State v. J. A. G.

Opinion

726 September 2, 2026 No. 849

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of J. A. G., aka J. A. G., Jr., a Youth. STATE OF OREGON,

Respondent,

v.

J. A. G.,

aka J. A. G., Jr.,

Appellant.

Union County Circuit Court 23JU03474; A183889 (Control), A183890

Thomas B. Powers, Judge. Submitted October 15, 2025. Erica Hayne Friedman and Youth, Rights & Justice filed the brief for appellant.

Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Kirsten M. Naito, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge.

POWERS, J. Vacated and remanded for written findings under ORS 419C.478(1).

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 726 (2026) 727

POWERS, J. In this consolidated juvenile delinquency proceeding , youth appeals from a juvenile court judgment continuing probation and committing youth to the custody of the Oregon Youth Authority (OYA). In a single assignment of error, youth argues that, in the order of commitment to OYA, the juvenile court failed to enter adequate written findings under ORS 419C.478(1) describing why it is in youth’s best interests to be committed to OYA custody. As explained below, we agree with youth’s argument, and accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand for written findings.

Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history, we do not set forth a recitation in this nonprecedential memorandum opinion. Although youth did not preserve the assignment of error advanced on appeal, we conclude that the preservation requirement is excused because the asserted error occurred for the first time in the written judgment. State v. D. B. O., 325 Or App 746, 747- 48, 529 P3d 1004 (2023) (excusing preservation for a similar argument for a youth committed to OYA custody when the juvenile court failed to include adequate written findings under ORS 419C.478(1)). Accordingly, we review the sufficiency of the juvenile court’s written findings pursuant to ORS 419C.478(1) for legal error. D. B. O., 325 Or App at 748.

ORS 419C.478(1) authorizes the juvenile court to “place an adjudicated youth who is at least 12 years of age in the legal custody of [OYA] for care, placement and supervision ” and requires that, in the order doing so, the court “include written findings describing why it is in the best interests of the adjudicated youth to be placed with [OYA].” The legislature imposed the written findings requirement “to ensure that the juvenile court takes time to consider the positive and negative impacts a decision may have on the adjudicated youth” and to show that it “engaged in a careful evaluation before making such a significant decision.” D. B. O., 325 Or App at 750-51.

In the order of commitment to OYA, the juvenile court made the following findings in the section explaining why OYA custody was in youth’s best interests:

728 State v. J. A. G.

“Community based probation has not been successful in the past. The youth’s behavior endangers the welfare of the youth, or another person, or endangers the community. The youth has specific needs that can be met by OYA.” On appeal, youth argues that the court’s findings are insufficient under ORS 419C.478(1). Specifically, youth asserts that the findings are ambiguous as to whether they are directed at youth’s interests or the interests of the community. The state contends that the findings are sufficient because they explain that youth will be safer in OYA custody and that youth has specific needs that only OYA can address. We disagree with the state’s argument and conclude that the juvenile court’s findings are insufficient.

First, the findings note that other placements have not been successful for youth; however, “findings that simply state there are no other options for a child do not demonstrate the careful evaluation that the legislature contemplated to ensure that a juvenile court’s decision is most likely to lead to a positive outcome for the child.” State v. E. J. R., 341 Or App 488, 499, 576 P3d 1051 (2025). Second, the finding that youth’s behavior “endangers the welfare of the youth, or another person, or endangers the community” is ambiguous such that it is not clear whether the focus is on youth’s best interest or the community’s interests. See id. at 498 (concluding that a finding that is “ambiguous as to whether it reflects consideration of youth’s best interest or the best interest of the community” is insufficient to meet the standard). Moreover, the findings provide that youth has “specific needs” but do not explain what those needs are or how commitment to OYA custody would meet those needs. See D. B. O., 325 Or App at 750 (observing that, if the court intended to convey a written finding that OYA custody was the only way for a youth’s “specific needs” to be met, it needed to explain “that conclusion or what those needs are in the commitment order”).

Finally, the findings taken together are too conclusory to satisfy ORS 419C.478(1). See State v. D. J. P., 342 Or App 422, 424, 576 P3d 1043 (2025) (concluding that a finding regarding “safety of youth and community” was “too conclusory to satisfy the statutory requirement”). As

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 726 (2026) 729

we explained in E. J. R., the legislature requires a juvenile court not just to state that the placement of the youth in OYA in custody is in the youth’s best interest, but also to describe why the choice to place the youth in OYA custody is in the best interest of that particular youth. 341 Or App at 499 (citing ORS 419C.478(1)). Therefore, we conclude that the juvenile court failed to provide adequate written findings in its order committing youth to OYA, and we vacate and remand the judgment.

Vacated and remanded for written findings under ORS 419C.478(1).