[Cite as State v. Howland, 2018-Ohio-613.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT HIGHLAND COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : Case No. 17CA3
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY CHARLES D. HOWLAND, :
Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED: 2/12/2018
APPEARANCES:
Steven H. Eckstein, Washington Court House, Ohio, for appellant.
Anneka Collins, Highland County Prosecuting Attorney, Hillsboro, Ohio, for appellee.
Harsha, J. {¶1} Charles Howland pleaded guilty to aggravated possession of
methamphetamine with a forfeiture specification. After accepting the plea the court
convicted him, imposed a sentence, and ordered certain monies forfeited. Howland
contends that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
because he was sleep deprived and under the influence of illegal drugs at the time he
entered it.
{¶2} However, the trial court correctly found Howland’s plea was made
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Howland expressly denied being under the
influence of drugs or alcohol. And there is no evidence in the record that drugs, alcohol
or sleep deprivation impaired Howland’s judgment. We overrule Howland’s assignment
of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. FACTS Highland App. No. 17CA3 2
{¶3} The state indicted Howland for possession of methamphetamine in
violation of R.C. 2925.11, a third-degree felony, with a forfeiture specification for
$674.00 in cash. He pleaded guilty and agreed to the forfeiture. The trial court
conducted a colloquy to determine whether Howland was on drugs or alcohol, and
whether he was fully informed of his rights and understood the consequence of his
guilty plea. Upon being satisfied that Howland voluntarily entered his plea and waived
his constitutional rights, the court accepted his plea and convicted him. Three months
later we allowed Howland this delayed appeal.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶4} Howland assigns the following error for our review:
HOWLAND’S GUILTY PLEA WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
{¶5} A defendant who enters a plea in a criminal case must act knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the
plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio
Constitution. See State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d
621, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). An
appellate court that determines whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily must conduct a de novo review of the record to ensure that
the trial court complied with the constitutional and procedural safeguards. See State v. Highland App. No. 17CA3 3
Cassell, 2017-Ohio-769, 79 N.E.3d 588, ¶ 30-32 (4th Dist.); see also State v. Moore,
4th Dist. Adams No. 13CA965, 2014-Ohio-3024, ¶ 13.
B. Defendant’s Claim of Impaired Judgment
{¶6} To decide Howard’s claim we look to Crim.R. 11(C), which governs the
process for accepting a felony plea of guilty or no contest. See Veney at ¶ 8. Before
accepting a guilty plea in a felony case a trial court must address the defendant
personally and determine that “the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with
understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if
applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of
community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). The court
must inform the defendant of both the constitutional and nonconstitutional rights he is
waiving and determine that he “understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest,
and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and
sentence.” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b). Finally, the court must determine that the defendant
understands that he “is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him
or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant's favor, and
to require the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at
which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.” Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(c).
{¶7} Substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) is sufficient for a
valid plea because they do not involve constitutional rights. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio
St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 14. “ ‘Substantial compliance means
that, under the totality of the circumstances, appellant subjectively understood the Highland App. No. 17CA3 4
implications of his plea and the rights he waived.’ ” State v. McDaniel, 4th Dist. Vinton
No. 09CA677, 2010-Ohio-5215, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Vinson, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
08AP-903, 2009-Ohio-3240, ¶ 6.
{¶8} But strict compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) is required because
constitutional rights are involved. “However, failure to [literally comply] will not
necessarily invalidate a plea. The underlying purpose, from the defendant's perspective,
of Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey to the defendant certain information so that he can make a
voluntary and intelligent decision whether to plead guilty.” Veney at ¶ 18 quoting State
v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479–480, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981). A guilty plea that is not
entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is void. State v. Moore, 165 Ohio
App.3d 538, 2006-Ohio-114, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.), citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.
459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969).
{¶9} Howland contends that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
make his guilty plea under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) because he was under the influence of
methamphetamine and “ICE,” as well as being sleep deprived, when he entered it.1
{¶10} Initially the state argues that because Howland was given an agreed
sentence, R.C. 2953.08(D) bars appellate review. However, because Howland is
arguing that the trial court did not comply with Crim.R. 11 in accepting his guilty plea,
R.C. 2953.08, which addresses sentencing is not controlling. State v. Gavin, 4th Dist.
Scioto No. 14CA3672, 2015-Ohio-2549, ¶ 10. We can review the validity of the plea
leading to the agreed sentence. Id.
1 Howland concedes that the trial court complied with all other requirements of Crim.R. 11(C). Highland App. No. 17CA3 5
{¶11} Although the trial court asked him if he was under the influence of any
types of drugs or alcohol and he responded “No, Sir,” Howland claims that “the effects
of the drugs were so pervasive that Howland told the trial court he was not under their
influence.” The state responds that Howland was incarcerated in the Highland County
Jail from the time he was arrested until the plea hearing and there is no evidence in the
record that Howland used illegal drugs during that 21-day period. The state also
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as State v. Howland, 2018-Ohio-613.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT HIGHLAND COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : Case No. 17CA3
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY CHARLES D. HOWLAND, :
Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED: 2/12/2018
APPEARANCES:
Steven H. Eckstein, Washington Court House, Ohio, for appellant.
Anneka Collins, Highland County Prosecuting Attorney, Hillsboro, Ohio, for appellee.
Harsha, J. {¶1} Charles Howland pleaded guilty to aggravated possession of
methamphetamine with a forfeiture specification. After accepting the plea the court
convicted him, imposed a sentence, and ordered certain monies forfeited. Howland
contends that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
because he was sleep deprived and under the influence of illegal drugs at the time he
entered it.
{¶2} However, the trial court correctly found Howland’s plea was made
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Howland expressly denied being under the
influence of drugs or alcohol. And there is no evidence in the record that drugs, alcohol
or sleep deprivation impaired Howland’s judgment. We overrule Howland’s assignment
of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. FACTS Highland App. No. 17CA3 2
{¶3} The state indicted Howland for possession of methamphetamine in
violation of R.C. 2925.11, a third-degree felony, with a forfeiture specification for
$674.00 in cash. He pleaded guilty and agreed to the forfeiture. The trial court
conducted a colloquy to determine whether Howland was on drugs or alcohol, and
whether he was fully informed of his rights and understood the consequence of his
guilty plea. Upon being satisfied that Howland voluntarily entered his plea and waived
his constitutional rights, the court accepted his plea and convicted him. Three months
later we allowed Howland this delayed appeal.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶4} Howland assigns the following error for our review:
HOWLAND’S GUILTY PLEA WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
{¶5} A defendant who enters a plea in a criminal case must act knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the
plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio
Constitution. See State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d
621, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). An
appellate court that determines whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily must conduct a de novo review of the record to ensure that
the trial court complied with the constitutional and procedural safeguards. See State v. Highland App. No. 17CA3 3
Cassell, 2017-Ohio-769, 79 N.E.3d 588, ¶ 30-32 (4th Dist.); see also State v. Moore,
4th Dist. Adams No. 13CA965, 2014-Ohio-3024, ¶ 13.
B. Defendant’s Claim of Impaired Judgment
{¶6} To decide Howard’s claim we look to Crim.R. 11(C), which governs the
process for accepting a felony plea of guilty or no contest. See Veney at ¶ 8. Before
accepting a guilty plea in a felony case a trial court must address the defendant
personally and determine that “the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with
understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if
applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of
community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). The court
must inform the defendant of both the constitutional and nonconstitutional rights he is
waiving and determine that he “understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest,
and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and
sentence.” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b). Finally, the court must determine that the defendant
understands that he “is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him
or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant's favor, and
to require the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at
which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.” Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(c).
{¶7} Substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) is sufficient for a
valid plea because they do not involve constitutional rights. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio
St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 14. “ ‘Substantial compliance means
that, under the totality of the circumstances, appellant subjectively understood the Highland App. No. 17CA3 4
implications of his plea and the rights he waived.’ ” State v. McDaniel, 4th Dist. Vinton
No. 09CA677, 2010-Ohio-5215, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Vinson, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
08AP-903, 2009-Ohio-3240, ¶ 6.
{¶8} But strict compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) is required because
constitutional rights are involved. “However, failure to [literally comply] will not
necessarily invalidate a plea. The underlying purpose, from the defendant's perspective,
of Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey to the defendant certain information so that he can make a
voluntary and intelligent decision whether to plead guilty.” Veney at ¶ 18 quoting State
v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479–480, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981). A guilty plea that is not
entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is void. State v. Moore, 165 Ohio
App.3d 538, 2006-Ohio-114, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.), citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.
459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969).
{¶9} Howland contends that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
make his guilty plea under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) because he was under the influence of
methamphetamine and “ICE,” as well as being sleep deprived, when he entered it.1
{¶10} Initially the state argues that because Howland was given an agreed
sentence, R.C. 2953.08(D) bars appellate review. However, because Howland is
arguing that the trial court did not comply with Crim.R. 11 in accepting his guilty plea,
R.C. 2953.08, which addresses sentencing is not controlling. State v. Gavin, 4th Dist.
Scioto No. 14CA3672, 2015-Ohio-2549, ¶ 10. We can review the validity of the plea
leading to the agreed sentence. Id.
1 Howland concedes that the trial court complied with all other requirements of Crim.R. 11(C). Highland App. No. 17CA3 5
{¶11} Although the trial court asked him if he was under the influence of any
types of drugs or alcohol and he responded “No, Sir,” Howland claims that “the effects
of the drugs were so pervasive that Howland told the trial court he was not under their
influence.” The state responds that Howland was incarcerated in the Highland County
Jail from the time he was arrested until the plea hearing and there is no evidence in the
record that Howland used illegal drugs during that 21-day period. The state also
contends that there is nothing in the hearing transcript that would indicate Howland was
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or unable to comprehend the proceedings due
to sleep deprivation.
{¶12} Howland cites to nothing in the record that indicates that he was under the
influence of drugs, alcohol, or that he was so sleep deprived he could not understand
the proceedings. The trial court asked Howland, “do you feel that you’re making a sound
judgment in going ahead now[?]” and Howland responded, “Yeah. I’m making a sound
judgment.” The trial court asked, “Are you under the influence of any types of drugs or
alcohol at this time?” and Howland responded, “No, sir.” The record shows that the trial
court conducted a proper Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy. Howland’s responses were clear
and unequivocal; he responded each time that he understood the trial court’s
statements and questions. Therefore, his assertion that his guilty plea was obtained in
violation of his state and federal constitutional rights is meritless. State v. Jacobson, 4th
Dist. Adams No. 01CA730, 2003-Ohio-1201, ¶ 8 (record did not support defendant’s
claim of impaired judgment where defendant denied being under the influence of drugs
or alcohol and appeared coherent during the Crim.R. 11 colloquy). We overrule
Howland’s sole assignment of error. Highland App. No. 17CA3 6
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶13} Having overruled the assignment of error, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Highland App. No. 17CA3 7
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that Appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Highland County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Hoover, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ________________________ William H. Harsha, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.