State v. J. Idland

2024 MT 44N, 544 P.3d 857

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: March 5, 2024
• Docket: DA 22-0120
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

03/05/2024

DA 22-0120 Case Number: DA 22-0120

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2024 MT 44N

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

JACOB JON IDLAND,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Custer, Cause No. DC-2021-32 Honorable Michael B. Hayworth, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Joshua James Thornton, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Cori Losing, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Wyatt Glade, Custer County Attorney, Sean A. Quinlan, Deputy County Attorney, Miles City, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: December 13, 2023

Decided: March 5, 2024

Filed:

__________________________________________ Clerk Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2 Jacob Jon Idland (Idland) appeals from a November 5, 2021 conviction and, in the

alternative, certain fees imposed in a January 19, 2022 Sentencing Order in the Sixteenth

Judicial District Court. A jury found Idland guilty of Driving While License Suspended or

Revoked in violation of § 61-5-212(1)(a)(i), MCA, and Driving Under the Influence of

Alcohol (4th or Subsequent Offense) in violation of § 61-8-401(1)(a), MCA (2015).1

Idland challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him and argues that a

prosecutorial remark prejudiced the jury against him. In the alternative, Idland argues the

District Court erred in assessing discretionary fines. We affirm.

¶3 At around 4:20 p.m. on May 8, 2021, Idland was driving on I-94 towards Miles City

when he passed a State Trooper (Cartwright), who was driving below the speed limit.

Cartwright ran a check on Idland’s license plate and driver’s license and pulled Idland over

for a suspended license. When he approached Idland’s vehicle, Cartwright observed

multiple indicators of impairment: the smell of alcohol; a can of beer on the floor; and

1 In 2021, the Legislature repealed Title 61, chapter 8, part 4, MCA, and replaced it with Title 61, chapter 8, part 10. Idland was convicted under § 61-8-401, MCA, before the effective date of § 61-8-1002, and thus all references to Title 61 will be to the 2015 Code unless otherwise noted. 2 Idland’s bloodshot, watery eyes, fixed gaze, slurred speech with delayed and confused

responses, and fine motor skill issues. Cartwright told Idland about these observations and

asked if he had been drinking. Idland stated he had only had one beer but declined to

perform field sobriety tests because he was missing a toe. Idland also declined field

sobriety tests that would not involve the use of his toe, standing, or walking and a

preliminary breath test. Cartwright arrested Idland for driving under the influence (DUI).

¶4 On the way to the detention center, Idland was repeatedly confused about why he

was stopped and argued that Cartwright was not allowed to pull him over for a suspended

license. His mood shifted several times from friendliness with Cartwright to outright anger

at him. At the detention facility, Idland again refused both blood and breath samples.

¶5 Idland was charged with driving while license suspended and driving under the

influence of alcohol. He went to trial on November 4 and 5, 2021, and a jury convicted

him of both counts. At sentencing, the District Court made findings of fact as to Idland’s

ability to pay and imposed certain fees and costs as discussed more fully below. Idland

appeals the sufficiency of the evidence for his DUI conviction, an allegedly improper

comment by the prosecutor during closing, and his ability to pay certain fines imposed.

¶6 Idland argues there was not sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to find

beyond a reasonable doubt that he was “under the influence” of alcohol when he was pulled

over, in violation of § 61-8-401(1)(a), MCA. Idland argues that there was not sufficient

evidence in the record because, in the limited amount of time Cartwright observed Idland’s

driving before pulling him over, Cartwright did not observe any poor driving behavior or,

when he was being escorted from his car to the police cruiser, any balance issues.

3 Essentially, Idland argues that an officer must have observed poor driving performance to

sustain a conviction for driving under the influence.

¶7 “‘Under the influence’ means that as a result of taking into the body alcohol . . . , a

person’s ability to safely operate a vehicle has been diminished,” or “‘reduced or to a lesser

degree.’” Section 61-8-401(3)(a), MCA; State v. Pankhurst, 2022 MT 89, ¶ 7, 408 Mont.

309, 509 P.3d 15 (quoting State v. Olson, 2017 MT 101, ¶ 16, 387 Mont. 318, 400 P.3d

214). The State is not required to produce evidence of a quantifiable blood alcohol content

to prove that a defendant was under the influence. City of Helena v. Kortum, 2003 MT

290, ¶ 22, 318 Mont. 77, 78 P.3d 882. Instead, the State can introduce “other competent

evidence” of the fact that a person is under the effect of alcohol. Kortum, ¶ 22. In Kortum,

we described that a standard field sobriety test is but one tool to show a person’s diminished

ability, and that we have “consistently upheld a full range of competent evidence” as

sufficient evidence of driving under the influence. Kortum, ¶ 22 (emphasis added).

¶8 Idland relies on Kortum to argue that poor driving is a necessary factor to show that

a defendant was under the influence. But Kortum does not stand for this proposition: “The

manner in which a vehicle is driven can be evidence of driving under the influence of

alcohol.” Kortum, ¶ 22 (emphasis added). Though some evidence is sufficient by itself,

no single piece of evidence is necessary under our case law. Rather, the jury may determine

from the full range of competent evidence that the defendant was under the influence.

¶9 Although the jury did not receive evidence of Idland’s blood alcohol content, nor

was Cartwright following Idland long enough to observe any instances of poor driving, the

Jury heard sufficient evidence to support Idland’s conviction for DUI. We review whether

4 there was sufficient evidence in the record to support a conviction by examining the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determining whether any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. McCarthy, 2004 MT 312, ¶ 46, 324 Mont. 1, 101 P.3d 288.

¶10 The jury heard Cartwright’s testimony, who observed the odor of alcohol coming

from the vehicle and an unopened can of beer on the floor; that Idland had bloodshot,

watery eyes and a fixed gaze during their conversation; that Idland had delayed and slurred

speech; that Idland quickly vacillated between friendly and angrily swearing at Cartwright;

and that Idland admitted to drinking that day. Additionally, the jury heard that Idland

refused all field sobriety tests and breath and blood tests, which allowed the jury to infer

that Idland was under the influence. Section 61-8-404(2), MCA; City of Missoula v.

Robertson, 2000 MT 52, ¶ 40, 298 Mont. 419, 998 P.2d 144. The jury also watched video

of the traffic stop and Idland’s ride to the detention facility, which contained numerous

instances of Idland’s confusion about where he was, why he was stopped, and argument

about whether it was legal to stop Idland for driving with a suspended license.2

¶11 Idland also argues that, unlike in Robertson, Cartwright did not observe any balance

or mobility issues with Idland. But, like Kortum, no single issue is dispositive or necessary

for a jury to conclude, among the State’s showing of other competent evidence, that Idland

was under the influence. See Robertson, ¶ 47 (noting that Robertson showed an obvious

2 Although Idland does not specifically challenge the vehicle stop by Cartwright, he implies it was illegal. Law enforcement can legally stop a vehicle once that officer has ascertained that the registered owner’s license has been suspended. See §§ 46-5-401, 61-5-212, MCA. 5 lack of balance in addition to slurred speech, the smell of alcohol, refusal to submit to a

breathalyzer, and failure of two other field sobriety tests). When the evidence is taken in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational juror could have found Idland guilty

of driving under the influence beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶12 Idland next argues that the prosecutor violated Idland’s right to a fair trial with an

improper remark during rebuttal closing. Idland argues that the prosecutor commented on

facts not in evidence when he said:

[D]efense counsel keeps bringing up the search warrant requirement. Part of the testimony that she simply just asked whether it was yes or no, did he get the search warrant? And Trooper Cartwright testified, no, he did not get the search warrant. The other question she asked was, did he know the prerequisites of what would allow him to get the search warrant? And he was allowed to say “yes” but not what those prerequisites are. And defense counsel wants to hammer away at these prerequisites to a search warrant -- telephonic search warrant for blood but wants to avoid what those pre --

Defense counsel objected at this point, and the District Court cautioned the jury that:

The Court did make some rulings . . . and here the Court did make a ruling that so limited the evidence. If you are to hold it against anyone, then you hold it against the Court. But the specific prerequisites are not relevant for your consideration here. Echoing what was said in the cautionary instruction, you are to be focused on the events of May 8th, 2021. It doesn’t matter what happened before. Doesn’t matter what happened since. Only questions that are before you are questions related to May 8th, 2021.

After the jury was excused, the State renewed its objection to the defense opening the door

to the requirements for a search warrant when the State would not be allowed through it.

Despite the prosecutor’s unfinished statement and the court’s cautionary instruction to the

6 jury, Idland argues that the prosecutor added a prejudicial fact into the record that

influenced the jury—that he had prior DUIs.

¶13 Substantive due process, as applicable through the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article II, Sections 24 and 26, of the

Montana Constitution, guarantee criminal defendants the right to a fair trial before an

impartial jury and the presumption of innocence. State v. Miller, 2022 MT 92, ¶ 21,

408 Mont. 316, 510 P.3d 17. “Prosecutorial comments . . . that substantially undermine or

infringe upon those fundamental constitutional rights improperly violate those rights and

are remediable by reversal of conviction if substantially prejudicial to the accused under

the totality of the circumstances in each case.” Miller, ¶ 21. As such, a prosecutor may

not assert or comment on facts not in evidence in the case. Miller, ¶ 23.

¶14 When defense counsel objected, the prosecutor had only recounted that defense

counsel had asked Cartwright about search warrant requirements. Idland’s briefing shows

that the alleged improper comment was what he thinks might have been said had the

prosecutor continued, rather than what he had already said: “Here, the prosecutor waited

until rebuttal closing to attempt to inject evidence of Idland’s past DUI convictions. The

prosecutor attempted to fault Idland for . . . .” (Emphasis added.)

¶15 Idland argues that these comments were improper because they encouraged the jury

to fault Idland for inadmissible evidence of prior DUIs not in the record. The fact is that

the prosecutor never injected those facts into his closing arguments. A defendant must

demonstrate, based on the record in the context of the case in its entirety, that the improper

comment substantially prejudiced his right to a fair and impartial trial. Miller, ¶¶ 27, 36.

7 ¶16 The statement was never completed. The District Court then cautioned the jury that

the prerequisites to obtaining a search warrant were not relevant to the jury’s consideration.

Idland has not met his burden to show that the prosecutor’s unfinished statement

substantially prejudiced his right to a fair and impartial trial.

¶17 Finally, Idland argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it imposed

certain discretionary fines. Over three separate sentencing hearings, the District Court

inquired into Idland’s finances and ability to pay any imposed fees. Idland answered some

questions about his ability to pay fees but was largely uncooperative with the process. At

one point Idland asserted his right to remain silent and refused to answer any further

financial questions. The court cautioned Idland that it was required to delve into Idland’s

finances and that depriving it might result in some error on the court’s assessment of

Idland’s ability to pay. In further questioning by Idland’s counsel as to his income, Idland

answered:

[Idland]: It varied. I wish not to answer any more of these questions.

[Defense Counsel]: So you understand, Mr. Idland, that these are the questions that we have to ask in order to make an argument that you will struggle paying [the fees] financially?

[Idland]: Sure.

[Defense Counsel]: Are you willing to answer the questions?

[Idland]: No. I am done answering financial questions. I have a witness here.

Despite his lack of cooperation, the court was able to determine some facts about Idland’s

finances over three hearings: he made between $10,000 and $25,000 a year prior to his

8 arrest; he is readily employable and will be able to return to full-time employment when

released; his assets include a 2001 Subaru, with a value of up to $1,000; and his debts

include $500–$600 in credit card debt and $10,000 in student loans. Finally, Idland does

not have any other bills because he lives with his mother who covers other expenses.

¶18 After the testimony, the court imposed $8,525 in charges and fines, $2,850 of which

was suspended, which it found Idland would be able to pay because of his employability

and his low living expenses while living with his mother. Idland challenges only the

discretionary fines: $515 in conviction surcharges and a $50 crime victim advocate

surcharge pursuant to § 46-18-236(1), MCA, which must be waived if the court determines

the defendant is unable to pay; a $10 information technology surcharge pursuant to

§ 3-1-317(1)(a), MCA, which may be waived if the defendant is unable to pay; a $100 cost

of prosecution fee pursuant to § 46-18-232(1), MCA, which may not be imposed unless

the defendant will be able to pay it; and the $2,850 cost of assigned counsel fee pursuant

to § 46-8-113(1), MCA, which the court suspended unless Idland’s probation was revoked.

¶19 We review sentencing conditions, such as fines, first for legality and then for abuse

of discretion as to the conditions’ reasonableness under the facts of the case. State v.

Ingram, 2020 MT 327, ¶ 8, 402 Mont. 374, 478 P.3d 799. A district court’s determination

that a defendant is able to pay an imposed cost is essentially a finding of fact that we will

reverse only if it is clearly erroneous. State v. Daricek, 2018 MT 31, ¶ 7, 390 Mont. 273,

412 P.3d 1044.

¶20 Idland does not dispute the legality of the charges imposed upon him. Instead,

Idland disputes the court’s findings of fact on his ability to pay, but he does not point to

9 any evidence in the record that shows the majority of his wages are not disposable after his

student loan and credit card bills are paid. Indeed, Idland cannot point to any conflicting

evidence because he refused to cooperate both with the pre-sentence investigation and with

questions into his finances at the hearing. Thus, we cannot say that the District Court’s

finding is clear error.

¶21 Idland also argues that the District Court abused its discretion by assessing more

than just the mandatory fines, which he argues would better set him up for success. Idland

argues that, assuming a $40,000 annual salary, Idland’s total fine of $8,525 would account

for 20% of annual income, but that assessing only the mandatory fines of $5,000 would be

far more feasible at 12.5% of annual income and would better set him up for success, while

still holding him accountable. Our review is limited to whether the District Court abused

its discretion in imposing the fees. Ingram, ¶ 8.

¶22 The District Court took into account both the nature of the offense committed, which

is Idland’s fourth DUI, and the burden that payment of the fine would impose by

suspending that portion of the fees. Section 46-18-231(3), MCA. Further, the District

Court imposed no requirement that Idland pay the remaining $5,675 in a single year.

¶23 Nor did the District Court fail to demonstrate a serious inquiry into Idland’s ability

to pay. Over three hearings, the court repeatedly admonished Idland to cooperate with its

questioning so that it could accurately evaluate Idland’s ability to pay. With Idland’s terse,

inconsistent answers, and his refusal to answer many other questions, the court received

only limited evidence on Idland’s ability to pay.

10 ¶24 Finally, we note that the court’s Sentencing Order invited Idland to “later petition

the court for remission of the payment of costs or of any unpaid portion of the costs based

on manifest hardship.” Accord § 46-8-113(5), MCA. The court found that Idland would

likely be able to pay the costs imposed with his employment after treatment but allowed

him to seek remission if that was not the case. This was not an abuse of discretion.

¶25 There was sufficient evidence in the record to support Idland’s conviction and there

was no substantial prejudice to Idland by the prosecutor’s unfinished comment. The

District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing discretionary fees.

¶26 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of

applicable standards of review.

¶27 Affirmed.

/S/ MIKE McGRATH

We Concur:

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ JIM RICE