy sufficed.
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¶25 We decline to address Miller’s IAC claim on direct appeal, without prejudicing the IAC claim Miller may pursue through postconviction relief proceedings, because we can only speculate as to why Miller’s counsel did or did not propose a curative jury instruction. Miller’s IAC claim is not appropriate for direct appeal.
¶26 Issue 3: Whether the District Court abused its discretion by admitting a photograph of the crime scene.
¶27 “Evidence that is relevant and admissible may nonetheless be excluded ‘if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its relative probative value.’” Smith, ¶ 64 (quoting State v. Lake, 2022 MT 28, ¶ 32, 407 Mont. 350, 503 P.3d 274). “Unfair prejudice occurs if the evidence arouses the jury’s hostility or sympathy towards one party without regard to the evidence’s probative value, confuses or misleads the trier of fact, or unduly distracts from the main issue.” Smith, ¶ 64 (citing State v. Colburn, 2018 MT 141, ¶ 16, 391 Mont. 449, 419 P.3d 1196). Photographs that possess “instructive value are relevant and admissible provided their probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” State v. Buslayev, 2013 MT 88, ¶ 9, 369 Mont. 428, 299 P.3d 324 (citation omitted). ¶28 Over Miller’s objection, the District Court admitted a close-up, color photograph depicting Trooper Johnson’s Montana Highway Patrol badge attached to his uniform vest. The photo depicted pine needles in the vest pocket beneath the badge and the badge partially covered in blood. The District Court determined the photograph had probative value because it demonstrated the force upon which Trooper Johnson hit the ground after
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being struck by Miller and that the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the photograph’s probative value. ¶29 Miller and the State dispute whether the District Court abused its discretion by admitting the photograph. Assuming for the sake of argument that the District Court abused its discretion by admitting the photograph, the error does not provide a basis for reversal because the error was harmless. ¶30 We apply the cumulative evidence test to determine whether an error was harmless. State v. Strizich, 2021 MT 306, ¶ 40, 406 Mont. 391, 499 P.3d 575 (citations omitted). Key inquiries include (1) whether the evidence tended to prove an element of the crime and (2) whether the factfinder was presented with admissible evidence that proved the same facts as the tainted evidence. Strizich, ¶ 40 (citation omitted). “If the tainted evidence was admitted to prove an element of the offense, then the State must direct us to admissible evidence that proves the same facts as the tainted evidence and demonstrate that the quality of the tainted evidence was such that there was no reasonable possibility it might have contributed to the conviction.” State v. Stewart, 2012 MT 317, ¶ 46, 367 Mont. 503, 291 P.3d 1187 (citation omitted). “But if the tainted evidence was not admitted to prove an element of the offense, then the admission of the evidence will be deemed harmless only if the State demonstrates that the quality of the tainted evidence was such that there was no reasonable possibility it might have contributed to the conviction.” Stewart, ¶ 46 (citation omitted). ¶31 The State argues it was harmless error to admit the photograph of Trooper Johnson’s badge because the photograph established a fact that did not prove an element of the crime
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and the State presented other evidence that demonstrated the force exerted upon Trooper Johnson, including other crime scene photographs and the videos recorded by Deputy Heintz’s dash cam and body cam. Miller notes that the State’s harmless error argument contradicts its argument that the photograph had probative value because the photograph demonstrated whether Miller intended to run over Trooper Johnson. Miller argues that the State cannot demonstrate the photograph did not contribute to Miller’s conviction because the photograph stoked the jury’s emotion to such a severity considering the emotional aspects of the case that there is no reasonable possibility that it did not contribute to Miller’s conviction. ¶32 The State directs us to Deputy Heintz’s dash cam and body cam videos that captured the incident and the crime scene photographs collected through DCI’s investigation. Both videos depict Miller rapidly accelerating towards Trooper Johnson, the vehicle striking Trooper Johnson as he is standing on the snow-covered portion of the road, and the shoulder of the road covered in pine needles. Deputy Heintz’s body cam video depicts Deputy Heintz running towards Trooper Johnson almost immediately after Trooper Johnson was struck and finding Trooper Johnson lying on the shoulder of the road within the pine needles. The crime scene photographs also demonstrate the force of the vehicle as they show the equipment that came loose from Trooper Johnson’s uniform when he was struck. ¶33 Miller argues that the photograph was so inflammatory that there is no reasonable possibility it could not have contributed to his conviction. But the photograph was not qualitatively more inflammatory or prejudicial than other evidence admitted at trial without
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objection. Before the jury observed the single still photograph of Trooper Johnson’s badge, it had already viewed the videos of Miller accelerating the vehicle and running over Trooper Johnson; the video of Deputy Heintz rendering aid to a bloody and incapacitated Trooper Johnson; it heard Trooper Johnson testifying as to what occurred; and it heard Deputy Heintz’s, Deputy Welchons’s, and Sergeant Pitman’s eye-witness testimony. There is no reasonable possibility that the photograph of Trooper Johnson’s badge partially covered in blood contributed to Miller’s conviction. State v. Hillious, 2025 MT 53, ¶ 69, 421 Mont. 72, 565 P.3d 1218 (citing Stewart, ¶ 50) (concluding there was no reasonable possibility that the inadmissible evidence contributed to the conviction because it was not qualitatively “any more inflammatory or prejudicial than the other, admissible evidence at trial”).
CONCLUSION
¶34 The District Court did not abuse its discretion by the manner in which it addressed Miller’s objection to the presence of uniformed law enforcement officers in the gallery during trial. Miller’s IAC claim is not appropriate for review on direct appeal. The admission of the crime scene photograph depicting Trooper Johnson’s badge partially covered in blood, even if admitted in error, does not provide a basis for reversal when considered in light of the cumulative evidence admitted at trial. Miller’s convictions and the judgment of the District Court are affirmed.
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
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We Concur:
/S/ BETH BAKER /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY
Chief Justice Cory J. Swanson recused himself and did not participate in the decision of this matter.