[Cite as State v. Hutchins, 2025-Ohio-1831.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114261 v. :
NICHOLAS HUTCHINS, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 22, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Case No. CR-24-688046-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Liam E. Blake, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Wegman Hessler Valore, Matthew O. Williams, and Dean M. Valore, for appellant.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Nicholas Hutchins (“Hutchins”) appeals the
constitutionality of the mandatory-bindover statutes and his sentence pursuant to
the Reagan Tokes Law. We affirm. I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} A complaint was filed against Hutchins in the Cuyahoga County Court
of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, alleging offenses that if committed by an
adult would constitute one count of aggravated robbery, three counts of robbery,
one count of assault, and one count of theft. The aggravated robbery and robbery
counts each carried one- and three-year firearm specifications. R.C.
2152.02(BB)(1) categorizes aggravated robbery as a category-two offense. Because
Hutchins was 16 years old and employed a firearm during the commission of a
category-two offense, transfer to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas,
General Division, is mandatory under R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b).
{¶3} After being bound over, Hutchins pleaded guilty to an amended count
of aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2911.031(A)(1) with
a one-year firearm specification. The other five charges were nolled. Hutchins was
sentenced to four to six years’ imprisonment on the amended aggravated-robbery
count, in accordance with the Reagan Tokes Law. He was also sentenced to one
year in prison to be served prior to and consecutive to the amended aggravated
robbery count for the firearm specification for a total of five to seven years’
imprisonment.
{¶4} Hutchins filed this appeal assigning three errors for our review:
1. The trial court erred in binding appellant over from the Juvenile Division to the General Division pursuant to R.C. 2152.10 because it violates his due process rights; 2. The trial court erred in binding appellant over because R.C. 2152.10 violates his right to equal protection; and
3. The trial court committed reversible error prejudicing appellant when it imposed an unconstitutional sentence upon appellant pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law, which is unconstitutional on its face.
II. Unconstitutionality of Statutes
A. Standard of Review
{¶5} “We review the challenge to the constitutionality of a statute de novo.”
State v. Parker, 2022-Ohio-1164, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Hacker, 2020-
Ohio-5048, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.). “‘De novo review is independent, without deference to
the lower court’s decision.’” (Internal citations omitted.) Id., quoting In re K.S.G.,
2020-Ohio-4515, ¶ 37 (3d Dist.).
{¶6} “‘There are two primary ways to challenge the constitutionality of a
statute: by facial challenge or through an as-applied challenge.’” Id. at ¶ 10,
quoting Derrico v. State, 2019-Ohio-1767, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), citing Harrold v.
Collier, 2005-Ohio-5334, ¶ 37. “When challenging the statute facially, the
appellant must demonstrate that there does not exist a set of facts whereas the
statute can be deemed constitutional.” Id., citing id. “However, an ‘as-applied’
challenge argues that when applied to a certain set of facts, the statute is
unconstitutional.” Id., citing id. “‘Facial challenges present a higher hurdle than
as-applied challenges because, in general, for a statute to be facially
unconstitutional, it must be unconstitutional in all applications.’” Id., quoting State v. Romage, 2014-Ohio-783, ¶ 7, citing Oliver v. Cleveland Indians Baseball
Co. Ltd. Partnership, 2009-Ohio-5030, ¶ 13.
{¶7} “Enactments of the General Assembly enjoy a strong presumption of
constitutionality.” Parker at ¶ 11. See, e.g., State v. Hollis, 2020-Ohio-5258, ¶ 52
(8th Dist.) (“[I]n determining whether a statute is constitutional, this court
presumes constitutionality.”). “‘This presumption requires substantial deference
to legislative judgments.’” Id., quoting Derrico at ¶ 18, citing Conley v. Shearer,
64 Ohio St.3d 284, 289 (1992). “‘It also means that courts refrain from judging the
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.’” Id., quoting Derrico at id., citing
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). “‘Rather, courts must uphold a challenged
statute if at all possible.’” Id., quoting Derrico at id., citing Conley at id.
{¶8} “‘It is difficult to prove that a statute is unconstitutional. All statutes
have a strong presumption of constitutionality.’” Parker at ¶ 12, quoting Groch v.
GMC, 2008-Ohio-546, ¶ 25. “‘Before a court may declare unconstitutional an
enactment of the legislative branch, it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that
the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible.’” Id.,
quoting id., quoting State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142 (1955),
paragraph one of the syllabus.
B. Law and Analysis
{¶9} In Hutchins’s first and second assignments of error, he argues that his
bindover pursuant to R.C. 2152.10 violates his due-process and equal-protection rights. Hutchins did not raise this argument to the trial court. “Generally, ‘[i]f the
defendant failed to raise an error affecting substantial rights at trial, an appellate
court reviews the error under the plain error standard in Crim.R. 52(B).’” State v.
Pugh, 2022-Ohio-3038, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Perry, 2004-Ohio-297,
¶ 14. “‘A plain error is obvious and prejudicial although neither objected to nor
affirmatively waived which, if permitted, would have a material adverse effect on
the character and public confidence in judicial proceedings.’” Id., quoting Schade
v. Carnegie Body Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 209 (1982).
{¶10} “Crim.R. 52 affords appellate courts ‘limited power’ to correct plain
errors that occurred during the trial court proceeding.’” Id. at ¶ 18, citing Perry at
¶ 9. “Crim.R. 52(B) provides that ‘[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
court.’” Id., quoting Crim.R. 52(B). “Under the plain-error standard, ‘the
defendant bears the burden of showing that but for a plain or obvious error, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been otherwise, and reversal must be
necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” Id., quoting State v. West,
2022-Ohio-1556, ¶ 22. “‘An appellate court has discretion to notice plain error and
therefore is not required to correct it.’” Id., citing State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459,
¶ 23.
{¶11} Hutchins contends that his due-process rights were violated when he
was transferred to the General Division without an opportunity to be heard and without consideration of his individual circumstances and characteristics. He
asserts that mandatory bindover statutes are based upon a statutory formula
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[Cite as State v. Hutchins, 2025-Ohio-1831.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114261 v. :
NICHOLAS HUTCHINS, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 22, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Case No. CR-24-688046-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Liam E. Blake, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Wegman Hessler Valore, Matthew O. Williams, and Dean M. Valore, for appellant.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Nicholas Hutchins (“Hutchins”) appeals the
constitutionality of the mandatory-bindover statutes and his sentence pursuant to
the Reagan Tokes Law. We affirm. I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} A complaint was filed against Hutchins in the Cuyahoga County Court
of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, alleging offenses that if committed by an
adult would constitute one count of aggravated robbery, three counts of robbery,
one count of assault, and one count of theft. The aggravated robbery and robbery
counts each carried one- and three-year firearm specifications. R.C.
2152.02(BB)(1) categorizes aggravated robbery as a category-two offense. Because
Hutchins was 16 years old and employed a firearm during the commission of a
category-two offense, transfer to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas,
General Division, is mandatory under R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b).
{¶3} After being bound over, Hutchins pleaded guilty to an amended count
of aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2911.031(A)(1) with
a one-year firearm specification. The other five charges were nolled. Hutchins was
sentenced to four to six years’ imprisonment on the amended aggravated-robbery
count, in accordance with the Reagan Tokes Law. He was also sentenced to one
year in prison to be served prior to and consecutive to the amended aggravated
robbery count for the firearm specification for a total of five to seven years’
imprisonment.
{¶4} Hutchins filed this appeal assigning three errors for our review:
1. The trial court erred in binding appellant over from the Juvenile Division to the General Division pursuant to R.C. 2152.10 because it violates his due process rights; 2. The trial court erred in binding appellant over because R.C. 2152.10 violates his right to equal protection; and
3. The trial court committed reversible error prejudicing appellant when it imposed an unconstitutional sentence upon appellant pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law, which is unconstitutional on its face.
II. Unconstitutionality of Statutes
A. Standard of Review
{¶5} “We review the challenge to the constitutionality of a statute de novo.”
State v. Parker, 2022-Ohio-1164, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Hacker, 2020-
Ohio-5048, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.). “‘De novo review is independent, without deference to
the lower court’s decision.’” (Internal citations omitted.) Id., quoting In re K.S.G.,
2020-Ohio-4515, ¶ 37 (3d Dist.).
{¶6} “‘There are two primary ways to challenge the constitutionality of a
statute: by facial challenge or through an as-applied challenge.’” Id. at ¶ 10,
quoting Derrico v. State, 2019-Ohio-1767, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), citing Harrold v.
Collier, 2005-Ohio-5334, ¶ 37. “When challenging the statute facially, the
appellant must demonstrate that there does not exist a set of facts whereas the
statute can be deemed constitutional.” Id., citing id. “However, an ‘as-applied’
challenge argues that when applied to a certain set of facts, the statute is
unconstitutional.” Id., citing id. “‘Facial challenges present a higher hurdle than
as-applied challenges because, in general, for a statute to be facially
unconstitutional, it must be unconstitutional in all applications.’” Id., quoting State v. Romage, 2014-Ohio-783, ¶ 7, citing Oliver v. Cleveland Indians Baseball
Co. Ltd. Partnership, 2009-Ohio-5030, ¶ 13.
{¶7} “Enactments of the General Assembly enjoy a strong presumption of
constitutionality.” Parker at ¶ 11. See, e.g., State v. Hollis, 2020-Ohio-5258, ¶ 52
(8th Dist.) (“[I]n determining whether a statute is constitutional, this court
presumes constitutionality.”). “‘This presumption requires substantial deference
to legislative judgments.’” Id., quoting Derrico at ¶ 18, citing Conley v. Shearer,
64 Ohio St.3d 284, 289 (1992). “‘It also means that courts refrain from judging the
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.’” Id., quoting Derrico at id., citing
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). “‘Rather, courts must uphold a challenged
statute if at all possible.’” Id., quoting Derrico at id., citing Conley at id.
{¶8} “‘It is difficult to prove that a statute is unconstitutional. All statutes
have a strong presumption of constitutionality.’” Parker at ¶ 12, quoting Groch v.
GMC, 2008-Ohio-546, ¶ 25. “‘Before a court may declare unconstitutional an
enactment of the legislative branch, it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that
the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible.’” Id.,
quoting id., quoting State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142 (1955),
paragraph one of the syllabus.
B. Law and Analysis
{¶9} In Hutchins’s first and second assignments of error, he argues that his
bindover pursuant to R.C. 2152.10 violates his due-process and equal-protection rights. Hutchins did not raise this argument to the trial court. “Generally, ‘[i]f the
defendant failed to raise an error affecting substantial rights at trial, an appellate
court reviews the error under the plain error standard in Crim.R. 52(B).’” State v.
Pugh, 2022-Ohio-3038, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Perry, 2004-Ohio-297,
¶ 14. “‘A plain error is obvious and prejudicial although neither objected to nor
affirmatively waived which, if permitted, would have a material adverse effect on
the character and public confidence in judicial proceedings.’” Id., quoting Schade
v. Carnegie Body Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 209 (1982).
{¶10} “Crim.R. 52 affords appellate courts ‘limited power’ to correct plain
errors that occurred during the trial court proceeding.’” Id. at ¶ 18, citing Perry at
¶ 9. “Crim.R. 52(B) provides that ‘[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
court.’” Id., quoting Crim.R. 52(B). “Under the plain-error standard, ‘the
defendant bears the burden of showing that but for a plain or obvious error, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been otherwise, and reversal must be
necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” Id., quoting State v. West,
2022-Ohio-1556, ¶ 22. “‘An appellate court has discretion to notice plain error and
therefore is not required to correct it.’” Id., citing State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459,
¶ 23.
{¶11} Hutchins contends that his due-process rights were violated when he
was transferred to the General Division without an opportunity to be heard and without consideration of his individual circumstances and characteristics. He
asserts that mandatory bindover statutes are based upon a statutory formula
enacted by the legislature forbidding the juvenile court from fulfilling its mandate.
{¶12} Hutchins’s assertions are misplaced. Regardless of whether bindover
in this case is mandatory or discretionary, the juvenile court had to first find
probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the acts charged. See
R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(2) (mandatory bindover) and 2152.12(B)(1) (discretionary
bindover). See also State v. Taylor, 2018-Ohio-3998, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.). The
legislature did not forbid the juvenile court from fulfilling its mandate because the
juvenile court has the discretion to find probable cause that Hutchins committed
the charged act. Further, Hutchins pleaded guilty to an amended indictment.
{¶13} The Supreme Court of Ohio has previously decided this issue and held
that mandatory bindovers do not violate a juvenile’s due-process or equal-
protection rights. State v. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956, ¶ 27, 37.
{¶14} Therefore, Hutchins’s first and second assignments of error are
overruled.
{¶15} In Hutchins’s third assignment of error, he argues that the trial court
committed reversible error prejudicing appellant when it imposed an
unconstitutional sentence upon him pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law, which is
unconstitutional on its face. {¶16} In State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470 (8th Dist.), this court, sitting en
banc, held that the indefinite sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law did
not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine, a defendant’s right to a jury trial, or
due process of law. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected similar constitutional
challenges to the Reagan Tokes Law’s indefinite sentencing scheme in State v.
Hacker, 2023-Ohio-2535. The Ohio Supreme Court thereafter affirmed this
court’s judgment in Delvallie on the authority of Hacker. The arguments presented
in this case do not present novel issues or theories challenging the constitutional
validity of any aspect of the Reagan Tokes Law left unaddressed by the Ohio
Supreme Court’s decision in Hacker.
{¶17} Accordingly, pursuant to Hacker, we overrule Hutchins’s third
assignment of error.
{¶18} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_________________________ ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., and LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR