State v. Hughes

2025 Ohio 2490

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Hughes, 2025-Ohio-2490.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT UNION COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 14-24-38 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

JAMES NATHAN HUGHES, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 24-CR-0085

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: July 14, 2025

APPEARANCES:

Alison Boggs for Appellant

Andrew M. Bigler for Appellee Case No. 14-24-38

MILLER, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, James Nathan Hughes (“Hughes”), appeals the

August 21, 2024 judgment of sentence of the Union County Court of Common

Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} This case stems from an April 18, 2024 incident in which officers were

dispatched to a complaint of an intoxicated person. K.C. and E.B., officers with the

Richwood Police Department, responded to the scene and found Hughes intoxicated

and uncooperative. After placing Hughes under arrest, K.C. and E.B. guided him

to a nearby patrol vehicle as Hughes resisted and yelled profanities at the officers.

While officers searched Hughes incident to arrest, Hughes “head butted” K.C. and

E.B., and all three fell to the ground.

{¶3} As a result of the incident, K.C. sought emergency medical treatment

on two occasions and was diagnosed with a concussion. E.B. received medical

treatment for a migraine headache resulting from the incident.

{¶4} On May 3, 2024, Hughes was indicted on two counts: Count One of

felonious assault of a peace officer in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), (D)(1)(a), a

first-degree felony; and Count Two of assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A),

(C)(5)(a), a fourth-degree felony. Count One related to K.C. and Count Two related

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to E.B., respectively. At his arraignment on May 7, 2024, Hughes entered not-guilty

pleas.

{¶5} The parties appeared for a change-of-plea hearing on July 3, 2024.

Pursuant to a negotiated-plea agreement, the State moved to amend Count One to

felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), (D)(1)(a), a second-degree

felony, which the trial court granted. In exchange, Hughes withdrew his not-guilty

pleas and entered a guilty plea to amended Count One and Count Two. The trial

court accepted Hughes’s guilty pleas and found him guilty. The trial court

continued the matter for sentencing and ordered a presentence investigation (“PSI”)

be prepared.

{¶6} On August 21, 2024, Hughes was sentenced to 6 to 9 years in prison on

Count One and 18 months in prison on Count Two. The trial court ordered the

sentences to be served consecutively for an aggregate term of 7 ½ to 10 ½ years in

prison.

{¶7} Hughes filed a notice of appeal on September 19, 2024. He raises one

assignment of error for our review.

Assignment of Error

Appellant’s sentence is contrary to law as the trial court failed to properly analyze and apply the sentencing factors found in ORC 2929.11, 2929.12, and 2929.14.

{¶8} In his assignment of error, Hughes argues that that his sentence was

contrary to law. Specifically, he challenges his individual sentences and the

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consecutive nature of his sentences on the grounds that his sentence is not supported

by the record.

Standard of Review

{¶9} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may reverse a sentence

“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not

support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is

otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. Clear and

convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a

firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id. at ¶ 22,

quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

Relevant Authority: Felony Sentencing

{¶10} “‘Trial courts have full discretion to impose any sentence within the

statutory range.’” State v. Smith, 2015-Ohio-4225, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v.

Noble, 2014-Ohio-5485, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.). A sentence imposed within the statutory

range is generally valid so long as the trial court considered the applicable

sentencing policies that apply to every felony sentencing, including those contained

in R.C. 2929.11, and the sentencing factors of 2929.12. See State v. Watts, 2020-

Ohio-5572, ¶ 10 and 14 (3d Dist.); State v. Maggette, 2016-Ohio-5554, ¶ 31 (3d

Dist.).

{¶11} R.C. 2929.11 provides, in pertinent part, that the “overriding purposes

of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and

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others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the

offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those

purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government

resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). To achieve the overriding purposes of felony

sentencing, R.C. 2929.11 directs courts to “consider the need for incapacitating the

offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the

offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.”

Id. In addition, R.C. 2929.11(B) instructs that a sentence imposed for a felony “shall

be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony

sentencing . . ., commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the

offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences

imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”

{¶12} “In accordance with these principles, the trial court must consider the

factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B)-(E) relating to the seriousness of the offender’s

conduct and the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism.” Smith at ¶ 10, citing R.C.

2929.12(A). In addition, the trial court must consider “the factors set forth in [R.C.

2929.12(F)] pertaining to the offender’s service in the armed forces of the United

States.” R.C. 2929.12(A). “‘A sentencing court has broad discretion to determine

the relative weight to assign the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12.’” Smith at ¶

15, quoting State v. Brimacombe, 2011-Ohio-5032, ¶ 18 (6th Dist.), citing State v.

Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215 (2000). Neither statute “requires a trial court to

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make any specific factual findings on the record.” State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729,

¶ 20; see also R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

{¶13} In considering R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 as they relate to felony-

sentencing appeals, the Supreme Court of Ohio has limited appellate review by

holding that “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) clearly does not provide a basis for an appellate

court to modify or vacate a sentence if it concludes that the record does not support

the sentence under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12,” and subdivision (b) “does not

provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its

view that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12.” Jones at ¶ 31, 34, 39 (“an appellate court’s conclusion that the record

does not support a sentence under R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12 is not the equivalent of

a conclusion that the sentence is ‘otherwise contrary to law’ as that term is used in

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b)”). Thus, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not allow “an appellate

court to independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment

for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with

R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id. at ¶ 42; see also State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878,

¶ 22. However, “when a trial court imposes a sentence based on factors or

considerations that are extraneous to those that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12, that sentence is contrary to law,” and claims that raise those “types of

issues are therefore reviewable.” Bryant at ¶ 22 (finding the trial court increased

the sentence based on an impermissible consideration).

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Analysis: Felony Sentencing

{¶14} The trial court sentenced Hughes to an indefinite term of 6 to 9 years

in prison for second-degree felony felonious assault and 18 months in prison for

fourth-degree felony assault. Thus, Hughes’s sentences fall within the respective

statutory ranges. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a); R.C. 2929.14(A)(4).

{¶15} The record reflects that the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12 when fashioning Hughes’s sentence. In the judgment entry of sentence, the

trial court indicated that it “considered the record, the State’s sentencing

recommendation, the Defendant’s sentencing recommendation, oral statements, the

PSI report and recommendations, the need for deterrence, incapacitation,

rehabilitation and restitution, the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C.

2929.11, and has balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C.

2929.12.” (Doc. No. 25). At the sentencing hearing, the trial court also specifically

indicated which R.C. 2929.12 factors it deemed were applicable to the instant

offenses. Therefore, because Hughes’s prison sentence is within the applicable

statutory range and the record supports that the trial court fulfilled its obligation of

considering R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, Hughes’s sentence is valid. See Watts,

2020-Ohio-5572, at ¶ 14.

{¶16} Yet, Hughes argues his prison sentence is not supported by the record

or is contrary to law because the trial court did not properly weigh the R.C. 2929.12

sentencing factors. However, “[n]either R.C. 2929.11 nor 2929.12 requires a trial

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court to make any specific factual findings on the record.” State v. Jones, 2020-

Ohio-6729, ¶ 20. “A trial court’s statement that it considered the required statutory

factors, without more, is sufficient to fulfill its obligations under the sentencing

statutes.” Maggette, 2016-Ohio-5554, at ¶ 32.

{¶17} Hughes alleges that the trial court did not properly weigh the

mitigating factors when imposing his sentence. We note that when imposing a

felony sentence, “it is ‘the trial court [that] determines the weight afforded to any

particular statutory factors, mitigating grounds, or other relevant circumstances.’”

State v. McKennelly, 2017-Ohio-9092, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Steger,

2016-Ohio-7908, ¶ 18 (12th Dist.). “The fact that the trial court chose to weigh

various sentencing factors differently than how appellant would have weighed them

does not mean the trial court erred in imposing appellant’s sentence.” Id.

{¶18} Hughes also summarily argues that his prison term for felonious

assault is not supported by the record or is contrary to law because the trial court

“took into consideration an element of the offense to justify its finding the offense

was more serious.” (Appellant’s Brief at 7). Hughes alleges that the trial court erred

by referencing K.C.’s injuries in support of the finding that Hughes’s conduct was

more serious than that normally constituting the offense because “serious physical

harm” is an element of felonious assault and, therefore, could not be used to elevate

the seriousness of the offense. See State v. Polizzi, 2019-Ohio-2505, ¶ 28 (11th

Dist.), quoting State v. Sims, 2012-Ohio-238, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.) (“there is case law that

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indicates ‘[a] trial court may not elevate the seriousness of an offense by pointing

to a fact that is also an element of the offense itself.’”).

{¶19} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:

The serious factors indicate that the victims suffered physical harm, including concussions. This was a felonious assault. Both officers required medical treatment. The female officer continues to have physical complications after being headbutted.

(Aug. 21, 2024 Tr. at 9). However, viewing the trial court’s statement in the context

of the entire sentencing hearing, we do not find that the trial court’s statement

constitutes reversible error. We note that defendant’s trial counsel, in an attempt to

mitigate the seriousness of Hughes’s conduct, discussed the nature of the victim’s

injury in some detail, inviting the trial court to respond to his comments regarding

the extent and severity of the victim’s injuries. Thus, in context, the trial court’s

statements, particularly its statement relating to K.B.’s continued physical

complications from the incident appear to be a direct response to Hughes’s counsel’s

attempt to minimize the victims’ injuries and, by extension, his own actions. See

also State v. Banas, 2019-Ohio-5053, ¶ 25 (4th Dist.) (“The holding in Polizzi was

that the trial court’s consecutive sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) were

clearly and convincingly not supported by the record. We decline to apply that

holding to appellant’s argument here that the trial court’s seriousness findings under

R.C. 2929.12 are not supported by the record.”).

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{¶20} Accordingly, Hughes’s prison sentences are not clearly and

convincingly contrary to law, and must, therefore, be affirmed. See State v. Slife,

2021-Ohio-644, ¶ 17 (3d Dist.).

{¶21} Next, Hughes argues that the trial court erred by ordering the sentences

in the instant case to be served consecutively to each other.

Relevant Authority: Consecutive Sentencing

{¶22} “Except as provided in . . . division (C) of section 2929.14, . . . a prison

term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any

other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this

state, another state, or the United States.” R.C. 2929.41(A). R.C. 2929.14(C)

provides:

(4) [T]he court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.

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(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.

{¶23} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a trial court to make specific findings on

the record when imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Hites, 2012-Ohio-1892,

¶ 11 (3d Dist.). Specifically, the trial court must find: (1) consecutive sentences are

necessary to either protect the public or punish the offender, (2) the sentences would

not be disproportionate to the offense committed; and (3) one of the factors in R.C.

2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c) applies. Id.

{¶24} The trial court must state the required findings at the sentencing

hearing prior to imposing consecutive sentences and incorporate those findings into

its sentencing entry. State v. Sharp, 2014-Ohio-4140, ¶ 50 (3d Dist.), citing State v.

Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 29. A trial court “has no obligation to state reasons to

support its findings” and is not “required to give a talismanic incantation of the

words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record

and are incorporated into the sentencing entry.” Bonnell at ¶ 37.

{¶25} Furthermore, pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a), appellate court may

only “modify or vacate consecutive sentences if it clearly and convincingly finds

that the record does not support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings.”

State v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 22.

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Analysis: Consecutive Sentencing

{¶26} Hughes does not argue that the trial court failed to make the requisite

consecutive-sentencing findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Rather, Hughes

contends the record does not support the trial court’s findings.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:

The court finds that consecutive sentences are necessary in order to protect the public and punish the defendant [a]nd that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and the danger he poses to the public. The court finds that the offender committed one or more of these offenses while he was awaiting trial or sentencing or under sanctions, or was under post release control for prior offenses. The court further finds that the defendant’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime.

(Aug. 21, 2024 Tr. at 9). The trial court memorialized those findings in its

sentencing entry. (Doc. No. 25). Accordingly, the record reflects that the trial court

made the appropriate R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings before imposing consecutive

sentences and incorporated those findings into its sentencing entry.

{¶27} Nonetheless, Hughes argues that the trial court’s finding that

consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public was not supported by the

record. Hughes contends that the facts outlined in the PSI indicate that Hughes was

not “harming” or “threatening the public” but was merely intoxicated and “loud” in

public, and “until the officers arrived, [he] was not aggressive.” (Appellant’s Brief

at 7). However, our review of the record contradicts Hughes’s statements.

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{¶28} The PSI indicates that when K.C. was dispatched to the scene, E.B.

determined, due to his prior experience with Hughes, it was prudent for him to

respond to the call with K.C. due to Hughes’s reputation for being “uncooperative.”

Furthermore, the PSI states that when the officers arrived on the scene Hughes put

his hands into a fist and uttered profanities at the officers. Moreover, according to

the PSI, during transport to the jail, Hughes became “extremely aggressive” and

threatening, stating “when I get loose, I’m gonna [sic] fuck you up.” Accordingly,

we find the trial court’s determination that consecutive sentences are not

disproportionate to the danger Hughes poses to the public to be properly supported

Conclusion

{¶29} Hughes’s assignment of error is overruled. Having found no error

prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm

the judgment of the Union County Court of Common Pleas.

WALDICK, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.

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JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is

overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby

rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the

judgment for costs.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.

Mark C. Miller, Judge

Juergen A. Waldick, Judge

John R. Willamowski, Judge

DATED: /jlm

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