Opinion,
BISHOP, J.
The defendant, John Ingram, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (l).2 He claims that (1) the evidence did not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of the crime.3 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. At some time during the evening of Friday, November 13,1998, the defendant entered the Kentucky [248]*248Fried Chicken restaurant on Main Street in New Britain and went into the rest room. The manager, Leon Stewart, locked the doors at approximately 11:30 p.m., not realizing that the defendant was in the rest room. The defendant remained in the restaurant overnight, waiting for it to reopen in the morning.
On Saturday, November 14, 1998, Stewart and his thirteen year old daughter returned to the restaurant at about 7:55 a.m. Once inside the restaurant, Stewart began to cut open a bag of com muffin mix. As he was doing so, he heard the defendant say, “Don’t move.” The defendant, with a knife in his hand and wearing a nylon mask over his face, moved toward Stewart. Stewart picked up a muffin tin to protect himself from the defendant, who swung at Stewart with an eight-inch knife. Stewart thrust back at the defendant with the knife that he had used to cut open the com muffin mix and protected himself with the muffin tin that he had in his other hand. Each man swung or “swiped” at the other two or three times. After several minutes, the defendant ran through the back door of the restaurant, and the police apprehended him a short time thereafter.
I
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
The gist of the defendant’s first claim is that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the requisite specific intent to cause another person serious physical injury. Specifically, he claims that because Stewart testified that he and the defendant were at “arm’s length” when the defendant swung the knife, the total distance between them would have to have been five feet or more, thereby making it impossible for the defendant actually to have made contact with Stewart. The defendant calculates the distance between the parties by assuming that they confronted each other in a “stiff [249]*249arm” fashion. He then adds the eight inch length of the defendant’s knife and the length of the muffin tin to the estimated length of the parties’ respective arms to arrive at a distance of at least five feet. The defendant then concludes that this “impossibility” would negate the specific intent to cause serious physical injury. In short, the defendant argues that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence is that he was not close enough to cause any injury, let alone serious physical injury, which necessarily negates the specific intent necessary for conviction.
It is well settled that we review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case by applying a two part test. We first review the evidence “in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 732, 759 A.2d 995 (2000). We have reviewed the evidence pursuant to that standard and find no such “impossibility,” as the defendant posits. To the contrary, the evidence shows that the parties were within one arm’s length of each other, and there is no evidence to support a “stiff arm” theory. We conclude that the defendant’s claim is devoid of merit.
II
THE JURY INSTRUCTION CLAIM
The defendant next claims that the court improperly instructed the jury on the element of intent. The state concedes that during the beginning of the court’s charge, but before the court outlined the essential ele[250]*250ments of each crime charged,4 the court instructed the jury as follows: “As defined by our statute, a person acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct.” The defendant claims that this instruction was erroneous and relieved the state of its burden of proving specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury, rather than finding specific intent to cause the result, simply could have found that he intended to engage in certain conduct. Although the defendant failed to take exception to that charge, the state concedes that we should review it pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).5 The claim here is of constitutional magnitude because it is a claim of an improper instruction on an element of the offense, and the record is adequate for review.6 The state argues, however, that [251]*251on the merits, the defendant has not established that he was clearly deprived of a fair trial because it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled. We agree with the state.
“[U]nder . . . Golding, a defendant may prevail on an unpreserved constitutional claim of instructional error only if, considering the substance of the charge rather than the form of what was said, [i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled. ... In determining whether the jury was misled, it is well established that [a] charge to the jury is not to be critically dissected for the purpose of discovering possible inaccuracies of statement, but is to be considered rather as to its probable effect upon the jury in guiding them to a correct verdict in the case. . . . The charge is to be read as a whole and individual instructions are not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charge. . . . The test to be applied to any part of a charge is whether the charge, considered as a whole, presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result. . . . Furthermore, [a] jury instruction is constitutionally adequate if it provides the jurors with a clear understanding of the elements of the crime charged, and affords them proper guidance for their determination of whether those elements were present.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Aponte, 63 Conn. App. 82, 85-86, 774 A.2d 1035 (2001), aff'd, 259 Conn. 512, 790 A.2d 457 (2002).
Here, the only part of the statutory definition of intent that applied was the specific intent necessary for a conviction of attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59 (a) (1). Because the statute requires a finding of specific intent to cause a specific result, namely, serious physical injury, the court’s charge with respect to the defendant’s general intent to engage in conduct was improper. As the state points out, however, the court read the general definition of [252]
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Opinion,
BISHOP, J.
The defendant, John Ingram, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (l).2 He claims that (1) the evidence did not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of the crime.3 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. At some time during the evening of Friday, November 13,1998, the defendant entered the Kentucky [248]*248Fried Chicken restaurant on Main Street in New Britain and went into the rest room. The manager, Leon Stewart, locked the doors at approximately 11:30 p.m., not realizing that the defendant was in the rest room. The defendant remained in the restaurant overnight, waiting for it to reopen in the morning.
On Saturday, November 14, 1998, Stewart and his thirteen year old daughter returned to the restaurant at about 7:55 a.m. Once inside the restaurant, Stewart began to cut open a bag of com muffin mix. As he was doing so, he heard the defendant say, “Don’t move.” The defendant, with a knife in his hand and wearing a nylon mask over his face, moved toward Stewart. Stewart picked up a muffin tin to protect himself from the defendant, who swung at Stewart with an eight-inch knife. Stewart thrust back at the defendant with the knife that he had used to cut open the com muffin mix and protected himself with the muffin tin that he had in his other hand. Each man swung or “swiped” at the other two or three times. After several minutes, the defendant ran through the back door of the restaurant, and the police apprehended him a short time thereafter.
I
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
The gist of the defendant’s first claim is that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the requisite specific intent to cause another person serious physical injury. Specifically, he claims that because Stewart testified that he and the defendant were at “arm’s length” when the defendant swung the knife, the total distance between them would have to have been five feet or more, thereby making it impossible for the defendant actually to have made contact with Stewart. The defendant calculates the distance between the parties by assuming that they confronted each other in a “stiff [249]*249arm” fashion. He then adds the eight inch length of the defendant’s knife and the length of the muffin tin to the estimated length of the parties’ respective arms to arrive at a distance of at least five feet. The defendant then concludes that this “impossibility” would negate the specific intent to cause serious physical injury. In short, the defendant argues that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence is that he was not close enough to cause any injury, let alone serious physical injury, which necessarily negates the specific intent necessary for conviction.
It is well settled that we review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case by applying a two part test. We first review the evidence “in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 732, 759 A.2d 995 (2000). We have reviewed the evidence pursuant to that standard and find no such “impossibility,” as the defendant posits. To the contrary, the evidence shows that the parties were within one arm’s length of each other, and there is no evidence to support a “stiff arm” theory. We conclude that the defendant’s claim is devoid of merit.
II
THE JURY INSTRUCTION CLAIM
The defendant next claims that the court improperly instructed the jury on the element of intent. The state concedes that during the beginning of the court’s charge, but before the court outlined the essential ele[250]*250ments of each crime charged,4 the court instructed the jury as follows: “As defined by our statute, a person acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct.” The defendant claims that this instruction was erroneous and relieved the state of its burden of proving specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury, rather than finding specific intent to cause the result, simply could have found that he intended to engage in certain conduct. Although the defendant failed to take exception to that charge, the state concedes that we should review it pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).5 The claim here is of constitutional magnitude because it is a claim of an improper instruction on an element of the offense, and the record is adequate for review.6 The state argues, however, that [251]*251on the merits, the defendant has not established that he was clearly deprived of a fair trial because it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled. We agree with the state.
“[U]nder . . . Golding, a defendant may prevail on an unpreserved constitutional claim of instructional error only if, considering the substance of the charge rather than the form of what was said, [i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled. ... In determining whether the jury was misled, it is well established that [a] charge to the jury is not to be critically dissected for the purpose of discovering possible inaccuracies of statement, but is to be considered rather as to its probable effect upon the jury in guiding them to a correct verdict in the case. . . . The charge is to be read as a whole and individual instructions are not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charge. . . . The test to be applied to any part of a charge is whether the charge, considered as a whole, presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result. . . . Furthermore, [a] jury instruction is constitutionally adequate if it provides the jurors with a clear understanding of the elements of the crime charged, and affords them proper guidance for their determination of whether those elements were present.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Aponte, 63 Conn. App. 82, 85-86, 774 A.2d 1035 (2001), aff'd, 259 Conn. 512, 790 A.2d 457 (2002).
Here, the only part of the statutory definition of intent that applied was the specific intent necessary for a conviction of attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59 (a) (1). Because the statute requires a finding of specific intent to cause a specific result, namely, serious physical injury, the court’s charge with respect to the defendant’s general intent to engage in conduct was improper. As the state points out, however, the court read the general definition of [252]*252intent only at the beginning of its charge and, thereafter, the jury heard the proper definition of the mental state required for the commission of the crime of assault in the first degree several times.7
Our careful review of the entire charge persuades us that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled when the court instructed on the definition of intent. [253]*253We conclude that the instructions were sufficient to convey to the jury the essential meaning of attempt to commit the crime of assault in the first degree and the state’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the required specific intent to commit the charged crime. Moreover, any possible risk of juiy confusion due to the court’s initial instructions on intent was eliminated by the court’s later, numerous, proper instructions on the specific intent required to be found guilty of attempt to commit assault in the first degree. Further, considering the strength of the state’s case, we cannot conclude that the remarks were substantially prejudicial to the defendant. For those reasons, we conclude that the defendant has failed to demonstrate that a constitutional violation clearly exists that clearly deprived him of a fair trial. Accordingly, his claim fails under Golding's third prong.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.