[Cite as State v. Hoskins, 2025-Ohio-1946.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CHAMPAIGN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 2024-CA-27 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CR 099 : ERIC ALLAN HOSKINS : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on May 30, 2025, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
[[Applied Signature]] MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE
[[Applied Signature 2]] RONALD C. LEWIS, JUDGE -2- [[Applied Signature 3]] MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE
OPINION CHAMPAIGN C.A. No. 2024-CA-27
ALANA VAN GUNDY, Attorney for Appellant KARA N. RICHTER, Attorney for Appellee
HUFFMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Eric Allan Hoskins appeals from his convictions, following his guilty pleas, to
three counts of receiving stolen property. For the following reasons, the judgment of the
trial court will be affirmed.
Procedural History
{¶ 2} On August 5, 2024, Hoskins was indicted on seven counts of receiving stolen
property and two counts of theft, all felonies, and one count of misdemeanor theft. The
offenses were based on allegations that he had stolen credit cards from parked vehicles and
then made purchases with them. On September 23, 2024, Hoskins pled guilty to three
counts of receiving stolen property. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts.
The trial court sentenced Hoskins to 12 months on each count, to be served consecutively.
Assignment of Error and Analysis
{¶ 3} In his sole assignment of error, Hoskins challenges his sentence, arguing that
the court considered inappropriate factors beyond those set forth in the sentencing statutes
and made prejudicial comments regarding his offenses. Specifically, Hoskins points to the -3- following statements by the court: “it is one thing to steal from a Walmart. It is another thing
to steal from people,” and “that is as serious of a sentencing factor, from this Court’s
perspective, as it is what you stole. When you steal our way of life, it may not be as
significant in a community that you have grown up in, but it is significant in our community.”
According to Hoskins, the court inferred that he came from a community that did not value
safety and that stealing was “a way of life” for Hoskins.
{¶ 4} Hoskins further argues that the court improperly compared his case to another
criminal matter in which the court found that the defendant, who had a significant criminal
history, had never been properly held accountable for his past crimes. Hoskins asserts that
the court’s consideration should have been limited to his case alone, especially his remorse
and completion of “programming” for mental health issues and impulse control. He argues
that the court’s improper considerations resulted in a harsher sentence. Finally, Hoskins
claims that the court erred in advising him that, in Champaign County, “we just say, you’ve
had opportunities and enough is enough.” Hoskins seeks resentencing.
{¶ 5} “When reviewing felony sentences, a court of appeals must apply the standard
of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G).” State v. Williams, 2022-Ohio-2897, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.),
citing State v. Farra, 2022-Ohio-1421, ¶ 73 (2d Dist.). Pursuant to that statute, an appellate
court may increase, reduce or modify a sentence, or vacate it altogether and remand for
resentencing, “only if it ‘clearly and convincingly’ finds either (1) that the record does not
support certain specified findings or (2) that the sentence imposed is contrary to law.” State
v. Worthen, 2021-Ohio-2788, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Huffman, 2017-Ohio-4097, ¶ 6
(2d Dist.).
{¶ 6} Generally, there is a presumption in favor of community control sanctions for
fifth-degree felonies. R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a). A trial court has discretion, however, to -4- impose a prison term upon an offender who pleads guilty to a felony of the fifth degree that
is not an offense of violence or that is a qualifying assault offense if the “offender committed
the offense while under a community control sanction, while on probation, or while released
on bond or personal recognizance.” R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(x). When imposing such a
prison term, “the sentencing court shall comply with the purposes and principles of
sentencing” pursuant to R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. R.C. 2929.13(B)(2).
{¶ 7} R.C. 2929.11 governs the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. R.C.
2929.12(B) through (F) set out factors for the court to consider relating to matters such as
the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and the likelihood of recidivism. Significantly, the
trial court may also “consider any other factors that are relevant to achieving” the purposes
and principles of sentencing. R.C. 2929.12(A). “Sentencing is designed to be a holistic
endeavor where the court may consider all the surrounding factors in a given case to arrive
at an appropriate punishment that protects the public and rehabilitates the offender.” State
v. Kibble, 2017-Ohio-12, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 8} We may not “independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute
[our] judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance
with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 42. “The inquiry is
simply whether the sentence is contrary to law.” State v. Bartley, 2023-Ohio-2325, ¶ 9 (2d
Dist.). “A sentence is contrary to law when it falls outside the statutory range for the offense
or if the sentencing court does not consider R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id., citing State v.
Dorsey, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 9} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) permits a trial court to impose consecutive sentences if it
finds that (1) consecutive sentencing is necessary to protect the public from future crime or
to punish the offender, (2) consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the -5- seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,
and (3) any of the following applies:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was
under post-release control for a prior offense.
...
(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive
sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the
offender.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a),(c). “The plain language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate
court to defer to the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings, and the trial court’s findings
must be upheld unless those findings are clearly and convincingly not supported by the
record.” State v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 5.
{¶ 10} At sentencing, the trial court indicated that it had considered R.C. 2929.11 and
R.C.
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[Cite as State v. Hoskins, 2025-Ohio-1946.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CHAMPAIGN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 2024-CA-27 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CR 099 : ERIC ALLAN HOSKINS : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on May 30, 2025, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
[[Applied Signature]] MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE
[[Applied Signature 2]] RONALD C. LEWIS, JUDGE -2- [[Applied Signature 3]] MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE
OPINION CHAMPAIGN C.A. No. 2024-CA-27
ALANA VAN GUNDY, Attorney for Appellant KARA N. RICHTER, Attorney for Appellee
HUFFMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Eric Allan Hoskins appeals from his convictions, following his guilty pleas, to
three counts of receiving stolen property. For the following reasons, the judgment of the
trial court will be affirmed.
Procedural History
{¶ 2} On August 5, 2024, Hoskins was indicted on seven counts of receiving stolen
property and two counts of theft, all felonies, and one count of misdemeanor theft. The
offenses were based on allegations that he had stolen credit cards from parked vehicles and
then made purchases with them. On September 23, 2024, Hoskins pled guilty to three
counts of receiving stolen property. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts.
The trial court sentenced Hoskins to 12 months on each count, to be served consecutively.
Assignment of Error and Analysis
{¶ 3} In his sole assignment of error, Hoskins challenges his sentence, arguing that
the court considered inappropriate factors beyond those set forth in the sentencing statutes
and made prejudicial comments regarding his offenses. Specifically, Hoskins points to the -3- following statements by the court: “it is one thing to steal from a Walmart. It is another thing
to steal from people,” and “that is as serious of a sentencing factor, from this Court’s
perspective, as it is what you stole. When you steal our way of life, it may not be as
significant in a community that you have grown up in, but it is significant in our community.”
According to Hoskins, the court inferred that he came from a community that did not value
safety and that stealing was “a way of life” for Hoskins.
{¶ 4} Hoskins further argues that the court improperly compared his case to another
criminal matter in which the court found that the defendant, who had a significant criminal
history, had never been properly held accountable for his past crimes. Hoskins asserts that
the court’s consideration should have been limited to his case alone, especially his remorse
and completion of “programming” for mental health issues and impulse control. He argues
that the court’s improper considerations resulted in a harsher sentence. Finally, Hoskins
claims that the court erred in advising him that, in Champaign County, “we just say, you’ve
had opportunities and enough is enough.” Hoskins seeks resentencing.
{¶ 5} “When reviewing felony sentences, a court of appeals must apply the standard
of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G).” State v. Williams, 2022-Ohio-2897, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.),
citing State v. Farra, 2022-Ohio-1421, ¶ 73 (2d Dist.). Pursuant to that statute, an appellate
court may increase, reduce or modify a sentence, or vacate it altogether and remand for
resentencing, “only if it ‘clearly and convincingly’ finds either (1) that the record does not
support certain specified findings or (2) that the sentence imposed is contrary to law.” State
v. Worthen, 2021-Ohio-2788, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Huffman, 2017-Ohio-4097, ¶ 6
(2d Dist.).
{¶ 6} Generally, there is a presumption in favor of community control sanctions for
fifth-degree felonies. R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a). A trial court has discretion, however, to -4- impose a prison term upon an offender who pleads guilty to a felony of the fifth degree that
is not an offense of violence or that is a qualifying assault offense if the “offender committed
the offense while under a community control sanction, while on probation, or while released
on bond or personal recognizance.” R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(x). When imposing such a
prison term, “the sentencing court shall comply with the purposes and principles of
sentencing” pursuant to R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. R.C. 2929.13(B)(2).
{¶ 7} R.C. 2929.11 governs the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. R.C.
2929.12(B) through (F) set out factors for the court to consider relating to matters such as
the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and the likelihood of recidivism. Significantly, the
trial court may also “consider any other factors that are relevant to achieving” the purposes
and principles of sentencing. R.C. 2929.12(A). “Sentencing is designed to be a holistic
endeavor where the court may consider all the surrounding factors in a given case to arrive
at an appropriate punishment that protects the public and rehabilitates the offender.” State
v. Kibble, 2017-Ohio-12, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 8} We may not “independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute
[our] judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance
with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 42. “The inquiry is
simply whether the sentence is contrary to law.” State v. Bartley, 2023-Ohio-2325, ¶ 9 (2d
Dist.). “A sentence is contrary to law when it falls outside the statutory range for the offense
or if the sentencing court does not consider R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id., citing State v.
Dorsey, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 9} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) permits a trial court to impose consecutive sentences if it
finds that (1) consecutive sentencing is necessary to protect the public from future crime or
to punish the offender, (2) consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the -5- seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,
and (3) any of the following applies:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was
under post-release control for a prior offense.
...
(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive
sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the
offender.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a),(c). “The plain language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate
court to defer to the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings, and the trial court’s findings
must be upheld unless those findings are clearly and convincingly not supported by the
record.” State v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 5.
{¶ 10} At sentencing, the trial court indicated that it had considered R.C. 2929.11 and
R.C. 2929.12, as well as the presentence investigation report (PSI), and its thorough
consideration of these was reflected in the judgment entry of conviction. Specifically, the
court considered that Hoskins was on bond or personal recognizance in multiple matters in
Hamilton County Municipal Court for theft, misuse of credit cards, and receiving stolen
property when he committed these offenses, and therefore the presumption in favor of
community control sanctions did not apply to Hoskins.
{¶ 11} Citing R.C. 2929.12, the trial court further observed that Hoskins had
committed his offenses by “preying on unsuspecting citizens enjoying recreational activities”
by breaking into their vehicles, and the court considered the psychological impact on the -6- victims. A victim impact statement included in the PSI described a female victim’s fear and
anxiety upon learning that her wallet, containing not only her credit cards but all of her
identifying information, had been stolen from her car. The PSI also stated that Hoskins had
an exaggerated sense of self and believed that he was never at fault. It was significant to
the PSI investigator that Hoskins had committed crimes around the country, had outstanding
criminal matters, and yet he continued to commit offenses. Hoskins reported that he had
never maintained employment for more than six months at a time.
{¶ 12} The court further considered that Hoskins victimized not only private citizens
but also the retail industry. The judgment entry reflected that, when Hoskins committed the
felonies at issue in this case, he was on intervention in lieu of conviction and under the
supervision of the probation department for five counts of receiving stolen property and theft
in Montgomery County; on misdemeanor probation for resisting arrest and access device
fraud in Pennsylvania; had absconded on bond in Hamilton County in four separate felony
and misdemeanor cases for theft, receiving stolen property, and misuse of credit cards; had
prior theft-related convictions in Texas for fraudulent use and two counts of burglary of a
vehicle; and had outstanding felony theft-related charges in Georgia for five counts of
financial transaction card theft and three counts of entering a vehicle with intent to commit
theft. The court described the “ongoing, pervasive, indiscriminate and opportunistic nature
of selecting his victims and committing the same type of theft against private citizens and
retail businesses in four separate states across the United States,” and it found that Hoskins
lacked genuine remorse.
{¶ 13} While the court was not required to make such findings, the record reflects that
the court considered factors relevant to achieving the purposes and principles of sentencing,
namely to protect the public from future crime by Hoskins, to punish Hoskins, and to promote -7- his effective rehabilitation. R.C. 2929.12(A). It was significant to the court that Hoskins
stole from unsuspecting citizens enjoying leisure activities within their community, and then
used their credit cards to further victimize retail establishments in the area. Taken as a
whole, the court considered all relevant factors in imposing sentence. Any other comments
by the court as to Hoskins’s own community did not demonstrate the consideration of
improper sentencing factors. The court merely explained its rationale, and we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects
compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.
{¶ 14} Hoskins’s 12-month sentences were not contrary to law. R.C. 2929.14(A)(5).
The court also made the requisite findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and we cannot
conclude that the court’s findings were clearly and convincingly not supported by the record.
As such, Hoskins is not entitled to resentencing, and his assignment of error is overruled.
The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
.............
TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.