An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA 15-345
Filed: 20 October 2015
Madison County, No. 13 CRS 392
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ROBERT WAYNE HUDGINS
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 2 October 2014 by Judge Gary
Gavenus in Madison County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28
September 2015.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General David L. Gore III, for the State.
Jeffrey William Gillette for defendant-appellant.
INMAN, Judge.
Robert Wayne Hudgins (“Defendant”) appeals from a judgment entered
following his conviction for driving while impaired (“DWI”). Defendant’s sole
contention on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for
insufficient evidence at the close of evidence. We find no error.
Background STATE V. HUDGINS
Opinion of the Court
The evidence presented at trial tends to show that Defendant was involved in
a one-car accident at approximately 9:30 p.m. on the night of 24 September 2013.
Defendant’s car crossed over the center line, went straight through a turn, and
collided with the guardrail. Madison County Deputy Jeff Elkins (“Elkins”) responded
to the scene and found Defendant standing by his vehicle. Elkins engaged Defendant
in conversation and noticed Defendant was “uneasy on his feet,” had slurred speech,
and had a faint odor of alcohol on his breath. Defendant told Elkins that a deer ran
into the path of his car, causing the accident. Elkins did not observe any “swerve
marks on the highway.” When Elkins asked Defendant about the odor of alcohol,
Defendant admitted to drinking wine earlier that day. Within minutes of Elkins’
arrival, Defendant began complaining of back pain and requested an ambulance.
State Trooper Jeremy Carver (“Carver”) arrived on the scene at approximately
10:30 p.m., just as Defendant was loaded into the ambulance. Before leaving the
accident scene, Elkins informed Carver that he believed Defendant to be impaired.
Carver remained at the accident site for approximately fifteen to twenty-five minutes
before following Defendant to the hospital.
Carver arrived at the hospital at midnight and found Defendant strapped to a
gurney in the hallway of the crowded emergency room. Carver questioned Defendant
about the accident and observed signs of impairment. Specifically, Carver noted that
Defendant exhibited glassy eyes, slow speech, and a “strong” odor of alcohol.
-2- STATE V. HUDGINS
Defendant also admitted to Carver that he had previously been drinking. Carver was
unable to administer most of the standard field sobriety tests due to Defendant’s
position on the gurney, but he did attempt to give Defendant the horizontal gaze
nystagmus (“HGN”) test. Carver was unable to complete the HGN due to Defendant’s
inability to focus on the stimulus. Defendant testified that he received a narcotic
painkiller for his pain, prior to Carver’s arrival.
Carver administered two alka-sensor tests on Defendant at 12:19 a.m. and
12:30 a.m., both of which registered positive for alcohol. Based on his observations,
Carver formed an opinion that Defendant “had consumed a sufficient quantity of an
impairing substance to appreciably impair his mental and physical faculties.” Carver
notified Defendant that he was to be charged with driving while impaired and
informed him of his rights regarding a chemical blood alcohol analysis. Defendant
refused to submit to the blood test and signed the form indicating his refusal.
On 12 June 2014, Defendant was tried in District Court, where he was found
guilty of DWI. Defendant appealed to Superior Court for a trial de novo. A jury found
Defendant guilty of DWI, and the trial court imposed a Level Four punishment of 120
days in the county jail. Defendant appeals from the judgment.
Discussion
Defendant raises one issue on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. Specifically, Defendant
-3- STATE V. HUDGINS
claims the State’s circumstantial evidence was insufficient to show he was impaired
at the time of the accident. For the following reasons, we disagree.
“The denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence is a question of law,
which this court reviews de novo.” State v. Bagley, 183 N.C. App. 514, 523, 644 S.E.2d
615, 621 (2007) (citations omitted). To affirm the trial court’s denial of a motion to
dismiss, we must find there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the
offense charged and of defendant’s identity as the perpetrator. Id. “Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror
to accept a conclusion.” State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 597, 573 S.E.2d 866, 869 (2002).
“Circumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to dismiss and support a conviction
even when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence.” Id. at 596,
573 S.E.2d at 869 (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also State v. Fritsch,
351 N.C. 373, 382, 526 S.E.2d 451, 457 (2000) (“The fact that some evidence in the
record supports a contrary inference is not determinative on the motion to dismiss.”).
In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all
reasonable inferences.” State v. Benson, 331 N.C. 537, 544, 417 S.E.2d 756, 761 (1992)
(citation omitted). “[C]ontradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of
the case – they are for the jury to resolve.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Furthermore, “the defendant’s evidence should be disregarded unless it is
-4- STATE V. HUDGINS
favorable to the State or it does not conflict with the State’s evidence.” Scott, 356
N.C. at 596, 573 S.E.2d at 869.
Defendant was charged with DWI, which required the State to prove that
Defendant drove a vehicle upon a highway, street, or public vehicular area while
under the influence of an impairing substance. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1(a)(1)
(2013). Prior to trial, Defendant stipulated to driving his vehicle on a street, highway,
or public vehicular area, satisfying the first element of impaired driving. Therefore,
our review is limited to whether the State presented sufficient evidence of
Defendant’s impairment.
“Before a defendant can be convicted under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1(a)(1),
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had ingested a
sufficient quantity of an impairing substance to cause his faculties to be appreciably
impaired.” State v. Phillips, 127 N.C. App. 391, 393, 489 S.E.2d 890, 891 (1997)
(citation omitted). “An officer’s opinion that a defendant is appreciably impaired is
competent testimony and admissible evidence when it is based on the officer’s
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA 15-345
Filed: 20 October 2015
Madison County, No. 13 CRS 392
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ROBERT WAYNE HUDGINS
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 2 October 2014 by Judge Gary
Gavenus in Madison County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28
September 2015.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General David L. Gore III, for the State.
Jeffrey William Gillette for defendant-appellant.
INMAN, Judge.
Robert Wayne Hudgins (“Defendant”) appeals from a judgment entered
following his conviction for driving while impaired (“DWI”). Defendant’s sole
contention on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for
insufficient evidence at the close of evidence. We find no error.
Background STATE V. HUDGINS
Opinion of the Court
The evidence presented at trial tends to show that Defendant was involved in
a one-car accident at approximately 9:30 p.m. on the night of 24 September 2013.
Defendant’s car crossed over the center line, went straight through a turn, and
collided with the guardrail. Madison County Deputy Jeff Elkins (“Elkins”) responded
to the scene and found Defendant standing by his vehicle. Elkins engaged Defendant
in conversation and noticed Defendant was “uneasy on his feet,” had slurred speech,
and had a faint odor of alcohol on his breath. Defendant told Elkins that a deer ran
into the path of his car, causing the accident. Elkins did not observe any “swerve
marks on the highway.” When Elkins asked Defendant about the odor of alcohol,
Defendant admitted to drinking wine earlier that day. Within minutes of Elkins’
arrival, Defendant began complaining of back pain and requested an ambulance.
State Trooper Jeremy Carver (“Carver”) arrived on the scene at approximately
10:30 p.m., just as Defendant was loaded into the ambulance. Before leaving the
accident scene, Elkins informed Carver that he believed Defendant to be impaired.
Carver remained at the accident site for approximately fifteen to twenty-five minutes
before following Defendant to the hospital.
Carver arrived at the hospital at midnight and found Defendant strapped to a
gurney in the hallway of the crowded emergency room. Carver questioned Defendant
about the accident and observed signs of impairment. Specifically, Carver noted that
Defendant exhibited glassy eyes, slow speech, and a “strong” odor of alcohol.
-2- STATE V. HUDGINS
Defendant also admitted to Carver that he had previously been drinking. Carver was
unable to administer most of the standard field sobriety tests due to Defendant’s
position on the gurney, but he did attempt to give Defendant the horizontal gaze
nystagmus (“HGN”) test. Carver was unable to complete the HGN due to Defendant’s
inability to focus on the stimulus. Defendant testified that he received a narcotic
painkiller for his pain, prior to Carver’s arrival.
Carver administered two alka-sensor tests on Defendant at 12:19 a.m. and
12:30 a.m., both of which registered positive for alcohol. Based on his observations,
Carver formed an opinion that Defendant “had consumed a sufficient quantity of an
impairing substance to appreciably impair his mental and physical faculties.” Carver
notified Defendant that he was to be charged with driving while impaired and
informed him of his rights regarding a chemical blood alcohol analysis. Defendant
refused to submit to the blood test and signed the form indicating his refusal.
On 12 June 2014, Defendant was tried in District Court, where he was found
guilty of DWI. Defendant appealed to Superior Court for a trial de novo. A jury found
Defendant guilty of DWI, and the trial court imposed a Level Four punishment of 120
days in the county jail. Defendant appeals from the judgment.
Discussion
Defendant raises one issue on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. Specifically, Defendant
-3- STATE V. HUDGINS
claims the State’s circumstantial evidence was insufficient to show he was impaired
at the time of the accident. For the following reasons, we disagree.
“The denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence is a question of law,
which this court reviews de novo.” State v. Bagley, 183 N.C. App. 514, 523, 644 S.E.2d
615, 621 (2007) (citations omitted). To affirm the trial court’s denial of a motion to
dismiss, we must find there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the
offense charged and of defendant’s identity as the perpetrator. Id. “Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror
to accept a conclusion.” State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 597, 573 S.E.2d 866, 869 (2002).
“Circumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to dismiss and support a conviction
even when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence.” Id. at 596,
573 S.E.2d at 869 (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also State v. Fritsch,
351 N.C. 373, 382, 526 S.E.2d 451, 457 (2000) (“The fact that some evidence in the
record supports a contrary inference is not determinative on the motion to dismiss.”).
In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all
reasonable inferences.” State v. Benson, 331 N.C. 537, 544, 417 S.E.2d 756, 761 (1992)
(citation omitted). “[C]ontradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of
the case – they are for the jury to resolve.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Furthermore, “the defendant’s evidence should be disregarded unless it is
-4- STATE V. HUDGINS
favorable to the State or it does not conflict with the State’s evidence.” Scott, 356
N.C. at 596, 573 S.E.2d at 869.
Defendant was charged with DWI, which required the State to prove that
Defendant drove a vehicle upon a highway, street, or public vehicular area while
under the influence of an impairing substance. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1(a)(1)
(2013). Prior to trial, Defendant stipulated to driving his vehicle on a street, highway,
or public vehicular area, satisfying the first element of impaired driving. Therefore,
our review is limited to whether the State presented sufficient evidence of
Defendant’s impairment.
“Before a defendant can be convicted under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1(a)(1),
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had ingested a
sufficient quantity of an impairing substance to cause his faculties to be appreciably
impaired.” State v. Phillips, 127 N.C. App. 391, 393, 489 S.E.2d 890, 891 (1997)
(citation omitted). “An officer’s opinion that a defendant is appreciably impaired is
competent testimony and admissible evidence when it is based on the officer’s
personal observation of an odor of alcohol and of faulty driving or other evidence of
impairment.” State v. Gregory, 154 N.C. App. 718, 721, 572 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2002)
(citation omitted). Other evidence of impairment may include slurred speech, red or
glassy eyes, or staggering or unsteadiness while walking or standing. Id. Further,
“[o]ur Supreme Court has held that ‘the [f]act that a motorist has been drinking, when
-5- STATE V. HUDGINS
considered in connection with faulty driving . . . or other conduct indicating an
impairment of physical or mental faculties, is sufficient prima facie to show a
violation of G.S. 20-138.’” State v. Coffey, 189 N.C. App. 382, 387, 658 S.E.2d 73, 76
(2008) (quoting Atkins v. Moye, 277 N.C. 179, 185, 176 S.E.2d 789, 794 (1970).
Our review of the record shows there was sufficient evidence that Defendant
was appreciably impaired at the time of the accident to withstand the motion to
dismiss. Deputy Elkins found Defendant’s car positioned against the guardrail,
following a crash. Elkins also noted Defendant was “uneasy on his feet,” had slurred
speech, and emitted a faint odor of alcohol. Defendant admitted he had been drinking
earlier in the day. At the hospital, Trooper Carver further observed that Defendant’s
eyes were glassy and red, he had slow and mumbled speech, and a strong odor of
alcohol coming from his breath. Defendant was unable to pass the HGN field sobriety
test and gave two positive alka-sensor results. Based on his observations, Carver
formed an opinion that Defendant “had consumed a sufficient quantity of an
impairing substance to appreciably impair his mental and physical faculties.”
Finally, Defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test was also competent
evidence of his impairment under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-139.1(f) (2013). See Gregory,
154 N.C. App. at 721, 572 S.E.2d at 840.
Conclusion
-6- STATE V. HUDGINS
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude there
was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference of Defendant’s guilt.
Accordingly, we hold the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
NO ERROR.
Judges STROUD and DAVIS concur.
Recommend Report per Rule 30(e).
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